Daily Papers

Ethereum has emerged as a leading platform for decentralized applications (dApps) due to its robust smart contract capabilities. One of the critical issues in the Ethereum ecosystem is Maximal Extractable Value (MEV), a concept that has gained significant attention in the blockchain community. However, MEV has remained a major challenge with significant implications for the platform's operation and integrity. This paper introduces the FairFlow protocol, a novel framework designed to mitigate the effects of MEV within Ethereum's existing infrastructure. The protocol aims to provide a more equitable environment, preventing exploitation by miners or validators, and protecting user data. The combined approach of auction-based block space allocation and randomized transaction ordering significantly reduces the potential for MEV exploitation.

We consider some classical optimization problems in path planning and network transport, and we introduce new auction-based algorithms for their optimal and suboptimal solution. The algorithms are based on mathematical ideas that are related to competitive bidding by persons for objects and the attendant market equilibrium, which underlie auction processes. However, the starting point of our algorithms is different, namely weighted and unweighted path construction in directed graphs, rather than assignment of persons to objects. The new algorithms have several potential advantages over existing methods: they are empirically faster in some important contexts, such as max-flow, they are well-suited for on-line replanning, and they can be adapted to distributed asynchronous operation. Moreover, they allow arbitrary initial prices, without complementary slackness restrictions, and thus are better-suited to take advantage of reinforcement learning methods that use off-line training with data, as well as on-line training during real-time operation. The new algorithms may also find use in reinforcement learning contexts involving approximation, such as multistep lookahead and tree search schemes, and/or rollout algorithms.

Large-scale approximate nearest neighbor search commonly relies on partitions for indexing: database vectors are partitioned into clusters, and for each query a probing function selects the clusters to be scanned. The query probing function and the database partition are rarely treated as separate entities: most techniques assign queries with the same assignment function as the database vectors, which is suboptimal especially when database and query distributions differ. This paper introduces CwA (Cluster with Auctions), which addresses this limitation by jointly learning a balanced database partition and a neural probing function. CwA optimizes search performance directly for the query distribution. It minimizes its objective by alternating two steps: (i) gradient descent on the neural network of the probing function, and (ii) a large-scale combinatorial optimization of the cluster assignment for the database vectors. We solve the latter with a parallelizable auction algorithm that balances the partition by design. To further scale CwA, we extend the method to a Cartesian product of clusters that increases the partition's granularity. When database and query distributions differ, CwA achieves up to 4.7times throughput over the state-of-the-art at equal recall. In the in-distribution (ID) setting, even a simple linear probing function trained with CwA outperforms competing deep neural methods.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

In the field of computational advertising, the integration of ads into the outputs of large language models (LLMs) presents an opportunity to support these services without compromising content integrity. This paper introduces novel auction mechanisms for ad allocation and pricing within the textual outputs of LLMs, leveraging retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). We propose a segment auction where an ad is probabilistically retrieved for each discourse segment (paragraph, section, or entire output) according to its bid and relevance, following the RAG framework, and priced according to competing bids. We show that our auction maximizes logarithmic social welfare, a new notion of welfare that balances allocation efficiency and fairness, and we characterize the associated incentive-compatible pricing rule. These results are extended to multi-ad allocation per segment. An empirical evaluation validates the feasibility and effectiveness of our approach over several ad auction scenarios, and exhibits inherent tradeoffs in metrics as we allow the LLM more flexibility to allocate ads.

Online allocation problems with resource constraints are central problems in revenue management and online advertising. In these problems, requests arrive sequentially during a finite horizon and, for each request, a decision maker needs to choose an action that consumes a certain amount of resources and generates reward. The objective is to maximize cumulative rewards subject to a constraint on the total consumption of resources. In this paper, we consider a data-driven setting in which the reward and resource consumption of each request are generated using an input model that is unknown to the decision maker. We design a general class of algorithms that attain good performance in various input models without knowing which type of input they are facing. In particular, our algorithms are asymptotically optimal under independent and identically distributed inputs as well as various non-stationary stochastic input models, and they attain an asymptotically optimal fixed competitive ratio when the input is adversarial. Our algorithms operate in the Lagrangian dual space: they maintain a dual multiplier for each resource that is updated using online mirror descent. By choosing the reference function accordingly, we recover the dual sub-gradient descent and dual multiplicative weights update algorithm. The resulting algorithms are simple, fast, and do not require convexity in the revenue function, consumption function and action space, in contrast to existing methods for online allocation problems. We discuss applications to network revenue management, online bidding in repeated auctions with budget constraints, online proportional matching with high entropy, and personalized assortment optimization with limited inventory.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a sequence of indivisible items that arrive online in an arbitrary order to a group of n agents with additive normalized valuation functions. We consider both the allocation of goods and chores and propose algorithms for approximating maximin share (MMS) allocations. When agents have identical valuation functions the problem coincides with the semi-online machine covering problem (when items are goods) and load balancing problem (when items are chores), for both of which optimal competitive ratios have been achieved. In this paper, we consider the case when agents have general additive valuation functions. For the allocation of goods, we show that no competitive algorithm exists even when there are only three agents and propose an optimal 0.5-competitive algorithm for the case of two agents. For the allocation of chores, we propose a (2-1/n)-competitive algorithm for n>=3 agents and a square root of 2 (approximately 1.414)-competitive algorithm for two agents. Additionally, we show that no algorithm can do better than 15/11 (approximately 1.364)-competitive for two agents.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

Budget management strategies in repeated auctions have received growing attention in online advertising markets. However, previous work on budget management in online bidding mainly focused on second-price auctions. The rapid shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions for online ads in recent years has motivated the challenging question of how to bid in repeated first-price auctions while controlling budgets. In this work, we study the problem of learning in repeated first-price auctions with budgets. We design a dual-based algorithm that can achieve a near-optimal O(T) regret with full information feedback where the maximum competing bid is always revealed after each auction. We further consider the setting with one-sided information feedback where only the winning bid is revealed after each auction. We show that our modified algorithm can still achieve an O(T) regret with mild assumptions on the bidder's value distribution. Finally, we complement the theoretical results with numerical experiments to confirm the effectiveness of our budget management policy.

The online knapsack problem is a classic problem in the field of online algorithms. Its canonical version asks how to pack items of different values and weights arriving online into a capacity-limited knapsack so as to maximize the total value of the admitted items. Although optimal competitive algorithms are known for this problem, they may be fundamentally unfair, i.e., individual items may be treated inequitably in different ways. We formalize a practically-relevant notion of time fairness which effectively models a trade off between static and dynamic pricing in a motivating application such as cloud resource allocation, and show that existing algorithms perform poorly under this metric. We propose a parameterized deterministic algorithm where the parameter precisely captures the Pareto-optimal trade-off between fairness (static pricing) and competitiveness (dynamic pricing). We show that randomization is theoretically powerful enough to be simultaneously competitive and fair; however, it does not work well in experiments. To further improve the trade-off between fairness and competitiveness, we develop a nearly-optimal learning-augmented algorithm which is fair, consistent, and robust (competitive), showing substantial performance improvements in numerical experiments.

