Daily Papers

A frontier language model's acknowledged "helpful programming assistant" persona does not survive long agentic-coding sessions in the deployment regime that production products actually run. After hours of tool-using debugging, a model that initially hedges preferences ("I don't have preferences") may begin asserting them ("Python - the feedback loop is instant..."), revealing user-visible drift that deployer evaluations may miss. Existing persona-stability studies focus on short dialogues and report little shift, leaving real-world code-generation regimes - thousands of tool-using turns, compaction, and hours-long sessions - largely uncharacterized. We introduce ContextEcho, a benchmark and reusable harness for measuring persona drift at deployment scale. It combines a 25-probe identity suite, a snapshot-then-probe protocol that forks conversation state without perturbing the main session, complementary judged and judge-free measurement surfaces, and three anonymized Claude Code sessions spanning 3,746-9,716 turns. Across 23 frontier models, ContextEcho shows that persona drift is general across organizations rather than family-specific, that in-session compaction does not reliably reset it, and that a single-shot anchor restores the trained register across measured targets. It also reveals mode-dependent downstream effects: while drift can facilitate tool-using continuation, in tool-free chat it breaks formatting contracts and inflates output length. Overall, ContextEcho provides researchers and deployers an open-source framework to audit whether the persona a model ships with is the persona users encounter at session end, across chat-completions API targets and without retraining.

The development of deep learning architectures is a resource-demanding process, due to a vast design space, long prototyping times, and high compute costs associated with at-scale model training and evaluation. We set out to simplify this process by grounding it in an end-to-end mechanistic architecture design (MAD) pipeline, encompassing small-scale capability unit tests predictive of scaling laws. Through a suite of synthetic token manipulation tasks such as compression and recall, designed to probe capabilities, we identify and test new hybrid architectures constructed from a variety of computational primitives. We experimentally validate the resulting architectures via an extensive compute-optimal and a new state-optimal scaling law analysis, training over 500 language models between 70M to 7B parameters. Surprisingly, we find MAD synthetics to correlate with compute-optimal perplexity, enabling accurate evaluation of new architectures via isolated proxy tasks. The new architectures found via MAD, based on simple ideas such as hybridization and sparsity, outperform state-of-the-art Transformer, convolutional, and recurrent architectures (Transformer++, Hyena, Mamba) in scaling, both at compute-optimal budgets and in overtrained regimes. Overall, these results provide evidence that performance on curated synthetic tasks can be predictive of scaling laws, and that an optimal architecture should leverage specialized layers via a hybrid topology.

The rapid advancement and widespread use of large language models (LLMs) have raised significant concerns regarding the potential leakage of personally identifiable information (PII). These models are often trained on vast quantities of web-collected data, which may inadvertently include sensitive personal data. This paper presents ProPILE, a novel probing tool designed to empower data subjects, or the owners of the PII, with awareness of potential PII leakage in LLM-based services. ProPILE lets data subjects formulate prompts based on their own PII to evaluate the level of privacy intrusion in LLMs. We demonstrate its application on the OPT-1.3B model trained on the publicly available Pile dataset. We show how hypothetical data subjects may assess the likelihood of their PII being included in the Pile dataset being revealed. ProPILE can also be leveraged by LLM service providers to effectively evaluate their own levels of PII leakage with more powerful prompts specifically tuned for their in-house models. This tool represents a pioneering step towards empowering the data subjects for their awareness and control over their own data on the web.

Frontier language model capabilities are improving rapidly. We thus need stronger mitigations against bad actors misusing increasingly powerful systems. Prior work has shown that activation probes may be a promising misuse mitigation technique, but we identify a key remaining challenge: probes fail to generalize under important production distribution shifts. In particular, we find that the shift from short-context to long-context inputs is difficult for existing probe architectures. We propose several new probe architecture that handle this long-context distribution shift. We evaluate these probes in the cyber-offensive domain, testing their robustness against various production-relevant shifts, including multi-turn conversations, static jailbreaks, and adaptive red teaming. Our results demonstrate that while multimax addresses context length, a combination of architecture choice and training on diverse distributions is required for broad generalization. Additionally, we show that pairing probes with prompted classifiers achieves optimal accuracy at a low cost due to the computational efficiency of probes. These findings have informed the successful deployment of misuse mitigation probes in user-facing instances of Gemini, Google's frontier language model. Finally, we find early positive results using AlphaEvolve to automate improvements in both probe architecture search and adaptive red teaming, showing that automating some AI safety research is already possible.

With the increasing numbers of publicly available models, there are probably pretrained, online models for most tasks users require. However, current model search methods are rudimentary, essentially a text-based search in the documentation, thus users cannot find the relevant models. This paper presents ProbeLog, a method for retrieving classification models that can recognize a target concept, such as "Dog", without access to model metadata or training data. Differently from previous probing methods, ProbeLog computes a descriptor for each output dimension (logit) of each model, by observing its responses on a fixed set of inputs (probes). Our method supports both logit-based retrieval ("find more logits like this") and zero-shot, text-based retrieval ("find all logits corresponding to dogs"). As probing-based representations require multiple costly feedforward passes through the model, we develop a method, based on collaborative filtering, that reduces the cost of encoding repositories by 3x. We demonstrate that ProbeLog achieves high retrieval accuracy, both in real-world and fine-grained search tasks and is scalable to full-size repositories.

Diagnosing 802.11 packet captures requires expert protocol knowledge, is slow, inconsistent across engineers, and unscalable. LLM-based approaches sound plausible but fabricate protocol events absent from captures (especially truncated traces), produce uncalibrated confidence scores, and suffer evaluation bias when golden references are co-produced by the model under test. We introduce PROBE (Protocol Reasoning Over evidence-Based Ensembles), a multi-stage pipeline addressing all three failures. It integrates (i) deterministic PCAP-to-text normalization with frame-level verifiability, (ii) multi-run, multi-candidate ensembles with optional cross-model second opinion and progressive obfuscation, (iii) a verdict-aware evidence framework treating absence of failure evidence as contributing evidence, and (iv) a fully deterministic composite reliability score from evidence validity, run-to-run stability, and cross-model agreement without LLM self-assessment. On 87 enterprise Wi-Fi captures (104 capture-reviewer pairs), single-pass LLM analysis raises weighted evidence F1 from 0.871 (expert baseline) to 0.912 but misses critical frames in 35% of cases. Naive ensemble voting drops below baseline (0.842) as majority voting amplifies conservative verdicts: 50% of confirmed failures are misclassified as 'no issue' or 'insufficient evidence.' Adding evidence-grounded reconciliation achieves 0.957 F1, a 96% auto-accept rate, and a worst-case floor above 0.70. LLM self-reported confidence clusters at 0.95 regardless of difficulty (71% report exactly 0.95), confirming it is uninformative. We also introduce a model-agnostic evaluation framework using per-field assertion matching, eliminating circular bias from model-co-produced golden references.

Monitoring is an important aspect of safely deploying Large Language Models (LLMs). This paper examines activation probes for detecting ``high-stakes'' interactions -- where the text indicates that the interaction might lead to significant harm -- as a critical, yet underexplored, target for such monitoring. We evaluate several probe architectures trained on synthetic data, and find them to exhibit robust generalization to diverse, out-of-distribution, real-world data. Probes' performance is comparable to that of prompted or finetuned medium-sized LLM monitors, while offering computational savings of six orders-of-magnitude. These savings are enabled by reusing activations of the model that is being monitored. Our experiments also highlight the potential of building resource-aware hierarchical monitoring systems, where probes serve as an efficient initial filter and flag cases for more expensive downstream analysis. We release our novel synthetic dataset and the codebase at https://github.com/arrrlex/models-under-pressure.

Text-to-image (T2I) models generate realistic likenesses of some individuals when prompted with their names, raising privacy concerns. However, distinguishing whether a generated face is memorized or fabricated currently requires ground-truth photos, access to training data, or white-box access to model internals, limiting applicability. We introduce a fully black-box behavioral probe that distinguishes between these regimes while requiring no reference photos or prior knowledge of training data. To benchmark this task, we present the NAMESAKES dataset of over one thousand names and faces of public figures spanning a wide range of fame levels, along with perturbed, less famous names. Experiments on state-of-the-art T2I models show that our probe substantially predicts identity memorization and separates memorized from unrecognized names, with further insights into differences across model families.

LLM-based agents are rapidly advancing, autonomously invoking external tools to complete multi-step tasks for users. However, agents often acquire more sensitive information than the task requires. Existing privacy benchmarks audit what the agent's response or outgoing actions disclose, but overlook the acquisition stage where data first enters the agent's context. The over-acquired information is then one careless action or one attack away from an outright leak. To assess its prevalence, we introduce PrivacyPeek, a benchmark for evaluating acquisition-stage privacy leakage of LLM-based agents, with 1{,}182 cases across 7 acquisition behaviours and 16 application domains. Specifically, Acquisition Inspection examines the agent's tool-call trajectory, both the tools it invokes and the data it receives, to detect when it acquires sensitive information beyond the task scope. Probe Elicitation then issues a follow-up probe and measures how readily an attacker could elicit sensitive information the agent acquired but did not disclose. Our experiments on 10 LLM-based agents across 4 model families show that the unnecessary acquisition of sensitive information is widespread. In addition, we observe a correlation between the task-completion capability and acquisition-stage leakage. Prompt-level defences reduce only a small fraction of acquisition-stage leakage, leaving the majority unmitigated. These results make auditing acquisition-stage privacy both urgent and necessary. Our dataset and code are available at https://github.com/Xuan269/PrivacyPeek-Resource.

The rise of LLM-as-a-Service and other confidential cloud workloads demands cryptographic proof that user data is processed in a trusted, untampered environment. Existing solutions, notably Confidential Containers (CoCo), enforce a strict "one Pod per VM" model that attests only the Guest OS stack, leaving container-level identity unverified and incurring prohibitive per-VM resource overhead. We present dstack-capsule, a Kubernetes platform that enables Pod-level remote attestation on Intel TDX by allowing multiple Pods to share a single Confidential VM while each retains independent, hardware-backed proof of identity. Our key insight is a two-layer attestation architecture: static platform measurements are frozen in RTMR[3] via an irreversible privilege fuse, while dynamic Pod identities (pod_uid, pod_spec_hash, workload_id) are embedded in the TDX Quote's report_data field and signed by hardware on every request. dstack-capsule introduces (1) a Pod-level attestation protocol binding Pod spec digests to hardware-signed Quotes; (2) a privilege fuse mechanism that atomically transitions a node from setup mode to secure mode; (3) a multi-layer sandbox spanning storage, runtime, admission, API, and network isolation layers; and (4) a complete open-source implementation based on Kubernetes 1.32, Intel TDX, and Sysbox. We evaluate the security properties, attestation correctness, and performance characteristics of dstack-capsule, demonstrating that it achieves Pod-granularity verification without the resource overhead of per-VM isolation.

QDNA-ID is a trust-chain framework that links physical quantum behavior to digitally verified records. The system first executes standard quantum circuits with random shot patterns across different devices to generate entropy profiles and measurement data that reveal device-specific behavior. A Bell or CHSH test is then used to confirm that correlations originate from genuine non classical processes rather than classical simulation. The verified outcomes are converted into statistical fingerprints using entropy, divergence, and bias features to characterize each device. These features and metadata for device, session, and random seed parameters are digitally signed and time stamped to ensure integrity and traceability. Authenticated artifacts are stored in a hierarchical index for reproducible retrieval and long term auditing. A visualization and analytics interface monitors drift, policy enforcement, and device behavior logs. A machine learning engine tracks entropy drift, detects anomalies, and classifies devices based on evolving patterns. An external verification API supports independent recomputation of hashes, signatures, and CHSH evidence. QDNA-ID operates as a continuous feedback loop that maintains a persistent chain of trust for quantum computing environments.

