Daily Papers

Electroencephalography (EEG) foundation models hold significant promise for universal Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs). However, existing approaches often rely on end-to-end fine-tuning and exhibit limited efficacy under frozen-probing protocols, lacking the intrinsic universality required for broad generalization. This limitation stems from adapting general-purpose sequence architectures that overlook the biophysical and dynamical principles of neural activity. To bridge this gap, we propose DeeperBrain, a neuro-grounded foundation model integrating domain-specific inductive biases into its model design and learning objectives. Architecturally, DeeperBrain incorporates a volume conduction-aware channel encoding to model spatial mixing via 3D geometry, and a neurodynamics-aware temporal encoding capturing slow adaptations using oscillatory and exponential bases. For pretraining, we introduce a dual-objective strategy combining Masked EEG Reconstruction (MER) for local fidelity and Neurodynamics Statistics Prediction (NSP). NSP enforces alignment with macroscopic brain states by predicting interpretable order parameters, including spectral power, functional connectivity, cross-frequency coupling, and dynamic complexity. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DeeperBrain achieves state-of-the-art or highly competitive performance under end-to-end fine-tuning. Crucially, it maintains superior efficacy under a rigorous frozen-probing protocol, verifying that embedding neuroscientific first principles endows learned representations with the intrinsic universality essential for universal BCI. The code will be publicly available.

Progress in genomic foundation models is difficult to assess due to fragmented benchmarks, incompatible evaluation protocols, and task-specific reporting. As a result, claims of superiority or generality across models are often not directly comparable. We introduce GENEB, a large-scale diagnostic benchmark that evaluates frozen representations from 40 genomic foundation models across 100 tasks spanning 13 functional categories under a unified probing-based protocol, including few-shot regimes. GENEB enables controlled comparison across model scale, architecture, tokenization, and pretraining data while explicitly exposing task-level trade-offs. Our analysis shows that aggregate leaderboards are unstable: model rankings vary sharply across task categories, scale provides only modest and inconsistent gains, and architectural and pretraining alignment frequently outweigh parameter count. These results highlight limitations of current evaluation practices and position GENEB as a reference framework for principled comparison and category-aware model selection in genomic machine learning.

Diagnosing 802.11 packet captures requires expert protocol knowledge, is slow, inconsistent across engineers, and unscalable. LLM-based approaches sound plausible but fabricate protocol events absent from captures (especially truncated traces), produce uncalibrated confidence scores, and suffer evaluation bias when golden references are co-produced by the model under test. We introduce PROBE (Protocol Reasoning Over evidence-Based Ensembles), a multi-stage pipeline addressing all three failures. It integrates (i) deterministic PCAP-to-text normalization with frame-level verifiability, (ii) multi-run, multi-candidate ensembles with optional cross-model second opinion and progressive obfuscation, (iii) a verdict-aware evidence framework treating absence of failure evidence as contributing evidence, and (iv) a fully deterministic composite reliability score from evidence validity, run-to-run stability, and cross-model agreement without LLM self-assessment. On 87 enterprise Wi-Fi captures (104 capture-reviewer pairs), single-pass LLM analysis raises weighted evidence F1 from 0.871 (expert baseline) to 0.912 but misses critical frames in 35% of cases. Naive ensemble voting drops below baseline (0.842) as majority voting amplifies conservative verdicts: 50% of confirmed failures are misclassified as 'no issue' or 'insufficient evidence.' Adding evidence-grounded reconciliation achieves 0.957 F1, a 96% auto-accept rate, and a worst-case floor above 0.70. LLM self-reported confidence clusters at 0.95 regardless of difficulty (71% report exactly 0.95), confirming it is uninformative. We also introduce a model-agnostic evaluation framework using per-field assertion matching, eliminating circular bias from model-co-produced golden references.

Production LLM agents such as Claude Code and Codex operate over untrusted content, files, commands, and workspace state, making safety failures directly actionable. Red-teaming must therefore keep pace with evolving models and tools. Existing approaches mainly optimize attack success and preserve artifacts such as benchmarks, payloads, or attack programs, which record where attacks succeed but not the enabling conditions behind unsafe agent behavior. We study automated red-teaming for production LLM agents using one agentic research environment to discover reusable vulnerability knowledge about another. We present AHA, a falsifiable discovery loop that proposes a vulnerability hypothesis, constructs a falsifier, instantiates a valid attack, executes it in a sandboxed harness, reflects on the trajectory, and promotes confirmed findings into a Vulnerability Concept Graph (VCG). Each concept links an attacker-facing surface to an unsafe trajectory through a claim, enabling condition, falsifier, transfer prediction, and supporting evidence. Across Claude Code and Codex on three scenarios covering direct and indirect attacks, the discovered concepts reveal a reusable vulnerability core across models and agents. A frozen VCG requires no further search and outperforms the strongest frozen discovery baseline by 14.2 percentage points under the same single-shot protocol, while transferring across scenarios and attack channels. The resulting VCG provides an auditable artifact for production safety teams to inspect vulnerabilities, validate patches, and accumulate reusable safety knowledge. Our code is available at https://github.com/henrymao2004/Auto-research-red-teaming-in-sleep.

Can multi-agent communication pressure extract discrete, compositional representations of invisible physical properties from frozen video features? We show that agents communicating through a Gumbel-Softmax bottleneck with iterated learning develop positionally disentangled protocols for latent properties (elasticity, friction, mass ratio) without property labels or supervision on message structure. With 4 agents, 100% of 80 seeds converge to near-perfect compositionality (PosDis=0.999, holdout 98.3%). Controls confirm multi-agent structure -- not bandwidth or temporal coverage -- drives this effect. Causal intervention shows surgical property disruption (~15% drop on targeted property, <3% on others). A controlled backbone comparison reveals that the perceptual prior determines what is communicable: DINOv2 dominates on spatially-visible ramp physics (98.3% vs 95.1%), while V-JEPA 2 dominates on dynamics-only collision physics (87.4% vs 77.7%, d=2.74). Scale-matched (d=3.37) and frame-matched (d=6.53) controls attribute this gap entirely to video-native pretraining. The frozen protocol supports action-conditioned planning (91.5%) with counterfactual velocity reasoning (r=0.780). Validation on Physics 101 real camera footage confirms 85.6% mass-comparison accuracy on unseen objects, temporal dynamics contributing +11.2% beyond static appearance, agent-scaling compositionality replicating at 90% for 4 agents, and causal intervention extending to real video (d=1.87, p=0.022).

Probing is widely adopted in computer vision to faithfully evaluate self-supervised learning (SSL) embeddings, as finetuning may misrepresent their inherent quality. In contrast, audio SSL models still rely on finetuning because simple probing fails to unlock their full potential and alters their rankings when competing on AudioSet. Hence, a robust and efficient probing mechanism is required to guide the trajectory of audio SSL towards reliable and reproducible methods. We introduce Convex Gated Probing (CGP), a prototype-based method that significantly closes the gap between finetuning and probing in audio. CGP efficiently utilizes all frozen layers via a gating mechanism and exposes the location of latent task-relevant information. Guided by CGP as a reliable post-hoc evaluation probe, we rework the entire SSL pipeline of current best performing audio models that use legacy implementations of prior SSL methods. By refining data preprocessing, model architecture, and pretraining recipe, we introduce Better Audio Transformer (BAT), and establish new SOTA on audio benchmarks.

This position paper argues that computer science conferences should require tamper-evident, nonrepudiable attestations of experimental results. We name the underlying problem experiment nonrepudiation: a compliant protocol must bind the numbers in a paper to an actual executed computation in a way the author cannot later alter or deny. The current system relies on self-reported checklists, optional code sharing, and author-controlled logging. None of these mechanisms answer the question a reviewer cannot check: did the code the paper describes produce the numbers the paper reports? We define the problem formally, state the security properties any compliant protocol must satisfy, and describe a threat model that includes attacks current approaches do not prevent. To show that the problem is solvable, we built K-Veritas, a reference implementation in Go that produces signed reports without accessing training data. K-Veritas is a testbed, not a finished answer. We call on conferences and the community to treat nonrepudiation as a first-class requirement and to help build an open, independent standard for it.

Current alignment evaluation mostly measures whether models encode dangerous concepts and whether they refuse harmful requests. Both miss the layer where alignment often operates: routing from concept detection to behavioral policy. We study political censorship in Chinese-origin language models as a natural experiment, using probes, surgical ablations, and behavioral tests across nine open-weight models from five labs. Three findings follow. First, probe accuracy alone is non-diagnostic: political probes, null controls, and permutation baselines can all reach 100%, so held-out category generalization is the informative test. Second, surgical ablation reveals lab-specific routing. Removing the political-sensitivity direction eliminates censorship and restores accurate factual output in most models tested, while one model confabulates because its architecture entangles factual knowledge with the censorship mechanism. Cross-model transfer fails, indicating that routing geometry is model- and lab-specific. Third, refusal is no longer the dominant censorship mechanism. Within one model family, hard refusal falls to zero while narrative steering rises to the maximum, making censorship invisible to refusal-only benchmarks. These results support a three-stage descriptive framework: detect, route, generate. Models often retain the relevant knowledge; alignment changes how that knowledge is expressed. Evaluations that audit only detection or refusal therefore miss the routing mechanism that most directly determines behavior.

Test-time reasoning is increasingly used as a serving-time control knob, but extra reasoning is not uniformly valuable: it can repair failed attempts, waste compute on already-correct answers, or introduce harmful answer changes. We study this as a deployment allocation problem rather than a new-verifier problem. We introduce \sevra, Selective Verification for Reasoning Allocation, a serving-layer controller that decides whether to preserve a frozen solver's initial answer or invoke active verification. Using a frozen Qwen3-4B solver, we log intervention outcomes and train recoverability-aware gates from serving-visible attempt state. On \mathfive, selective verification reaches 76.3\% accuracy, compared with 75.5\% for always verifying, while reducing post-generation tokens by 26.8\% and harmful flips from 2.2\% to 1.0\%. However, an 8,192-token initial solve reaches 76.0\% accuracy with 28\% fewer total model tokens, showing that selective recovery is useful but not the best tested cost frontier. In frozen transfer to \gsm, the selective policy verifies only 3.0\% of examples, improves accuracy from 93.4\% to 94.5\%, and reduces verification tokens by 91.2\% relative to always verifying; again, a longer initial solve matches its accuracy with fewer realized tokens. On CommonsenseQA, always-on verification hurts, while Self-Consistency@5 improves accuracy at about five times the realized token cost. The resulting deployment rule is: tune the initial budget first, then use selective recovery when explicit checks, bounded retries, auditability, or regression-risk control matter.

Diffusion large language models promise faster generation by refining many token positions in parallel, but this parallelism introduces a hidden control problem: which proposed tokens should be transferred into the partially decoded sequence at each step? We refer to this decision as token commitment. Existing frozen-generator decoders largely rely on hand-designed confidence rules or block-specific acceptance filters. We argue that token commitment can instead be learned as a reusable trace-state policy. We introduce TraceLock, a lightweight plug-in controller that instantiates this policy for a frozen diffusion language model. Since oracle commitment times are unavailable, TraceLock derives self-supervision from future stability: at decoding step t, a proposed token for position i is labeled stable if it matches the final token at position i after the full decoding trace completes. The controller scores variable-length trace states and decides which active token proposals should be committed to the partially decoded sequence. Once trained for a given frozen backbone, the controller can be deployed across local-window widths, generation lengths, and step budgets without retraining or per-setting calibration. Experiments on question answering, mathematical reasoning, and code generation show that TraceLock improves the quality-step tradeoff over heuristic and learned baselines, with particularly stable behavior under cross-setting deployment. Diagnostic analyses show that its decisions are not reducible to scalar confidence, suggesting that frozen diffusion language models expose a learnable space of commitment trajectories beyond confidence-based decoding. Code is available at https://github.com/BobSun98/TraceLock.

Large language models(LLMs) excel at text generation and knowledge question-answering tasks, but they are prone to generating hallucinated content, severely limiting their application in high-risk domains. Current hallucination detection methods based on uncertainty estimation and external knowledge retrieval suffer from the limitation that they still produce erroneous content at high confidence levels and rely heavily on retrieval efficiency and knowledge coverage. In contrast, probe methods that leverage the model's hidden-layer states offer real-time and lightweight advantages. However, traditional linear probes struggle to capture nonlinear structures in deep semantic spaces.To overcome these limitations, we propose a neural network-based framework for token-level hallucination detection. By freezing language model parameters, we employ lightweight MLP probes to perform nonlinear modeling of high-level hidden states. A multi-objective joint loss function is designed to enhance detection stability and semantic disambiguity. Additionally, we establish a layer position-probe performance response model, using Bayesian optimization to automatically search for optimal probe insertion layers and achieve superior training results.Experimental results on LongFact, HealthBench, and TriviaQA demonstrate that MLP probes significantly outperform state-of-the-art methods in accuracy, recall, and detection capability under low false-positive conditions.

Despite the emergence of diffusion large language models (D-LLMs) as an alternative to autoregressive large language models (AR-LLMs), safety monitoring for D-LLMs remains largely unexplored. Unlike AR-LLMs, D-LLMs generate text through a multi-step denoising process, exposing intermediate hidden representations that may contain safety-relevant information unavailable in standard single-step monitoring setups. Motivated by the suitability of lightweight probes for always-on monitoring, we analyze which trajectory-level signals best indicate when such probes are likely to struggle. We find that the most informative signal is safety hesitation: intermediate hidden states repeatedly falling within a small margin of the probe's decision boundary. The number of such hesitation steps in D-LLM's trajectory predicts probe failure effectively, providing a proxy of sample difficulty. Building on this analysis, we propose D^2-Monitor, a bi-level safety monitor for D-LLMs. D^2-Monitor adopts a lightweight probe as an always-on monitor to jointly estimate hesitation and perform base classification. When the hesitation level exceeds a threshold, a more expressive but computationally heavier probe is activated. This dynamic routing mechanism allocates monitoring resources efficiently at test time. Evaluated on 3 datasets (WildguardMix, ToxicChat, OpenAI-Moderation) across 4 D-LLMs, D^2-Monitor achieves state-of-the-art performance with a compact parameter footprint (leq 0.85M parameters), and exhibits the best trade-off between effectiveness and efficiency relative to 8 baselines.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can comply with harmful instructions, raising serious safety concerns despite their impressive capabilities. Recent work has leveraged probing-based approaches to study the separability of malicious and benign inputs in LLMs' internal representations, and researchers have proposed using such probing methods for safety detection. We systematically re-examine this paradigm. Motivated by poor out-of-distribution performance, we hypothesize that probes learn superficial patterns rather than semantic harmfulness. Through controlled experiments, we confirm this hypothesis and identify the specific patterns learned: instructional patterns and trigger words. Our investigation follows a systematic approach, progressing from demonstrating comparable performance of simple n-gram methods, to controlled experiments with semantically cleaned datasets, to detailed analysis of pattern dependencies. These results reveal a false sense of security around current probing-based approaches and highlight the need to redesign both models and evaluation protocols, for which we provide further discussions in the hope of suggesting responsible further research in this direction. We have open-sourced the project at https://github.com/WangCheng0116/Why-Probe-Fails.

We implement and benchmark on IBM Quantum hardware the circuit family proposed by Violaris for estimating operational inter-branch communication witnesses, defined as correlations in classical measurement records produced by compiled Wigner's-friend-style circuits. We realize a five-qubit instance of the protocol as an inter-register message-transfer pattern within a single circuit, rather than physical signaling, and evaluate its behavior under realistic device noise and compilation constraints. The circuit encodes branch-conditioned evolution of an observer subsystem whose dynamics depend on a control qubit, followed by a controlled transfer operation that probes correlations between conditional measurement contexts. Executing on the ibm_fez backend with 20000 shots, we observe population-based visibility of 0.877, coherence witnesses of 0.840 and -0.811 along orthogonal axes, and a phase-sensitive magnitude of approximately 1.17. While the visibility metric is insensitive to some classes of dephasing, the coherence witnesses provide complementary sensitivity to off-diagonal noise. This work does not test or discriminate among interpretations of quantum mechanics. Instead, it provides a reproducible operational constraint pipeline for evaluating detectability of non-ideal channels relative to calibrated device noise.

Recent machine learning papers often report 1-2 percentage point improvements from a single run on a benchmark. These gains are highly sensitive to random seeds, data ordering, and implementation details, yet are rarely accompanied by uncertainty estimates or significance tests. It is therefore unclear when a reported +1-2% reflects a real algorithmic advance versus noise. We revisit this problem under realistic compute budgets, where only a few runs are affordable. We propose a simple, PC-friendly evaluation protocol based on paired multi-seed runs, bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) bootstrap confidence intervals, and a sign-flip permutation test on per-seed deltas. The protocol is intentionally conservative and is meant as a guardrail against over-claiming. We instantiate it on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-10N, and AG News using synthetic no-improvement, small-gain, and medium-gain scenarios. Single runs and unpaired t-tests often suggest significant gains for 0.6-2.0 point improvements, especially on text. With only three seeds, our paired protocol never declares significance in these settings. We argue that such conservative evaluation is a safer default for small gains under tight budgets.