The rapid growth of Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystems has intensified the challenge of efficiently allocating heterogeneous resources in highly dynamic, distributed environments. Conventional centralized mechanisms and single-objective auction models, focusing solely on metrics such as cost minimization or revenue maximization, struggle to deliver balanced system performance. This paper proposes the Multi-Objective Hierarchical Auction Framework (MOHAF), a distributed resource allocation mechanism that jointly optimizes cost, Quality of Service (QoS), energy efficiency, and fairness. MOHAF integrates hierarchical clustering to reduce computational complexity with a greedy, submodular optimization strategy that guarantees a (1-1/e) approximation ratio. A dynamic pricing mechanism adapts in real time to resource utilization, enhancing market stability and allocation quality. Extensive experiments on the Google Cluster Data trace, comprising 3,553 requests and 888 resources, demonstrate MOHAF's superior allocation efficiency (0.263) compared to Greedy (0.185), First-Price (0.138), and Random (0.101) auctions, while achieving perfect fairness (Jain's index = 1.000). Ablation studies reveal the critical influence of cost and QoS components in sustaining balanced multi-objective outcomes. With near-linear scalability, theoretical guarantees, and robust empirical performance, MOHAF offers a practical and adaptable solution for large-scale IoT deployments, effectively reconciling efficiency, equity, and sustainability in distributed resource coordination.

The growing demand for Large Language Models (LLMs) across diverse applications has prompted a paradigm shift in the design of deep learning serving systems. Deploying LLMs, especially in multi-tenant environments, presents considerable challenges due to their high computational and memory demands. We present BlockLLM, a serving system that exploits the potential of sharing components among fine-tuned LLM models to offer an efficient and flexible solution for LLM workloads. BlockLLM partitions the models into finer-grained blocks to enable the reuse of model components and independent provisioning to improve the computation efficiency. BlockLLM consists of an offline block zoo, for storing the blocks, and an online system to serve the requests through chains of blocks. It offers multi-fold flexibility: (1) Adaptive assembly of block chains on-the-fly is achieved with the help of equivalence evaluation among blocks in the zoo. (2) We enable per-block batch size and configure best-effort KV cache coordination at individual block level. (3) We adopt speculative execution and locality-aware block placement to mitigate the communication costs from dynamic block resource allocation. Our evaluation demonstrates that BlockLLM reduces memory and storage footprints and improves computation efficiency, outperforming existing serving approach in 95\%ile latency and GPU utilization by 33.5\% and 20.1\%, respectively.

Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.

Online display advertising platforms service numerous advertisers by providing real-time bidding (RTB) for the scale of billions of ad requests every day. The bidding strategy handles ad requests cross multiple channels to maximize the number of clicks under the set financial constraints, i.e., total budget and cost-per-click (CPC), etc. Different from existing works mainly focusing on single channel bidding, we explicitly consider cross-channel constrained bidding with budget allocation. Specifically, we propose a hierarchical offline deep reinforcement learning (DRL) framework called ``HiBid'', consisted of a high-level planner equipped with auxiliary loss for non-competitive budget allocation, and a data augmentation enhanced low-level executor for adaptive bidding strategy in response to allocated budgets. Additionally, a CPC-guided action selection mechanism is introduced to satisfy the cross-channel CPC constraint. Through extensive experiments on both the large-scale log data and online A/B testing, we confirm that HiBid outperforms six baselines in terms of the number of clicks, CPC satisfactory ratio, and return-on-investment (ROI). We also deploy HiBid on Meituan advertising platform to already service tens of thousands of advertisers every day.

Small language models are increasingly viewed as a promising, cost-effective approach to agentic AI, with proponents claiming they are sufficiently capable for agentic workflows. However, while smaller agents can closely match larger ones on simple tasks, it remains unclear how their performance scales with task complexity, when large models become necessary, and how to better leverage small agents for long-horizon workloads. In this work, we empirically show that small agents' performance fails to scale with task complexity on deep search and coding tasks, and we introduce Strategy Auctions for Workload Efficiency (SALE), an agent framework inspired by freelancer marketplaces. In SALE, agents bid with short strategic plans, which are scored by a systematic cost-value mechanism and refined via a shared auction memory, enabling per-task routing and continual self-improvement without training a separate router or running all models to completion. Across deep search and coding tasks of varying complexity, SALE reduces reliance on the largest agent by 53%, lowers overall cost by 35%, and consistently improves upon the largest agent's pass@1 with only a negligible overhead beyond executing the final trace. In contrast, established routers that rely on task descriptions either underperform the largest agent or fail to reduce cost -- often both -- underscoring their poor fit for agentic workflows. These results suggest that while small agents may be insufficient for complex workloads, they can be effectively "scaled up" through coordinated task allocation and test-time self-improvement. More broadly, they motivate a systems-level view of agentic AI in which performance gains come less from ever-larger individual models and more from market-inspired coordination mechanisms that organize heterogeneous agents into efficient, adaptive ecosystems.

Affine Maximizer Auctions (AMAs), a generalized mechanism family from VCG, are widely used in automated mechanism design due to their inherent dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC) and individual rationality (IR). However, as the payment form is fixed, AMA's expressiveness is restricted, especially in distributions where bidders' valuations are correlated. In this paper, we propose Correlation-Aware AMA (CA-AMA), a novel framework that augments AMA with a new correlation-aware payment. We show that any CA-AMA preserves the DSIC property and formalize finding optimal CA-AMA as a constraint optimization problem subject to the IR constraint. Then, we theoretically characterize scenarios where classic AMAs can perform arbitrarily poorly compared to the optimal revenue, while the CA-AMA can reach the optimal revenue. For optimizing CA-AMA, we design a practical two-stage training algorithm. We derive that the target function's continuity and the generalization bound on the degree of deviation from strict IR. Finally, extensive experiments showcase that our algorithm can find an approximate optimal CA-AMA in various distributions with improved revenue and a low degree of violation of IR.

This paper presents Block, a distributed scheduling framework designed to optimize load balancing and auto-provisioning across instances in large language model serving frameworks by leveraging contextual information from incoming requests. Unlike popular model serving systems that rely on monolithic and heuristic task schedulers, Block operates as a fully distributed, stateless, and predictive scheduling system to achieve low overhead, reliability, and scalability. It leverages the deterministic and predictable characteristics of LLM inferences, such as host configurations, response lengths, and hardware performance, to make scheduling decisions based on accurately predicted metrics. Evaluation on a 12 GPUs cluster shows that Block significantly outperforms heuristic schedulers, boosting serving capacity by up to 16.7\% and reducing P99 tail latency by up to 49.5\%. These performance gains remain consistent across diverse models, workloads and configurations. Code and data are open-sourced.