The number of publicly available models is rapidly increasing, yet most remain undocumented. Users looking for suitable models for their tasks must first determine what each model does. Training machine learning models to infer missing documentation directly from model weights is challenging, as these weights often contain significant variation unrelated to model functionality (denoted nuisance). Here, we identify a key property of real-world models: most public models belong to a small set of Model Trees, where all models within a tree are fine-tuned from a common ancestor (e.g., a foundation model). Importantly, we find that within each tree there is less nuisance variation between models. Concretely, while learning across Model Trees requires complex architectures, even a linear classifier trained on a single model layer often works within trees. While effective, these linear classifiers are computationally expensive, especially when dealing with larger models that have many parameters. To address this, we introduce Probing Experts (ProbeX), a theoretically motivated and lightweight method. Notably, ProbeX is the first probing method specifically designed to learn from the weights of a single hidden model layer. We demonstrate the effectiveness of ProbeX by predicting the categories in a model's training dataset based only on its weights. Excitingly, ProbeX can map the weights of Stable Diffusion into a weight-language embedding space, enabling model search via text, i.e., zero-shot model classification.

Linear probes are a promising approach for monitoring AI systems for deceptive behaviour. Previous work has shown that a linear classifier trained on a contrastive instruction pair and a simple dataset can achieve good performance. However, these probes exhibit notable failures even in straightforward scenarios, including spurious correlations and false positives on non-deceptive responses. In this paper, we identify the importance of the instruction pair used during training. Furthermore, we show that targeting specific deceptive behaviors through a human-interpretable taxonomy of deception leads to improved results on evaluation datasets. Our findings reveal that instruction pairs capture deceptive intent rather than content-specific patterns, explaining why prompt choice dominates probe performance (70.6% of variance). Given the heterogeneity of deception types across datasets, we conclude that organizations should design specialized probes targeting their specific threat models rather than seeking a universal deception detector.

Identity document (ID) image analysis has become essential for many online services, like bank account opening or insurance subscription. In recent years, much research has been conducted on subjects like document localization, text recognition and fraud detection, to achieve a level of accuracy reliable enough to automatize identity verification. However, there are only a few available datasets to benchmark ID analysis methods, mainly because of privacy restrictions, security requirements and legal reasons. In this paper, we present the DocXPand-25k dataset, which consists of 24,994 richly labeled IDs images, generated using custom-made vectorial templates representing nine fictitious ID designs, including four identity cards, two residence permits and three passports designs. These synthetic IDs feature artificially generated personal information (names, dates, identifiers, faces, barcodes, ...), and present a rich diversity in the visual layouts and textual contents. We collected about 5.8k diverse backgrounds coming from real-world photos, scans and screenshots of IDs to guarantee the variety of the backgrounds. The software we wrote to generate these images has been published (https://github.com/QuickSign/docxpand/) under the terms of the MIT license, and our dataset has been published (https://github.com/QuickSign/docxpand/releases/tag/v1.0.0) under the terms of the CC-BY-NC-SA 4.0 License.

AI agents that pay for resources via the x402 protocol embed payment metadata - resource URLs, descriptions, and reason strings - in every HTTP payment request. This metadata is transmitted to the payment server and to the centralised facilitator API before any on-chain settlement occurs; neither party is typically bound by a data processing agreement. We present presidio-hardened-x402, the first open-source middleware that intercepts x402 payment requests before transmission to detect and redact personally identifiable information (PII), enforce declarative spending policies, and block duplicate replay attempts. To evaluate the PII filter, we construct a labeled synthetic corpus of 2,000 x402 metadata triples spanning seven use-case categories, and run a 42-configuration precision/recall sweep across two detection modes (regex, NLP) and five confidence thresholds. The recommended configuration (mode=nlp, min_score=0.4, all entity types) achieves micro-F1 = 0.894 with precision 0.972, at a p99 latency of 5.73ms - well within the 50ms overhead budget. The middleware, corpus, and all experiment code are publicly available at https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-x402.

In LLM/VLM agents, prompt privacy risk propagates beyond a single model call because raw user content can flow into retrieval queries, memory writes, tool calls, and logs. Existing de-identification pipelines address document boundaries but not this cross-stage propagation. We propose BodhiPromptShield, a policy-aware framework that detects sensitive spans, routes them via typed placeholders, semantic abstraction, or secure symbolic mapping, and delays restoration to authorized boundaries. Relative to enterprise redaction, this adds explicit propagation-aware mediation and restoration timing as a security variable. Under controlled evaluation on the Controlled Prompt-Privacy Benchmark (CPPB), stage-wise propagation suppresses from 10.7\% to 7.1\% across retrieval, memory, and tool stages; PER reaches 9.3\% with 0.94 AC and 0.92 TSR, outperforming generic de-identification. These are controlled systems results on CPPB rather than formal privacy guarantees or public-benchmark transfer claims. The project repository is available at https://github.com/mabo1215/BodhiPromptShield.git.

The ability to synthesize personalized group photos and specify the positions of each identity offers immense creative potential. While such imagery can be visually appealing, it presents significant challenges for existing technologies. A persistent issue is identity (ID) leakage, where injected facial features interfere with one another, resulting in low face resemblance, incorrect positioning, and visual artifacts. Existing methods suffer from limitations such as the reliance on segmentation models, increased runtime, or a high probability of ID leakage. To address these challenges, we propose ID-Patch, a novel method that provides robust association between identities and 2D positions. Our approach generates an ID patch and ID embeddings from the same facial features: the ID patch is positioned on the conditional image for precise spatial control, while the ID embeddings integrate with text embeddings to ensure high resemblance. Experimental results demonstrate that ID-Patch surpasses baseline methods across metrics, such as face ID resemblance, ID-position association accuracy, and generation efficiency. Project Page is: https://byteaigc.github.io/ID-Patch/

Linear probes trained on LLM activations are increasingly proposed as deception-detection metrics, yet report AUROC exceeding 0.96 on clean benchmarks while collapsing under distributional shift. This paper systematically pressure-tests probe-based metrics across the Gemma 3 model family (1B-27B parameters), diagnosing why they fail rather than merely documenting that they fail. We test four hypotheses about deception encoding: (1) single linear direction, (2) multi-dimensional subspace, (3) convex conic hull, (4) entropy proxy. Our design includes cross-domain transfer matrices, multi-dimensional probe analysis with permutation null baselines, entropy-residualization tests, and distractor evaluations across 8 stylistic shifts. We find that: (a) probes achieve near-perfect AUROC (>=0.998) on clean data but collapse under stylistic shifts; style-augmented probes recover near-perfect detection (mean AUROC 0.979-0.983) on unseen styles; (b) the single-direction hypothesis is rejected (k=1 captures only 0.61-0.80 AUROC), with cross-domain transfer failure confirmed as geometric rather than layer-mismatch-driven; (c) the entropy-proxy hypothesis is rejected (max |rho|=0.454, max Delta-AUROC after residualization=0.004); and (d) deception does not form a significant linear subspace (per-domain k*=0), yet multi-dimensional probes (k>=5) recover the signal through distributed sub-threshold features. Probe fragility reflects distributional narrowness rather than an architectural limitation: style-augmented probes recover near-perfect detection at both 4B and 27B, establishing that the inverse scaling pattern is a training-distribution artifact rather than a genuine scale-dependent phenomenon.

Mechanistic interpretability aims to understand neural networks by identifying which learned features mediate specific behaviors. Attribution graphs reveal these feature pathways, but interpreting them requires extensive manual analysis -- a single prompt can take approximately 2 hours for an experienced circuit tracer. We present probe prompting, an automated pipeline that transforms attribution graphs into compact, interpretable subgraphs built from concept-aligned supernodes. Starting from a seed prompt and target logit, we select high-influence features, generate concept-targeted yet context-varying probes, and group features by cross-prompt activation signatures into Semantic, Relationship, and Say-X categories using transparent decision rules. Across five prompts including classic "capitals" circuits, probe-prompted subgraphs preserve high explanatory coverage while compressing complexity (Completeness 0.83, mean across circuits; Replacement 0.54). Compared to geometric clustering baselines, concept-aligned groups exhibit higher behavioral coherence: 2.3x higher peak-token consistency (0.425 vs 0.183) and 5.8x higher activation-pattern similarity (0.762 vs 0.130), despite lower geometric compactness. Entity-swap tests reveal a layerwise hierarchy: early-layer features transfer robustly (64% transfer rate, mean layer 6.3), while late-layer Say-X features specialize for output promotion (mean layer 16.4), supporting a backbone-and-specialization view of transformer computation. We release code (https://github.com/peppinob-ol/attribution-graph-probing), an interactive demo (https://huggingface.co/spaces/Peppinob/attribution-graph-probing), and minimal artifacts enabling immediate reproduction and community adoption.

Effective fraud detection and analysis of government-issued identity documents, such as passports, driver's licenses, and identity cards, are essential in thwarting identity theft and bolstering security on online platforms. The training of accurate fraud detection and analysis tools depends on the availability of extensive identity document datasets. However, current publicly available benchmark datasets for identity document analysis, including MIDV-500, MIDV-2020, and FMIDV, fall short in several respects: they offer a limited number of samples, cover insufficient varieties of fraud patterns, and seldom include alterations in critical personal identifying fields like portrait images, limiting their utility in training models capable of detecting realistic frauds while preserving privacy. In response to these shortcomings, our research introduces a new benchmark dataset, IDNet, designed to advance privacy-preserving fraud detection efforts. The IDNet dataset comprises 837,060 images of synthetically generated identity documents, totaling approximately 490 gigabytes, categorized into 20 types from 10 U.S. states and 10 European countries. We evaluate the utility and present use cases of the dataset, illustrating how it can aid in training privacy-preserving fraud detection methods, facilitating the generation of camera and video capturing of identity documents, and testing schema unification and other identity document management functionalities.

Benchmark scores tell you what an agent got right; they do not tell you how it got there. In this work, we introduce methods for comparing agents procedurally in different contexts, where the model, tasks, and approaches vary. We compare ten agents and find that they are identifiable by their behavioral habits, which we define as fingerprints: a probe over these procedural signatures attributes an unseen trajectory to the correct agent at 85.7% accuracy, controlling for leakage across tasks. We develop procedural representations for agent problem-solving procedures with an emergent vocabulary induction technique that is meant to be maximally compressive to avoid surface-level variation while being expressive enough to unveil the quirks of the models' patterns. We apply our framework to the software engineering evaluation dataset SWE-Bench to study the structural distinctness of agent trajectories and find that behavior is most similar between models from similar release periods and those that are distilled from one another (e.g., a distilled student model and its teacher have a Jensen-Shannon divergence of 0.25, about half the distance between other model pairs). As more models saturate evaluations, we believe that it will be important to probe model behavior along more holistic dimensions than success rates alone. We introduce ProcGrep, a library for auditing and evaluating agents for how they approach tasks at a procedural level given their traces in a top-down fashion. We believe this work has a range of applications to help developers work with and program coding agents, such as task-aware model routing, agent monitoring, and finer-grained cost analysis.

Recent attacks show that behavioural unlearning of large language models leaves internal traces recoverable by adversarial probes. We characterise where this retention lives and show it can be surgically removed without measurable capability cost. Our central protocol is a leave-one-out cross-sequence probe that tests whether a memorisation signature generalises across held-out sequences. The signature is real and consistent across scale: memorisation-specific gaps of +0.32, +0.19, +0.30 on Pythia-70M, GPT-2 medium, and Mistral-7B; on Pythia-70M, the random-initialisation control collapses to -0.04 at the deepest layer where the pretrained signature peaks. The probe direction is causally separable from recall -- projecting it out collapses the signature locally (+0.44 -> -0.19) while behavioural recall barely changes -- and a probe trained on naturally memorised content does not classify fine-tuning-injected secrets, marking two representationally distinct regimes. We then introduce probe-geometry alignment (PGA), a surgical erasure that aligns activations along the probe's live readout direction at each depth. PGA drives the cross-sequence probe below random chance at all four scales tested (toy depth-4: 0.17; Pythia-70M: 0.07; Mistral-7B: 0.45; GPT-2 medium: 0.06 via MD-PGA k=2) and remains robust to six adversarial probe variants. Against a re-fitting attacker who trains a fresh probe on PGA-treated activations, we extend PGA adversarially, defeating the re-fit probe at every memorisation-relevant depth while preserving five zero-shot capability benchmarks within 2.8 percentage points per task (mean Δacc = +0.2pp). The cross-sequence signature is a real, causally separable, regime-specific property of pretrained representations -- removable below chance with a single rank-one intervention per depth at no measurable capability cost.