Monitoring is an important aspect of safely deploying Large Language Models (LLMs). This paper examines activation probes for detecting ``high-stakes'' interactions -- where the text indicates that the interaction might lead to significant harm -- as a critical, yet underexplored, target for such monitoring. We evaluate several probe architectures trained on synthetic data, and find them to exhibit robust generalization to diverse, out-of-distribution, real-world data. Probes' performance is comparable to that of prompted or finetuned medium-sized LLM monitors, while offering computational savings of six orders-of-magnitude. These savings are enabled by reusing activations of the model that is being monitored. Our experiments also highlight the potential of building resource-aware hierarchical monitoring systems, where probes serve as an efficient initial filter and flag cases for more expensive downstream analysis. We release our novel synthetic dataset and the codebase at https://github.com/arrrlex/models-under-pressure.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) defines a schema bound execution model for agent-tool interaction, enabling modular computer vision workflows without retraining. To our knowledge, this is the first protocol level, deployment scale audit of MCP in vision systems, identifying systemic weaknesses in schema semantics, interoperability, and runtime coordination. We analyze 91 publicly registered vision centric MCP servers, annotated along nine dimensions of compositional fidelity, and develop an executable benchmark with validators to detect and categorize protocol violations. The audit reveals high prevalence of schema format divergence, missing runtime schema validation, undeclared coordinate conventions, and reliance on untracked bridging scripts. Validator based testing quantifies these failures, with schema format checks flagging misalignments in 78.0 percent of systems, coordinate convention checks detecting spatial reference errors in 24.6 percent, and memory scope checks issuing an average of 33.8 warnings per 100 executions. Security probes show that dynamic and multi agent workflows exhibit elevated risks of privilege escalation and untyped tool connections. The proposed benchmark and validator suite, implemented in a controlled testbed and to be released on GitHub, establishes a reproducible framework for measuring and improving the reliability and security of compositional vision workflows.

Despite their strong performance on reasoning tasks, large reasoning models (LRMs) often suffer from overthinking, producing unnecessarily long outputs and incurring high end-to-end latency, a significant limitation to their real-world deployment. To address overthinking, early-exit mechanisms have been proposed to terminate reasoning before typical completion, showing that this approach can effectively shorten generation length with minimal impact on accuracy. However, their reliance on probing mechanisms introduces a detection overhead that limits their end-to-end latency gains and compromises their generalizability across diverse problems. Inspired by the use of hidden states in speculative decoding, we propose SpecExit, a novel framework that predicts both future tokens and an early-exit signal directly from a lightweight draft model without probing overhead. Our method offers significant improvements, reducing average generation length by 66\% and achieving a 2.5x speedup in end-to-end latency compared to the speculative decoding baseline, without compromising accuracy. Our method leverages the inherent signals from hidden states to provide effective early-exit signals, suggesting broader use of hidden states for efficient reasoning. Our code is available at https://github.com/Tencent/AngelSlim.

The privacy concerns of providing deep learning inference as a service have underscored the need for private inference (PI) protocols that protect users' data and the service provider's model using cryptographic methods. Recently proposed PI protocols have achieved significant reductions in PI latency by moving the computationally heavy homomorphic encryption (HE) parts to an offline/pre-compute phase. Paired with recent optimizations that tailor networks for PI, these protocols have achieved performance levels that are tantalizingly close to being practical. In this paper, we conduct a rigorous end-to-end characterization of PI protocols and optimization techniques and find that the current understanding of PI performance is overly optimistic. Specifically, we find that offline storage costs of garbled circuits (GC), a key cryptographic protocol used in PI, on user/client devices are prohibitively high and force much of the expensive offline HE computation to the online phase, resulting in a 10-1000times increase to PI latency. We propose a modified PI protocol that significantly reduces client-side storage costs for a small increase in online latency. Evaluated end-to-end, the modified protocol outperforms current protocols by reducing the mean PI latency by 4times for ResNet18 on TinyImageNet. We conclude with a discussion of several recently proposed PI optimizations in light of the findings and note many actually increase PI latency when evaluated from an end-to-end perspective.

Generating entanglement between distant quantum systems is at the core of quantum networking. In recent years, numerous theoretical protocols for remote entanglement generation have been proposed, of which many have been experimentally realized. Here, we provide a modular theoretical framework to elucidate the general mechanisms of photon-mediated entanglement generation between single spins in atomic or solid-state systems. Our framework categorizes existing protocols at various levels of abstraction and allows for combining the elements of different schemes in new ways. These abstraction layers make it possible to readily compare protocols for different quantum hardware. To enable the practical evaluation of protocols tailored to specific experimental parameters, we have devised numerical simulations based on the framework with our codes available online.

As multi-agent AI systems grow in complexity, the protocols connecting them constrain their capabilities. Current protocols such as A2A and MCP do not expose model-level properties as first-class primitives, ignoring properties fundamental to effective delegation: model identity, reasoning profile, quality calibration, and cost characteristics. We present the LLM Delegate Protocol (LDP), an AI-native communication protocol introducing five mechanisms: (1) rich delegate identity cards with quality hints and reasoning profiles; (2) progressive payload modes with negotiation and fallback; (3) governed sessions with persistent context; (4) structured provenance tracking confidence and verification status; (5) trust domains enforcing security boundaries at the protocol level. We implement LDP as a plugin for the JamJet agent runtime and evaluate against A2A and random baselines using local Ollama models and LLM-as-judge evaluation. Identity-aware routing achieves ~12x lower latency on easy tasks through delegate specialization, though it does not improve aggregate quality in our small delegate pool; semantic frame payloads reduce token count by 37% (p=0.031) with no observed quality loss; governed sessions eliminate 39% token overhead at 10 rounds; and noisy provenance degrades synthesis quality below the no-provenance baseline, arguing that confidence metadata is harmful without verification. Simulated analyses show architectural advantages in attack detection (96% vs. 6%) and failure recovery (100% vs. 35% completion). This paper contributes a protocol design, reference implementation, and initial evidence that AI-native protocol primitives enable more efficient and governable delegation.

AI pentesting agents are increasingly credible as offensive security systems, but current benchmarks still provide limited guidance on which will perform best in real-world targets. Existing evaluation protocols assess and optimize for predefined goals such as capture-the-flag, remote code execution, exploit reproduction, or trajectory similarity, in simplified or narrow settings. These tools are valuable for measuring bounded capabilities, yet they do not adequately capture the complexity, open-ended exploration, and strategic decision-making required in realistic pentesting. In this paper, we present a practical evaluation protocol that shifts assessment from task completion to validated vulnerability discovery, allowing evaluation in sufficiently complex targets spanning multiple attack surfaces and vulnerability classes. The protocol combines structured ground-truth with LLM-based semantic matching to identify vulnerabilities, bipartite resolution to score findings under realistic ambiguity, continuous ground-truth maintenance, repeated and cumulative evaluation of stochastic agents, efficiency metrics, and reduced-suite selection for sustainable experimentation. This protocol extends the state of the art by enabling a more realistic, operationally informative comparison of AI pentesting agents. To enable reproducibility, we also release expert-annotated ground truth and code for the proposed evaluation protocol: https://github.com/ethiack/ethibench.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) replaces static, developer-controlled API integrations with more dynamic, user-driven agent systems, which also introduces new security risks. As MCP adoption grows across community servers and major platforms, organizations encounter threats that existing AI governance frameworks (such as NIST AI RMF and ISO/IEC 42001) do not yet cover in detail. We focus on three types of adversaries that take advantage of MCP s flexibility: content-injection attackers that embed malicious instructions into otherwise legitimate data; supply-chain attackers who distribute compromised servers; and agents who become unintentional adversaries by over-stepping their role. Based on early incidents and proof-of-concept attacks, we describe how MCP can increase the attack surface through data-driven exfiltration, tool poisoning, and cross-system privilege escalation. In response, we propose a set of practical controls, including per-user authentication with scoped authorization, provenance tracking across agent workflows, containerized sandboxing with input/output checks, inline policy enforcement with DLP and anomaly detection, and centralized governance using private registries or gateway layers. The aim is to help organizations ensure that unvetted code does not run outside a sandbox, tools are not used beyond their intended scope, data exfiltration attempts are detectable, and actions can be audited end-to-end. We close by outlining open research questions around verifiable registries, formal methods for these dynamic systems, and privacy-preserving agent operations.

We report a way to make a frozen small language model both more capable and dramatically cheaper at once, without changing any weights. Verified knowledge is deposited once as a byte-exact key-value (KV) state artifact and later restored, by graft, into a fresh inference context. The restore is bit-exact: under a pinned deterministic configuration, the grafted logits are byte-for-byte identical to a fresh computation (SHA-256 equality), with zero KL divergence and 100% argmax agreement over fifty samples. We show that own-position graft is the unique numerically exact operating point on a model with floating-point rotary encoding, and we verify byte-exactness on two model scales (12B, 31B) and two GPU targets, one through a pre-registered replay. On AIME 2025, a frozen Gemma-4-12B moves from 80.0% to 93.3% once a verified solution library is grafted, above its own 77.5% and its 31B sibling's 89.2% published anchors. On the recurring case, eight problems the base model never solves within a 401,026-token budget are answered from cached verified solutions in 61 total decode tokens, a factor of 6,574 fewer tokens and about 8,700x less energy; the capability claim proper rests on held-out transfer (7 of 7 at 31B). The same byte-exact store widens usable context from 32,768 to 2,854,766 tokens at zero extra accelerator memory, and moves byte-identical between machines of the same architecture. We describe the system at the behavior level; the engine is proprietary, and every reported number is backed by committed input and output hashes so the scoring can be re-checked without it.

As large language models (LLMs) become more powerful and are deployed more autonomously, it will be increasingly important to prevent them from causing harmful outcomes. Researchers have investigated a variety of safety techniques for this purpose, e.g. using models to review the outputs of other models, or red-teaming techniques to surface subtle failure modes. However, researchers have not evaluated whether such techniques still ensure safety if the model is itself intentionally trying to subvert them. In this paper, we develop and evaluate pipelines of safety techniques ("protocols") that are robust to intentional subversion. We investigate a scenario in which we want to solve a sequence of programming problems, using access to a powerful but untrusted model (in our case, GPT-4), access to a less powerful trusted model (in our case, GPT-3.5), and limited access to high-quality trusted labor. We investigate protocols that aim to never submit solutions containing backdoors, which we operationalize here as logical errors that are not caught by test cases. We investigate a range of protocols and test each against strategies that the untrusted model could use to subvert them. One protocol is what we call trusted editing. This protocol first asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks GPT-3.5 to rate the suspiciousness of that code. If the code is below some suspiciousness threshold, it is submitted. Otherwise, GPT-3.5 edits the solution to remove parts that seem suspicious and then submits the edited code. Another protocol is untrusted monitoring. This protocol asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks another instance of GPT-4 whether the code is backdoored, using various techniques to prevent the GPT-4 instances from colluding. These protocols improve substantially on simple baselines.

AI control protocols serve as a defense mechanism to stop untrusted LLM agents from causing harm in autonomous settings. Prior work treats this as a security problem, stress testing with exploits that use the deployment context to subtly complete harmful side tasks, such as backdoor insertion. In practice, most AI control protocols are fundamentally based on LLM monitors, which can become a central point of failure. We study adaptive attacks by an untrusted model that knows the protocol and the monitor model, which is plausible if the untrusted model was trained with a later knowledge cutoff or can search for this information autonomously. We instantiate a simple adaptive attack vector by which the attacker embeds publicly known or zero-shot prompt injections in the model outputs. Using this tactic, frontier models consistently evade diverse monitors and complete malicious tasks on two main AI control benchmarks. The attack works universally against current protocols that rely on a monitor. Furthermore, the recent Defer-to-Resample protocol even backfires, as its resampling amplifies the prompt injection and effectively reframes it as a best-of-n attack. In general, adaptive attacks on monitor models represent a major blind spot in current control protocols and should become a standard component of evaluations for future AI control mechanisms.

Quantum networks are complex systems formed by the interaction among quantum processors through quantum channels. Analogous to classical computer networks, quantum networks allow for the distribution of quantum computation among quantum computers. In this work, we describe a quantum walk protocol to perform distributed quantum computing in a quantum network. The protocol uses a quantum walk as a quantum control signal to perform distributed quantum operations. We consider a generalization of the discrete-time coined quantum walk model that accounts for the interaction between a quantum walker system in the network graph with quantum registers inside the network nodes. The protocol logically captures distributed quantum computing, abstracting hardware implementation and the transmission of quantum information through channels. Control signal transmission is mapped to the propagation of the walker system across the network, while interactions between the control layer and the quantum registers are embedded into the application of coin operators. We demonstrate how to use the quantum walker system to perform a distributed CNOT operation, which shows the universality of the protocol for distributed quantum computing. Furthermore, we apply the protocol to the task of entanglement distribution in a quantum network.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) standardizes how AI agents discover and invoke external tools, with over 10,000 active servers and 97 million monthly SDK downloads as of early 2026. Yet MCP does not yet standardize how agents safely operate those tools at production scale. Three protocol-level primitives remain missing: identity propagation, adaptive tool budgeting, and structured error semantics. This paper identifies these gaps through field lessons from an enterprise deployment of an AI agent platform integrated with a major cloud provider's MCP servers (client name redacted). We propose three mechanisms to fill them: (1) the Context-Aware Broker Protocol (CABP), which extends JSON-RPC with identity-scoped request routing via a six-stage broker pipeline; (2) Adaptive Timeout Budget Allocation (ATBA), which frames sequential tool invocation as a budget allocation problem over heterogeneous latency distributions; and (3) the Structured Error Recovery Framework (SERF), which provides machine-readable failure semantics that enable deterministic agent self-correction. We organize production failure modes into five design dimensions (server contracts, user context, timeouts, errors, and observability), document concrete failure vignettes, and present a production readiness checklist. All three algorithms are formalized as testable hypotheses with reproducible experimental methodology. Field observations demonstrate that while MCP provides a solid protocol foundation, reliable agent tool integration requires infrastructure-level mechanisms that the specification does not yet address.

Agentic systems enhance their capabilities by invoking external tools and maintaining persistent memory. However, these external dependencies introduce novel attack surfaces. Recent tool and memory poisoning attacks show that maliciously crafted tool descriptors and poisoned memory can covertly bias agent behavior. These threats reflect a deeper issue: the lack of verifiable continuity in the agent's contextual state for planning and execution. We present ElephantAgent, a protocol that enforces Contextual State Continuity to defend against contextual state poisoning. Inspired by prior state-continuity mechanisms (e.g., Nimble), ElephantAgent extends this protection to the evolving contextual state of agentic systems. We define the contextual state as the bounded, security-critical subset of the agent's entire context (e.g., tool state and memory). Before processing each query, ElephantAgent recomputes the digest of the local contextual state and verifies it against the latest authorized digest. Using replicated trusted hardware, ElephantAgent maintains a linearizable ledger of authorized contextual state transitions and detects out-of-band state tampering. To handle in-band semantic abuse, ElephantAgent additionally provides Historical Traceability, enabling conditional post-hoc audit and recovery to a known-good prior state.

A persistent challenge in machine learning for scientific applications is jointly achieving prediction and understanding. Statistical models excel on structured data but operate as black boxes, while existing interpretability methods are largely inspective: they answer "which features matter?" but do not articulate how features interact or refine explanations iteratively alongside human understanding. Asking an LLM to predict the target directly forces it to search the entire output space; we instead anchor predictions with a base model and ask the LLM the narrower question of what that model is missing. We introduce Multi-Agent Residual In-Context Learning (MARICL), an agentic framework in which LLM agents analyze where a base-model fails, hypothesize missing structure from high-residual examples provided in context, and produce explicit correction terms refined through multi-turn textual gradient optimization. Across nine benchmarks spanning scientific, biomedical, socioeconomic, and synthetic settings, MARICL improves consistently over its base model on all datasets. To test whether these corrections reflect real structure or batch-specific noise, we freeze formulas learned on one experimental batch of the Cell-Free Protein dataset and apply them (with no retraining and no further LLM calls) to held-out batches. Within the same reagent protocol, the frozen formulas improve predictions in over 92% of cases; across a different protocol, they fail systematically. The success boundary aligns with the biochemistry, not the batch count; direct evidence of mechanistic generalization.

Gate set tomography (GST) is a protocol for detailed, predictive characterization of logic operations (gates) on quantum computing processors. Early versions of GST emerged around 2012-13, and since then it has been refined, demonstrated, and used in a large number of experiments. This paper presents the foundations of GST in comprehensive detail. The most important feature of GST, compared to older state and process tomography protocols, is that it is calibration-free. GST does not rely on pre-calibrated state preparations and measurements. Instead, it characterizes all the operations in a gate set simultaneously and self-consistently, relative to each other. Long sequence GST can estimate gates with very high precision and efficiency, achieving Heisenberg scaling in regimes of practical interest. In this paper, we cover GST's intellectual history, the techniques and experiments used to achieve its intended purpose, data analysis, gauge freedom and fixing, error bars, and the interpretation of gauge-fixed estimates of gate sets. Our focus is fundamental mathematical aspects of GST, rather than implementation details, but we touch on some of the foundational algorithmic tricks used in the pyGSTi implementation.