We study the polynomial-time approximability of the optimal online stochastic bipartite matching algorithm, initiated by Papadimitriou et al. (EC'21). Here, nodes on one side of the graph are given upfront, while at each time t, an online node and its edge weights are drawn from a time-dependent distribution. The optimal algorithm is PSPACE-hard to approximate within some universal constant. We refer to this optimal algorithm, which requires time to think (compute), as a philosopher, and refer to polynomial-time online approximations of the above as philosopher inequalities. The best known philosopher inequality for online matching yields a 0.652-approximation. In contrast, the best possible prophet inequality, or approximation of the optimum offline solution, is 0.5. Our main results are a 0.678-approximate algorithm and a 0.685-approximation for a vertex-weighted special case. Notably, both bounds exceed the 0.666-approximation of the offline optimum obtained by Tang, Wu, and Wu (STOC'22) for the vertex-weighted problem. Building on our algorithms and the recent black-box reduction of Banihashem et al. (SODA'24), we provide polytime (pricing-based) truthful mechanisms which 0.678-approximate the social welfare of the optimal online allocation for bipartite matching markets. Our online allocation algorithm relies on the classic pivotal sampling algorithm (Srinivasan FOCS'01, Gandhi et al. J.ACM'06), along with careful discarding to obtain negative correlations between offline nodes. Consequently, the analysis boils down to examining the distribution of a weighted sum X of negatively correlated Bernoulli variables, specifically lower bounding its mass below a threshold, E[min(1,X)], of possible independent interest. Interestingly, our bound relies on an imaginary invocation of pivotal sampling.

In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex post. To address this, we develop a technique to bound the amount by which the ex-post spend differs from the ex-ante spend -- the property is termed budget balanced up to one project (BB1). With respect to fairness, we take a best-of-both-worlds perspective, seeking outcomes that are both ex-ante and ex-post fair. Towards this goal, we initiate a study of ex-ante fairness properties in PB, including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS) and their stronger variants, as well as Group Fair Share (GFS). We show several incompatibility results between these ex-ante fairness notions and existing ex-post concepts based on justified representation. One of our main contributions is a randomized algorithm which simultaneously satisfies ex-ante Strong UFS, ex-post full justified representation (FJR) and ex-post BB1 for PB with binary utilities.

Speculative decoding accelerates inference by using a lightweight draft model to generate candidate tokens in parallel, and are then verified by the target model, enabling lossless acceleration. Recently, diffusion-based speculative decoding further improves parallelism by generating multiple tokens per forward pass via block-level diffusion, achieving state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance. However, existing methods adopt a fixed inference block size and assume a uniform optimal decoding strategy across all inputs. In this paper, we show that this assumption is suboptimal, as the optimal block size varies across samples and plays a critical role in speculative decoding performance. Moreover, these values exhibit a clear local structure, concentrating around the training block size, which reduces the problem to a low-dimensional and structured decision space. Based on these insights, we propose BlockPilot, a sample-adaptive policy that predicts the optimal block size from the prefilling representation. Specifically, we formulate block size selection as a lightweight policy learning problem and propose an instance-adaptive decision mechanism that predicts the optimal block size based on the representation of the prefilling stage. The prediction is performed only once after prefilling, allowing for seamless integration. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method is plug-and-play, introduces minimal overhead, and consistently improves efficiency, achieving an acceptance length of 5.92 and a 4.20times speedup on Qwen3-4B under temperature T=1.

We consider multi-draft speculative sampling, where the proposal sequences are sampled independently from different draft models. At each step, a token-level draft selection scheme takes a list of valid tokens as input and produces an output token whose distribution matches that of the target model. Previous works have demonstrated that the optimal scheme (which maximizes the probability of accepting one of the input tokens) can be cast as a solution to a linear program. In this work we show that the optimal scheme can be decomposed into a two-step solution: in the first step an importance sampling (IS) type scheme is used to select one intermediate token; in the second step (single-draft) speculative sampling is applied to generate the output token. For the case of two identical draft models we further 1) establish a necessary and sufficient condition on the distributions of the target and draft models for the acceptance probability to equal one and 2) provide an explicit expression for the optimal acceptance probability. Our theoretical analysis also motives a new class of token-level selection scheme based on weighted importance sampling. Our experimental results demonstrate consistent improvements in the achievable block efficiency and token rates over baseline schemes in a number of scenarios.

The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding (RTB) --- each ad display impression is auctioned off in real-time when it is just being generated from a user visit. To place an ad automatically and optimally, it is critical for advertisers to devise a learning algorithm to cleverly bid an ad impression in real-time. Most previous works consider the bid decision as a static optimization problem of either treating the value of each impression independently or setting a bid price to each segment of ad volume. However, the bidding for a given ad campaign would repeatedly happen during its life span before the budget runs out. As such, each bid is strategically correlated by the constrained budget and the overall effectiveness of the campaign (e.g., the rewards from generated clicks), which is only observed after the campaign has completed. Thus, it is of great interest to devise an optimal bidding strategy sequentially so that the campaign budget can be dynamically allocated across all the available impressions on the basis of both the immediate and future rewards. In this paper, we formulate the bid decision process as a reinforcement learning problem, where the state space is represented by the auction information and the campaign's real-time parameters, while an action is the bid price to set. By modeling the state transition via auction competition, we build a Markov Decision Process framework for learning the optimal bidding policy to optimize the advertising performance in the dynamic real-time bidding environment. Furthermore, the scalability problem from the large real-world auction volume and campaign budget is well handled by state value approximation using neural networks.

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare. We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash welfare.

The problem of fair multi-agent coordination in decentralized settings is one of the most pressing challenges for building efficient collaborative systems. Resource allocation is based on optimized collective arrangements accounting for agents' needs. Such coordination should not only be computationally efficient but also account for fairness, i.e., equitable redistribution of costs incurred by all agents. Recent literature has proposed several algorithms that efficiently determine optimal plan combinations balancing system-wide efficiency and individual discomfort of agents in a centralized setting. However, these works do not address equitable resource optimization in fully decentralized scenarios, specifically, the optimized redistribution of discomfort among coordinating agents so that none experiences a discomfort level that could lead to loss of incentive or polarization that can disrupt planned operations. In this work, we study the problem of optimizing three objectives: (i) system-wide efficiency, (ii) individuals' comfort and (iii) fairness (i.e., balancing of incurred discomfort costs) in decentralized multi-agent coordination. We design a novel model to optimize those three orthogonal objectives, without any substantial increase in communication and computational overhead. Through experiments on two real-world datasets, we validate the model and demonstrate that it can achieve fairer optimization outcomes, while satisfying agents' preferences and system goals.

The rapid adoption of autonomous AI agents is giving rise to a new economic layer where agents transact and coordinate at scales and speeds beyond direct human oversight. We propose the "sandbox economy" as a framework for analyzing this emergent system, characterizing it along two key dimensions: its origins (emergent vs. intentional) and its degree of separateness from the established human economy (permeable vs. impermeable). Our current trajectory points toward a spontaneous emergence of a vast and highly permeable AI agent economy, presenting us with opportunities for an unprecedented degree of coordination as well as significant challenges, including systemic economic risk and exacerbated inequality. Here we discuss a number of possible design choices that may lead to safely steerable AI agent markets. In particular, we consider auction mechanisms for fair resource allocation and preference resolution, the design of AI "mission economies" to coordinate around achieving collective goals, and socio-technical infrastructure needed to ensure trust, safety, and accountability. By doing this, we argue for the proactive design of steerable agent markets to ensure the coming technological shift aligns with humanity's long-term collective flourishing.