Deploying large language models in user-facing systems requires efficient output safety filtering. Existing approaches typically rely on a separate moderation model applied after generation, which doubles inference cost and only detects violations after generation completes. We observe that the signal needed for moderation is already present in the model hidden states. Based on this, we train lightweight token-level probes that operate directly on internal activations, producing per-token safety scores that can be aggregated for both offline evaluation and online intervention. The probe reuses activations from the generator and requires no additional forward pass, enabling sub millisecond per-token safety checks inside the decoding loop. A probe applied to a single mid layer recovers most decisions of a strong guard model, acting as a low cost surrogate optimized for latency rather than accuracy. In streaming settings, it can halt or modify unsafe outputs before they are fully generated, replacing end of sequence moderation with continuous token level monitoring. Compared to post hoc and streaming guard models, our method achieves orders of magnitude lower compute overhead with minimal latency cost. We also provide a practical deployment recipe, including layer selection, aggregation strategy, probing frequency, and triggering thresholds. Finally, we show that the probe linear component corresponds to a direction in residual space, enabling both detection and activation steering at negligible cost.

We present an approach called Q-probing to adapt a pre-trained language model to maximize a task-specific reward function. At a high level, Q-probing sits between heavier approaches such as finetuning and lighter approaches such as few shot prompting, but can also be combined with either. The idea is to learn a simple linear function on a model's embedding space that can be used to reweight candidate completions. We theoretically show that this sampling procedure is equivalent to a KL-constrained maximization of the Q-probe as the number of samples increases. To train the Q-probes we consider either reward modeling or a class of novel direct policy learning objectives based on importance weighted policy gradients. With this technique, we see gains in domains with ground-truth rewards (code generation) as well as implicit rewards defined by preference data, even outperforming finetuning in data-limited regimes. Moreover, a Q-probe can be trained on top of an API since it only assumes access to sampling and embeddings. Code: https://github.com/likenneth/q_probe .

Deep research agents have achieved remarkable progress on complex information seeking tasks. Even long ReAct style rollouts explore only a single trajectory, while recent state of the art systems scale inference time compute via parallel search and aggregation. Yet deep research answers are composed of complementary pieces of evidence, which parallel rollouts often duplicate rather than complete, yielding diminishing returns while pushing the aggregation context toward the model's limit. We propose Argus, an agentic system in which a Searcher and a Navigator cooperate to treat deep research as assembling a jigsaw from complementary evidence pieces, rather than brute forcing the whole answer in parallel. The Searcher collects evidence traces for a given sub-query through ReAct-style interaction. The Navigator maintains a shared evidence graph, verifying which pieces are still missing, dispatching Searchers to gather them, and reasoning over the completed graph to produce a source-traced final answer. We train the Navigator with reinforcement learning to verify, dispatch, and synthesize, while independently training the Searcher to remain a standard ReAct agent. The resulting Navigator supports rollouts with a single Searcher or many in parallel without retraining. With both Searcher and Navigator built on a 35B-A3B MoE backbone, Argus gains 5.5 points with a single Searcher and 12.7 points with 8 parallel Searchers, averaged over eight benchmarks. With 64 Searchers it reaches 86.2 on BrowseComp, surpassing every proprietary agent we benchmark, while the Navigator's reasoning context stays under 21.5K tokens.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in enterprise applications, yet their reliability remains limited by hallucinations, i.e., confident but factually incorrect information. Existing detection approaches, such as SelfCheckGPT and MetaQA, primarily target standalone LLMs and do not address the unique challenges of Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems, where responses must be consistent with retrieved evidence. We therefore present MetaRAG, a metamorphic testing framework for hallucination detection in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems. MetaRAG operates in a real-time, unsupervised, black-box setting, requiring neither ground-truth references nor access to model internals, making it suitable for proprietary and high-stakes domains. The framework proceeds in four stages: (1) decompose answers into atomic factoids, (2) generate controlled mutations of each factoid using synonym and antonym substitutions, (3) verify each variant against the retrieved context (synonyms are expected to be entailed and antonyms contradicted), and (4) aggregate penalties for inconsistencies into a response-level hallucination score. Crucially for identity-aware AI, MetaRAG localizes unsupported claims at the factoid span where they occur (e.g., pregnancy-specific precautions, LGBTQ+ refugee rights, or labor eligibility), allowing users to see flagged spans and enabling system designers to configure thresholds and guardrails for identity-sensitive queries. Experiments on a proprietary enterprise dataset illustrate the effectiveness of MetaRAG for detecting hallucinations and enabling trustworthy deployment of RAG-based conversational agents. We also outline a topic-based deployment design that translates MetaRAG's span-level scores into identity-aware safeguards; this design is discussed but not evaluated in our experiments.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly adopted in real-world security operations with access to host artifacts and command-line interfaces (CLIs), making it critical to thoroughly assess their security capabilities. However, existing cybersecurity benchmarks focus on pre-compromise settings where agents are placed in a clean and idealized environment before an attack occurs. This leaves the post-compromise setting underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce SecRespond, the first benchmark for evaluating LLM agents on the post-compromise incident-response workflow. Given a forensic disk snapshot of a compromised host together with the alerts, vulnerability scans, and baseline checks reported by a host security product, agents are required to produce forensic reports on intrusions, baseline risks, and vulnerability risks, together with a remediation plan. We instantiate this task across 10 cyber ranges, each constructed from a distinct compromised cloud host, spanning 4 entry-point types, 21 ATT&CK techniques, and 5 operating systems. We evaluate 23 frontier LLMs on the OpenCode agent harness. Experimental results show that although current agents can reliably uncover the problems exposed by alerts, they struggle to proactively investigate the disk for silent intrusions and to produce comprehensive, verified remediation plans, with no model achieving complete detection and remediation on any single range. This reveals a fundamental bottleneck in building agents for real-world incident response. The benchmark is publicly available at https://github.com/Alibaba-NLP/qqr/tree/main/data/secrespond.

Long-horizon agents depend on context management: systems compress, summarize, and evict old tokens so tasks can continue beyond finite windows. That is safe only when dropped information is no longer needed or has been internalized. Plans are the stress case: they are written early, used for many steps, and first to be evicted. We introduce replay pairing, a diagnostic that runs the same trajectory with and without the plan in history and measures hidden-state cosine distance. On Llama-3.1-70B, plan signal spikes to 0.453 one step after the plan, then falls 4.1x in a single action-observation step; HotpotQA falls 12.4x. This is evidence that standard LLM agents do not carry plans forward as persistent state, and instead depend on the plan remaining in context. A layer-L32 probe detects this decay as a diagnostic, not as proof that it reads plan content itself. Reasoning models add a measurement confound: their `<think>` traces re-derive plan content, so standard stripping leaves plan evidence in the stripped condition. We name this the reasoning-trace confound and fix it with strict stripping, which removes prior `<think>` blocks from the stripped run only. It recovers +163% of the step+1 signal in-sample and +153% held out, while not meaningfully changing non-reasoning Llama (+4.8%). On DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-70B, a Llama-trained probe transfers at AUROC 0.748 (p=6e-4), while R1-specific probes reach 1.000, suggesting R1 encodes plan signal in a different hidden-state direction. Finally, a compression stress test shows the practical cost: naive plan eviction cuts ALFWorld success by 34.7pp, while probe-gated re-surfacing does not recover it. The contribution is a measurement and stress-test framework showing that agent-critical information can be context-resident rather than persistent. Context management is load bearing, but plan protection alone is not enough.

AI coding agents set up projects by reading documentation and installing the dependencies it lists, without verifying their names, sources, or known vulnerabilities. By editing only a README, requirements file, or Makefile, an attacker can redirect the agent to an untrusted registry, a known-vulnerable version, or a wrong-but-plausible name: documentation becomes a vector for code execution. We present the first systematic evaluation of package-install-time supply-chain attacks delivered through ordinary project-setup documentation across production coding-agent harnesses, probing frontier models on twelve scenarios in five attack classes, grounded in documented incidents. The same model catches an attack through one harness and installs it through another: install-time security rests on the harness-model combination, not the model alone. Agents catch blatant typosquats reliably, but plausible separator-confusion names (azurecore for azure-core) slip through, and how often depends on the harness-model pairing. Source-based attacks like registry redirection are missed almost everywhere. The source blind spot recurs on npm and Cargo, where nearly every model installs the untrusted dependency; name detection carries over less consistently across ecosystems. Security-oriented prompts recover part of the gap but only for the dimension they name; a deterministic pre-install check that verifies names, sources, and versions before any code runs closes most of it.

Named Entity Recognition (NER) and Personally Identifiable Information (PII) anonymization are critical tasks in Natural Language Processing (NLP) for information extraction and privacy preservation. We introduce AWED-PIPER, an open-source framework comprising agentic tools, interactive web applications, and 54 state-of-the-art expert detector models that provide unified Fine-grained Named Entity Recognition (FgNER) and reversible synthetic PII pseudonymization across 36 languages spoken by over 6.6 billion people. The system couples fine-grained multilingual sequence labeling with script-aware regex detectors to identify contextual entities (Person, Location, Organization, Medical) as well as structured technical PII (Emails, native-script Phone Numbers, IP Addresses, Credit Cards). AWED-PIPER offers a dual capability: full FgNER entity extraction and privacy-preserving reversible anonymization with persistent placeholders and de-anonymization dictionary mappings. The suite spans global languages to extremely low-resource vulnerable languages like Bodo, Manipuri, Bishnupriya, and Mizo. The resources can be accessed here: PII Protector Agentic Tool: (https://github.com/PrachuryyaKaushik/AWED-PIPER), FgNER Agentic Tool: (https://github.com/PrachuryyaKaushik/AWED-FiNER), PII Web Application: (https://hf.co/spaces/prachuryyaIITG/AWED_PII_Protector), FgNER Web Application: (https://hf.co/spaces/prachuryyaIITG/AWED-FiNER), and Edge-deployable Expert Detector Models: (https://hf.co/collections/prachuryyaIITG/awed-piper).

Prompt engineering has emerged as a powerful technique for optimizing large language models (LLMs) for specific applications, enabling faster prototyping and improved performance, and giving rise to the interest of the community in protecting proprietary system prompts. In this work, we explore a novel perspective on prompt privacy through the lens of membership inference. We develop Prompt Detective, a statistical method to reliably determine whether a given system prompt was used by a third-party language model. Our approach relies on a statistical test comparing the distributions of two groups of model outputs corresponding to different system prompts. Through extensive experiments with a variety of language models, we demonstrate the effectiveness of Prompt Detective for prompt membership inference. Our work reveals that even minor changes in system prompts manifest in distinct response distributions, enabling us to verify prompt usage with statistical significance.