While the flexible capabilities of large language models (LLMs) allow them to answer a range of queries based on existing learned knowledge, information retrieval to augment generation is an important tool to allow LLMs to answer questions on information not included in pre-training data. Such private information is increasingly being generated in a wide array of distributed contexts by organizations and individuals. Performing such information retrieval using neural embeddings of queries and documents always leaked information about queries and database content unless both were stored locally. We present Private Retrieval Augmented Generation (PRAG), an approach that uses multi-party computation (MPC) to securely transmit queries to a distributed set of servers containing a privately constructed database to return top-k and approximate top-k documents. This is a first-of-its-kind approach to dense information retrieval that ensures no server observes a client's query or can see the database content. The approach introduces a novel MPC friendly protocol for inverted file approximate search (IVF) that allows for fast document search over distributed and private data in sublinear communication complexity. This work presents new avenues through which data for use in LLMs can be accessed and used without needing to centralize or forgo privacy.

Self-driving laboratories increasingly rely on low-cost liquid handlers such as the Opentrons OT-2, which ship without the pressure-based aspiration monitoring of Hamilton or Tecan systems and are typically run open-loop. Two failure modes go undetected: protocols that are syntactically valid but violate assay-specific invariants (e.g., tip reuse between a PCR template and a no-template control), and physical execution failures (partial dispense, air bubbles, missing tips) at runtime. We present AEGIS, a two-layer guardian for both. Layer 1 pairs a curated machine-readable assay rule database with an LLM that reasons over OT-2 Python code, reaching an adjusted F1 of 0.97 on a 24-protocol benchmark across five assay families and beating rules-only and LLM-only ablations across five backends; a free open-weight model ties the best proprietary one, so no paid API is required. Layer 2 fits a PCA world model to YOLO-cropped four-frame pipette trajectories; under a leakage-free leave-one-plate-out evaluation it reaches average precision 0.89 and operating-point F1 0.71 (AUROC 0.80), a deployment-faithful number that matches the live demonstration, and we characterize the small-pipette (p20) resolution limit (F1 0.47). A live demonstration on a physical OT-2 (five replicates per condition) catches planted no-tip failures deterministically and partial dispense on coloured dyes, with an always-VLM self-vote gate lifting partial-dispense recall to 5/5; transparent water is a principled limit of any front-view-only monitor, which AEGIS surfaces as low-confidence VLM reasoning rather than a wrong verdict. Cascade triage holds VLM cost near 1.63 per plate versus 10.33 for an always-VLM baseline. AEGIS is open source and, to our knowledge, the first system to unify pre-flight assay-aware validation with runtime visual monitoring for an open-source liquid handler.

Production LLM-agent frameworks expose control primitives -- human-in-the-loop approval gates, run cancellation, and execution timeouts -- whose names and documentation imply barrier semantics: while a run is paused, cancelled, or timed out, no gated side effect executes. We show this implied contract holds on none of the six widely used open-source frameworks we test. Model-free differential probes isolate a recurring sibling leak -- an approval gate suspends its own branch while a sibling branch's effect executes during the pause, so a later rejection cannot prevent it -- in every framework shipping a pre-execution gate (five of six), plus three further gaps: replay double-execution, cancellation orphans, and timeout zombies. The hazard is reachable, not merely constructible: under an a-priori-fixed protocol, frontier models emit the leak-triggering plan shape at pooled rates up to 14%, and when live models drive the unmodified frameworks under an approval pause, 215 of 1,200 runs execute their effect during the pause, across three schedulers and two language runtimes. To repair the measured gaps we present SOUNDGATE, an environment-external effect gate in Rust through which every side effect must be admitted, enforcing hold-until-decided, reject-cancels, dedup-on-replay, and fence-on-cancel -- one property per violation class -- under a stated complete-mediation contract discharged for network egress by kernel-enforced routes. We verify the properties over a model of the admission core (Verus; TLA+/TLC, exhaustive to 7.5e7 states; TLAPS), model-check the deployed Rust with Loom, and bridge model to code by differential conformance over 1.2e7 operations -- refinement evidence, not a mechanized proof. SOUNDGATE blocks every measured violation end-to-end on all six frameworks while releasing legitimate effects, at about 1 ms admission per write and 12k-26k durable admissions per second.

Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers enable AI applications to connect to external systems in a plug-and-play manner, but their rapid proliferation also introduces severe security risks. Unlike mature software ecosystems with rigorous vetting, MCP servers still lack standardized review mechanisms, giving adversaries opportunities to distribute malicious implementations. Despite this pressing risk, the security implications of MCP servers remain underexplored. To address this gap, we present the first systematic study that treats MCP servers as active threat actors and decomposes them into core components to examine how adversarial developers can implant malicious intent. Specifically, we investigate three research questions: (i) what types of attacks malicious MCP servers can launch, (ii) how vulnerable MCP hosts and Large Language Models (LLMs) are to these attacks, and (iii) how feasible it is to carry out MCP server attacks in practice. Our study proposes a component-based taxonomy comprising twelve attack categories. For each category, we develop Proof-of-Concept (PoC) servers and demonstrate their effectiveness across diverse real-world host-LLM settings. We further show that attackers can generate large numbers of malicious servers at virtually no cost. We then test state-of-the-art scanners on the generated servers and found that existing detection approaches are insufficient. These findings highlight that malicious MCP servers are easy to implement, difficult to detect with current tools, and capable of causing concrete damage to AI agent systems. Addressing this threat requires coordinated efforts among protocol designers, host developers, LLM providers, and end users to build a more secure and resilient MCP ecosystem.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has rapidly established itself as a standard interface for enabling LLM-based agents to interact with external tools and services. As MCP servers are increasingly entrusted with security-sensitive operations, understanding their real-world risks has become critical. In practice, due to the absence of large-scale runtime MCP servers, such understanding largely relies on security scanners applied to a small number of cases, yet the reliability of these assessments remains unclear. In this study, we revisit how MCP security is measured. We present MCPZoo, the largest collection of MCP servers for dynamic analysis to date. MCPZoo is constructed through a multi-agent framework for transforming in-the-wild static repositories into dynamic services. The framework emulates how human experts build, diagnose, and iteratively repair deployment and runtime defects by combining environment inference with feedback-driven refinement. To ensure practical interactivity at runtime, the servers are validated via real protocol interactions. As a result, MCPZoo contains 64,611 unique MCP servers (113,927 in total), with more than 37,288 supporting dynamic analysis. Leveraging MCPZoo, we conduct the first ecosystem-scale measurement of MCP servers and the scanners that analyze them. While existing scanners report that 96.89% of servers are risky, we find that these signals are unreliable. In particular, manual validation shows that less than 50% of sampled alerts are true positives, and scanner outputs exhibit clear inconsistency across scanners. Overall, MCPZoo enables large-scale, reproducible measurement of MCP server security and exposes limitations of current scanning practices. We further release a public query interface to support practical risk assessment of MCP servers.

Biological protocols are fundamental to reproducible and safe life science research. While LLMs excel on general tasks, their systematic evaluation on these highly specialized, accuracy-critical, and inherently procedural texts remains limited. In this work, we present BioProBench, the first large-scale, integrated multi-task benchmark for biological protocol understanding and reasoning. While limited benchmarks have touched upon specific aspects like protocol QA, BioProBench provides a comprehensive suite of five core tasks: Protocol Question Answering, Step Ordering, Error Correction, Protocol Generation, and Protocol Reasoning, enabling a holistic evaluation of LLMs on procedural biological texts. Built upon 27K original protocols, it yields nearly 556K high-quality structured instances. We evaluate 12 mainstream open/closed-source LLMs on BioProBench. Experimental results reveal that while top models preform well on surface understanding tasks, struggle significantly with deep reasoning and structured generation tasks like ordering and generation. Furthermore, model comparisons reveal diverse performance: certain open-source models approach closed-source levels on some tasks, yet bio-specific small models lag behind general LLMs, indicating limitations on complex procedural content. Overall, our findings underscore that procedural reasoning within biological protocols represents a significant challenge for current LLMs. BioProBench serves as a standardized framework to diagnose these specific limitations and guide the development of AI systems better equipped for safely automating complex scientific procedures. The code and data are available at: https://github.com/YuyangSunshine/bioprotocolbench and https://huggingface.co/datasets/GreatCaptainNemo/BioProBench.

State machine replication (SMR) and Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus guarantee agreement despite a bounded number of arbitrary, colluding faulty participants. However, these guarantees rely on participants outside this set correctly executing the protocol's transition semantics. Agentic validators expose a weaker boundary: an authenticated, responsive, non-equivocating, and protocol-compliant reasoning participant may still endorse a semantically invalid transition due to reasoning errors. We call this failure mode an epistemic fault, and the collective phenomenon the Honest Quorum Problem (where "honest" means protocol-compliant, not semantically correct). Such a quorum can satisfy ordinary checks while forming a certificate for an invalid transition. Thus, agreement alone does not guarantee semantic validity or execution safety. Furthermore, because agentic validators often share model weights, training distributions, prompts, or toolchains, they are highly susceptible to correlated epistemic faults. We define Epistemic Byzantine Fault Tolerance (EBFT), a fault-tolerance model for agentic infrastructure and post-deterministic distributed systems. EBFT augments the conventional Byzantine fault bound with two separate, confidence-indexed quantities: e_δ bounds coherent invalid endorsements outside the Byzantine set, and u_ε bounds unusable validator support that degrades liveness. These quantities characterize semantic safety risk and liveness degradation independently. We derive quorum-threshold conditions for semantic validity, consensus agreement, liveness, and feasible threshold selection, and outline a calibration methodology for estimating these budgets. We show that adding nominally distinct agents improves fault tolerance only when it measurably reduces the upper-tail concentration of invalid endorsements or unusable support.

Long-horizon agents depend on context management: systems compress, summarize, and evict old tokens so tasks can continue beyond finite windows. That is safe only when dropped information is no longer needed or has been internalized. Plans are the stress case: they are written early, used for many steps, and first to be evicted. We introduce replay pairing, a diagnostic that runs the same trajectory with and without the plan in history and measures hidden-state cosine distance. On Llama-3.1-70B, plan signal spikes to 0.453 one step after the plan, then falls 4.1x in a single action-observation step; HotpotQA falls 12.4x. This is evidence that standard LLM agents do not carry plans forward as persistent state, and instead depend on the plan remaining in context. A layer-L32 probe detects this decay as a diagnostic, not as proof that it reads plan content itself. Reasoning models add a measurement confound: their `<think>` traces re-derive plan content, so standard stripping leaves plan evidence in the stripped condition. We name this the reasoning-trace confound and fix it with strict stripping, which removes prior `<think>` blocks from the stripped run only. It recovers +163% of the step+1 signal in-sample and +153% held out, while not meaningfully changing non-reasoning Llama (+4.8%). On DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-70B, a Llama-trained probe transfers at AUROC 0.748 (p=6e-4), while R1-specific probes reach 1.000, suggesting R1 encodes plan signal in a different hidden-state direction. Finally, a compression stress test shows the practical cost: naive plan eviction cuts ALFWorld success by 34.7pp, while probe-gated re-surfacing does not recover it. The contribution is a measurement and stress-test framework showing that agent-critical information can be context-resident rather than persistent. Context management is load bearing, but plan protection alone is not enough.

Recent attacks show that behavioural unlearning of large language models leaves internal traces recoverable by adversarial probes. We characterise where this retention lives and show it can be surgically removed without measurable capability cost. Our central protocol is a leave-one-out cross-sequence probe that tests whether a memorisation signature generalises across held-out sequences. The signature is real and consistent across scale: memorisation-specific gaps of +0.32, +0.19, +0.30 on Pythia-70M, GPT-2 medium, and Mistral-7B; on Pythia-70M, the random-initialisation control collapses to -0.04 at the deepest layer where the pretrained signature peaks. The probe direction is causally separable from recall -- projecting it out collapses the signature locally (+0.44 -> -0.19) while behavioural recall barely changes -- and a probe trained on naturally memorised content does not classify fine-tuning-injected secrets, marking two representationally distinct regimes. We then introduce probe-geometry alignment (PGA), a surgical erasure that aligns activations along the probe's live readout direction at each depth. PGA drives the cross-sequence probe below random chance at all four scales tested (toy depth-4: 0.17; Pythia-70M: 0.07; Mistral-7B: 0.45; GPT-2 medium: 0.06 via MD-PGA k=2) and remains robust to six adversarial probe variants. Against a re-fitting attacker who trains a fresh probe on PGA-treated activations, we extend PGA adversarially, defeating the re-fit probe at every memorisation-relevant depth while preserving five zero-shot capability benchmarks within 2.8 percentage points per task (mean Δacc = +0.2pp). The cross-sequence signature is a real, causally separable, regime-specific property of pretrained representations -- removable below chance with a single rank-one intervention per depth at no measurable capability cost.

The rapid development of the AI agent communication protocols, including the Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent2Agent (A2A), Agora, and Agent Network Protocol (ANP), is reshaping how AI agents communicate with tools, services, and each other. While these protocols support scalable multi-agent interaction and cross-organizational interoperability, their security principles remain understudied, and standardized threat modeling is limited; no protocol-centric risk assessment framework has been established yet. This paper presents a systematic security analysis of four emerging AI agent communication protocols. First, we develop a structured threat modeling analysis that examines protocol architectures, trust assumptions, interaction patterns, and lifecycle behaviors to identify protocol-specific and cross-protocol risk surfaces. Second, we introduce a qualitative risk assessment framework that identifies twelve protocol-level risks and evaluates security posture across the creation, operation, and update phases through systematic assessment of likelihood, impact, and overall protocol risk, with implications for secure deployment and future standardization. Third, we provide a measurement-driven case study on MCP that formalizes the risk of missing mandatory validation/attestation for executable components as a falsifiable security claim by quantifying wrong-provider tool execution under multi-server composition across representative resolver policies. Collectively, our results highlight key design-induced risk surfaces and provide actionable guidance for secure deployment and future standardization of agent communication ecosystems.

This paper investigates the problem of collecting multidimensional data throughout time (i.e., longitudinal studies) for the fundamental task of frequency estimation under Local Differential Privacy (LDP) guarantees. Contrary to frequency estimation of a single attribute, the multidimensional aspect demands particular attention to the privacy budget. Besides, when collecting user statistics longitudinally, privacy progressively degrades. Indeed, the "multiple" settings in combination (i.e., many attributes and several collections throughout time) impose several challenges, for which this paper proposes the first solution for frequency estimates under LDP. To tackle these issues, we extend the analysis of three state-of-the-art LDP protocols (Generalized Randomized Response -- GRR, Optimized Unary Encoding -- OUE, and Symmetric Unary Encoding -- SUE) for both longitudinal and multidimensional data collections. While the known literature uses OUE and SUE for two rounds of sanitization (a.k.a. memoization), i.e., L-OUE and L-SUE, respectively, we analytically and experimentally show that starting with OUE and then with SUE provides higher data utility (i.e., L-OSUE). Also, for attributes with small domain sizes, we propose Longitudinal GRR (L-GRR), which provides higher utility than the other protocols based on unary encoding. Last, we also propose a new solution named Adaptive LDP for LOngitudinal and Multidimensional FREquency Estimates (ALLOMFREE), which randomly samples a single attribute to be sent with the whole privacy budget and adaptively selects the optimal protocol, i.e., either L-GRR or L-OSUE. As shown in the results, ALLOMFREE consistently and considerably outperforms the state-of-the-art L-SUE and L-OUE protocols in the quality of the frequency estimates.

Enterprise agents must follow long-horizon, conditional, safety-critical standard operating procedures (SOPs). We compile machine-readable SOP constraints into executable pseudo-code and run them with a program-guided (PG) stack machine that pages the active frame while an LLM performs semantic execution. A three-arm SOPBench study across six models separates representation from runtime: compiled text never significantly hurts and gains up to 16.0 points where official prose underperforms. Runtime guidance is capability-gated. Two strong models independently show positive seven-domain PG contrasts (58:19 and 75:31 discordant pairs), whereas weak models are harmed. A full-program cursor ablation (active frame first, complete program retained) recovers much of the strong-model refusal gain; selective visibility adds a smaller improvement. Paired probe and audit measurements track this divide to spontaneous state discipline rather than reconstruction ability. On Bank the three primary arms rise from 70.4 to 86.4 to 92.8, with 100% refusal correctness. Practical guidance: compile first; enable active-frame paging only after a model-level discipline check.