Inference-time scaling has emerged as a critical avenue for enhancing Large Language Models' performance, yet real-world deployment is constrained by strict computational budgets. In this work, we formulate inference budget allocation as a global constrained optimization problem governed by economic principles. By modeling per-query reasoning utility with a shifted-surge function, we derive an optimal allocation policy based on a global shadow price that equilibrates marginal utility under resource scarcity. Based on this theory, we propose Constrained Latent-utility Equilibrium Allocation for Reasoning (CLEAR). It performs rational abandonment and reallocates resources from insolvent queries to solvable queries near their emergence thresholds. Extensive experiments on several reasoning tasks with different traffic streams demonstrate that CLEAR significantly improves the Pareto frontier of total token cost versus mean accuracy. In resource-scarce regimes, CLEAR achieves up to a 3x improvement in global accuracy compared to uniform allocation.

Batch Bayesian optimisation (BO) is a successful technique for the optimisation of expensive black-box functions. Asynchronous BO can reduce wallclock time by starting a new evaluation as soon as another finishes, thus maximising resource utilisation. To maximise resource allocation, we develop a novel asynchronous BO method, AEGiS (Asynchronous epsilon-Greedy Global Search) that combines greedy search, exploiting the surrogate's mean prediction, with Thompson sampling and random selection from the approximate Pareto set describing the trade-off between exploitation (surrogate mean prediction) and exploration (surrogate posterior variance). We demonstrate empirically the efficacy of AEGiS on synthetic benchmark problems, meta-surrogate hyperparameter tuning problems and real-world problems, showing that AEGiS generally outperforms existing methods for asynchronous BO. When a single worker is available performance is no worse than BO using expected improvement.

AI agents are increasingly transacting on behalf of users -- delegating tasks, spending budgets, and negotiating with unfamiliar counterparties. Unlike human marketplaces, which operate under institutional designs refined over centuries, the rules governing emerging agent marketplaces are being built ad-hoc, and early choices tend to lock in. Understanding what dynamics these rules produce is urgent. We present diagon, a programmable market system serving as a rule-agnostic experimental testbed for institutional design in emerging agent cognitive-labour markets. diagon makes institutional choices experimentally manipulable: heterogeneous tool-using agents post jobs, bid, negotiate, execute, pay, and accumulate reputation, with every mechanism end-to-end observable. We instantiate one market form to demonstrate diagon. We find that market exchange generates more productivity gains over self-sufficient agents, but these gains depend strongly on institutional structure; for example, interventions such as identity transparency and stronger competitive selection can degrade market performance rather than improve it. These findings highlight concrete design requirements for the economic infrastructure of the agent era. Code and data are available at https://github.com/assassin808/diagon.

Stochastic optimization is one of the central problems in Machine Learning and Theoretical Computer Science. In the standard model, the algorithm is given a fixed distribution known in advance. In practice though, one may acquire at a cost extra information to make better decisions. In this paper, we study how to buy information for stochastic optimization and formulate this question as an online learning problem. Assuming the learner has an oracle for the original optimization problem, we design a 2-competitive deterministic algorithm and a e/(e-1)-competitive randomized algorithm for buying information. We show that this ratio is tight as the problem is equivalent to a robust generalization of the ski-rental problem, which we call super-martingale stopping. We also consider an adaptive setting where the learner can choose to buy information after taking some actions for the underlying optimization problem. We focus on the classic optimization problem, Min-Sum Set Cover, where the goal is to quickly find an action that covers a given request drawn from a known distribution. We provide an 8-competitive algorithm running in polynomial time that chooses actions and decides when to buy information about the underlying request.

Online advertising has recently grown into a highly competitive and complex multi-billion-dollar industry, with advertisers bidding for ad slots at large scales and high frequencies. This has resulted in a growing need for efficient "auto-bidding" algorithms that determine the bids for incoming queries to maximize advertisers' targets subject to their specified constraints. This work explores efficient online algorithms for a single value-maximizing advertiser under an increasingly popular constraint: Return-on-Spend (RoS). We quantify efficiency in terms of regret relative to the optimal algorithm, which knows all queries a priori. We contribute a simple online algorithm that achieves near-optimal regret in expectation while always respecting the specified RoS constraint when the input sequence of queries are i.i.d. samples from some distribution. We also integrate our results with the previous work of Balseiro, Lu, and Mirrokni [BLM20] to achieve near-optimal regret while respecting both RoS and fixed budget constraints. Our algorithm follows the primal-dual framework and uses online mirror descent (OMD) for the dual updates. However, we need to use a non-canonical setup of OMD, and therefore the classic low-regret guarantee of OMD, which is for the adversarial setting in online learning, no longer holds. Nonetheless, in our case and more generally where low-regret dynamics are applied in algorithm design, the gradients encountered by OMD can be far from adversarial but influenced by our algorithmic choices. We exploit this key insight to show our OMD setup achieves low regret in the realm of our algorithm.

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among a set of agents. Our focus is on the existence of allocations that give each agent their maximin fair share--the value they are guaranteed if they divide the goods into as many bundles as there are agents, and receive their lowest valued bundle. An MMS allocation is one where every agent receives at least their maximin fair share. We examine the existence of such allocations when agents have cost utilities. In this setting, each item has an associated cost, and an agent's valuation for an item is the cost of the item if it is useful to them, and zero otherwise. Our main results indicate that cost utilities are a promising restriction for achieving MMS. We show that for the case of three agents with cost utilities, an MMS allocation always exists. We also show that when preferences are restricted slightly further--to what we call laminar set approvals--we can guarantee MMS allocations for any number of agents. Finally, we explore if it is possible to guarantee each agent their maximin fair share while using a strategyproof mechanism.

We propose and evaluate a number of solutions to the problem of calculating the cost to serve each location in a single-vehicle transport setting. Such cost to serve analysis has application both strategically and operationally in transportation. The problem is formally given by the traveling salesperson game (TSG), a cooperative total utility game in which agents correspond to locations in a traveling salesperson problem (TSP). The cost to serve a location is an allocated portion of the cost of an optimal tour. The Shapley value is one of the most important normative division schemes in cooperative games, giving a principled and fair allocation both for the TSG and more generally. We consider a number of direct and sampling-based procedures for calculating the Shapley value, and present the first proof that approximating the Shapley value of the TSG within a constant factor is NP-hard. Treating the Shapley value as an ideal baseline allocation, we then develop six proxies for that value which are relatively easy to compute. We perform an experimental evaluation using Synthetic Euclidean games as well as games derived from real-world tours calculated for fast-moving consumer goods scenarios. Our experiments show that several computationally tractable allocation techniques correspond to good proxies for the Shapley value.