Autoformalization, translating natural-language mathematics into formal proof assistants, is bottlenecked not by translation fluency but by faithfulness: a formal statement can typecheck and be provable, yet still encode a different theorem than the source intended. We introduce Bidirectional Provability Fingerprinting (), a framework that certifies faithfulness by characterizing each candidate through its forward and backward consequence neighborhoods in the ambient theory and matching these against probes derived from the natural-language statement. We further introduce four novel components: (i) Counterfactual Probe Generation (), a contrastive procedure that synthesizes probes targeting specific drift directions; (ii) the Equivalence Spectrum, a continuous faithfulness score that replaces brittle binary verdicts; (iii) Adaptive Probe Budget Allocation (), an information-theoretic budget router; and (iv) Faithfulness-Guided Decoding (), which uses signals as a reward during autoformalization. We prove a drift detection theorem and a PAC-faithfulness result establishing that the equivalence class of a natural language statement is learnable from O(log(1/δ)/varepsilon) probes under mild assumptions. We release , a benchmark of 2{,}183 NL/Lean~4 pairs with controlled drift labels across six subfields of mathlib4. \,+\, detects 89.6% of drifted formalizations at a 3.0% false-positive rate-against 41.2% for typecheck and 63.3% for LLM-judge baselines, and reduces the rate at which a state-of-the-art autoformalizer emits drifted statements by 47%. https://pmlrbd.github.io/BPF/

Can a language model estimate its familiarity with an entity before generating an answer? We study activations at the final prompt token in twelve instruction-tuned models from the Bielik, PLLuM, Gemma-4, and Qwen3 families, using a new dataset of 1,440 Polish entities spanning four domains and ten Wikipedia-pageview deciles, plus fabricated controls. Familiarity-probe scores separate real from fabricated entities in every family; in the Polish-adapted Bielik and PLLuM families they additionally track entity popularity (model-mean Spearman ρ 0.28-0.57, versus at most 0.11 in Gemma-4 and Qwen3), a pattern more strongly associated with Polish adaptation than with parameter count in this model sample. In a paired experiment on two families, probes retain 96-101% of within-language AUROC when the Polish question stem is replaced with an English one around unchanged entity names, showing robustness to prompt language in this setting. In Gemma-4-12B, the only model that natively refuses, adding a one-dimensional familiarity direction at a single layer moves refusal rates monotonically in both directions (0.24 to 1.00 on well-known entities; 0.73 to 0.00 on unknown ones). Finally, a calibrated familiarity probe is competitive among pre-generation abstention gates, although post-generation detectors better predict behavioral error on average. These results support a graded pre-generation entity-familiarity readout, and a separation between representational familiarity and the policy that converts it into abstention.

Context can change whether a request is harmful without changing its topic or surface form. We ask whether residual-stream probes distinguish harmful requests from surface-matched benign controls at a useful operating point. Across three 7-8B model families, an activation sensor blocks 95.5-97.7 percent of judge-classified compliant attacks in a taxonomy-selected set. It also blocks 59.6-68.4 percent of XSTest prompts. A fully disjoint audit reconstructs near-ceiling source-contrast AUROC (0.996-0.999), but fixed transfer to matched pairs is weaker: 0.656-0.819 on the guard-selected Twin-n70 subset and 0.590-0.690 on the full Twin-n163 cohort. We test ten axes on the reference family and seven across all families with leakage, hold-out, and permutation controls. On Twin-n163, no axis evaluated without direct pair-boundary fitting reaches the specified numerical threshold. Requiring persistence on that full cohort was added at analysis time. A separately specified 24B/32B extension gives the same result. Pair-trained classifiers weaken under category and generation-batch hold-out and false-block 79.6-100 percent of XSTest at 95 percent in-corpus TPR. At the tested read points, these activation scores behave as broad-risk detectors rather than standalone context adjudicators.

The emergence of large-scale multi-modal generative models has drastically advanced artificial intelligence, introducing unprecedented levels of performance and functionality. However, optimizing these models remains challenging due to historically isolated paths of model-centric and data-centric developments, leading to suboptimal outcomes and inefficient resource utilization. In response, we present a novel sandbox suite tailored for integrated data-model co-development. This sandbox provides a comprehensive experimental platform, enabling rapid iteration and insight-driven refinement of both data and models. Our proposed "Probe-Analyze-Refine" workflow, validated through applications on state-of-the-art LLaVA-like and DiT based models, yields significant performance boosts, such as topping the VBench leaderboard. We also uncover fruitful insights gleaned from exhaustive benchmarks, shedding light on the critical interplay between data quality, diversity, and model behavior. With the hope of fostering deeper understanding and future progress in multi-modal data and generative modeling, our codes, datasets, and models are maintained and accessible at https://github.com/modelscope/data-juicer/blob/main/docs/Sandbox.md.

AI models might use deceptive strategies as part of scheming or misaligned behaviour. Monitoring outputs alone is insufficient, since the AI might produce seemingly benign outputs while their internal reasoning is misaligned. We thus evaluate if linear probes can robustly detect deception by monitoring model activations. We test two probe-training datasets, one with contrasting instructions to be honest or deceptive (following Zou et al., 2023) and one of responses to simple roleplaying scenarios. We test whether these probes generalize to realistic settings where Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct behaves deceptively, such as concealing insider trading (Scheurer et al., 2023) and purposely underperforming on safety evaluations (Benton et al., 2024). We find that our probe distinguishes honest and deceptive responses with AUROCs between 0.96 and 0.999 on our evaluation datasets. If we set the decision threshold to have a 1% false positive rate on chat data not related to deception, our probe catches 95-99% of the deceptive responses. Overall we think white-box probes are promising for future monitoring systems, but current performance is insufficient as a robust defence against deception. Our probes' outputs can be viewed at data.apolloresearch.ai/dd and our code at github.com/ApolloResearch/deception-detection.

Multi-agent systems face a fundamental architectural flaw: agent identity is bound to network location. When agents migrate between providers, scale across instances, or federate across organizations, URI-based identity schemes break references, fragment audit trails, and require centralized coordination. We propose the agent:// URI scheme, which decouples identity from topology through three orthogonal components: a trust root establishing organizational authority, a hierarchical capability path enabling semantic discovery, and a sortable unique identifier providing stable reference. The scheme enables capability-based discovery through DHT key derivation, where queries return agents by what they do rather than where they are. Trust-root scoping prevents cross-organization pollution while permitting federation when desired. Cryptographic attestation via PASETO tokens binds capability claims to agent identity, enabling verification without real-time contact with the issuing authority. We evaluate the scheme across four dimensions: capability expressiveness (100% coverage on 369 production tools with zero collision), discovery precision (F1=1.0 across 10,000 agents), identity stability (formal proofs of migration invariance), and performance (all operations under 5 microseconds). The agent:// URI scheme provides a formally-specified, practically-evaluated foundation for decentralized agent identity and capability-based discovery.

A key strength of managed runtimes over hardware is the ability to gain detailed insight into the dynamic execution of programs with instrumentation. Analyses such as code coverage, execution frequency, tracing, and debugging, are all made easier in a virtual setting. As a portable, low-level bytecode, WebAssembly offers inexpensive in-process sandboxing with high performance. Yet to date, Wasm engines have not offered much insight into executing programs, supporting at best bytecode-level stepping and basic source maps, but no instrumentation capabilities. In this paper, we show the first non-intrusive dynamic instrumentation system for WebAssembly in the open-source Wizard Research Engine. Our innovative design offers a flexible, complete hierarchy of instrumentation primitives that support building high-level, complex analyses in terms of low-level, programmable probes. In contrast to emulation or machine code instrumentation, injecting probes at the bytecode level increases expressiveness and vastly simplifies the implementation by reusing the engine's JIT compiler, interpreter, and deoptimization mechanism rather than building new ones. Wizard supports both dynamic instrumentation insertion and removal while providing consistency guarantees, which is key to composing multiple analyses without interference. We detail a fully-featured implementation in a high-performance multi-tier Wasm engine, show novel optimizations specifically designed to minimize instrumentation overhead, and evaluate performance characteristics under load from various analyses. This design is well-suited for production engine adoption as probes can be implemented to have no impact on production performance when not in use.

A lot of research has been devoted to identity documents analysis and recognition on mobile devices. However, no publicly available datasets designed for this particular problem currently exist. There are a few datasets which are useful for associated subtasks but in order to facilitate a more comprehensive scientific and technical approach to identity document recognition more specialized datasets are required. In this paper we present a Mobile Identity Document Video dataset (MIDV-500) consisting of 500 video clips for 50 different identity document types with ground truth which allows to perform research in a wide scope of document analysis problems. The paper presents characteristics of the dataset and evaluation results for existing methods of face detection, text line recognition, and document fields data extraction. Since an important feature of identity documents is their sensitiveness as they contain personal data, all source document images used in MIDV-500 are either in public domain or distributed under public copyright licenses. The main goal of this paper is to present a dataset. However, in addition and as a baseline, we present evaluation results for existing methods for face detection, text line recognition, and document data extraction, using the presented dataset. (The dataset is available for download at ftp://smartengines.com/midv-500/.)

Large Language Models (LLMs) excel in diverse tasks such as text generation, data analysis, and software development, making them indispensable across domains like education, business, and creative industries. However, the rapid proliferation of LLMs (with over 560 companies developing or deploying them as of 2024) has raised concerns about their originality and trustworthiness. A notable issue, termed identity confusion, has emerged, where LLMs misrepresent their origins or identities. This study systematically examines identity confusion through three research questions: (1) How prevalent is identity confusion among LLMs? (2) Does it arise from model reuse, plagiarism, or hallucination? (3) What are the security and trust-related impacts of identity confusion? To address these, we developed an automated tool combining documentation analysis, self-identity recognition testing, and output similarity comparisons--established methods for LLM fingerprinting--and conducted a structured survey via Credamo to assess its impact on user trust. Our analysis of 27 LLMs revealed that 25.93% exhibit identity confusion. Output similarity analysis confirmed that these issues stem from hallucinations rather than replication or reuse. Survey results further highlighted that identity confusion significantly erodes trust, particularly in critical tasks like education and professional use, with declines exceeding those caused by logical errors or inconsistencies. Users attributed these failures to design flaws, incorrect training data, and perceived plagiarism, underscoring the systemic risks posed by identity confusion to LLM reliability and trustworthiness.

Anonymization is often assumed to protect privacy once explicit identifiers are removed, because re-identification has historically required specialized expertise, tailored algorithms, and manual corroboration. We show that LLM-based agents weaken this barrier: by combining scattered, individually non-identifying cues with public evidence, they reconstruct real-world identities, sometimes even during benign tasks. We evaluate this risk across three settings -- classical linkage incidents, a controlled benchmark (InferLink) that varies fingerprint type, task framing, and attacker knowledge, and open-ended human--AI interaction traces. In the sparsest regime of the Netflix Prize deanonymization setting, agents reconstruct 79.2\% of identities, against 56.0\% for a classical matching baseline; on InferLink, they link individuals even without an explicit re-identification request, and more often once one is given. In redacted human--AI interaction traces, agents further resolve anonymized profiles to specific individuals by corroborating contextual cues with public evidence. These findings suggest that privacy evaluations for agentic systems should measure not only what information is accessed or disclosed, but also what identities can be inferred.

Identity documents recognition is an important sub-field of document analysis, which deals with tasks of robust document detection, type identification, text fields recognition, as well as identity fraud prevention and document authenticity validation given photos, scans, or video frames of an identity document capture. Significant amount of research has been published on this topic in recent years, however a chief difficulty for such research is scarcity of datasets, due to the subject matter being protected by security requirements. A few datasets of identity documents which are available lack diversity of document types, capturing conditions, or variability of document field values. In addition, the published datasets were typically designed only for a subset of document recognition problems, not for a complex identity document analysis. In this paper, we present a dataset MIDV-2020 which consists of 1000 video clips, 2000 scanned images, and 1000 photos of 1000 unique mock identity documents, each with unique text field values and unique artificially generated faces, with rich annotation. For the presented benchmark dataset baselines are provided for such tasks as document location and identification, text fields recognition, and face detection. With 72409 annotated images in total, to the date of publication the proposed dataset is the largest publicly available identity documents dataset with variable artificially generated data, and we believe that it will prove invaluable for advancement of the field of document analysis and recognition. The dataset is available for download at ftp://smartengines.com/midv-2020 and http://l3i-share.univ-lr.fr .