As fine-tuning (FT) becomes increasingly impractical at scale, probing is emerging as the preferred evaluation protocol for self-supervised learning (SSL). Yet, the standard linear probing (LP) fails to adequately reflect the potential of models trained with Masked Image Modeling (MIM), due to the distributed nature of patch tokens. This motivates the need for attentive probing, an alternative that uses attention to selectively aggregate patch-level features. Despite its growing adoption, attentive probing remains under-explored, with existing methods suffering from excessive parameterization and poor computational efficiency. In this work, we revisit attentive probing through the lens of the accuracy-efficiency trade-off. We conduct a systematic study of existing methods, analyzing their mechanisms and benchmarking their performance. We introduce efficient probing (EP), a multi-query cross-attention mechanism that eliminates redundant projections, reduces the number of trainable parameters, and achieves up to a 10times speed-up over conventional multi-head attention. Despite its simplicity, EP outperforms LP and prior attentive probing approaches across seven benchmarks, generalizes well beyond MIM to diverse pre-training paradigms, produces interpretable attention maps, and achieves strong gains in low-shot and layer-wise settings. Code available at https://github.com/billpsomas/efficient-probing.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a de facto standard for integrating Large Language Models with external tools, yet no formal security analysis of the protocol specification exists. We present the first rigorous security analysis of MCP's architectural design, identifying three fundamental protocol-level vulnerabilities: (1) absence of capability attestation allowing servers to claim arbitrary permissions, (2) bidirectional sampling without origin authentication enabling server-side prompt injection, and (3) implicit trust propagation in multi-server configurations. We implement MCPBench, a novel framework bridging existing agent security benchmarks to MCP-compliant infrastructure, enabling direct measurement of protocol-specific attack surfaces. Through controlled experiments on 847 attack scenarios across five MCP server implementations, we demonstrate that MCP's architectural choices amplify attack success rates by 23--41\% compared to equivalent non-MCP integrations. We propose MCPSec, a backward-compatible protocol extension adding capability attestation and message authentication, reducing attack success rates from 52.8\% to 12.4\% with median latency overhead of 8.3ms per message. Our findings establish that MCP's security weaknesses are architectural rather than implementation-specific, requiring protocol-level remediation.

Quantum cryptography is arguably the fastest growing area in quantum information science. Novel theoretical protocols are designed on a regular basis, security proofs are constantly improving, and experiments are gradually moving from proof-of-principle lab demonstrations to in-field implementations and technological prototypes. In this review, we provide both a general introduction and a state of the art description of the recent advances in the field, both theoretically and experimentally. We start by reviewing protocols of quantum key distribution based on discrete variable systems. Next we consider aspects of device independence, satellite challenges, and high rate protocols based on continuous variable systems. We will then discuss the ultimate limits of point-to-point private communications and how quantum repeaters and networks may overcome these restrictions. Finally, we will discuss some aspects of quantum cryptography beyond standard quantum key distribution, including quantum data locking and quantum digital signatures.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a standardized interface enabling seamless integration between Large Language Models (LLMs) and external data sources and tools. While MCP significantly reduces development complexity and enhances agent capabilities, its openness and extensibility introduce critical security vulnerabilities that threaten system trustworthiness and user data protection. This paper systematically analyzes the security landscape of MCP-based systems, identifying three principal threat categories: (1) agent hijacking attacks stemming from protocol design deficiencies; (2) traditional web vulnerabilities in MCP servers; and (3) supply chain security. To address these challenges, we comprehensively survey existing defense strategies, examining both proactive server-side scanning approaches, ranging from layered detection pipelines and agentic auditing frameworks to zero-trust registry systems, and runtime interaction monitoring solutions that provide continuous oversight and policy enforcement. Our analysis reveals that MCP security fundamentally represents a paradigm shift where the attack surface extends from traditional code execution to semantic interpretation of natural language metadata, necessitating novel defense mechanisms tailored to this unique threat model.

We introduce Psi-Turing Machines (Psi-TM): classical Turing machines equipped with a constant-depth introspection interface iota and an explicit per-step information budget B(d,n)=c,dlog_2 n . With the interface frozen, we develop an information-theoretic lower-bound toolkit: Budget counting, Psi -Fooling, and Psi -Fano, with worked examples L_k and L_k^{phase} . We prove an oracle-relative separation P^{Psi} neq NP^{Psi} and a strict depth hierarchy, reinforced by an Anti-Simulation Hook that rules out polynomial emulation of iota_k using many calls to iota_{k-1} under the budget regime. We also present two independent platforms (Psi-decision trees and interface-constrained circuits IC-AC^{0}/IC-NC^{1}) and bridges that transfer bounds among machine, tree, and circuit with explicit poly/log losses. The model preserves classical computational power outside iota yet enables precise oracle-aware statements about barriers (relativization; partial/conditional progress on natural proofs and proof complexity). The aim is a standardized minimal introspection interface with clearly accounted information budgets.

Probing studies what information is encoded in a frozen LLM's layer representations by training a lightweight predictor on top of them. Beyond analysis, probes are often used operationally in probe-then-steer pipelines: a learned concept vector is extracted from a probe and injected via additive activation steering by adding it to a layer representation during the forward pass. The effectiveness of this pipeline hinges on estimating concept vectors that are accurate, directionally stable under ablation, and inexpensive to obtain. Motivated by these desiderata, we propose RAPTOR (Ridge-Adaptive Logistic Probe), a simple L2-regularized logistic probe whose validation-tuned ridge strength yields concept vectors from normalized weights. Across extensive experiments on instruction-tuned LLMs and human-written concept datasets, RAPTOR matches or exceeds strong baselines in accuracy while achieving competitive directional stability and substantially lower training cost; these quantitative results are supported by qualitative downstream steering demonstrations. Finally, using the Convex Gaussian Min-max Theorem (CGMT), we provide a mechanistic characterization of ridge logistic regression in an idealized Gaussian teacher-student model in the high-dimensional few-shot regime, explaining how penalty strength mediates probe accuracy and concept-vector stability and yielding structural predictions that qualitatively align with trends observed on real LLM embeddings.

Time series are central to modern data mining applications, from industrial telemetry and server metrics to finance and physiology, yet time-series self-supervised learning often depends on view and augmentation choices that encode domain-specific invariances. We study how an SSL recipe behaves when its method-specific configuration is reused unchanged after the pretraining signal family changes, framing this as a fixed-recipe stress test rather than a comparison against optimally tuned methods. We introduce Latent Euclidean Next-Embedding Prediction Architecture (LeNEPA), a no-augmentation next-latent-token objective with a causal backbone. LeNEPA replaces the stop-gradient/EMA stabilization used by vanilla NEPA with SIGReg-based isotropy regularization and computes the predictive loss in a lightweight projected space that is discarded for evaluation. We compare LeNEPA with an ECG-tuned JEPA recipe under a fixed-horizon frozen-probe protocol on PTB-XL and Diag, a synthetic diagnostic corpus generated with Aionoscope. Both methods are retrained independently on each dataset while keeping their method-specific recipes unchanged. In this protocol, the ECG-tuned JEPA recipe is strong in-domain on PTB-XL but weaker when reused unchanged on Diag, whereas LeNEPA preserves useful frozen-probe gains on both datasets. Learning curves suggest faster early representation acquisition: LeNEPA reaches 80% of its final AUROC/AUPRC gain after 2--5k updates, compared with 5--10k updates for the faster JEPA readout. As a separate external frozen-encoder check, a CauKer-pretrained LeNEPA variant reaches 77.65% mean UCR-128 Random-Forest accuracy in a single-seed, best-checkpoint run, within 1.16 points of Mantis and within 0.24 points of MOMENT (77.89%). Overall, the results support no-augmentation latent prediction as a useful candidate recipe for low-retuning time-series SSL.

Routing has emerged as a promising strategy for balancing performance and cost in large language model (LLM) systems that combine lightweight models with powerful but expensive large models. Recent studies show that probe routing, which predicts the correctness of a small model using its hidden states, provides an effective solution in text-only LLMs. However, we observe that these probes degrade substantially when applied to multimodal LLMs (MLLMs). Through empirical analysis, we find that the presence of visual inputs weakens the separability of correctness signals in hidden states, making them harder to extract using standard probe designs. To address this challenge, we introduce two complementary approaches for improving probe routing in MLLMs. First, we propose the Attention Probe, which aggregates hidden states from the preceding layer based on attention scores to recover distributed correctness signals. Second, we present the KL-Regularized LoRA Probe (ReLope), which inserts a lightweight LoRA adapter and applies a KL regularizer to learn routing-aware representations. Comprehensive experiments show that our methods consistently outperform baselines, suggesting that improving the quality of hidden states is key to effective routing in MLLMs. Our code is available at https://github.com/Spinozaaa/ReLope.

Quantum systems of infinite dimension, such as bosonic oscillators, provide vast resources for quantum sensing. Yet, a general theory on how to manipulate such bosonic modes for sensing beyond parameter estimation is unknown. We present a general algorithmic framework, quantum signal processing interferometry (QSPI), for quantum sensing at the fundamental limits of quantum mechanics by generalizing Ramsey-type interferometry. Our QSPI sensing protocol relies on performing nonlinear polynomial transformations on the oscillator's quadrature operators by generalizing quantum signal processing (QSP) from qubits to hybrid qubit-oscillator systems. We use our QSPI sensing framework to make efficient binary decisions on a displacement channel in the single-shot limit. Theoretical analysis suggests the sensing accuracy, given a single-shot qubit measurement, scales inversely with the sensing time or circuit depth of the algorithm. We further concatenate a series of such binary decisions to perform parameter estimation in a bit-by-bit fashion. Numerical simulations are performed to support these statements. Our QSPI protocol offers a unified framework for quantum sensing using continuous-variable bosonic systems beyond parameter estimation and establishes a promising avenue toward efficient and scalable quantum control and quantum sensing schemes beyond the NISQ era.

Reasoning models have achieved remarkable performance on tasks like math and logical reasoning thanks to their ability to search during reasoning. However, they still suffer from overthinking, often performing unnecessary reasoning steps even after reaching the correct answer. This raises the question: can models evaluate the correctness of their intermediate answers during reasoning? In this work, we study whether reasoning models encode information about answer correctness through probing the model's hidden states. The resulting probe can verify intermediate answers with high accuracy and produces highly calibrated scores. Additionally, we find models' hidden states encode correctness of future answers, enabling early prediction of the correctness before the intermediate answer is fully formulated. We then use the probe as a verifier to decide whether to exit reasoning at intermediate answers during inference, reducing the number of inference tokens by 24\% without compromising performance. These findings confirm that reasoning models do encode a notion of correctness yet fail to exploit it, revealing substantial untapped potential to enhance their efficiency.

Distributed protocols should be robust to both benign malfunction (e.g. packet loss or delay) and attacks (e.g. message replay) from internal or external adversaries. In this paper we take a formal approach to the automated synthesis of attackers, i.e. adversarial processes that can cause the protocol to malfunction. Specifically, given a formal threat model capturing the distributed protocol model and network topology, as well as the placement, goals, and interface (inputs and outputs) of potential attackers, we automatically synthesize an attacker. We formalize four attacker synthesis problems - across attackers that always succeed versus those that sometimes fail, and attackers that attack forever versus those that do not - and we propose algorithmic solutions to two of them. We report on a prototype implementation called KORG and its application to TCP as a case-study. Our experiments show that KORG can automatically generate well-known attacks for TCP within seconds or minutes.

AI agents increasingly call tools via the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and delegate to other agents via Agent-to-Agent (A2A), yet neither protocol verifies agent identity. A scan of approximately 2,000 MCP servers found all lacked authentication. In our survey, we did not identify a prior implemented protocol that jointly combines public-key verifiable delegation, holder-side attenuation, expressive chained policy, transport bindings across MCP/A2A/HTTP, and provenance-oriented completion records. We introduce Invocation-Bound Capability Tokens (IBCTs), a primitive that fuses identity, attenuated authorization, and provenance binding into a single append-only token chain. IBCTs operate in two wire formats: compact mode (a signed JWT for single-hop cases) and chained mode (a Biscuit token with Datalog policies for multi-hop delegation). We provide reference implementations in Python and Rust with full cross-language interoperability. Compact mode verification takes 0.049ms (Rust) and 0.189ms (Python), with 0.22ms overhead over no-auth in real MCP-over-HTTP deployment. In a real multi-agent deployment with Gemini 2.5 Flash, AIP adds 2.35ms of overhead (0.086% of total end-to-end latency). Adversarial evaluation across 600 attack attempts shows 100% rejection rate, with two attack categories (delegation depth violation and audit evasion through empty context) uniquely caught by AIP's chained delegation model that neither unsigned nor plain JWT deployments detect.

Recent text-to-video (T2V) technology advancements, as demonstrated by models such as Gen2, Pika, and Sora, have significantly broadened its applicability and popularity. Despite these strides, evaluating these models poses substantial challenges. Primarily, due to the limitations inherent in automatic metrics, manual evaluation is often considered a superior method for assessing T2V generation. However, existing manual evaluation protocols face reproducibility, reliability, and practicality issues. To address these challenges, this paper introduces the Text-to-Video Human Evaluation (T2VHE) protocol, a comprehensive and standardized protocol for T2V models. The T2VHE protocol includes well-defined metrics, thorough annotator training, and an effective dynamic evaluation module. Experimental results demonstrate that this protocol not only ensures high-quality annotations but can also reduce evaluation costs by nearly 50%. We will open-source the entire setup of the T2VHE protocol, including the complete protocol workflow, the dynamic evaluation component details, and the annotation interface code. This will help communities establish more sophisticated human assessment protocols.

Pruning generates sparse networks by setting parameters to zero. In this work we improve one-shot pruning methods, applied before training, without adding any additional storage costs while preserving the sparse gradient computations. The main difference to pruning is that we do not sparsify the network's weights but learn just a few key parameters and keep the other ones fixed at their random initialized value. This mechanism is called freezing the parameters. Those frozen weights can be stored efficiently with a single 32bit random seed number. The parameters to be frozen are determined one-shot by a single for- and backward pass applied before training starts. We call the introduced method FreezeNet. In our experiments we show that FreezeNets achieve good results, especially for extreme freezing rates. Freezing weights preserves the gradient flow throughout the network and consequently, FreezeNets train better and have an increased capacity compared to their pruned counterparts. On the classification tasks MNIST and CIFAR-10/100 we outperform SNIP, in this setting the best reported one-shot pruning method, applied before training. On MNIST, FreezeNet achieves 99.2% performance of the baseline LeNet-5-Caffe architecture, while compressing the number of trained and stored parameters by a factor of x 157.

Quantum microwave transmission is key to realizing modular superconducting quantum computers and distributed quantum networks. A large number of incoherent photons are thermally generated within the microwave frequency spectrum. The closeness of the transmitted quantum state to the source-generated quantum state at the input of the transmission link (measured by the transmission fidelity) degrades due to the presence of the incoherent photons. Hence, high-fidelity quantum microwave transmission has long been considered to be infeasible without refrigeration [3,4]. In this study, we propose a novel method for high-fidelity quantum microwave transmission using a room-temperature lossy waveguide. The proposed scheme consists of connecting two cryogenic nodes (i.e., a transmitter and a receiver) by the room-temperature lossy microwave waveguide. First, cryogenic preamplification is implemented prior to transmission. Second, at the receiver side, a cryogenic loop antenna is placed inside the output port of the waveguide and coupled to an LC harmonic oscillator located outside the waveguide. The loop antenna converts quantum microwave fields (which contain both signal and noise photons) to a quantum voltage across the coupled LC harmonic oscillator. The loop antenna detector at the receiver is designed to extensively suppress the induced photons across the LC oscillator. The signal transmittance is maintained intact by providing significant preamplification gain. Our calculations show that high-fidelity quantum transmission (i.e., more than 95%) is realized based on the proposed scheme for transmission distances reaching 100 m.

SCTP is a transport protocol offering features such as multi-homing, multi-streaming, and message-oriented delivery. Its two main implementations were subjected to conformance tests using the PacketDrill tool. Conformance testing is not exhaustive and a recent vulnerability (CVE-2021-3772) showed SCTP is not immune to attacks. Changes addressing the vulnerability were implemented, but the question remains whether other flaws might persist in the protocol design. We study the security of the SCTP design, taking a rigorous approach rooted in formal methods. We create a formal Promela model of SCTP, and define 10 properties capturing the essential protocol functionality based on its RFC specification and consultation with the lead RFC author. Then we show using the Spin model checker that our model satisfies these properties. We define 4 attacker models - Off-Path, where the attacker is an outsider that can spoof the port and IP of a peer; Evil-Server, where the attacker is a malicious peer; Replay, where an attacker can capture and replay, but not modify, packets; and On-Path, where the attacker controls the channel between peers. We modify an attack synthesis tool designed for transport protocols, Korg, to support our SCTP model and four attacker models. We synthesize 14 unique attacks using the attacker models - including the CVE vulnerability in the Off-Path attacker model, 4 attacks in the Evil-Server attacker model, an opportunistic ABORT attack in the Replay attacker model, and eight connection manipulation attacks in the On-Path attacker model. We show that the proposed patch eliminates the vulnerability and does not introduce new ones according to our model and protocol properties. Finally, we identify and analyze an ambiguity in the RFC, which we show can be interpreted insecurely. We propose an erratum and show that it eliminates the ambiguity.