Disaggregated inference architectures physically separate prefill and decode phases onto distinct GPU pools, creating competing "agents" that share a fixed hardware budget. We provide, to our knowledge, the first formal game-theoretic analysis of this architecture, using NVIDIA Dynamo as a concrete case study. We model disaggregated serving as three coupled games: a two-player resource game between prefill and decode pools, a selfish caching game over the hierarchical KV cache, and a congestion game with positive externalities for request routing. We empirically validate the latter two; the P/D resource game is treated analytically (Section 9.2). We characterize how GPU saturation induces regime transitions that shift the game's payoff structure: below saturation, selfish behavior has bounded Price of Anarchy (PoA); at saturation, superlinear latency and cache externalities drive our empirical estimator PoA-hat (defined in Section 6.4) upward. Based on this analysis, we design an adaptive controller that detects saturation transitions in real time and adjusts routing parameters accordingly, shifting from cache-affinity exploitation to load-balanced congestion avoidance. We instantiate our framework on a 3-node NVIDIA B200 cluster running Dynamo with two models, Nemotron-4-340B (TP=8, full-node workers with cross-InfiniBand KV transfers) and Llama-3.1-70B (TP=4), and find the same three-regime PoA-hat structure with the same first post-knee grid point (C=128) on both models. Adaptive routing shifts each model to a better operating point. Our strongest result is on the 70B 1P/5D topology, where PoA-hat drops 3.1x (66.4 to 21.5) in the saturated phase at a 13% throughput cost. On the 70B 1P/2D, PoA-hat drops 2.2x and TTFT P99 drops 7.6x (see Section 8.5).

While plan-and-infill decoding in Masked Diffusion Models (MDMs) shows promise for mathematical and code reasoning, performance remains highly sensitive to slot infilling order, often yielding substantial output variance. We introduce McDiffuSE, a framework that formulates slot selection as decision making and optimises infilling orders through Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS). McDiffuSE uses look-ahead simulations to evaluate partial completions before commitment, systematically exploring the combinatorial space of generation orders. Experiments show an average improvement of 3.2% over autoregressive baselines and 8.0% over baseline plan-and-infill, with notable gains of 19.5% on MBPP and 4.9% on MATH500. Our analysis reveals that while McDiffuSE predominantly follows sequential ordering, incorporating non-sequential generation is essential for maximising performance. We observe that larger exploration constants, rather than increased simulations, are necessary to overcome model confidence biases and discover effective orderings. These findings establish MCTS-based planning as an effective approach for enhancing generation quality in MDMs.

Multi-armed bandit problems are the predominant theoretical model of exploration-exploitation tradeoffs in learning, and they have countless applications ranging from medical trials, to communication networks, to Web search and advertising. In many of these application domains the learner may be constrained by one or more supply (or budget) limits, in addition to the customary limitation on the time horizon. The literature lacks a general model encompassing these sorts of problems. We introduce such a model, called "bandits with knapsacks", that combines aspects of stochastic integer programming with online learning. A distinctive feature of our problem, in comparison to the existing regret-minimization literature, is that the optimal policy for a given latent distribution may significantly outperform the policy that plays the optimal fixed arm. Consequently, achieving sublinear regret in the bandits-with-knapsacks problem is significantly more challenging than in conventional bandit problems. We present two algorithms whose reward is close to the information-theoretic optimum: one is based on a novel "balanced exploration" paradigm, while the other is a primal-dual algorithm that uses multiplicative updates. Further, we prove that the regret achieved by both algorithms is optimal up to polylogarithmic factors. We illustrate the generality of the problem by presenting applications in a number of different domains including electronic commerce, routing, and scheduling. As one example of a concrete application, we consider the problem of dynamic posted pricing with limited supply and obtain the first algorithm whose regret, with respect to the optimal dynamic policy, is sublinear in the supply.

We give a very general and simple framework to incorporate predictions on requests for online covering problems in a rigorous and black-box manner. Our framework turns any online algorithm with competitive ratio ρ(k, cdot) depending on k, the number of arriving requests, into an algorithm with competitive ratio of ρ(η, cdot), where η is the prediction error. With accurate enough prediction, the resulting competitive ratio breaks through the corresponding worst-case online lower bounds, and smoothly degrades as the prediction error grows. This framework directly applies to a wide range of well-studied online covering problems such as facility location, Steiner problems, set cover, parking permit, etc., and yields improved and novel bounds.

The Neural Architecture Search (NAS) problem is typically formulated as a graph search problem where the goal is to learn the optimal operations over edges in order to maximise a graph-level global objective. Due to the large architecture parameter space, efficiency is a key bottleneck preventing NAS from its practical use. In this paper, we address the issue by framing NAS as a multi-agent problem where agents control a subset of the network and coordinate to reach optimal architectures. We provide two distinct lightweight implementations, with reduced memory requirements (1/8th of state-of-the-art), and performances above those of much more computationally expensive methods. Theoretically, we demonstrate vanishing regrets of the form O(sqrt(T)), with T being the total number of rounds. Finally, aware that random search is an, often ignored, effective baseline we perform additional experiments on 3 alternative datasets and 2 network configurations, and achieve favourable results in comparison.

We study the design of loss functions for click-through rates (CTR) to optimize (social) welfare in advertising auctions. Existing works either only focus on CTR predictions without consideration of business objectives (e.g., welfare) in auctions or assume that the distribution over the participants' expected cost-per-impression (eCPM) is known a priori, then use various additional assumptions on the parametric form of the distribution to derive loss functions for predicting CTRs. In this work, we bring back the welfare objectives of ad auctions into CTR predictions and propose a novel weighted rankloss to train the CTR model. Compared to existing literature, our approach provides a provable guarantee on welfare but without assumptions on the eCPMs' distribution while also avoiding the intractability of naively applying existing learning-to-rank methods. Further, we propose a theoretically justifiable technique for calibrating the losses using labels generated from a teacher network, only assuming that the teacher network has bounded ell_2 generalization error. Finally, we demonstrate the advantages of the proposed loss on synthetic and real-world data.

Sphere packing, Hilbert's eighteenth problem, asks for the densest arrangement of congruent spheres in n-dimensional Euclidean space. Although relevant to areas such as cryptography, crystallography, and medical imaging, the problem remains unresolved: beyond a few special dimensions, neither optimal packings nor tight upper bounds are known. Even a major breakthrough in dimension n=8, later recognised with a Fields Medal, underscores its difficulty. A leading technique for upper bounds, the three-point method, reduces the problem to solving large, high-precision semidefinite programs (SDPs). Because each candidate SDP may take days to evaluate, standard data-intensive AI approaches are infeasible. We address this challenge by formulating SDP construction as a sequential decision process, the SDP game, in which a policy assembles SDP formulations from a set of admissible components. Using a sample-efficient model-based framework that combines Bayesian optimisation with Monte Carlo Tree Search, we obtain new state-of-the-art upper bounds in dimensions 4-16, showing that model-based search can advance computational progress in longstanding geometric problems. Together, these results demonstrate that sample-efficient, model-based search can make tangible progress on mathematically rigid, evaluation limited problems, pointing towards a complementary direction for AI-assisted discovery beyond large-scale LLM-driven exploration.