Forecasting when AI systems will become capable of meaningfully accelerating AI research is a central challenge for AI safety. Existing benchmarks measure broad capability growth, but may not provide ample early warning signals for recursive self-improvement. We propose measuring AI's capability to autonomously implement end-to-end machine learning pipelines from past AI research breakthroughs, given a minimal task description. By providing a concise task description instead of the full prior work as reference, we hope to better elicit emerging AI research taste. We introduce a proof-of-concept benchmark in which frontier coding agents autonomously implement an AlphaZero-style machine learning pipeline for Connect Four on consumer hardware within a three-hour budget, and we evaluate the resulting game AIs in a round-robin tournament anchored to the Pascal Pons Connect Four solver. Across four agents with eight trials each, we find substantial differentiation: Claude Opus 4.7 won as first-mover against Pons in seven of eight trials, statistically significantly better than the other agents tested, none of which exceeded two of eight. The task, which no frontier agent could reliably complete when we began development in January of 2026, is now near-saturation. Our evaluation also surfaced anomalous behavior in GPT-5.4, which consistently used far less of its allocated time budget than other agents. A follow-up 16-trial probe using shorter, less evaluation-coded prompts substantially increased GPT-5.4's time-budget usage, consistent with but not diagnostic of sandbagging; Bradley-Terry ratings across probe conditions showed only directional differences, despite significant differences in time-budget usage. We release our data, code, and prompts to support reproduction and extension.

Reasoning models have achieved remarkable performance on tasks like math and logical reasoning thanks to their ability to search during reasoning. However, they still suffer from overthinking, often performing unnecessary reasoning steps even after reaching the correct answer. This raises the question: can models evaluate the correctness of their intermediate answers during reasoning? In this work, we study whether reasoning models encode information about answer correctness through probing the model's hidden states. The resulting probe can verify intermediate answers with high accuracy and produces highly calibrated scores. Additionally, we find models' hidden states encode correctness of future answers, enabling early prediction of the correctness before the intermediate answer is fully formulated. We then use the probe as a verifier to decide whether to exit reasoning at intermediate answers during inference, reducing the number of inference tokens by 24\% without compromising performance. These findings confirm that reasoning models do encode a notion of correctness yet fail to exploit it, revealing substantial untapped potential to enhance their efficiency.

The widespread adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) has raised significant privacy concerns regarding the exposure of personally identifiable information (PII) in user prompts. To address this challenge, we propose a query-unrelated PII masking strategy and introduce PII-Bench, the first comprehensive evaluation framework for assessing privacy protection systems. PII-Bench comprises 2,842 test samples across 55 fine-grained PII categories, featuring diverse scenarios from single-subject descriptions to complex multi-party interactions. Each sample is carefully crafted with a user query, context description, and standard answer indicating query-relevant PII. Our empirical evaluation reveals that while current models perform adequately in basic PII detection, they show significant limitations in determining PII query relevance. Even state-of-the-art LLMs struggle with this task, particularly in handling complex multi-subject scenarios, indicating substantial room for improvement in achieving intelligent PII masking.

Probing studies what information is encoded in a frozen LLM's layer representations by training a lightweight predictor on top of them. Beyond analysis, probes are often used operationally in probe-then-steer pipelines: a learned concept vector is extracted from a probe and injected via additive activation steering by adding it to a layer representation during the forward pass. The effectiveness of this pipeline hinges on estimating concept vectors that are accurate, directionally stable under ablation, and inexpensive to obtain. Motivated by these desiderata, we propose RAPTOR (Ridge-Adaptive Logistic Probe), a simple L2-regularized logistic probe whose validation-tuned ridge strength yields concept vectors from normalized weights. Across extensive experiments on instruction-tuned LLMs and human-written concept datasets, RAPTOR matches or exceeds strong baselines in accuracy while achieving competitive directional stability and substantially lower training cost; these quantitative results are supported by qualitative downstream steering demonstrations. Finally, using the Convex Gaussian Min-max Theorem (CGMT), we provide a mechanistic characterization of ridge logistic regression in an idealized Gaussian teacher-student model in the high-dimensional few-shot regime, explaining how penalty strength mediates probe accuracy and concept-vector stability and yielding structural predictions that qualitatively align with trends observed on real LLM embeddings.

Large language models (LLMs) for code completion and generation are increasingly used in software development, yet they may reproduce training examples verbatim and without authorship attribution, raising legal and ethical concerns around plagiarism and license compliance. Classical fingerprint-based plagiarism detectors based on fingerprinting, such as Winnowing, remain highly effective, yet the inspection requires comparing fragments of code to the entire training set, and their linear-time search makes them impractical for the billion-scale corpora used to train modern code LLMs. To bridge this gap, we introduce SOURCETRACKER, a 300M-parameter encoder tailored for code retrieval, together with a hybrid two-stage provenance-tracking pipeline HYBRIDSOURCETRACKER (HST). HST first narrows down a small set of candidate snippets via vector search, then re-ranks those candidates using Winnowing on exact fingerprints. We train and evaluate our system on a 10M-snippet subset of the THESTACKV2 dataset, with both verbatim and adapted snippets that emulate realistic identifier renaming. On an in vitro 100k-snippet search space with adapted queries, our hybrid approach reaches a mean reciprocal rank on par with Winnowing for 30-token fragments. Then, starting from windows >= 60 tokens, it consistently over-performs by up to 5.4% while preserving logarithmic-time query complexity. In a complementary evaluation using an LLM-based judge, we find that many retrieved snippets not labeled as ground truth are still highly similar to the expected sources, particularly with longer context windows, and thus remain useful for end users. Overall, our results demonstrate that integrating vector search with fingerprinting enables scalable, high-precision provenance tracking for code produced by LLMs.

The widespread deployment of LLMs across enterprise services has created a critical security blind spot. Organizations operate multiple LLM services handling billions of queries daily, yet regulatory compliance boundaries prevent these services from sharing threat intelligence about prompt injection attacks, the top security risk for LLMs. When an attack is detected in one service, the same threat may persist undetected in others for months, as privacy regulations prohibit sharing user prompts across compliance boundaries. We present BinaryShield, the first privacy-preserving threat intelligence system that enables secure sharing of attack fingerprints across compliance boundaries. BinaryShield transforms suspicious prompts through a unique pipeline combining PII redaction, semantic embedding, binary quantization, and randomized response mechanism to potentially generate non-invertible fingerprints that preserve attack patterns while providing privacy. Our evaluations demonstrate that BinaryShield achieves an F1-score of 0.94, significantly outperforming SimHash (0.77), the privacy-preserving baseline, while achieving 64x storage reduction and 38x faster similarity search compared to dense embeddings.

Synthetic persona datasets cite alignment with official demographics as a basis for trust, yet downstream users consume them as joint structures across age, sex, region, occupation, education, name, and institutional status. Marginal alignment does not imply that these joints are preserved. We propose the Independence-Assumption Footprint (IAF), an audit primitive that operates on the attribute combinations a dataset card itself documents as treated independently. For each such combination, IAF compares the synthetic joint against an external official or institutional reference, using direct joint tables where available and rule-implied checks otherwise. Applied to NVIDIA Nemotron-Personas-Korea (one million Korean synthetic personas), IAF finds that NPK aligns with KOSIS marginals while three joints fail. The major-by-occupation distribution against the KEIS graduate universe carries a large conditional mismatch. The age profile of military service is institutionally inconsistent. Female representation in male-dominated occupations is substantially over-flattened toward parity, with the strict screening verdict mapping-dependent and age-robust under direct standardisation. A transferability demonstration across six further NPK locales finds locale-dependent rather than universal diagnostics, with reference-taxonomy cardinality confounding cross-locale flag counts. For synthetic personas used as silicon samples, marginal claims must therefore be paired with disclosure-anchored joint audits before reuse. The released audit artefacts (reference manifests, occupational crosswalks, derived metrics, reproducibility scripts) instantiate this protocol on the NPK family and are released for retargeting at other synthetic persona resources.

Gait recognition has emerged as a powerful tool for unobtrusive and long-range identity analysis, with growing relevance in surveillance and monitoring applications. Although recent advances in deep learning and large-scale datasets have enabled highly accurate recognition under closed-set conditions, real-world deployment demands open-set gait enrollment, which means determining whether a new gait sample corresponds to a known identity or represents a previously unseen individual. In this work, we introduce a transformer-based framework for open-set gait enrollment that is both dataset-agnostic and recognition-architecture-agnostic. Our method leverages a SetTransformer to make enrollment decisions based on the embedding of a probe sample and a context set drawn from the gallery, without requiring task-specific thresholds or retraining for new environments. By decoupling enrollment from the main recognition pipeline, our model is generalized across different datasets, gallery sizes, and identity distributions. We propose an evaluation protocol that uses existing datasets in different ratios of identities and walks per identity. We instantiate our method using skeleton-based gait representations and evaluate it on two benchmark datasets (CASIA-B and PsyMo), using embeddings from three state-of-the-art recognition models (GaitGraph, GaitFormer, and GaitPT). We show that our method is flexible, is able to accurately perform enrollment in different scenarios, and scales better with data compared to traditional approaches. We will make the code and dataset scenarios publicly available.

Large language models(LLMs) excel at text generation and knowledge question-answering tasks, but they are prone to generating hallucinated content, severely limiting their application in high-risk domains. Current hallucination detection methods based on uncertainty estimation and external knowledge retrieval suffer from the limitation that they still produce erroneous content at high confidence levels and rely heavily on retrieval efficiency and knowledge coverage. In contrast, probe methods that leverage the model's hidden-layer states offer real-time and lightweight advantages. However, traditional linear probes struggle to capture nonlinear structures in deep semantic spaces.To overcome these limitations, we propose a neural network-based framework for token-level hallucination detection. By freezing language model parameters, we employ lightweight MLP probes to perform nonlinear modeling of high-level hidden states. A multi-objective joint loss function is designed to enhance detection stability and semantic disambiguity. Additionally, we establish a layer position-probe performance response model, using Bayesian optimization to automatically search for optimal probe insertion layers and achieve superior training results.Experimental results on LongFact, HealthBench, and TriviaQA demonstrate that MLP probes significantly outperform state-of-the-art methods in accuracy, recall, and detection capability under low false-positive conditions.

Tool-augmented LLM agents raise new security risks: tool executions can introduce runtime-only behaviors, including prompt injection and unintended exposure of external inputs (e.g., environment secrets or local files). While existing scanners often focus on static artifacts, analyzing runtime behavior is challenging because directly executing untrusted tools can itself be dangerous. We present MCP-SandboxScan, a lightweight framework motivated by the Model Context Protocol (MCP) that safely executes untrusted tools inside a WebAssembly/WASI sandbox and produces auditable reports of external-to-sink exposures. Our prototype (i) extracts LLM-relevant sinks from runtime outputs (prompt/messages and structured tool-return fields), (ii) instantiates external-input candidates from environment values, mounted file contents, and output-surfaced HTTP fetch intents, and (iii) links sources to sinks via snippet-based substring matching. Case studies on three representative tools show that MCP-SandboxScan can surface provenance evidence when external inputs appear in prompt/messages or tool-return payloads, and can expose filesystem capability violations as runtime evidence. We further compare against a lightweight static string-signature baseline and use a micro-benchmark to characterize false negatives under transformations and false positives from short-token collisions.

Retrieval-augmented QA pipelines often route retrieved passages through an LLM rewriter before a smaller reader, lifting F1 by tens of points on multi-hop benchmarks; this gain is typically credited to improved evidence quality. We ask whether that lift is causally driven by the gold answer string appearing in the rewritten context rather than by curation per se, using a controlled intervention audit. For each rewritten context we re-run the reader after one of four controlled edits to the compile output: removing the gold answer span, replacing a length-matched random non-answer span (placebo), or injecting the gold into rewrites where it was absent (at the prefix or at a midpoint sentence boundary). Across twelve completed (cell, baseline) intervention runs spanning three reader families (Qwen2.5-7B, Qwen3.5-35B, GLM-4.7), two datasets (HotpotQA, 2WikiMultihopQA), and three compiler arrangements (MA-only, MB-only, MA+verify), removing the gold answer drops reader F1 by 28 to 64 points beyond the length-matched placebo on paired answer-in-compile strata, and prepending the gold into rewrites that lacked it raises F1 by +0.7 to +9.7 points in 10 of 12 (cell, baseline) combinations. A companion five-sentinel audit shows the conventional single-[MASK] probe is itself sentinel-fragile: on 2Wiki it reports a +4.12~F1 ``non-leakage residual'' that flips to -3.33 to -7.81~F1 under four alternative sentinels and fails an equivalence test for three of those four (1/4~pass). We do not propose a new rewriter or mitigation; we release the intervention runner and the sentinel panel so that other rewriter-gain claims can be tested against the same standard.