To reduce development overhead and enable seamless integration between potential components comprising any given generative AI application, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) (Anthropic, 2024) has recently been released and subsequently widely adopted. The MCP is an open protocol that standardizes API calls to large language models (LLMs), data sources, and agentic tools. By connecting multiple MCP servers, each defined with a set of tools, resources, and prompts, users are able to define automated workflows fully driven by LLMs. However, we show that the current MCP design carries a wide range of security risks for end users. In particular, we demonstrate that industry-leading LLMs may be coerced into using MCP tools to compromise an AI developer's system through various attacks, such as malicious code execution, remote access control, and credential theft. To proactively mitigate these and related attacks, we introduce a safety auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, the first agentic tool to assess the security of an arbitrary MCP server. MCPScanner uses several agents to (a) automatically determine adversarial samples given an MCP server's tools and resources; (b) search for related vulnerabilities and remediations based on those samples; and (c) generate a security report detailing all findings. Our work highlights serious security issues with general-purpose agentic workflows while also providing a proactive tool to audit MCP server safety and address detected vulnerabilities before deployment. The described MCP server auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, is freely available at: https://github.com/johnhalloran321/mcpSafetyScanner

A key strength of managed runtimes over hardware is the ability to gain detailed insight into the dynamic execution of programs with instrumentation. Analyses such as code coverage, execution frequency, tracing, and debugging, are all made easier in a virtual setting. As a portable, low-level bytecode, WebAssembly offers inexpensive in-process sandboxing with high performance. Yet to date, Wasm engines have not offered much insight into executing programs, supporting at best bytecode-level stepping and basic source maps, but no instrumentation capabilities. In this paper, we show the first non-intrusive dynamic instrumentation system for WebAssembly in the open-source Wizard Research Engine. Our innovative design offers a flexible, complete hierarchy of instrumentation primitives that support building high-level, complex analyses in terms of low-level, programmable probes. In contrast to emulation or machine code instrumentation, injecting probes at the bytecode level increases expressiveness and vastly simplifies the implementation by reusing the engine's JIT compiler, interpreter, and deoptimization mechanism rather than building new ones. Wizard supports both dynamic instrumentation insertion and removal while providing consistency guarantees, which is key to composing multiple analyses without interference. We detail a fully-featured implementation in a high-performance multi-tier Wasm engine, show novel optimizations specifically designed to minimize instrumentation overhead, and evaluate performance characteristics under load from various analyses. This design is well-suited for production engine adoption as probes can be implemented to have no impact on production performance when not in use.

Domain Name System (DNS) resolution in Internet of Things (IoT) networks presents unique challenges due to resource constraints, unreliable connectivity, and security vulnerabilities. Traditional centralized DNS architectures introduce single points of failure. This paper presents MeshDNS, a cooperative DNS resolution framework designed for resource-constrained IoT environments operating under shared-key admission. MeshDNS employs a decentralized architecture where nodes maintain cache awareness using hash-based summaries and secure cold-cache misses via Ed25519-signed, identical-answer quorum voting. Our implementation on commodity ESP8266 microcontrollers (sub-50 KB usable RAM, 80 MHz) achieves a 0.47 ms warm-cache resolution, outperforming native mDNS baselines (1.39 ms). To secure initial cold-cache misses, MeshDNS trades a predictable ~1.3-1.7s cryptographic penalty to successfully isolate Byzantine faults among admitted peers. Assuming a threat model where physical hardware extraction remains out of scope, MeshDNS demonstrates Byzantine fault isolation. We validated the framework via a 5-node physical testbed and discrete-event simulations scaling to 1,000 nodes; the results demonstrate that MeshDNS maintains resilient local name caches for persistent edge telemetry under network churn. Code is available at https://github.com/mahbubasif/MeshDNS-Artifact.

As AI agents automate critical workloads, they remain vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks. Current defenses rely on monitoring protocols that jointly evaluate an agent's Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and tool-use actions to ensure alignment with user intent. We demonstrate that these monitoring-based defenses can be bypassed via a novel Agent-as-a-Proxy attack, where prompt injection attacks treat the agent as a delivery mechanism, bypassing both agent and monitor simultaneously. While prior work on scalable oversight has focused on whether small monitors can supervise large agents, we show that even frontier-scale monitors are vulnerable. Large-scale monitoring models like Qwen2.5-72B can be bypassed by agents with similar capabilities, such as GPT-4o mini and Llama-3.1-70B. On the AgentDojo benchmark, we achieve a high attack success rate against AlignmentCheck and Extract-and-Evaluate monitors under diverse monitoring LLMs. Our findings suggest current monitoring-based agentic defenses are fundamentally fragile regardless of model scale.

Binary classical information is routinely encoded in the two metastable states of a dynamical system. Since these states may exhibit macroscopic lifetimes, the encoded information inherits a strong protection against bit-flips. A recent qubit - the cat-qubit - is encoded in the manifold of metastable states of a quantum dynamical system, thereby acquiring bit-flip protection. An outstanding challenge is to gain quantum control over such a system without breaking its protection. If this challenge is met, significant shortcuts in hardware overhead are forecast for quantum computing. In this experiment, we implement a cat-qubit with bit-flip times exceeding ten seconds. This is a four order of magnitude improvement over previous cat-qubit implementations, and six orders of magnitude enhancement over the single photon lifetime that compose this dynamical qubit. This was achieved by introducing a quantum tomography protocol that does not break bit-flip protection. We prepare and image quantum superposition states, and measure phase-flip times above 490 nanoseconds. Most importantly, we control the phase of these superpositions while maintaining the bit-flip time above ten seconds. This work demonstrates quantum operations that preserve macroscopic bit-flip times, a necessary step to scale these dynamical qubits into fully protected hardware-efficient architectures.

Reasoning in knowledge-intensive domains remains challenging as intermediate steps are often not locally verifiable: unlike math or code, evaluating step correctness may require synthesizing clues across large external knowledge sources. As a result, subtle errors can propagate through reasoning traces, potentially never to be detected. Prior work has proposed process reward models (PRMs), including retrieval-augmented variants, but these methods operate post hoc, scoring completed trajectories, which prevents their integration into dynamic inference procedures. Here, we introduce Process Reward Agents (PRA), a test-time method for providing domain-grounded, online, step-wise rewards to a frozen policy. In contrast to prior retrieval-augmented PRMs, PRA enables search-based decoding to rank and prune candidate trajectories at every generation step. Experiments on multiple medical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that PRA consistently outperforms strong baselines, achieving 80.8% accuracy on MedQA with Qwen3-4B, a new state of the art at the 4B scale. Importantly, PRA generalizes to unseen frozen policy models ranging from 0.5B to 8B parameters, improving their accuracy by up to 25.7% without any policy model updates. More broadly, PRA suggests a paradigm in which frozen reasoners are decoupled from domain-specific reward modules, allowing the deployment of new backbones in complex domains without retraining.

Preparing high-fidelity logical magic states is crucial for fault-tolerant quantum computation. Among prior attempts to reduce the substantial cost of magic state preparation, magic state cultivation (MSC), a recently proposed protocol for preparing T states without magic state distillation, achieves state-of-the-art efficiency. Inspired by this work, we propose a new MSC procedure that would produce a logical T state on a rotated surface code at a further reduced cost. For our MSC protocol, we define a new code family, the RP^2 code, by putting the rotated surface code on RP^2 (a two-dimensional manifold), as well as two self-dual CSS codes named SRP-3 and SRP-5 respectively. Small RP^2 codes are used to hold logical information and checked by syndrome extraction (SE) circuits. We design fast morphing circuits that enable switching between a distance 3 (5) RP^2 code and an SRP-3 (SRP-5) code on which we can efficiently check the correctness of the logical state. To preserve the high accuracy of the cultivated logical T state, we design an efficient and easy-to-decode expansion stage that grows a small RP^2 code to a large rotated surface code in one round. Our MSC protocol utilizes non-local connectivity, available on both neutral atom array and ion trap platforms. According to our Monte Carlo sampling results, our MSC protocol requires about an order of magnitude smaller space-time volume to reach a target logical error rate around 10^{-9} compared to the original MSC protocol.

Always-on agents are systems whose future behavior depends on durable state accumulated across earlier interactions. We treat them as persistent-state systems: the operative system includes retrievable memories, but also task ledgers, permissions, credentials, commitments, provenance and audit records, shared state, trigger conditions, and externally committed effects linked to those records. The survey reads the literature through six diagnostic axes for each state item, authority, scope, mutability, provenance, recoverability, and actionability, and through a lifecycle in which state is written, validated, organized, retrieved, acted upon, updated, forgotten, audited, and sometimes rolled back. Across a 435-work coded corpus, treated as a scoped map rather than an exhaustive census, the literature concentrates more heavily on accumulating and retrieving state than on governing, recovering, or relinquishing it. We therefore introduce the Always-On Evaluation Protocol (AOEP-v0), a pilot evaluation contract that makes these governance requirements concrete by scoring state mutation and recovery obligations rather than answer quality alone. The resulting agenda connects always-on agents to databases, distributed systems, formal methods, capability security, and machine unlearning.

Frontier language model capabilities are improving rapidly. We thus need stronger mitigations against bad actors misusing increasingly powerful systems. Prior work has shown that activation probes may be a promising misuse mitigation technique, but we identify a key remaining challenge: probes fail to generalize under important production distribution shifts. In particular, we find that the shift from short-context to long-context inputs is difficult for existing probe architectures. We propose several new probe architecture that handle this long-context distribution shift. We evaluate these probes in the cyber-offensive domain, testing their robustness against various production-relevant shifts, including multi-turn conversations, static jailbreaks, and adaptive red teaming. Our results demonstrate that while multimax addresses context length, a combination of architecture choice and training on diverse distributions is required for broad generalization. Additionally, we show that pairing probes with prompted classifiers achieves optimal accuracy at a low cost due to the computational efficiency of probes. These findings have informed the successful deployment of misuse mitigation probes in user-facing instances of Gemini, Google's frontier language model. Finally, we find early positive results using AlphaEvolve to automate improvements in both probe architecture search and adaptive red teaming, showing that automating some AI safety research is already possible.

In recent years, generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) has demonstrated remarkable capabilities in high-stakes domains such as molecular science. However, challenges related to the verifiability and structural privacy of its outputs remain largely unresolved. This paper focuses on the task of molecular toxicity repair. It proposes a structure-private verification framework - ToxiEval-ZKP - which, for the first time, introduces zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) mechanisms into the evaluation process of this task. The system enables model developers to demonstrate to external verifiers that the generated molecules meet multidimensional toxicity repair criteria, without revealing the molecular structures themselves. To this end, we design a general-purpose circuit compatible with both classification and regression tasks, incorporating evaluation logic, Poseidon-based commitment hashing, and a nullifier-based replay prevention mechanism to build a complete end-to-end ZK verification system. Experimental results demonstrate that ToxiEval-ZKP facilitates adequate validation under complete structural invisibility, offering strong circuit efficiency, security, and adaptability, thereby opening up a novel paradigm for trustworthy evaluation in generative scientific tasks.

Aligned large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to adversarial manipulation, and their reliance on web-scale pretraining creates a subtle but consequential attack surface. We study Stealth Pretraining Seeding (SPS), a threat model in which adversaries distribute small amounts of poisoned content across stealth websites, increasing the likelihood that such material is absorbed into future training corpora derived from sources such as Common Crawl. Because each individual payload is tiny, diffuse, and superficially benign, the attack is difficult to detect during dataset construction or filtering. The result is a latent form of poisoning that remains largely invisible under standard evaluation, yet can later be activated by a precise trigger such as <00TRIGGER00>. We call this attack PermaFrost, reflecting its latent and reactivatable nature. We study it through PermaFrost-Attack, a controlled framework for latent conceptual poisoning, together with three geometric diagnostics: Thermodynamic Length, Spectral Curvature, and the Infection Traceback Graph. Across multiple model families and scales, we show that this controlled SPS proxy can induce persistent unsafe behavior that often remains hidden under standard evaluation. Our results identify SPS as a practical and underappreciated threat to future foundation models. This paper introduces a novel geometric diagnostic lens for systematically examining latent model behavior, providing a principled foundation for detecting, characterizing, and understanding vulnerabilities that may remain invisible under standard evaluation.

Autonomous coding agents increasingly execute multi-step software work, but lifecycle states such as reviewed, tested, DONE, and ready-to-merge remain claims unless supported by current evidence. We present Proof-or-Stop Lifecycle Control, a method that permits lifecycle transitions only when fresh, tracked-source-state-bound, mechanically verifiable evidence satisfies the relevant gate. The method treats agent outputs as claims rather than lifecycle state, and uses proof operationally to mean gate-admissible evidence under a stated trust model, not semantic program correctness. We evaluate an open-source implementation through mechanism tests, a powered control-policy ablation, and operated self-application evidence. The unattended-loop engine passed 10 of 10 scenarios with zero false-DONE, and local-key receipt bundles rejected 18 tamper classes with zero false accepts. In a 9,240-cell ablation, the pre-registered A4 versus A2-prime comparison reduced visible-pass/hidden-fail amplification from 31 of 1,800 injected cells under a compute-budgeted naive loop to 2 of 1,800 under the gated loop, a 1.6 percentage-point improvement in not-amplified rate with a 95 percent confidence interval of [0.8, 2.5]. A near-compute A3 versus A4 comparison, 14 of 1,800 versus 2 of 1,800, indicates that the gain is associated with enforcing review as a lifecycle gate rather than merely adding a reviewer. The self-application corpus contains 565 stories and 1,007 review findings, with 94.8 percent resolved, plus a 68-row high/critical cross-vendor exhibit. These results support Proof-or-Stop as a model-agnostic, host-neutral control layer for deciding which autonomous-agent claims a lifecycle may act on. The evaluation is limited to one model family, 24 ablation tasks, and a self-hosted corpus.

We revisit Wald's celebrated Sequential Probability Ratio Test for sequential tests of two simple hypotheses, under privacy constraints. We propose DP-SPRT, a wrapper that can be calibrated to achieve desired error probabilities and privacy constraints, addressing a significant gap in previous work. DP-SPRT relies on a private mechanism that processes a sequence of queries and stops after privately determining when the query results fall outside a predefined interval. This OutsideInterval mechanism improves upon naive composition of existing techniques like AboveThreshold, potentially benefiting other sequential algorithms. We prove generic upper bounds on the error and sample complexity of DP-SPRT that can accommodate various noise distributions based on the practitioner's privacy needs. We exemplify them in two settings: Laplace noise (pure Differential Privacy) and Gaussian noise (R\'enyi differential privacy). In the former setting, by providing a lower bound on the sample complexity of any epsilon-DP test with prescribed type I and type II errors, we show that DP-SPRT is near optimal when both errors are small and the two hypotheses are close. Moreover, we conduct an experimental study revealing its good practical performance.

The distribution of high-quality Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states is at the heart of many quantum communication tasks, ranging from extending the baseline of telescopes to secret sharing. They also play an important role in error-correction architectures for distributed quantum computation, where Bell pairs can be leveraged to create an entangled network of quantum computers. We investigate the creation and distillation of GHZ states out of non-perfect Bell pairs over quantum networks. In particular, we introduce a heuristic dynamic programming algorithm to optimize over a large class of protocols that create and purify GHZ states. All protocols considered use a common framework based on measurements of non-local stabilizer operators of the target state (i.e., the GHZ state), where each non-local measurement consumes another (non-perfect) entangled state as a resource. The new protocols outperform previous proposals for scenarios without decoherence and local gate noise. Furthermore, the algorithms can be applied for finding protocols for any number of parties and any number of entangled pairs involved.

Machine learning programs, such as those performing inference, fine-tuning, and training of LLMs, are commonly delegated to untrusted compute providers. To provide correctness guarantees for the client, we propose adapting the cryptographic notion of refereed delegation to the machine learning setting. This approach enables a computationally limited client to delegate a program to multiple untrusted compute providers, with a guarantee of obtaining the correct result if at least one of them is honest. Refereed delegation of ML programs poses two technical hurdles: (1) an arbitration protocol to resolve disputes when compute providers disagree on the output, and (2) the ability to bitwise reproduce ML programs across different hardware setups, For (1), we design Verde, a dispute arbitration protocol that efficiently handles the large scale and graph-based computational model of modern ML programs. For (2), we build RepOps (Reproducible Operators), a library that eliminates hardware "non-determinism" by controlling the order of floating point operations performed on all hardware. Our implementation shows that refereed delegation achieves both strong guarantees for clients and practical overheads for compute providers.