Scaling test-time compute has emerged as an effective strategy for improving the performance of large language models. However, existing methods typically allocate compute uniformly across all queries, overlooking variation in query difficulty. To address this inefficiency, we formulate test-time compute allocation as a novel bandit learning problem and propose adaptive algorithms that estimate query difficulty on the fly and allocate compute accordingly. Compared to uniform allocation, our algorithms allocate more compute to challenging queries while maintaining accuracy on easier ones. Among challenging queries, our algorithms further learn to prioritize solvable instances, effectively reducing excessive computing on unsolvable queries. We theoretically prove that our algorithms achieve better compute efficiency than uniform allocation and empirically validate their effectiveness on math and code benchmarks. Specifically, our algorithms achieve up to an 11.10% performance improvement (15.04% relative) on the MATH-500 dataset and up to a 7.41% performance improvement (14.40% relative) on LiveCodeBench.

Test-time compute has emerged as a promising strategy to enhance the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). However, this strategy has in turn increased how much users pay cloud-based providers offering LLM-as-a-service, since providers charge users for the amount of test-time compute they use to generate an output. In our work, we show that the market of LLM-as-a-service is socially inefficient: providers have a financial incentive to increase the amount of test-time compute, even if this increase contributes little to the quality of the outputs. To address this inefficiency, we introduce a reverse second-price auction mechanism where providers bid their offered price and (expected) quality for the opportunity to serve a user, and users pay proportionally to the marginal value generated by the winning provider relative to the second-highest bidder. To illustrate and complement our theoretical results, we conduct experiments with multiple instruct models from the Llama and Qwen families, as well as reasoning models distilled from DeepSeek-R1, on math and science benchmark datasets.

The bandits with knapsack (BwK) framework models online decision-making problems in which an agent makes a sequence of decisions subject to resource consumption constraints. The traditional model assumes that each action consumes a non-negative amount of resources and the process ends when the initial budgets are fully depleted. We study a natural generalization of the BwK framework which allows non-monotonic resource utilization, i.e., resources can be replenished by a positive amount. We propose a best-of-both-worlds primal-dual template that can handle any online learning problem with replenishment for which a suitable primal regret minimizer exists. In particular, we provide the first positive results for the case of adversarial inputs by showing that our framework guarantees a constant competitive ratio alpha when B=Omega(T) or when the possible per-round replenishment is a positive constant. Moreover, under a stochastic input model, our algorithm yields an instance-independent O(T^{1/2}) regret bound which complements existing instance-dependent bounds for the same setting. Finally, we provide applications of our framework to some economic problems of practical relevance.

Modern cloud data warehouses store data in micro-partitions and rely on metadata (e.g., zonemaps) for efficient data pruning during query processing. Maintaining data clustering in a large-scale table is crucial for effective data pruning. Existing automatic clustering approaches lack the flexibility required in dynamic cloud environments with continuous data ingestion and evolving workloads. This paper advocates a clean separation between reclustering policy and clustering-key selection. We introduce the concept of boundary micro-partitions that sit on the boundary of query ranges. We then present WAIR, a workload-aware algorithm to identify and recluster only boundary micro-partitions most critical for pruning efficiency. WAIR achieves near-optimal (with respect to fully sorted table layouts) query performance but incurs significantly lower reclustering cost with a theoretical upper bound. We further implement the algorithm into a prototype reclustering service and evaluate on standard benchmarks (TPC-H, DSB) and a real-world workload. Results show that WAIR improves query performance and reduces the overall cost compared to existing solutions.

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a generalization of the classical (single-round) version of the problem in which the principal interacts with the agent by committing to contracts over multiple rounds. The principal has no information about the agent, and they have to learn an optimal contract by only observing the outcome realized at each round. We focus on settings in which the size of the agent's action space is small. We design an algorithm that learns an approximately-optimal contract with high probability in a number of rounds polynomial in the size of the outcome space, when the number of actions is constant. Our algorithm solves an open problem by Zhu et al.[2022]. Moreover, it can also be employed to provide a mathcal{O}(T^{4/5}) regret bound in the related online learning setting in which the principal aims at maximizing their cumulative utility, thus considerably improving previously-known regret bounds.

Motivated by the operational problems in click and collect systems, such as curbside pickup programs, we study a joint admission control and capacity allocation problem. We consider a system where arriving customers have preferred service delivery times and gauge the service quality based on the service provider's ability to complete the service as close as possible to the preferred time. Customers can be of different priority classes, and their priority may increase as they wait longer in the queue. The service provider can reject customers upon their arrival if the system is overloaded or outsource the service (alternatively work overtime) when the capacity is not enough. The service provider's goal is to find the minimum-cost admission and capacity allocation policy to dynamically decide when to serve and whom to serve. We model this problem as a Markov Decision Process. Our structural results partially characterize a set of suboptimal solutions, and we develop solution methods using these results. We also develop a problem-specific approximation method that is based on state aggregation to overcome the computational challenges. We present extensive computational results and discuss the impact of problem parameters on the optimal policy.

Auto-bidding systems aim to maximize advertiser value over long horizons under budget constraints and ratio targets such as cost-per-acquisition, yet future traffic and auction dynamics are non-stationary and uncertain. Existing approaches face distinct limitations: control-based pacing reacts to deviations but cannot anticipate future conditions, while RL and generative methods fold constraints into reward signals, obscuring violations and degrading under distribution shift. We shift the learning target from actions to responses with the Generative Response Model (GRM), a history-conditioned sequence model that jointly predicts future traffic volume and horizon-aggregate cost/value curves as functions of a single bid multiplier. We show that under mild monotonicity conditions, the optimality gap relative to full per-tick control is bounded by the dispersion of per-tick marginal value-per-cost. Given predicted responses, a lightweight analytic controller enforces each active constraint via a 1D root-finding step. We prove this controller is exact for the single-multiplier problem and bound constraint violations under receding-horizon replanning in terms of prediction error. Experiments on AuctionNet show that GRM improves constraint stability and overall score compared to existing baselines.