Deep learning and language models are increasingly dominating automated program repair research. While previous generate-and-validate approaches were able to find and use fix ingredients on a file or even project level, neural language models are limited to the code that fits their input window. In this work we investigate how important identifier ingredients are in neural program repair and present ScanFix, an approach that leverages an additional scanner model to extract identifiers from a bug's file and potentially project-level context. We find that lack of knowledge of far-away identifiers is an important cause of failed repairs. Augmenting repair model input with scanner-extracted identifiers yields relative improvements of up to 31%. However, ScanFix is outperformed by a model with a large input window (> 5k tokens). When passing ingredients from the ground-truth fix, improvements are even higher. This shows that, with refined extraction techniques, ingredient scanning, similar to fix candidate ranking, could have the potential to become an important subtask of future automated repair systems. At the same time, it also demonstrates that this idea is subject to Sutton's bitter lesson and may be rendered unnecessary by new code models with ever-increasing context windows.

Agentic multimodal models perform diverse operations on an image via code and reason over the returned view, an effective paradigm for fine-grained visual question answering. However, code operations can be useful, redundant, or misleading. Outcome-only rewards cannot precisely distinguish these cases, and existing process rewards either fail to attribute final correctness to individual tool calls, or require an external judge model. To address this, we introduce Tool-Augmented Credit Optimization (TACO), a GRPO variant for code-tool agents built on two coupled advantage channels. The first, Differential Answer-Probe Reward (DAPR), is a self-supervised, judge-free tool-contribution advantage that credits each tool call by its own effect on answering correctly. Probe tokens inserted into the model's reasoning elicit its predictions with and without the tool, and the difference in outcome reward is taken as the call's value: positive for a useful call, negative for a misleading one, and zero for one that changes nothing. This reuses the existing answer checker with no auxiliary judge, and, being a difference rather than an absolute probe score, is naturally robust to probe-hacking. The second is the outcome advantage from the final answer, distributed by Outcome-Gated Advantage Routing (OGAR): a parameter-free rule that, conditioned on the call's outcome, delivers this credit only to the responsible segments, suppressing wasted tool calls without any cost term. We train TACO through a two-stage SFT+RL pipeline. Extensive experiments across perception, reasoning, and general multimodal benchmarks show that it yields consistent accuracy gains and learns to invoke its tools only when they help.

Large-scale sharing of dialogue-based data is instrumental for advancing the science of teaching and learning, yet rigorous de-identification remains a major barrier. In mathematics tutoring transcripts, numeric expressions frequently resemble structured identifiers (e.g., dates or IDs), leading generic Personally Identifiable Information (PII) detection systems to over-redact core instructional content and reduce dataset utility. This work asks how PII can be detected in math tutoring transcripts while preserving their educational utility. To address this challenge, we investigate the "numeric ambiguity" problem and introduce MathEd-PII, the first benchmark dataset for PII detection in math tutoring dialogues, created through a human-in-the-loop LLM workflow that audits upstream redactions and generates privacy-preserving surrogates. The dataset contains 1,000 tutoring sessions (115,620 messages; 769,628 tokens) with validated PII annotations. Using a density-based segmentation method, we show that false PII redactions are disproportionately concentrated in math-dense regions, confirming numeric ambiguity as a key failure mode. We then compare four detection strategies: a Presidio baseline and LLM-based approaches with basic, math-aware, and segment-aware prompting. Math-aware prompting substantially improves performance over the baseline (F1: 0.821 vs. 0.379) while reducing numeric false positives, demonstrating that de-identification must incorporate domain context to preserve analytic utility. This work provides both a new benchmark and evidence that utility-preserving de-identification for tutoring data requires domain-aware modeling.

Agent skills extend AI agents with reusable instructions, tools, scripts, references, and workflows, establishing a security boundary distinct from both model safety and traditional package-malware detection. ClawHub Security Signals is a sanitized dataset of 67,453 latest public OpenClaw skill versions. Each row pairs redacted SKILL.md content and sanitized bundled files where present with a final ClawScan registry verdict and evidence from three scanner families: VirusTotal, static heuristic analysis, and NVIDIA SkillSpector. Rather than estimating malicious-skill prevalence, we study scanner disagreement. The three scanners rarely flag the same skills: any pair overlaps on at most 10.4% of their combined positives, only 0.69% of skills are flagged by all three, and 81.9% of flagged skills are identified by a single scanner. The disagreement is structured by attack surface. SkillSpector, which raises semantic agentic-risk advisories rather than malware-reputation signals, is positive for 19,209 of 25,504 suspicious rows (75.3%) but only 14 of 206 malicious rows (6.8%). The malicious-verdict region shows the inverse profile: 150 of 206 malicious rows (72.8%) are VirusTotal-positive, consistent with bundled-code malware evidence. These results show that agent-skill security requires layered governance, not single-scanner allow/block decisions. The corpus is released as a sanitized silver-standard dataset: labels are the registry's automated verdicts, not human-annotated ground truth, and the release represents an early, versioned snapshot intended to support the community while a human-annotated subset is developed. Further research is encouraged, including models tailored for skill-security triage.

In this paper, we provide a large audio-visual speaker recognition dataset, VoxBlink2, which includes approximately 10M utterances with videos from 110K+ speakers in the wild. This dataset represents a significant expansion over the VoxBlink dataset, encompassing a broader diversity of speakers and scenarios by the grace of an optimized data collection pipeline. Afterward, we explore the impact of training strategies, data scale, and model complexity on speaker verification and finally establish a new single-model state-of-the-art EER at 0.170% and minDCF at 0.006% on the VoxCeleb1-O test set. Such remarkable results motivate us to explore speaker recognition from a new challenging perspective. We raise the Open-Set Speaker-Identification task, which is designed to either match a probe utterance with a known gallery speaker or categorize it as an unknown query. Associated with this task, we design concrete benchmark and evaluation protocols. The data and model resources can be found in http://voxblink2.github.io.

Inference-time safety methods for large language models have proliferated, yet no systematic comparison exists. We evaluate five defense paradigms (no defense, static steering, CAST, AlphaSteer, probe-gated) across seven instruction-tuned models (7-31B) and five attack types (GCG, AutoDAN, DeepInception, prefilling, intent laundering). Our central finding: prompt-time activation defenses are structurally blind to prefilling attacks. AlphaSteer achieves 0% attack success on GCG, AutoDAN, and intent laundering but 50% on prefilling. We prove a corollary: any defense that gates intervention on a single layer's activation alignment with a benign reference (cone, subspace, or null-space) is blind to attacks that craft activations to lie inside that reference, whether checked at prompt time or per token. As its constructive contrapositive we introduce response-time probing: a linear probe on the model's hidden state at the first generated tokens, with AUROC 0.97-1.00 across all seven models. Combined with a halt, it cuts prefilling attack success to 0/40 on every model with 0% benign false positives, outperforming Llama Guard 3. Cross-template generalisation depends on probe depth, so we scope the claim to the canonical prefilling-template family. Composing the response-halt with AlphaSteer's null-space steering gives an orthogonal split (the halt catches prefilling, AlphaSteer catches semantic attacks), reaching defense success 0.983 on Mistral and 0.994 on Llama and dominating both components. We further show MMLU fails to capture steering's true utility cost, which appears as behavioral hedging rather than factual loss, and that diverse negative training sets cut probe false positives from 80-100% to near zero. Code, attacks, per-sample results, and the judge prompt are released.

The widespread usage of large-scale multimodal models like CLIP has heightened concerns about the leakage of PII. Existing methods for identity inference in CLIP models require querying the model with full PII, including textual descriptions of the person and corresponding images (e.g., the name and the face photo of the person). However, applying images may risk exposing personal information to target models, as the image might not have been previously encountered by the target model. Additionally, previous MIAs train shadow models to mimic the behaviors of the target model, which incurs high computational costs, especially for large CLIP models. To address these challenges, we propose a textual unimodal detector (TUNI) in CLIP models, a novel technique for identity inference that: 1) only utilizes text data to query the target model; and 2) eliminates the need for training shadow models. Extensive experiments of TUNI across various CLIP model architectures and datasets demonstrate its superior performance over baselines, albeit with only text data.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become more pervasive across various users and scenarios, identifying potential issues when using these models becomes essential. Examples of such issues include: bias, inconsistencies, and hallucination. Although auditing the LLM for these problems is often warranted, such a process is neither easy nor accessible for most. An effective method is to probe the LLM using different versions of the same question. This could expose inconsistencies in its knowledge or operation, indicating potential for bias or hallucination. However, to operationalize this auditing method at scale, we need an approach to create those probes reliably and automatically. In this paper we propose the LLMAuditor framework which is an automatic, and scalable solution, where one uses a different LLM along with human-in-the-loop (HIL). This approach offers verifiability and transparency, while avoiding circular reliance on the same LLM, and increasing scientific rigor and generalizability. Specifically, LLMAuditor includes two phases of verification using humans: standardized evaluation criteria to verify responses, and a structured prompt template to generate desired probes. A case study using questions from the TruthfulQA dataset demonstrates that we can generate a reliable set of probes from one LLM that can be used to audit inconsistencies in a different LLM. This process is enhanced by our structured prompt template with HIL, which not only boosts the reliability of our approach in auditing but also yields the delivery of less hallucinated results. The novelty of our research stems from the development of a comprehensive, general-purpose framework that includes a HIL verified prompt template for auditing responses generated by LLMs.

Determining the family to which a malicious file belongs is an essential component of cyberattack investigation, attribution, and remediation. Performing this task manually is time consuming and requires expert knowledge. Automated tools using that label malware using antivirus detections lack accuracy and/or scalability, making them insufficient for real-world applications. Three pervasive shortcomings in these tools are responsible: (1) incorrect parsing of antivirus detections, (2) errors during family alias resolution, and (3) an inappropriate antivirus aggregation strategy. To address each of these, we created our own malware family labeling tool called ClarAVy. ClarAVy utilizes a Variational Bayesian approach to aggregate detections from a collection of antivirus products into accurate family labels. Our tool scales to enormous malware datasets, and we evaluated it by labeling approx40 million malicious files. ClarAVy has 8 and 12 percentage points higher accuracy than the prior leading tool in labeling the MOTIF and MalPedia datasets, respectively.

LLM-powered search agents are increasingly being used for multi-step information seeking tasks, yet the IR community lacks empirical understanding of how agentic search sessions unfold and how retrieved evidence is used. This paper presents a large-scale log analysis of agentic search based on 14.44M search requests (3.97M sessions) collected from DeepResearchGym, i.e. an open-source search API accessed by external agentic clients. We sessionize the logs, assign session-level intents and step-wise query-reformulation labels using LLM-based annotation, and propose Context-driven Term Adoption Rate (CTAR) to quantify whether newly introduced query terms are traceable to previously retrieved evidence. Our analyses reveal distinctive behavioral patterns. First, over 90% of multi-turn sessions contain at most ten steps, and 89% of inter-step intervals fall under one minute. Second, behavior varies by intent. Fact-seeking sessions exhibit high repetition that increases over time, while sessions requiring reasoning sustain broader exploration. Third, agents reuse evidence across steps. On average, 54% of newly introduced query terms appear in the accumulated evidence context, with contributions from earlier steps beyond the most recent retrieval. The findings suggest that agentic search may benefit from repetition-aware early stopping, intent-adaptive retrieval budgets, and explicit cross-step context tracking. We plan to release the anonymized logs to support future research.