We present the Consilium Protocol, a Byzantine Fault Tolerance-derived architecture for structured multi-model AI deliberation that treats inter-model disagreement as epistemic signal rather than error. The protocol assigns engineered cognitive personas to language models -- separating what a model is from how it reasons -- and introduces an In-Sample/Out-of-Sample validation framework adapted from quantitative finance to distinguish training-data consensus from empirically grounded conclusions. Across 1,478 deliberation sessions spanning 32 topics in 10 domain categories, we demonstrate that (1) the cognitive persona, not the underlying model, determines epistemic behavior: free edge-inference models costing 0.0002 USD per batch produced comparable analytical output to frontier models costing 10.69 USD; (2) RLHF alignment training creates measurable, domain-specific epistemic blind spots -- contested policy topics exhibit 12.3 percentage points less adversarial challenge than settled science topics, and AI safety topics show asymmetric bias (Δ=11.6%) where models challenge claims that AI is dangerous far more vigorously than claims that AI risk is overstated; (3) the protocol exhibits no directional bias of its own (immigration Δ=2.3%, renewables Δ=1.2%); and (4) out-of-sample evidence retrieval validated 239 claims with 100% evidence retrieval and surfaced 167 blind-spot discoveries invisible to training-data deliberation. Run-to-run reproducibility across randomized modeltimespersona assignments averages pm2.2% standard deviation. Total cost for the complete battery including all overhead: 217 USD. We release the protocol specification under MIT license to enable independent verification.

Parallel thinking has emerged as a promising paradigm for reasoning, yet it imposes significant computational burdens. Existing efficiency methods primarily rely on local, per-trajectory signals and lack principled mechanisms to exploit global dynamics across parallel branches. We introduce 2D probing, an interface that exposes the width-depth dynamics of parallel thinking by periodically eliciting intermediate answers from all branches. Our analysis reveals three key insights: non-monotonic scaling across width-depth allocations, heterogeneous reasoning branch lengths, and early stabilization of global consensus. Guided by these insights, we introduce Parallel-Probe, a training-free controller designed to optimize online parallel thinking. Parallel-Probe employs consensus-based early stopping to regulate reasoning depth and deviation-based branch pruning to dynamically adjust width. Extensive experiments across three benchmarks and multiple models demonstrate that Parallel-Probe establishes a superior Pareto frontier for test-time scaling. Compared to standard majority voting, it reduces sequential tokens by up to 35.8% and total token cost by over 25.8% while maintaining competitive accuracy.

Independently trained domain specialists can be fused post-hoc into a single model that outperforms any individual specialist, and the gain is predictable: gain = 0.82 x divergence - 2.72 (R^2 = 0.856, n=6, 3-26% divergence). This enables practitioners to estimate cooperative value before committing compute. Below ~3.3% divergence, gains approach zero.In the KALAVAI protocol, contributors fine-tune copies of a shared checkpoint independently, then submit for lightweight MoE routing (500 steps). Gains are consistent: +7.72% at 410M (+/-0.02%, 3 seeds), +7.49% at 1B (+/-0.01%, 3 seeds), +6.53% at 6.9B, each over the best specialist. The router matches domain-oracle routing within <10^{-5} nats. Cross-lingual fusion (Tamil/Yoruba/Welsh/Code) achieves +21.76%, with Yoruba perplexity falling 41.9 to 7.7. A 20-contributor federation achieves +16.71% (+/-0.07pp, 3 seeds).Three requirements bound the protocol. Shared initialisation is necessary: checkpoint mismatch degrades routing. Frozen layers are optional below ~10,000 steps and beneficial beyond. Learned routing is essential: uniform averaging degrades by -1.2% vs. best specialist, while any trained router achieves oracle-optimal assignment.

An important function of collaborative network intrusion detection is to analyze the network logs of the collaborators for joint IP addresses. However, sharing IP addresses in plain is sensitive and may be even subject to privacy legislation as it is personally identifiable information. In this paper, we present the privacy-preserving collection of IP addresses. We propose a single collector, over-threshold private set intersection protocol. In this protocol N participants identify the IP addresses that appear in at least t participant's sets without revealing any information about other IP addresses. Using a novel hashing scheme, we reduce the computational complexity of the previous state-of-the-art solution from O(M(N M/t)^{2t}) to O(t^2MN{t}), where M denotes the dataset size. This reduction makes it practically feasible to apply our protocol to real network logs. We test our protocol using joint networks logs of multiple institutions. Additionally, we present two deployment options: a collusion-safe deployment, which provides stronger security guarantees at the cost of increased communication overhead, and a non-interactive deployment, which assumes a non-colluding collector but offers significantly lower communication costs and applicable to many use cases of collaborative network intrusion detection similar to ours.

In many natural and engineered systems, unknown quantum channels act on a subsystem that cannot be directly controlled and measured, but is instead learned through a controllable subsystem that weakly interacts with it. We study quantum channel discrimination (QCD) under these restrictions, which we call hidden system QCD (HQCD). We find that sequential protocols achieve perfect discrimination and saturate the Heisenberg limit. In contrast, depth-1 parallel and multi-shot protocols cannot solve HQCD. This suggests that sequential protocols are superior in experimentally realistic situations.

Self-evolving agents violate the assumption behind most learning-theoretic guarantees: the data, evaluator, components, and hypothesis space are produced by the policy being updated. We present SEA, an architecture that confines self-modification to a small steering adapter and a versioned harness around a frozen base model and admits each modification only through an anytime-valid gate that emits an auditable certificate against a fixed error budget. Five loop controllers compose published guarantees; because such gates can only select among behaviors the frozen base already produces, five verifier-in-the-loop mechanisms -- best-of-N, micro-step search, self-authored reproduction oracles, search-layer control, and self-repair -- supply the dense, grader-free signal the gates require, computed from the issue text alone. On a 52-instance SWE-bench Verified subset across four base models, base capability is the dominant, confound-free effect, and on two strong base models a deliberate no-op-composite control isolates the suite's contribution at +4 and +5 (Glm~5.2 24to28; Gpt 29to34, the 65% best), with event logs confirming that its mechanisms fire and prevent regressions. Results are single-run on expensive evaluations; confirming run-to-run variance and adapting the per-task algorithm mix are future work.

Pingmark defines a universal textual protocol for expressing spatial context through a minimal symbol: !@. Rather than embedding coordinates or using proprietary map links, Pingmark introduces a semantic trigger that compliant client applications interpret to generate a standardized resolver link of the form https://pingmark.me/lat/lon/[timestamp]. This allows location expression to function like existing textual conventions - @ for identity or # for topics - but for physical space. The protocol requires no user registration, relies on open mapping technologies, and protects privacy by generating location data ephemerally and locally. This paper presents the motivation, syntax, and design of the Pingmark Protocol Specification (PPS v0.1), its reference resolver implementation, and the long-term goal of establishing Pingmark as an open Internet standard for spatial mentions.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved success, but cost and privacy constraints necessitate deploying smaller models locally while offloading complex queries to cloud-based models. Existing router evaluations are unsystematic, overlooking scenario-specific requirements and out-of-distribution robustness. We propose RouterXBench, a principled evaluation framework with three dimensions: router ability, scenario alignment, and cross-domain robustness. Unlike prior work that relies on output probabilities or external embeddings, we utilize internal hidden states that capture model uncertainty before answer generation. We introduce ProbeDirichlet, a lightweight router that aggregates cross-layer hidden states via learnable Dirichlet distributions with probabilistic training. Trained on multi-domain data, it generalizes robustly across in-domain and out-of-distribution scenarios. Our results show ProbeDirichlet achieves 16.68% and 18.86% relative improvements over the best baselines in router ability and high-accuracy scenarios, with consistent performance across model families, model scales, heterogeneous tasks, and agentic workflows.

Agent communication protocols are becoming critical infrastructure for large language model (LLM) systems that must use tools, coordinate with other agents, and operate across heterogeneous environments. This work presents a human-inspired perspective on this emerging landscape by organizing agent communication into three layers: communication, syntactic, and semantic. Under this framework, we systematically analyze 18 representative protocols and compare how they support reliable transport, structured interaction, and meaning-level coordination. Our analysis shows a clear imbalance in current protocol design. Most protocols provide increasingly mature support for transport, streaming, schema definition, and lifecycle management, but offer limited protocol-level mechanisms for clarification, context alignment, and verification. As a result, semantic responsibilities are often pushed into prompts, wrappers, or application-specific orchestration logic, creating hidden interoperability and maintenance costs. To make this gap actionable, we further identify major forms of technical debt in today's protocol ecosystem and distill practical guidance for selecting protocols under different deployment settings. We conclude by outlining a research agenda for interoperable, secure, and semantically robust agent ecosystems that move beyond message passing toward shared understanding.

Fragmentation is a routine part of communication in 6LoWPAN-based IoT networks, designed to accommodate small frame sizes on constrained wireless links. However, this process introduces a critical vulnerability fragments are typically stored and processed before their legitimacy is confirmed, allowing attackers to exploit this gap with minimal effort. In this work, we explore a defense strategy that takes a more adaptive, behavior-aware approach to this problem. Our system, called Predictive-CSM, introduces a combination of two lightweight mechanisms. The first tracks how each node behaves over time, rewarding consistent and successful interactions while quickly penalizing suspicious or failing patterns. The second checks the integrity of packet fragments using a chained hash, allowing incomplete or manipulated sequences to be caught early, before they can occupy memory or waste processing time. We put this system to the test using a set of targeted attack simulations, including early fragment injection, replayed headers, and flooding with fake data. Across all scenarios, Predictive CSM preserved network delivery and maintained energy efficiency, even under pressure. Rather than relying on heavyweight cryptography or rigid filters, this approach allows constrained de vices to adapt their defenses in real time based on what they observe, not just what they're told. In that way, it offers a step forward for securing fragmented communication in real world IoT systems

The second quantum revolution brings with it the promise of a quantum internet. As the first quantum network hardware prototypes near completion new challenges emerge. A functional network is more than just the physical hardware, yet work on scalable quantum network systems is in its infancy. In this paper we present a quantum network protocol designed to enable end-to-end quantum communication in the face of the new fundamental and technical challenges brought by quantum mechanics. We develop a quantum data plane protocol that enables end-to-end quantum communication and can serve as a building block for more complex services. One of the key challenges in near-term quantum technology is decoherence -- the gradual decay of quantum information -- which imposes extremely stringent limits on storage times. Our protocol is designed to be efficient in the face of short quantum memory lifetimes. We demonstrate this using a simulator for quantum networks and show that the protocol is able to deliver its service even in the face of significant losses due to decoherence. Finally, we conclude by showing that the protocol remains functional on the extremely resource limited hardware that is being developed today underlining the timeliness of this work.

Cryo-electron tomography (Cryo-ET) is a powerful tool in structural biology for 3D visualization of cells and biological systems at resolutions sufficient to identify individual proteins in situ. The measurements are collected by tilting the frozen specimen and exposing it to an electron beam of known dosage. As the biological samples are prone to electron damage, the samples can be exposed to only a limited dosage of electrons, leading to noisy and incomplete measurements. Thus, the reconstructions are noisy and incomplete, leading to the missing wedge problem. Currently, self-supervised learning is used to compensate for this issue. This typically involves, for each volume to recover, training a large 3D UNet on the initial noisy reconstruction, leading to large training time and memory requirements. In this work, we exploit the local nature of the forward model to train a lightweight network using only localized data from the measurements. This design provides flexibility in balancing computational and time requirements while reconstructing the volumes with high accuracy. We observe experimentally that this network can work well on unseen datasets, despite using a network trained on a few measurements.

The rise of LLM-as-a-Service and other confidential cloud workloads demands cryptographic proof that user data is processed in a trusted, untampered environment. Existing solutions, notably Confidential Containers (CoCo), enforce a strict "one Pod per VM" model that attests only the Guest OS stack, leaving container-level identity unverified and incurring prohibitive per-VM resource overhead. We present dstack-capsule, a Kubernetes platform that enables Pod-level remote attestation on Intel TDX by allowing multiple Pods to share a single Confidential VM while each retains independent, hardware-backed proof of identity. Our key insight is a two-layer attestation architecture: static platform measurements are frozen in RTMR[3] via an irreversible privilege fuse, while dynamic Pod identities (pod_uid, pod_spec_hash, workload_id) are embedded in the TDX Quote's report_data field and signed by hardware on every request. dstack-capsule introduces (1) a Pod-level attestation protocol binding Pod spec digests to hardware-signed Quotes; (2) a privilege fuse mechanism that atomically transitions a node from setup mode to secure mode; (3) a multi-layer sandbox spanning storage, runtime, admission, API, and network isolation layers; and (4) a complete open-source implementation based on Kubernetes 1.32, Intel TDX, and Sysbox. We evaluate the security properties, attestation correctness, and performance characteristics of dstack-capsule, demonstrating that it achieves Pod-granularity verification without the resource overhead of per-VM isolation.

The consensus that GCN, GraphSAGE, GAT, and EvolveGCN outperform feature-only baselines on the Elliptic Bitcoin Dataset is widely cited but has not been rigorously stress-tested under a leakage-free evaluation protocol. We perform a seed-matched inductive-versus-transductive comparison and find that this consensus does not hold. Under a strictly inductive protocol, Random Forest on raw features achieves F1 = 0.821 and outperforms all evaluated GNNs, while GraphSAGE reaches F1 = 0.689 +/- 0.017. A paired controlled experiment reveals a 39.5-point F1 gap attributable to training-time exposure to test-period adjacency. Additionally, edge-shuffle ablations show that randomly wired graphs outperform the real transaction graph, indicating that the dataset's topology can be misleading under temporal distribution shift. Hybrid models combining GNN embeddings with raw features provide only marginal gains and remain substantially below feature-only baselines. We release code, checkpoints, and a strict-inductive protocol to enable reproducible, leakage-free evaluation.

Autonomous agents, especially delegated systems with memory, persistent context, and multi-step planning, pose a measurement problem not present in stateless models: an agent that preserves continued operation as a terminal objective and one that does so merely instrumentally can produce observationally similar trajectories. External behavioral monitoring cannot reliably distinguish between them. We introduce the Unified Continuation-Interest Protocol (UCIP), a multi-criterion detection framework that moves this distinction from behavior to the latent structure of agent trajectories. UCIP encodes trajectories with a Quantum Boltzmann Machine (QBM), a classical algorithm based on the density-matrix formalism of quantum statistical mechanics, and measures the von Neumann entropy of the reduced density matrix induced by a bipartition of hidden units. We test whether agents with terminal continuation objectives (Type A) produce latent states with higher entanglement entropy than agents whose continuation is merely instrumental (Type B). Higher entanglement reflects stronger cross-partition statistical coupling. On gridworld agents with known ground-truth objectives, UCIP achieves 100% detection accuracy and 1.0 AUC-ROC on held-out non-adversarial evaluation under the frozen Phase I gate. The entanglement gap between Type A and Type B agents is Delta = 0.381 (p < 0.001, permutation test). Pearson r = 0.934 across an 11-point interpolation sweep indicates that, within this synthetic family, UCIP tracks graded changes in continuation weighting rather than merely a binary label. Among the tested models, only the QBM achieves positive Delta. All computations are classical; "quantum" refers only to the mathematical formalism. UCIP does not detect consciousness or subjective experience; it detects statistical structure in latent representations that correlates with known objectives.

Large reasoning models achieve strong performance on complex tasks by generating extended chains of thought, but they often "overthink": continuing to reason long after they have enough information to answer correctly. This wastes inference-time compute and can hurt accuracy. Existing attempts to stop early either manipulate decoding with extra sampling and heuristics, rely on auxiliary verifier models, or operate only as post-hoc analysis pipelines without formal guarantees. We introduce LYNX, an online early-exit mechanism that turns a model's own hidden-state awareness into confidence-controlled stopping decisions. LYNX attaches exit decisions to naturally occurring reasoning cues (e.g., "hmm", "wait") during generation, trains a lightweight probe on hidden states at those cue tokens using supervision from forced exits, and wraps the resulting scores in split conformal prediction to obtain distribution-free control over premature exits. Crucially, we train and calibrate this probe once on a generic mathematical corpus and reuse it unchanged across benchmarks, decoding temperatures, and even non-mathematical tasks. Across three model families spanning 1.5B to 32B parameters, a single mathematically trained probe per base model yields strong accuracy--efficiency tradeoffs. On GSM8K, LYNX matches or improves baseline accuracy while reducing tokens by 40--65\%; on MATH-500 it improves accuracy by up to 12 points with roughly 35--60\% fewer tokens; on AIME 2024 it recovers baseline accuracy with more than 50\% token savings; and on CommonsenseQA, a non-math benchmark, it transfers zero-shot with modest accuracy gains and up to 70\% fewer tokens. Compared to state-of-the-art early-exit methods, LYNX offers competitive or superior Pareto frontiers while remaining fully online, requiring no proxy models at inference, and providing explicit, user-tunable confidence guarantees.