The core of Transferable Utility (T.U.) games is a well-known solution concept from cooperative game theory yielding a cost allocation among n agents (called players) forming a coalition that is stable (i.e. no subset of players has an interest to deviate). In this paper, inspired by a practical application in the context of a decision support system for collaborative transportation in a Short Food Supply Chain (SFSC), we mainly focus on Traveling Salesman Games (TSGs), where the objective is to allocate the cost of a Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) with n locations and 1 depot to n players, each linked to exactly one of the locations. Given the computational complexity of computing an element of the core and the cost of a TSP, we study semicore allocations: a relaxation of the core that only requires that the subsets of size n -1 and of size 1 do not wish to deviate from the coalition. In the literature, instances of TSGs with empty cores and semicores are found. Hence, this paper first surveys the methods to approximate stability whenever the core is empty, such as the cost of stability (computing the minimum amount of money to subsidize the coalition with to attain stability) and the ε-core (which is a set of allocations that allow subsets of players to exceed their actual cost, but at most of a value of ε). We prove that these two solution

In this paper, we investigate a problem of actively learning threshold in latent space, where the unknown reward g(gamma, v) depends on the proposed threshold gamma and latent value v and it can be only achieved if the threshold is lower than or equal to the unknown latent value. This problem has broad applications in practical scenarios, e.g., reserve price optimization in online auctions, online task assignments in crowdsourcing, setting recruiting bars in hiring, etc. We first characterize the query complexity of learning a threshold with the expected reward at most epsilon smaller than the optimum and prove that the number of queries needed can be infinitely large even when g(gamma, v) is monotone with respect to both gamma and v. On the positive side, we provide a tight query complexity Theta(1/epsilon^3) when g is monotone and the CDF of value distribution is Lipschitz. Moreover, we show a tight Theta(1/epsilon^3) query complexity can be achieved as long as g satisfies one-sided Lipschitzness, which provides a complete characterization for this problem. Finally, we extend this model to an online learning setting and demonstrate a tight Theta(T^{2/3}) regret bound using continuous-arm bandit techniques and the aforementioned query complexity results.

We study a fair allocation problem of indivisible items under additive externalities in which each agent also receives values from items that are assigned to other agents. We propose several new fairness concepts. We extend the well-studied envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) to this setting, and we propose a new fairness concept called general fair share (GFS). We undertake a detailed study and present algorithms for finding fair allocations.

Mixture of Block Attention (MoBA) (Lu et al., 2025) is a promising building block for efficiently processing long contexts in LLMs by enabling queries to sparsely attend to a small subset of key-value blocks, drastically reducing computational cost. However, the design principles governing MoBA's performance are poorly understood, and it lacks an efficient GPU implementation, hindering its practical adoption. In this paper, we first develop a statistical model to analyze MoBA's underlying mechanics. Our model reveals that performance critically depends on the router's ability to accurately distinguish relevant from irrelevant blocks based on query-key affinities. We derive a signal-to-noise ratio that formally connects architectural parameters to this retrieval accuracy. Guided by our analysis, we identify two key pathways for improvement: using smaller block sizes and applying a short convolution on keys to cluster relevant signals, which enhances routing accuracy. While theoretically better, small block sizes are inefficient on GPUs. To bridge this gap, we introduce FlashMoBA, a hardware-aware CUDA kernel that enables efficient MoBA execution even with the small block sizes our theory recommends. We validate our insights by training LLMs from scratch, showing that our improved MoBA models match the performance of dense attention baselines. FlashMoBA achieves up to 14.7x speedup over FlashAttention-2 for small blocks, making our theoretically-grounded improvements practical. Code is available at: https://github.com/mit-han-lab/flash-moba.

In digital online advertising, advertisers procure ad impressions simultaneously on multiple platforms, or so-called channels, such as Google Ads, Meta Ads Manager, etc., each of which consists of numerous ad auctions. We study how an advertiser maximizes total conversion (e.g. ad clicks) while satisfying aggregate return-on-investment (ROI) and budget constraints across all channels. In practice, an advertiser does not have control over, and thus cannot globally optimize, which individual ad auctions she participates in for each channel, and instead authorizes a channel to procure impressions on her behalf: the advertiser can only utilize two levers on each channel, namely setting a per-channel budget and per-channel target ROI. In this work, we first analyze the effectiveness of each of these levers for solving the advertiser's global multi-channel problem. We show that when an advertiser only optimizes over per-channel ROIs, her total conversion can be arbitrarily worse than what she could have obtained in the global problem. Further, we show that the advertiser can achieve the global optimal conversion when she only optimizes over per-channel budgets. In light of this finding, under a bandit feedback setting that mimics real-world scenarios where advertisers have limited information on ad auctions in each channels and how channels procure ads, we present an efficient learning algorithm that produces per-channel budgets whose resulting conversion approximates that of the global optimal problem. Finally, we argue that all our results hold for both single-item and multi-item auctions from which channels procure impressions on advertisers' behalf.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

Designing effective agentic systems requires the seamless composition and integration of agents, tools, and models within dynamic and uncertain environments. Most existing methods rely on static, semantic retrieval approaches for tool or agent discovery. However, effective reuse and composition of existing components remain challenging due to incomplete capability descriptions and the limitations of retrieval methods. Component selection suffers because the decisions are not based on capability, cost, and real-time utility. To address these challenges, we introduce a structured, automated framework for agentic system composition that is inspired by the knapsack problem. Our framework enables a composer agent to systematically identify, select, and assemble an optimal set of agentic components by jointly considering performance, budget constraints, and compatibility. By dynamically testing candidate components and modeling their utility in real-time, our approach streamlines the assembly of agentic systems and facilitates scalable reuse of resources. Empirical evaluation with Claude 3.5 Sonnet across five benchmarking datasets shows that our online-knapsack-based composer consistently lies on the Pareto frontier, achieving higher success rates at significantly lower component costs compared to our baselines. In the single-agent setup, the online knapsack composer shows a success rate improvement of up to 31.6% in comparison to the retrieval baselines. In multi-agent systems, the online knapsack composer increases success rate from 37% to 87% when agents are selected from an agent inventory of 100+ agents. The substantial performance gap confirms the robust adaptability of our method across diverse domains and budget constraints.

Polymarket is a prediction market platform where users can speculate on future events by trading shares tied to specific outcomes, known as conditions. Each market is associated with a set of one or more such conditions. To ensure proper market resolution, the condition set must be exhaustive -- collectively accounting for all possible outcomes -- and mutually exclusive -- only one condition may resolve as true. Thus, the collective prices of all related outcomes should be \1, representing a combined probability of 1 of any outcome. Despite this design, Polymarket exhibits cases where dependent assets are mispriced, allowing for purchasing (or selling) a certain outcome for less than (or more than) 1, guaranteeing profit. This phenomenon, known as arbitrage, could enable sophisticated participants to exploit such inconsistencies. In this paper, we conduct an empirical arbitrage analysis on Polymarket data to answer three key questions: (Q1) What conditions give rise to arbitrage (Q2) Does arbitrage actually occur on Polymarket and (Q3) Has anyone exploited these opportunities. A major challenge in analyzing arbitrage between related markets lies in the scalability of comparisons across a large number of markets and conditions, with a naive analysis requiring O(2^{n+m}) comparisons. To overcome this, we employ a heuristic-driven reduction strategy based on timeliness, topical similarity, and combinatorial relationships, further validated by expert input. Our study reveals two distinct forms of arbitrage on Polymarket: Market Rebalancing Arbitrage, which occurs within a single market or condition, and Combinatorial Arbitrage, which spans across multiple markets. We use on-chain historical order book data to analyze when these types of arbitrage opportunities have existed, and when they have been executed by users. We find a realized estimate of 40 million USD of profit extracted.