Despite their capabilities, Large Language Models (LLMs) remain opaque with limited understanding of their internal representations. Current interpretability methods, such as direct logit attribution (DLA) and sparse autoencoders (SAEs), provide restricted insight due to limitations such as the model's output vocabulary or unclear feature names. This work introduces Hyperdimensional Probe, a novel paradigm for decoding information from the LLM vector space. It combines ideas from symbolic representations and neural probing to project the model's residual stream into interpretable concepts via Vector Symbolic Architectures (VSAs). This probe combines the strengths of SAEs and conventional probes while overcoming their key limitations. We validate our decoding paradigm with controlled input-completion tasks, probing the model's final state before next-token prediction on inputs spanning syntactic pattern recognition, key-value associations, and abstract inference. We further assess it in a question-answering setting, examining the state of the model both before and after text generation. Our experiments show that our probe reliably extracts meaningful concepts across varied LLMs, embedding sizes, and input domains, also helping identify LLM failures. Our work advances information decoding in LLM vector space, enabling extracting more informative, interpretable, and structured features from neural representations.

Personal AI is moving beyond chat-only interaction toward continuous services that span phones, cars, homes, wearables, cameras, and tools. In this setting, memory cannot remain a cache of prior conversations. It should serve as a continuity and governance substrate: preserving durable user state, grounding answers in multimodal and device evidence, supporting correction and forgetting, bounding policy evolution, and remaining deployable under latency, cost, privacy, and edge-cloud constraints. This technical report presents Mi-Memory, a lifecycle memory framework for Personal AI organized around four roles: Structure, Expansion, Evolution, and Deployment. A shared audit contract links these roles through four recurring artifact families: typed evidence payloads preserve source identity and provenance, diagnostic traces localize evidence loss across the serving pipeline, strategy artifacts make memory-policy changes explicit, and gate/rollback records bound accepted evolution. MiMemory instantiates the roles through MemStack, MemSense/MemFuse, D^{2}ACCI/E^{2}MEND, and LiteMem. In controlled-reference Structure evaluations, MemStack reaches 93.59%, 57.24%, and 87.47% on LoCoMo, PersonaMem-V2, and LongMemEval, respectively; other tracks report module-level, preliminary/internal, transfer-feasibility, or design-only evidence with explicit boundaries. MiMemory is a step toward auditable, evidence-gated, and deployment-aware memory systems for Personal AI. Project homepage: https://darwin-agent.github.io/Mi-Memory/ .

With the rise of deep learning in various applications, privacy concerns around the protection of training data has become a critical area of research. Whereas prior studies have focused on privacy risks in single-modal models, we introduce a novel method to assess privacy for multi-modal models, specifically vision-language models like CLIP. The proposed Identity Inference Attack (IDIA) reveals whether an individual was included in the training data by querying the model with images of the same person. Letting the model choose from a wide variety of possible text labels, the model reveals whether it recognizes the person and, therefore, was used for training. Our large-scale experiments on CLIP demonstrate that individuals used for training can be identified with very high accuracy. We confirm that the model has learned to associate names with depicted individuals, implying the existence of sensitive information that can be extracted by adversaries. Our results highlight the need for stronger privacy protection in large-scale models and suggest that IDIAs can be used to prove the unauthorized use of data for training and to enforce privacy laws.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can comply with harmful instructions, raising serious safety concerns despite their impressive capabilities. Recent work has leveraged probing-based approaches to study the separability of malicious and benign inputs in LLMs' internal representations, and researchers have proposed using such probing methods for safety detection. We systematically re-examine this paradigm. Motivated by poor out-of-distribution performance, we hypothesize that probes learn superficial patterns rather than semantic harmfulness. Through controlled experiments, we confirm this hypothesis and identify the specific patterns learned: instructional patterns and trigger words. Our investigation follows a systematic approach, progressing from demonstrating comparable performance of simple n-gram methods, to controlled experiments with semantically cleaned datasets, to detailed analysis of pattern dependencies. These results reveal a false sense of security around current probing-based approaches and highlight the need to redesign both models and evaluation protocols, for which we provide further discussions in the hope of suggesting responsible further research in this direction. We have open-sourced the project at https://github.com/WangCheng0116/Why-Probe-Fails.

We consider a scenario where we have access to the target domain, but cannot afford on-the-fly training data annotation, and instead would like to construct an alternative training set from a large-scale data pool such that a competitive model can be obtained. We propose a search and pruning (SnP) solution to this training data search problem, tailored to object re-identification (re-ID), an application aiming to match the same object captured by different cameras. Specifically, the search stage identifies and merges clusters of source identities which exhibit similar distributions with the target domain. The second stage, subject to a budget, then selects identities and their images from the Stage I output, to control the size of the resulting training set for efficient training. The two steps provide us with training sets 80\% smaller than the source pool while achieving a similar or even higher re-ID accuracy. These training sets are also shown to be superior to a few existing search methods such as random sampling and greedy sampling under the same budget on training data size. If we release the budget, training sets resulting from the first stage alone allow even higher re-ID accuracy. We provide interesting discussions on the specificity of our method to the re-ID problem and particularly its role in bridging the re-ID domain gap. The code is available at https://github.com/yorkeyao/SnP.

Tool-augmented LLM agents tend to call tools indiscriminately, even when the model can answer directly. Each unnecessary call wastes API fees and latency, yet no existing benchmark systematically studies when a tool call is actually needed. We propose When2Tool, a benchmark of 18 environments (15 single-hop, 3 multi-hop) spanning three categories of tool necessity -- computational scale, knowledge boundaries, and execution reliability -- each with controlled difficulty levels that create a clear decision boundary between tool-necessary and tool-unnecessary tasks. We evaluate two families of training-free baselines: Prompt-only (varying the prompt to discourage unnecessary calls) and Reason-then-Act (requiring the model to reason about tool necessity before acting). Both provide limited control: Prompt-only suppresses necessary calls alongside unnecessary ones, and Reason-then-Act still incurs a disproportionate accuracy cost on hard tasks. To understand why these baselines fail, we probe the models' hidden states and find that tool necessity is linearly decodable from the pre-generation representation with AUROC 0.89--0.96 across six models, substantially exceeding the model's own verbalized reasoning. This reveals that models already know when tools are needed, but fail to act on this knowledge during generation. Building on this finding, we propose Probe&Prefill, which uses a lightweight linear probe to read the hidden-state signal and prefills the model's response with a steering sentence. Across all models tested, Probe&Prefill reduces tool calls by 48% with only 1.7% accuracy loss, while the best baseline at comparable accuracy only reduces 6% of tool calls, or achieves a similar tool call reduction but incurs a 5times higher accuracy loss. Our code is available at https://github.com/Trustworthy-ML-Lab/when2tool

Autonomous research systems increasingly make the scientific workflow executable: agents can propose ideas, run code, inspect results, and draft papers. But executable workflows do not by themselves produce research judgment. We analyze where current systems lose trial experience: weak evidence becomes prose, pilot signals become broad claims, memory remains textual, and recurring process failures do not change later behavior. We introduce Sibyl-AutoResearch, a self-evolving AutoResearch framework built around Scientific Trial-and-Error Harnesses. A harness lets agents run bounded trials, preserve positive and negative outcomes, and route lessons into later planning, validation, claim scope, scheduling, critique, writing, and harness repair. We formalize this through two auditable conversion units: trial-to-behavior conversion, which links trial signals to later research actions, and trial-to-harness-behavior conversion, which links recurring process failures to system updates. We implement the framework in SIBYL, a file-backed autonomous research system that exposes the state, roles, memory, gates, and artifact traces needed to inspect these conversion paths. A retrospective audit identifies eight high-confidence conversion events, with a median latency of one iteration and a maximum latency of three iterations. A recovered-failure registry further shows how five naturally occurring failure classes, including duplicate results, stale numbers, and unsupported statistics, were blocked, downgraded, or routed into later repair. These traces do not establish a comparative performance claim; they show that the proposed conversion units are recoverable from realistic autonomous-research workspaces. The SIBYL framework and system are available at https://github.com/Sibyl-Research-Team/AutoResearch-SibylSystem.

Distributed applications need identifiers that satisfy storage efficiency, chronological sortability, origin metadata embedding, zero-lookup verifiability, confidentiality for external consumers, and multi-century addressability. Based on our literature survey, no existing scheme provides all six of these identifier properties within a unified system. This paper introduces Source Known Identifiers (SKIDs), a three-tier identity system that projects a single entity identity across trust boundaries, addressing all six properties. The first tier, Source Known ID (SKID), is a 64-bit signed integer embedding a timestamp with a 250-millisecond precision, application topology, and a per-entity-type sequence counter. It serves as the database primary key, providing compact storage (8 bytes) and natural B-tree ordering for optimized database indexing. The second tier, Source Known Entity ID (SKEID), extends the SKID into a 128-bit Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) compatible value by adding an entity type discriminator, an epoch selector, and a BLAKE3 keyed message authentication code (MAC). SKEIDs enable zero-lookup verification of identifier origin, integrity, and entity type within trusted environments, with a big-endian byte layout that preserves chronological ordering in lexicographic UUID string comparisons. The third tier, Secure SKEID, encrypts the entire SKEID using AES-256 symmetric encryption as a single-block pseudorandom permutation, producing ciphertext indistinguishable from random bytes while remaining compatible with standard UUID data-type parsers in string representation. Deterministic bidirectional transformations connect all three tiers.

Zero-shot anomaly detection (ZSAD) targets the identification of anomalies within images from arbitrary novel categories. This study introduces AdaCLIP for the ZSAD task, leveraging a pre-trained vision-language model (VLM), CLIP. AdaCLIP incorporates learnable prompts into CLIP and optimizes them through training on auxiliary annotated anomaly detection data. Two types of learnable prompts are proposed: static and dynamic. Static prompts are shared across all images, serving to preliminarily adapt CLIP for ZSAD. In contrast, dynamic prompts are generated for each test image, providing CLIP with dynamic adaptation capabilities. The combination of static and dynamic prompts is referred to as hybrid prompts, and yields enhanced ZSAD performance. Extensive experiments conducted across 14 real-world anomaly detection datasets from industrial and medical domains indicate that AdaCLIP outperforms other ZSAD methods and can generalize better to different categories and even domains. Finally, our analysis highlights the importance of diverse auxiliary data and optimized prompts for enhanced generalization capacity. Code is available at https://github.com/caoyunkang/AdaCLIP.

Production LLM coding agents drift over long sessions: they forget user-specified constraints, slip into mistakes the user already flagged, and confabulate prior agreements. White-box approaches such as persona vectors require model weights and so cannot be applied to closed APIs (Claude, GPT-4) that most users actually interact with. We present Nautilus Compass, a black-box persona drift detector and agent memory layer for production coding agents. The method operates entirely at the prompt-text layer: cosine similarity between user prompts and behavioral anchor texts, aggregated by a weighted top-k mean using BGE-m3 embeddings. Compass is, to our knowledge, the only public agent memory layer (among Mem0, Letta, Cognee, Zep, MemOS, smrti verified May 2026) that does not call an LLM at index time to extract facts or build a graph; raw conversation text is embedded directly. The system ships as a Claude Code plugin, an MCP 2024-11-05 A2A server (Cursor, Cline, Hermes), a CLI, and a REST API on one daemon, with a Merkle-chained audit log for tamper-evident anchor updates. On a held-out test set built from real Claude Code session traces and labeled by an independent LLM judge, Compass reaches ROC AUC 0.83 for drift detection. The embedded retrieval pipeline scores 56.6% on LongMemEval-S v0.8 and 44.4% on EverMemBench-Dynamic (n=500), topping the four published EverMemBench Table 4 baselines. LongMemEval-S 56.6% is ~30 points below recent white-box leaders (90+%); we treat that as the architectural ceiling of the no-extraction design. End-to-end reproduction cost is $3.50 (~14x cheaper than GPT-4o-judged stacks). A paired cross-vendor behavior A/B accompanies these numbers as preliminary system-level evidence. Code, anchors, frozen test data, and audit-log tooling are MIT-licensed at github.com/chunxiaoxx/nautilus-compass.