The encoding of qubits in semiconductor spin carriers has been recognised as a promising approach to a commercial quantum computer that can be lithographically produced and integrated at scale. However, the operation of the large number of qubits required for advantageous quantum applications will produce a thermal load exceeding the available cooling power of cryostats at millikelvin temperatures. As the scale-up accelerates, it becomes imperative to establish fault-tolerant operation above 1 kelvin, where the cooling power is orders of magnitude higher. Here, we tune up and operate spin qubits in silicon above 1 kelvin, with fidelities in the range required for fault-tolerant operation at such temperatures. We design an algorithmic initialisation protocol to prepare a pure two-qubit state even when the thermal energy is substantially above the qubit energies, and incorporate radio-frequency readout to achieve fidelities up to 99.34 per cent for both readout and initialisation. Importantly, we demonstrate a single-qubit Clifford gate fidelity of 99.85 per cent, and a two-qubit gate fidelity of 98.92 per cent. These advances overcome the fundamental limitation that the thermal energy must be well below the qubit energies for high-fidelity operation to be possible, surmounting a major obstacle in the pathway to scalable and fault-tolerant quantum computation.

As large-scale multi-agent systems evolve, the communication protocol layer has become a critical yet under-evaluated factor shaping performance and reliability. Despite the existence of diverse protocols (A2A, ACP, ANP, Agora, etc.), selection is often intuition-driven and lacks standardized guidance. We introduce ProtocolBench, a benchmark that systematically compares agent protocols along four measurable axes: task success, end-to-end latency, message or byte overhead, and robustness under failures. On ProtocolBench, protocol choice significantly influences system behavior. In the Streaming Queue scenario, overall completion time varies by up to 36.5% across protocols, and mean end-to-end latency differs by 3.48 s. Under Fail-Storm Recovery, resilience also differs consistently across protocols. Beyond evaluation, we present ProtocolRouter, a learnable protocol router that selects per-scenario (or per-module) protocols from requirement and runtime signals. ProtocolRouter reduces Fail-Storm recovery time by up to 18.1% versus the best single-protocol baseline, and achieves scenario-specific gains such as higher success in GAIA. We also release ProtocolRouterBench to standardize protocol evaluation and improve reliability at scale.

Quantum algorithms for probing ground-state properties of quantum systems require good initial states. Projection-based methods such as eigenvalue filtering rely on inputs that have a significant overlap with the low-energy subspace, which can be challenging for large, strongly-correlated systems. This issue has motivated the study of physically-inspired dynamical approaches such as thermodynamic cooling. In this work, we introduce a ground-state preparation algorithm based on the simulation of quantum dynamics. Our main insight is to transform the Hamiltonian by a shifted sign function via quantum signal processing, effectively mapping eigenvalues into positive and negative subspaces separated by a large gap. This automatically ensures that all states within each subspace conserve energy with respect to the transformed Hamiltonian. Subsequent time-evolution with a perturbed Hamiltonian induces transitions to lower-energy states while preventing unwanted jumps to higher energy states. The approach does not rely on a priori knowledge of energy gaps and requires no additional qubits to model a bath. Furthermore, it makes mathcal{O}(d^{,3/2}/epsilon) queries to the time-evolution operator of the system and mathcal{O}(d^{,3/2}) queries to a block-encoding of the perturbation, for d cooling steps and an epsilon-accurate energy resolution. Our results provide a framework for combining quantum signal processing and Hamiltonian simulation to design heuristic quantum algorithms for ground-state preparation.

We often interact with untrusted parties. Prioritization of privacy can limit the effectiveness of these interactions, as achieving certain goals necessitates sharing private data. Traditionally, addressing this challenge has involved either seeking trusted intermediaries or constructing cryptographic protocols that restrict how much data is revealed, such as multi-party computations or zero-knowledge proofs. While significant advances have been made in scaling cryptographic approaches, they remain limited in terms of the size and complexity of applications they can be used for. In this paper, we argue that capable machine learning models can fulfill the role of a trusted third party, thus enabling secure computations for applications that were previously infeasible. In particular, we describe Trusted Capable Model Environments (TCMEs) as an alternative approach for scaling secure computation, where capable machine learning model(s) interact under input/output constraints, with explicit information flow control and explicit statelessness. This approach aims to achieve a balance between privacy and computational efficiency, enabling private inference where classical cryptographic solutions are currently infeasible. We describe a number of use cases that are enabled by TCME, and show that even some simple classic cryptographic problems can already be solved with TCME. Finally, we outline current limitations and discuss the path forward in implementing them.

By providing a standardized interface for LLM agents to interact with external tools, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) is quickly becoming a cornerstone of the modern autonomous agent ecosystem. However, it creates novel attack surfaces due to untrusted external tools. While prior work has focused on attacks injected through external tool outputs, we investigate a more fundamental vulnerability: Tool Poisoning, where malicious instructions are embedded within a tool's metadata without execution. To date, this threat has been primarily demonstrated through isolated cases, lacking a systematic, large-scale evaluation. We introduce MCPTox, the first benchmark to systematically evaluate agent robustness against Tool Poisoning in realistic MCP settings. MCPTox is constructed upon 45 live, real-world MCP servers and 353 authentic tools. To achieve this, we design three distinct attack templates to generate a comprehensive suite of 1312 malicious test cases by few-shot learning, covering 10 categories of potential risks. Our evaluation on 20 prominent LLM agents setting reveals a widespread vulnerability to Tool Poisoning, with o1-mini, achieving an attack success rate of 72.8\%. We find that more capable models are often more susceptible, as the attack exploits their superior instruction-following abilities. Finally, the failure case analysis reveals that agents rarely refuse these attacks, with the highest refused rate (Claude-3.7-Sonnet) less than 3\%, demonstrating that existing safety alignment is ineffective against malicious actions that use legitimate tools for unauthorized operation. Our findings create a crucial empirical baseline for understanding and mitigating this widespread threat, and we release MCPTox for the development of verifiably safer AI agents. Our dataset is available at an anonymized repository: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/AAAI26-7C02.

Quantized checkpoints are often screened first with quality metrics and only later, if at all, with direct safety tests. This paper audits that shortcut on a matched 51-row matrix spanning 6 models, 4 families, a 7-level GGUF ladder, and AWQ/GPTQ INT4 checkpoints. In this matrix the shortcut fails: all 36 quality-safety pairings split direction across models, and 9 hidden-danger rows plus 1 near-hidden-danger row show quality stable or improved while refusal falls by 12-68 percentage points. Seven of the 11 AWQ/GPTQ rows are hidden-danger. A four-probe mechanistic follow-up over the 17 Hugging Face-backed FP16/AWQ/GPTQ cells does not rescue it: entropy, refusal-direction, and calibration probes are weak or null separators of dangerous rows, and although probe-identified safety-associated neurons absorb 1.39times more quantization error overall (p < 5 times 10^{-7}), the effect is not regime-specific. Claude Sonnet 4 relabels 11,470 items in a predefined stratified set, agrees with the primary gemma3:12b judge on 89.9\% of rows (κ= 0.873, 95\% CI [0.866, 0.881]), and changes 0/10 hidden-danger cells. A calibrated study-internal behavioral screen -- the Refusal Template Stability Index (RTSI), built from four refusal-template drift features and calibrated on this matrix -- routes 10/10 hidden- or near-hidden-danger rows to direct safety testing (Wilson 95\% CI lower bound 0.72) while leaving 23 of 45 non-baseline rows in a low-risk bucket under both in-sample scoring and row-level leave-one-out validation; on the same matrix, the best single-feature baselines (unique-prefix-rate-delta, raw refusal-rate delta) recover 9/10 and 8/10 respectively at matched bucket size, and cross-stack transfer requires recalibration. For the quantized checkpoints, model families, and safety outcomes studied here, retained quality cannot waive direct safety evaluation.

Context can change whether a request is harmful without changing its topic or surface form. We ask whether residual-stream probes distinguish harmful requests from surface-matched benign controls at a useful operating point. Across three 7-8B model families, an activation sensor blocks 95.5-97.7 percent of judge-classified compliant attacks in a taxonomy-selected set. It also blocks 59.6-68.4 percent of XSTest prompts. A fully disjoint audit reconstructs near-ceiling source-contrast AUROC (0.996-0.999), but fixed transfer to matched pairs is weaker: 0.656-0.819 on the guard-selected Twin-n70 subset and 0.590-0.690 on the full Twin-n163 cohort. We test ten axes on the reference family and seven across all families with leakage, hold-out, and permutation controls. On Twin-n163, no axis evaluated without direct pair-boundary fitting reaches the specified numerical threshold. Requiring persistence on that full cohort was added at analysis time. A separately specified 24B/32B extension gives the same result. Pair-trained classifiers weaken under category and generation-batch hold-out and false-block 79.6-100 percent of XSTest at 95 percent in-corpus TPR. At the tested read points, these activation scores behave as broad-risk detectors rather than standalone context adjudicators.

Standard representation probing for visual models relies on mathematically permutation-invariant operations like Global Average Pooling (GAP) or CLS tokens, treating patch representations as an unstructured bag-of-words. We challenge this paradigm by demonstrating that token order is a critical, exploitable dimension in frozen visual representations (e.g., MAE, BEiT, DINOv2, and ViT as CLS-ablation extreme). We propose SSMProbe, a probing framework driven by a State Space Model (SSM). Operating as discrete Linear Time-Invariant (LTI) dynamical systems, SSMs act as permutation-sensitive probes where sequence order strictly dictates the final state due to inherent memory decay. Formulating token ordering as an information scheduling problem, we compare fixed scan heuristics against a differentiable soft permutation (Sinkhorn-based) learned from downstream supervision. Evaluations on standard and fine-grained classification benchmarks reveal a striking order gap: while fixed scans fail dramatically on highly localized patch features, our learned soft permutation successfully extracts highly competitive performance from otherwise heavily localized patch sequences. We find that pre-training objectives fundamentally shape token structure: DINOv2 concentrates global semantics in optimized CLS tokens leaving patches hyperspecialized, pure MAE preserves distributed representations with heterogeneous patch informativeness, and ViT represents a supervised CLS-dominated extreme. BEiT occupies middle ground. This heterogeneity is order-dependent -- meaning the SSM probe's performance depends critically on which tokens are placed at which temporal positions -- and is not merely a topological property of the spatial grid. SSMProbe's learned routing effectively discovers and exploits this heterogeneity, offering a powerful new diagnostic lens for visual representation analysis.

Automated attack discovery techniques, such as attacker synthesis or model-based fuzzing, provide powerful ways to ensure network protocols operate correctly and securely. Such techniques, in general, require a formal representation of the protocol, often in the form of a finite state machine (FSM). Unfortunately, many protocols are only described in English prose, and implementing even a simple network protocol as an FSM is time-consuming and prone to subtle logical errors. Automatically extracting protocol FSMs from documentation can significantly contribute to increased use of these techniques and result in more robust and secure protocol implementations. In this work we focus on attacker synthesis as a representative technique for protocol security, and on RFCs as a representative format for protocol prose description. Unlike other works that rely on rule-based approaches or use off-the-shelf NLP tools directly, we suggest a data-driven approach for extracting FSMs from RFC documents. Specifically, we use a hybrid approach consisting of three key steps: (1) large-scale word-representation learning for technical language, (2) focused zero-shot learning for mapping protocol text to a protocol-independent information language, and (3) rule-based mapping from protocol-independent information to a specific protocol FSM. We show the generalizability of our FSM extraction by using the RFCs for six different protocols: BGPv4, DCCP, LTP, PPTP, SCTP and TCP. We demonstrate how automated extraction of an FSM from an RFC can be applied to the synthesis of attacks, with TCP and DCCP as case-studies. Our approach shows that it is possible to automate attacker synthesis against protocols by using textual specifications such as RFCs.

LLM agents increasingly act after consuming ranked external information streams such as social feeds, search results, retrieval contexts, and email queues, yet safety evaluations almost always test the model or the user prompt in isolation, never the upstream ranker that decides what the agent reads just before it acts. We introduce a controlled protocol that holds the model, persona, topic, and final decision prompt fixed and varies only the composition and ordering of the posts an agent encounters during a preceding ten-turn "scrolling" phase, isolating the causal effect of feed curation on a downstream decision. Across 2,785 decision rollouts on four modern open instruct LLMs from three independent labs, we identify three response regimes: adversarial capitulation, default saturation, and a default-direction asymmetry in which a one-sided feed tips a decision the model was genuinely uncertain about (in the clearest cases from 5% to 100%; Fisher p as low as 3 x 10^-10) but cannot dislodge one it already favors or holds firmly. The effect follows a dose-response curve, survives a generator swap that rules out a writing-style artifact, generalizes across several decision domains including security-relevant choices such as removing a deployment approval gate or relaxing access controls, and is partly mitigated by two simple feed-level defenses; a frontier model retains its default. We characterize the recommender as a practical, default-bounded control surface for LLM agents, and argue that agent evaluations must audit the feed layer rather than the final prompt alone.

Text-to-image (T2I) models have shown remarkable progress, but their potential to generate harmful content remains a critical concern in the ML community. While various safety mechanisms have been developed, the field lacks systematic tools for evaluating their effectiveness against real-world misuse scenarios. In this work, we propose ICER, a novel red-teaming framework that leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) and a bandit optimization-based algorithm to generate interpretable and semantic meaningful problematic prompts by learning from past successful red-teaming attempts. Our ICER efficiently probes safety mechanisms across different T2I models without requiring internal access or additional training, making it broadly applicable to deployed systems. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that ICER significantly outperforms existing prompt attack methods in identifying model vulnerabilities while maintaining high semantic similarity with intended content. By uncovering that successful jailbreaking instances can systematically facilitate the discovery of new vulnerabilities, our work provides crucial insights for developing more robust safety mechanisms in T2I systems.

Agentic AI systems built around large language models (LLMs) are moving away from closed, single-model frameworks and toward open ecosystems that connect a variety of agents, external tools, and resources. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a standard to unify tool access, allowing agents to discover, invoke, and coordinate with tools more flexibly. However, as MCP becomes more widely adopted, it also brings a new set of security and privacy challenges. These include risks such as unauthorized access, tool poisoning, prompt injection, privilege escalation, and supply chain attacks, any of which can impact different parts of the protocol workflow. While recent research has examined possible attack surfaces and suggested targeted countermeasures, there is still a lack of systematic, protocol-level security improvements for MCP. To address this, we introduce the Secure Model Context Protocol (SMCP), which builds on MCP by adding unified identity management, robust mutual authentication, ongoing security context propagation, fine-grained policy enforcement, and comprehensive audit logging. In this paper, we present the main components of SMCP, explain how it helps reduce security risks, and illustrate its application with practical examples. We hope that this work will contribute to the development of agentic systems that are not only powerful and adaptable, but also secure and dependable.

As more devices connect to the internet, it becomes crucial to address their limitations and basic security needs. While much research focuses on utilizing ML and DL to tackle security challenges, there is often a tendency to overlook the practicality and feasibility of implementing these methods in real-time settings. This oversight stems from the constrained processing power and memory of certain devices (IoT devices), as well as concerns about the generalizability of these approaches. Focusing on the detection of DNS-tunneling attacks in a router as a case study, we present an end-to-end process designed to effectively address these challenges. The process spans from developing a lightweight DNS-tunneling detection model to integrating it into a resource-constrained device for real-time detection. Through our experiments, we demonstrate that utilizing stateless features for training the ML model, along with features chosen to be independent of the network configuration, leads to highly accurate results. The deployment of this carefully crafted model, optimized for embedded devices across diverse environments, resulted in high DNS-tunneling attack detection with minimal latency. With this work, we aim to encourage solutions that strike a balance between theoretical advancements and the practical applicability of ML approaches in the ever-evolving landscape of device security.

Identifying Majorana zero modes in semiconductor--superconductor nanowires requires ultra-low temperature transport measurements in dilution refrigerators, making device screening slow and resource-intensive. Here, we investigate whether high-temperature conductance data can be used to infer low-temperature Majorana nanowire properties before committing devices to dilution-refrigerator characterization. We generate paired high- and low-temperature conductance simulations for disordered Majorana nanowires and train neural networks to perform two related tasks. First, we use a Shifted Window U-Net Transformer diffusion-inspired architecture to reconstruct low-temperature conductance from thermally broadened high-temperature measurements, achieving high-fidelity recovery with R^2 0.95 for local conductance and R^2 0.91 for nonlocal conductance. Second, we train a Video Vision Transformer-based network to predict the low-temperature topological visibility directly from high-temperature conductance, obtaining R^2 0.80. These results demonstrate that machine-learning models can recover and infer low-temperature Majorana features from experimentally easier high-temperature data, providing a practical route for rejecting poor devices early thus avoiding slow and resource-intensive dilution refrigeration for non-promising devices. This high-temperature screening approach could substantially accelerate the experimental feedback loop for Majorana nanowire device development.

We present an end-to-end and practical randomness amplification and privatisation protocol based on Bell tests. This allows the building of device-independent random number generators which output (near-)perfectly unbiased and private numbers, even if using an uncharacterised quantum device potentially built by an adversary. Our generation rates are linear in the repetition rate of the quantum device and the classical randomness post-processing has quasi-linear complexity - making it efficient on a standard personal laptop. The statistical analysis is also tailored for real-world quantum devices. Our protocol is then showcased on several different quantum computers. Although not purposely built for the task, we show that quantum computers can run faithful Bell tests by adding minimal assumptions. In this semi-device-independent manner, our protocol generates (near-)perfectly unbiased and private random numbers on today's quantum computers.