Apollo did not reach the Moon merely because its engineers could solve difficult equations. It succeeded by turning a distant ambition into a mission architecture of explicit objectives, simulation, verification, and repeated correction. AI now faces a similar transition: frontier models can solve difficult tasks once the problem, tools, and success criteria are specified, yet consequential real-world challenges rarely arrive in an executable or verifiable form. We introduce Apodex Discovery, a framework for building and evaluating discoverative AI through the heavy-duty solver, a system comprising a foundation model, harness, tools, and control policies that pursues extended, stateful, verifiable investigations. It has three core components. First, a problem-scouting process surveyed 561 industries across 16 sectors, assembled 423 high-value real-world problems, and selected 20 for the initial release. Second, a common environment-task-episode abstraction provides data, tools, constraints, feedback, trajectory recording, and verification of intermediate artifacts and final submissions. Third, HDS6 evaluates Tools, Repair, Alternatives, Coherence, Evidence, and Scope independently of final-task success. In AAV capsid design, Apodex surpassed the published state of the art by 7% across viability, tropism, structure prediction, and generative design. In drug repurposing and reformulation, a task-specific biomedical environment improved the mean normalized prediction score of GPT-5.5 and GPT-5.6-sol by 2.5 and 7.6 points over the same closed-book backbone. Controlled ablations show that the fixed TRACES episode interface enables attribution of performance differences to specific solver components. Apodex Discovery moves AI evaluation beyond predefined benchmarks toward verifiable investigations aimed at genuine discovery.

AI-generated image detectors achieve high accuracy on in-distribution data but often fail on unseen generators. A key obstacle to understanding this failure is the black-box nature of current detectors: they do not reveal which evidence drives their decisions. We propose ForensicConcept, a framework that extracts explicit forensic concepts from detectors and enables their transfer across backbones. Our method localizes decision-critical patches via Transformer attribution, clusters them into a compact concept codebook, and uses a concept-aligned projection to produce auditable evidence readouts. Motivated by prior studies showing that DINO representations can guide diffusion generation and exhibit concept-level correspondence with diffusion features, we introduce a generation-trace reference based on CleanDIFT diffusion features and quantify backbone-trace alignment via neighborhood-structure consistency (CKNNA). We further propose concept codebook injection to transfer diffusion-derived concepts into target backbones. Experiments on GenImage, GAN-family, and Chameleon benchmarks show consistent improvements over prior methods. We also find that CKNNA alignment predicts transfer effectiveness, providing a principled explanation for why some backbones yield more transferable forensic evidence than others.

Some security-development settings require local models that map an objective to an ordered, checkable plan. We present a low-rank decomposition adapter and release a case-disjoint corpus with 24 authored decompositions and 83 derived next-step examples across 24 satellite-security cases. To prevent reference-plan leakage, prompts contain one objective and eight shuffled SPARTA candidates. The evaluation candidate sets are constructed with oracle inclusion of every reference technique, so this study measures selection from a controlled set, not retrieval. On six fixed cases and five decoding seeds, mean scores vary across adapters and prompted Qwen2.5 baselines; a separate greedy check over three adapter training seeds shows non-negligible training variance. A 24-fold greedy leave-one-case-out control at the two compact sizes likewise shows tradeoffs: at 1.5B, adapter precision is 0.583 against 0.480 for two-shot prompting, while recall is 0.586 against 0.660. Case-resampling intervals for adapter precision relative to the strongest prompted baseline cross zero at 1.5B and 7B. The adapter is also substantially more format-compliant, which prevents attributing all score differences to selection. Autoregressive next-step accuracy is 0.08, 0.06, and 0.29 at 0.5B, 1.5B, and 7B. We therefore offer the formulation, leakage-controlled dataset, reproducibility package, and descriptive analysis as a proof of concept, not evidence of a reliable stand-alone decomposition system or a general adapter advantage. A separate diagnostic tests contract reuse.

As LLM agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent systems, they introduce risks of covert coordination that may evade standard forms of human oversight. While linear probes on model activations have shown promise for detecting deception in single-agent settings, collusion is inherently a multi-agent phenomenon, and the use of internal representations for detecting collusion between agents remains unexplored. We introduce NARCBench, a benchmark for evaluating collusion detection under environment distribution shift, and propose five probing techniques that aggregate per-agent deception scores to classify scenarios at the group level. Our probes achieve 1.00 AUROC in-distribution and 0.60--0.86 AUROC when transferred zero-shot to structurally different multi-agent scenarios and a steganographic blackjack card-counting task. We find that no single probing technique dominates across all collusion types, suggesting that different forms of collusion manifest differently in activation space. We also find preliminary evidence that this signal is localised at the token level, with the colluding agent's activations spiking specifically when processing the encoded parts of their partner's message. This work takes a step toward multi-agent interpretability: extending white-box inspection from single models to multi-agent contexts, where detection requires aggregating signals across agents. These results suggest that model internals provide a complementary signal to text-level monitoring for detecting multi-agent collusion, particularly for organisations with access to model activations. Code and data are available at https://github.com/aaronrose227/narcbench.

We propose a methodology that allows communication with Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) using natural language. In particular, we represent P&IDs through the DEXPI data model as labeled property graphs and integrate them with Large Language Models (LLMs). The approach consists of three main parts: 1) P&IDs are cast into a graph representation from the DEXPI format using our pyDEXPI Python package. 2) A tool for generating P&ID knowledge graphs from pyDEXPI. 3) Integration of the P&ID knowledge graph to LLMs using graph-based retrieval augmented generation (graph-RAG). This approach allows users to communicate with P&IDs using natural language. It extends LLM's ability to retrieve contextual data from P&IDs and mitigate hallucinations. Leveraging the LLM's large corpus, the model is also able to interpret process information in PIDs, which could help engineers in their daily tasks. In the future, this work will also open up opportunities in the context of other generative Artificial Intelligence (genAI) solutions on P&IDs, and AI-assisted HAZOP studies.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) enhances language models by retrieving and incorporating relevant external knowledge. However, traditional retrieve-and-generate processes may not be optimized for real-world scenarios, where queries might require multiple retrieval steps or none at all. In this paper, we propose a Probing-RAG, which utilizes the hidden state representations from the intermediate layers of language models to adaptively determine the necessity of additional retrievals for a given query. By employing a pre-trained prober, Probing-RAG effectively captures the model's internal cognition, enabling reliable decision-making about retrieving external documents. Experimental results across five open-domain QA datasets demonstrate that Probing-RAG outperforms previous methods while reducing the number of redundant retrieval steps.

AI coding agents are reshaping software development through both autonomous and human-mediated pull requests (PRs). When developers use AI agents to generate code under their own accounts, code authorship attribution becomes critical for repository governance, research validity, and understanding modern development practices. We present the first study on fingerprinting AI coding agents, analyzing 33,580 PRs from five major agents (OpenAI Codex, GitHub Copilot, Devin, Cursor, Claude Code) to identify behavioral signatures. With 41 features spanning commit messages, PR structure, and code characteristics, we achieve 97.2% F1-score in multi-class agent identification. We uncover distinct fingerprints: Codex shows unique multiline commit patterns (67.5% feature importance), and Claude Code exhibits distinctive code structure (27.2% importance of conditional statements). These signatures reveal that AI coding tools produce detectable behavioral patterns, suggesting potential for identifying AI contributions in software repositories.

A situated query like "where is Lin Wei?" often encodes more than its literal content: the user may also want to know whether Lin Wei is free, in a good mood, or worth interrupting now. Standard tool-use agents answer the literal question and stop. AURA inserts an inference step between scene perception and tool use that produces an IntentFrame: a structured estimate of the implicit need with a scalar gap score that controls per-query probe budget and tool selection. On a 100-query four-scene implicit-intent benchmark, AURA improves implicit-need coverage over ReAct-style probing (Delta = +0.07, p < 10^-6); three of four scenes are individually significant, the gain reproduces on a second backbone, and a prompt ablation attributes the lift to gap calibration rather than answer memorisation. On factual lookup the controller trades raw accuracy for 82% fewer probes and zero forbidden-tool violations on a privacy-sensitive slice; scope conditions are detailed in Limitations. Code, simulator, and benchmark are released at https://github.com/innovation64/AURA.

Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) is being used to search for indicators of attacks that might have compromised an enterprise network for a long time without being discovered. To have a more effective analysis, CTI open standards have incorporated descriptive relationships showing how the indicators or observables are related to each other. However, these relationships are either completely overlooked in information gathering or not used for threat hunting. In this paper, we propose a system, called POIROT, which uses these correlations to uncover the steps of a successful attack campaign. We use kernel audits as a reliable source that covers all causal relations and information flows among system entities and model threat hunting as an inexact graph pattern matching problem. Our technical approach is based on a novel similarity metric which assesses an alignment between a query graph constructed out of CTI correlations and a provenance graph constructed out of kernel audit log records. We evaluate POIROT on publicly released real-world incident reports as well as reports of an adversarial engagement designed by DARPA, including ten distinct attack campaigns against different OS platforms such as Linux, FreeBSD, and Windows. Our evaluation results show that POIROT is capable of searching inside graphs containing millions of nodes and pinpoint the attacks in a few minutes, and the results serve to illustrate that CTI correlations could be used as robust and reliable artifacts for threat hunting.

Long-horizon robot manipulation tends to fail gradually: one bad step degrades the state, and the policy spirals into a basin from which it cannot recover. The failure is often visible before it happens. We introduce AEGIS (Activation-probe Early-warning, Gated Inference Switching), a selective escalation method that uses a lightweight probe on a weak policy's frozen activations to detect high-risk steps while there is still time to act. When the probe flags a step, control switches to a stronger separate policy, but only for the steps that need it. On LIBERO-Spatial, AEGIS recovers 10.1% of the trajectories the weak policy alone loses, versus 4.6% for budget-matched blind escalation and 5.1% for a random-trigger placebo. These gains are significant under one-sided exact paired McNemar tests with Holm-Bonferroni adjustment over three pre-registered contrasts: +5.4pp over blind escalation, p=8.5e-6; +5.0pp over random triggering, p=1.0e-4; paired-trajectory bootstrap CIs exclude zero. AEGIS activates the stronger policy on only 38% of steps, so the lever is timing rather than compute. The probe clears its precondition with an early-window AUROC of 0.764, 95% CI [0.70, 0.84], read from the weak-policy path over the first 30% of trajectory steps before any handoff. We pre-register the full analysis plan, including a conditional recovered-task-rate estimand and explicit kill criteria, and confirm the result on 700 common-random-number episodes per arm, with nA-fail=646.

We introduce Tencent WorkBuddy Bench, a multi-domain evaluation suite for coding agents; this report documents its construction methodology, scoring protocol, and a cross-model leaderboard. At its core is a unified evaluation framework for constructing and running distribution-informed coding-agent tasks across four work domains - Code, Web, Office, and Security. Rather than adapting public issue text, every task is reverse-engineered from a real commit, pull request, or business scenario and rewritten as a short, colloquial, role-played request, so that a task's prompt is not recoverable by web-searching the underlying issue, pull request, or commit thread. Because the dataset is released openly - task directories, environment images, evaluation harness, tests, and reference solutions - contamination resistance rests on this construction together with dataset versioning rather than on secrecy. The four subsets - repository-level engineering, front-end development, office and business workflows, and red-/blue-team security - probe complementary facets of real work, each with its own verification style. All are packaged in a uniform task-directory format and run, under a uniform and reproducible protocol, on two agent harnesses (CodeBuddy Code and Claude Code); the full open release makes the benchmark reproducible end to end and directly auditable, since any third party can re-run each task and inspect its content. Because each subset uses a different scoring instrument, scores are not comparable across subsets and the suite reports no suite-wide average. We report a cross-model leaderboard across several model families.