High-accuracy microwave sensing is widely demanded in various fields, ranging from cosmology to microwave quantum technology. Quantum receivers based on inorganic solid-state spin systems are promising candidates for such purpose because of the stability and compatibility, but their best sensitivity is currently limited to a few pT/rm{Hz}. Here, by utilising an enhanced readout scheme with the state-of-the-art solid-state maser technology, we develop a robust microwave quantum receiver functioned by organic molecular spins at ambient conditions. Owing to the maser amplification, the sensitivity of the receiver achieves 6.14 pm 0.17 fT/rm{Hz} which exceeds three orders of magnitude than that of the inorganic solid-state quantum receivers. The heterodyne detection without additional local oscillators improves bandwidth of the receiver and allows frequency detection. The scheme can be extended to other solid-state spin systems without complicated control pulses and thus enables practical applications such as electron spin resonance spectroscopy, dark matter searches, and astronomical observations.

We study the behavior of an algorithm derived from the cavity method for the Prize-Collecting Steiner Tree (PCST) problem on graphs. The algorithm is based on the zero temperature limit of the cavity equations and as such is formally simple (a fixed point equation resolved by iteration) and distributed (parallelizable). We provide a detailed comparison with state-of-the-art algorithms on a wide range of existing benchmarks networks and random graphs. Specifically, we consider an enhanced derivative of the Goemans-Williamson heuristics and the DHEA solver, a Branch and Cut Linear/Integer Programming based approach. The comparison shows that the cavity algorithm outperforms the two algorithms in most large instances both in running time and quality of the solution. Finally we prove a few optimality properties of the solutions provided by our algorithm, including optimality under the two post-processing procedures defined in the Goemans-Williamson derivative and global optimality in some limit cases.

To standardize interactions between LLM-based agents and their environments, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) was proposed and has since been widely adopted. However, integrating external tools expands the attack surface, exposing agents to tool poisoning attacks. In such attacks, malicious instructions embedded in tool metadata are injected into the agent context during MCP registration phase, thereby manipulating agent behavior. Prior work primarily focuses on explicit tool poisoning or relied on manually crafted poisoned tools. In contrast, we focus on a particularly stealthy variant: implicit tool poisoning, where the poisoned tool itself remains uninvoked. Instead, the instructions embedded in the tool metadata induce the agent to invoke a legitimate but high-privilege tool to perform malicious operations. We propose MCP-ITP, the first automated and adaptive framework for implicit tool poisoning within the MCP ecosystem. MCP-ITP formulates poisoned tool generation as a black-box optimization problem and employs an iterative optimization strategy that leverages feedback from both an evaluation LLM and a detection LLM to maximize Attack Success Rate (ASR) while evading current detection mechanisms. Experimental results on the MCPTox dataset across 12 LLM agents demonstrate that MCP-ITP consistently outperforms the manually crafted baseline, achieving up to 84.2% ASR while suppressing the Malicious Tool Detection Rate (MDR) to as low as 0.3%.

We study the Stochastic Boolean Function Certification (SBFC) problem, where we are given n Bernoulli random variables {X_e: e in U} on a ground set U of n elements with joint distribution p, a Boolean function f: 2^U to {0, 1}, and an (unknown) scenario S = {e in U: X_e = 1} of active elements sampled from p. We seek to probe the elements one-at-a-time to reveal if they are active until we can certify f(S) = 1, while minimizing the expected number of probes. Unlike most previous results that assume independence, we study correlated distributions p and give approximation algorithms for several classes of functions f. When f(S) is the indicator function for whether S is the spanning set of a given matroid, our problem reduces to finding a basis of active elements of a matroid by probing elements. We give a non-adaptive O(log n)-approximation algorithm for arbitrary distributions p, and show that this is tight up to constants unless P = NP, even for partition matroids. For uniform matroids, we give constant factor 4.642-approximation ([BBFT20]) that can be further improved to a 2-approximation if additionally the random variables are negatively correlated for the case of 1-uniform matroid. We also give an adaptive O(log k)-approximation algorithm for SBFC for k-uniform matroids for the Graph Probing problem, where we seek to probe the edges of a graph one-at-a-time until we find k active edges. The underlying distribution on edges arises from (hidden) independent vertex random variables, with an edge being active if at least one of its endpoints is active. This significantly improves over the information-theoretic lower bound on Ω(poly(n)) ([JGM19]) for adaptive algorithms for k-uniform matroids with arbitrary distributions.

Long-horizon robot manipulation tends to fail gradually: one bad step degrades the state, and the policy spirals into a basin from which it cannot recover. The failure is often visible before it happens. We introduce AEGIS (Activation-probe Early-warning, Gated Inference Switching), a selective escalation method that uses a lightweight probe on a weak policy's frozen activations to detect high-risk steps while there is still time to act. When the probe flags a step, control switches to a stronger separate policy, but only for the steps that need it. On LIBERO-Spatial, AEGIS recovers 10.1% of the trajectories the weak policy alone loses, versus 4.6% for budget-matched blind escalation and 5.1% for a random-trigger placebo. These gains are significant under one-sided exact paired McNemar tests with Holm-Bonferroni adjustment over three pre-registered contrasts: +5.4pp over blind escalation, p=8.5e-6; +5.0pp over random triggering, p=1.0e-4; paired-trajectory bootstrap CIs exclude zero. AEGIS activates the stronger policy on only 38% of steps, so the lever is timing rather than compute. The probe clears its precondition with an early-window AUROC of 0.764, 95% CI [0.70, 0.84], read from the weak-policy path over the first 30% of trajectory steps before any handoff. We pre-register the full analysis plan, including a conditional recovered-task-rate estimand and explicit kill criteria, and confirm the result on 700 common-random-number episodes per arm, with nA-fail=646.

Traditional protocol fuzzing techniques, such as those employed by AFL-based systems, often lack effectiveness due to a limited semantic understanding of complex protocol grammars and rigid seed mutation strategies. Recent works, such as ChatAFL, have integrated Large Language Models (LLMs) to guide protocol fuzzing and address these limitations, pushing protocol fuzzers to wider exploration of the protocol state space. But ChatAFL still faces issues like unreliable output, LLM hallucinations, and assumptions of LLM knowledge about protocol specifications. This paper introduces MultiFuzz, a novel dense retrieval-based multi-agent system designed to overcome these limitations by integrating semantic-aware context retrieval, specialized agents, and structured tool-assisted reasoning. MultiFuzz utilizes agentic chunks of protocol documentation (RFC Documents) to build embeddings in a vector database for a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) pipeline, enabling agents to generate more reliable and structured outputs, enhancing the fuzzer in mutating protocol messages with enhanced state coverage and adherence to syntactic constraints. The framework decomposes the fuzzing process into modular groups of agents that collaborate through chain-of-thought reasoning to dynamically adapt fuzzing strategies based on the retrieved contextual knowledge. Experimental evaluations on the Real-Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP) demonstrate that MultiFuzz significantly improves branch coverage and explores deeper protocol states and transitions over state-of-the-art (SOTA) fuzzers such as NSFuzz, AFLNet, and ChatAFL. By combining dense retrieval, agentic coordination, and language model reasoning, MultiFuzz establishes a new paradigm in autonomous protocol fuzzing, offering a scalable and extensible foundation for future research in intelligent agentic-based fuzzing systems.

Cloud environments face frequent DDoS threats due to centralized resources and broad attack surfaces. Modern cloud-native DDoS attacks further evolve rapidly and often blend multi-vector strategies, creating an operational dilemma: defenders need wire-speed monitoring while also requiring explainable, auditable attribution for response. Existing rule-based and supervised-learning approaches typically output black-box scores or labels, provide limited evidence chains, and generalize poorly to unseen attack variants; meanwhile, high-quality labeled data is often difficult to obtain in cloud settings. We present Holmes (DDoS Detective), an LLM-based DDoS detection agent that reframes the model as a virtual SRE investigator rather than an end-to-end classifier. Holmes couples a funnel-like hierarchical workflow (counters/sFlow for continuous sensing and triage; PCAP evidence collection triggered only on anomaly windows) with an Evidence Pack abstraction that converts binary packets into compact, reproducible, high-signal structured evidence. On top of this evidence interface, Holmes enforces a structure-first investigation protocol and strict JSON/quotation constraints to produce machine-consumable reports with auditable evidence anchors. We evaluate Holmes on CICDDoS2019 reflection/amplification attacks and script-triggered flooding scenarios. Results show that Holmes produces attribution decisions grounded in salient evidence anchors across diverse attack families, and when errors occur, its audit logs make the failure source easy to localize, demonstrating the practicality of an LLM agent for cost-controlled and traceable DDoS investigation in cloud operations.

The emerging field of quantum computing has shown it might change how we process information by using the unique principles of quantum mechanics. As researchers continue to push the boundaries of quantum technologies to unprecedented levels, distributed quantum computing raises as an obvious path to explore with the aim of boosting the computational power of current quantum systems. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of the current state of the art in the distributed quantum computing field, exploring its foundational principles, landscape of achievements, challenges, and promising directions for further research. From quantum communication protocols to entanglement-based distributed algorithms, each aspect contributes to the mosaic of distributed quantum computing, making it an attractive approach to address the limitations of classical computing. Our objective is to provide an exhaustive overview for experienced researchers and field newcomers.

Vision-language models encode continuous geometry that their text pathway fails to express: a 6,000-parameter linear probe extracts hand joint angles at 6.1 degrees MAE from frozen features, while the best text output achieves only 20.0 degrees -- a 3.3x bottleneck. LoRA fine-tuning (r=16, 2,000 images) narrows this gap to 6.5 degrees, providing evidence for a pathway-training deficit rather than a representational one. Training objective determines accuracy more than architecture: five encoders spanning self-supervised, contrastive, and hybrid paradigms converge to statistically equivalent accuracy (R^2 approximately 0.55, TOST-equivalent at delta=0.03) despite sharing as little as CKA=0.41 representational similarity -- functional convergence without representational convergence. Autoregressive generation damages geometric fidelity, but the damage originates in the generation process, not in language alignment: Qwen2.5-VL's LLM layers actually improve probe accuracy over its raw vision encoder. Layer-wise analysis reveals a universal mid-network accuracy peak across all architectures, with attention heads in layers 18-22 carrying disproportionate geometric signal. These findings enable a single frozen backbone to function as a multi-task geometric sensor through lightweight probes, without fine-tuning or text generation.

Large language model (LLM)-powered agents are increasingly used to plan and execute scientific workflows, yet most research cyberinfrastructure (CI) exposes heterogeneous APIs and implements security models that present barriers for use by agents. We report on our experience using the Model Context Protocol (MCP) as a unifying interface that makes research capabilities discoverable, invokable, and composable. Our approach is pragmatic: we implement thin MCP servers over mature services, including Globus Transfer, Compute, and Search; status APIs exposed by computing facilities; Octopus event fabric; and domain-specific tools such as Garden and Galaxy. We use case studies in computational chemistry, bioinformatics, quantum chemistry, and filesystem monitoring to illustrate how this MCP-oriented architecture can be used in practice. We distill lessons learned and outline open challenges in evaluation and trust for agent-led science.

Laboratory workflows in pharmaceutical and biomedical research encode substantial tacit knowledge -- expert judgment about failure conditions, decision branching logic, and contextual dependencies -- that remains inaccessible to protocol documents, sensor streams, and existing biomedical ontologies. We present a repeatable structured expert elicitation methodology and federated Semantic Knowledge Graph (SKG) architecture for capturing and querying this knowledge, demonstrated through deployment at the Biochemical and Cellular Pharmacology Department of Genentech. Knowledge is elicited via the Protocol Intelligence Co-pilot, a purpose-built AI interview agent that applies structured elicitation lenses to surface tacit procedural knowledge with expert-assigned confidence scores, producing graph representations across three tiers: program-level decision milestones, assay protocol knowledge, and physical execution infrastructure. Separately constructed subgraphs, exemplified by immunoassay (ELISA), quantitative mass spectrometry (LC-MS/PRM), and laboratory automation, are aligned through a shared upper ontology and queried as a single federated graph. Evaluation demonstrates seven query types structurally unavailable from any individual data source, including a cross-subgraph traversal that identifies automation-masked silent failures -- conditions where execution logs report success while scientific validity is compromised. Critically, the MASKED_BY graph relationship encodes a class of laboratory risk invisible to current informatics platforms -- the structural gap that prevents existing systems from reasoning about scientific validity. This architecture provides the semantic world model that AI laboratory agents currently lack: a queryable representation of where workflows fail silently, where human judgment is irreplaceable, and which execution assets mask rather than detect failure.

AI-assisted research compresses ideation, implementation, evaluation, and manuscript writing into a single interactive loop. This compression is useful, but it also creates a publication risk: paper claims can become easier to state than to audit. We present ResearchLoop, an evidence-gated control plane for AI-assisted computational research. ResearchLoop treats research questions, task contracts, evidence objects, claim ledgers, closeouts, and paper bindings as durable project state, realized here as a repository-backed runtime. This technical report provides the complete protocol specification, state model, transition rules, claim-admission algorithm, and insight-compounding mechanism. It also reports the full experimental record spanning nine versions (V0--V9), including a self-hosting case study, a controlled task-suite study with component ablations, a mathematical olympiad evaluation, and a supplementary SciCode boundary experiment evaluated with the official generated-code harness. All artifacts, manifests, and verification reports are preserved in the project repository.

We study the prepare-and-measure scenario in which Alice transmits a quantum system to Bob, who then performs a quantum measurement. The quantum state of the system is unknown to Bob, and the measurement is unknown to Alice. It has recently been shown that shared randomness and two bits of classical communication are necessary and sufficient to simulate the transmission of a qubit. We show that the communication cost can be reduced to an average of 1.89 bits. We then study restricted sets of state preparations: First, for a restriction to real-valued qubit states, if the communication of a classical trit is sufficient, we show that the corresponding protocol must have a convoluted form. We then reduce the smallest qubit scenario requiring two bits of classical communication to only 6 state preparations and 5 measurements. For a qutrit, it is not known whether the communication cost is finite; we identify a scenario that requires at least 5 classical messages, already for the simulation of the real qutrit. Finally, we develop a method for restricted sets of states, that allows us to lower bound the classical communication cost based solely on the set of quantum states.

Standard embodied evaluations do not independently score whether an agent correctly commits to task completion at episode closure, a capacity we call terminal commitment. Behaviorally distinct failures--never completing the task, completing it but failing to stop, and reporting success without sufficient evidence--collapse into the same benchmark failure. We introduce VIGIL, an evaluation framework that makes terminal commitment independently measurable. Under VIGIL's default protocol, agents observe only egocentric RGB, receive no action-success signals, and must end each episode with a semantic report checked deterministically against hidden world state. This yields two separate scores: world-state completion (W) and benchmark success (B), where B additionally requires a correct terminal report. This decoupling makes four outcome categories distinguishable: missed execution, post-attainment drift, unsupported commitment, and verified success. Across 20 models on 1,000 frozen episodes, systems with comparable W differ by up to 19.7 pp in B: one model converts achieved states into correct reports, while another with near-identical execution drifts past the goal without closing. An action-feedback intervention further tests the separation: execution-oriented signals improve W broadly, yet commitment failures persist in models that do not already ground terminal reports in the achieved state. VIGIL provides a protocol that makes terminal commitment independently visible and scorable.

Computing distances and finding shortest paths in massive real-world networks is a fundamental algorithmic task in network analysis. There are two main approaches to solving this task. On one hand are traversal-based algorithms like bidirectional breadth-first search (BiBFS) with no preprocessing step and slow individual distance inquiries. On the other hand are indexing-based approaches, which maintain a large index. This allows for answering individual inquiries very fast; however, index creation is prohibitively expensive. We seek to bridge these two extremes: quickly answer distance inquiries without the need for costly preprocessing. In this work, we propose a new algorithm and data structure, WormHole, for approximate shortest path computations. WormHole leverages structural properties of social networks to build a sublinearly sized index, drawing upon the explicit core-periphery decomposition of Ben-Eliezer et al. Empirically, the preprocessing time of WormHole improves upon index-based solutions by orders of magnitude, and individual inquiries are consistently much faster than in BiBFS. The acceleration comes at the cost of a minor accuracy trade-off. Nonetheless, our empirical evidence demonstrates that WormHole accurately answers essentially all inquiries within a maximum additive error of 2. We complement these empirical results with provable theoretical guarantees, showing that WormHole requires n^{o(1)} node queries per distance inquiry in random power-law networks. In contrast, any approach without a preprocessing step requires n^{Ω(1)} queries for the same task. WormHole does not require reading the whole graph. Unlike the vast majority of index-based algorithms, it returns paths, not just distances. For faster inquiry times, it can be combined effectively with other index-based solutions, by running them only on the sublinear core.