Scheduling precedence-constrained tasks under shared renewable resources is central to modern computing platforms. The Resource Investment Problem (RIP) models this setting by minimizing the cost of provisioned renewable resources under precedence and timing constraints. Exact mixed-integer programming and constraint programming become impractically slow on large instances, and dynamic updates require schedule revisions under tight latency budgets. We present iScheduler, a reinforcement-learning-driven iterative scheduling framework that formulates RIP solving as a Markov decision process over decomposed subproblems and constructs schedules through sequential process selection. The framework accelerates optimization and supports reconfiguration by reusing unchanged process schedules and rescheduling only affected processes. We also release L-RIPLIB, an industrial-scale benchmark derived from cloud-platform workloads with 1,000 instances of 2,500-10,000 tasks. Experiments show that iScheduler attains competitive resource costs while reducing time to feasibility by up to 43times against strong commercial baselines.

Open Radio Access Network systems, with their virtualized base stations (vBSs), offer operators the benefits of increased flexibility, reduced costs, vendor diversity, and interoperability. Optimizing the allocation of resources in a vBS is challenging since it requires knowledge of the environment, (i.e., "external'' information), such as traffic demands and channel quality, which is difficult to acquire precisely over short intervals of a few seconds. To tackle this problem, we propose an online learning algorithm that balances the effective throughput and vBS energy consumption, even under unforeseeable and "challenging'' environments; for instance, non-stationary or adversarial traffic demands. We also develop a meta-learning scheme, which leverages the power of other algorithmic approaches, tailored for more "easy'' environments, and dynamically chooses the best performing one, thus enhancing the overall system's versatility and effectiveness. We prove the proposed solutions achieve sub-linear regret, providing zero average optimality gap even in challenging environments. The performance of the algorithms is evaluated with real-world data and various trace-driven evaluations, indicating savings of up to 64.5% in the power consumption of a vBS compared with state-of-the-art benchmarks.

Discrete diffusion models have steadily improved in quality relative to autoregressive (AR) models. However, these models are normally constrained to fixed-length generation and do not support key-value (KV) caching. Block diffusion partially bridges diffusion and AR by generating token blocks left-to-right, but its fixed-size sequential blocks limit decoding flexibility and parallelism. Here, we present a new class of language models, set diffusion, comprised of (i) a likelihood parameterization that factorizes over flexible-position, flexible-length token sets and (ii) a set-causal diffusion architecture that supports KV cache updates after every inference step. By factorizing over token sets instead of fixed-size blocks, tokens can be decoded in arbitrarily-ordered sets, including sliding-window sets, enabling faster inference and support for any-order decoding. Set diffusion achieves better speed-quality tradeoffs on mathematical reasoning, summarization, and unconditional generation compared to prior diffusion language models while offering stronger infilling performance than block diffusion. We provide the code, along with the model weights and blog post on the project page: https://m-arriola.com/setdlms/

We study permissionless spot--perpetual basis trading in decentralized finance as a collateral control problem. The strategy holds spot inventory, hedges directional exposure with a short perpetual, and allocates capital between spot inventory and derivative margin under on-chain liquidity and execution frictions. The paper delivers three results. First, it solves a static control problem for the collateral share and shows that the risk-constrained formulation provides a more robust operating benchmark relative to the economic optimum. In comparative calibration, the required collateral rises monotonically under volatility stress. The collateral is the lowest for BTC and increases significantly for long tail assets such as LINK and DOGE. Second, the paper derives an asymmetric dynamic extension in which the lower boundary of intervention is solvency driven, and the upper boundary is determined by a trade-off between carry-loss and the cost of rebalancing. Monte Carlo simulation shows that the lower boundary remains structurally relevant, whereas meaningful interior upper triggers survive mainly in the regimes with high carry and low costs. Third, the paper validates an execution-aware implementation with live routed execution and historical backtests. The execution layer shows that the realized wedges are significant, but become worse in the case of selling the basis. This justifies a minimum effective rebalancing size and a positive execution buffer. The historical validation shows that in the case of a fixed control rule the realized performance is predominantly explained by the funding environment.

We consider a fair division model in which agents have positive, zero and negative utilities for items. For this model, we analyse one existing fairness property - EFX - and three new and related properties - EFX_0, EFX^3 and EF1^3 - in combination with Pareto-optimality. With general utilities, we give a modified version of an existing algorithm for computing an EF1^3 allocation. With -alpha/0/alpha utilities, this algorithm returns an EFX^3 and PO allocation. With absolute identical utilities, we give a new algorithm for an EFX and PO allocation. With -alpha/0/beta utilities, this algorithm also returns such an allocation. We report some new impossibility results as well.

In many areas of medicine, security, and life sciences, we want to allocate limited resources to different sources in order to detect extreme values. In this paper, we study an efficient way to allocate these resources sequentially under limited feedback. While sequential design of experiments is well studied in bandit theory, the most commonly optimized property is the regret with respect to the maximum mean reward. However, in other problems such as network intrusion detection, we are interested in detecting the most extreme value output by the sources. Therefore, in our work we study extreme regret which measures the efficiency of an algorithm compared to the oracle policy selecting the source with the heaviest tail. We propose the ExtremeHunter algorithm, provide its analysis, and evaluate it empirically on synthetic and real-world experiments.

As LLM agents evolve, tokens have emerged as the core economic primitives of Agentic AI. However, their exponential consumption introduces severe computational, collaborative, and security bottlenecks. Current surveys remain fragmented across system optimization, architecture design, and trust, lacking a unified framework to evaluate the fundamental trade-off between output quality and economic cost. To bridge this gap, this survey presents the first comprehensive survey of Token Economics. By unifying computer science and economics, we conceptualize tokens as production factors, exchange mediums, and units of account. We synthesize existing literature across a four-dimensional taxonomy: (1) Micro-level (Single Agent): Optimizing budget-constrained factor substitution via neoclassical firm theory. (2) Meso-level (Multi-Agent Systems): Minimizing collaboration friction using transaction cost and principal-agent theories. (3) Macro-level (Agent Ecosystems): Addressing congestion externalities and pricing via mechanism design. (4) Security: Internalizing adversarial threats as endogenous economic constraints. Finally, we outline frontier directions, including differentiable token budgets and dynamic markets, to lay the theoretical foundation for scalable next-generation agent systems.

The concept of Critical Batch Size, as pioneered by OpenAI, has long served as a foundational principle for large-scale pre-training. However, with the paradigm shift towards the Warmup-Stable-Decay (WSD) learning rate scheduler, we observe that the original theoretical framework and its underlying mechanisms fail to align with new pre-training dynamics. To bridge this gap between theory and practice, this paper derives a revised E(S) relationship tailored for WSD scheduler, characterizing the trade-off between training data consumption E and steps S during pre-training. Our theoretical analysis reveals two fundamental properties of WSD-based pre-training: 1) B_min, the minimum batch size threshold required to achieve a target loss, and 2) B_opt, the optimal batch size that maximizes data efficiency by minimizing total tokens. Building upon these properties, we propose a dynamic Batch Size Scheduler. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our revised formula precisely captures the dynamics of large-scale pre-training, and the resulting scheduling strategy significantly enhances both training efficiency and final model quality.

Sparse matrix-vector multiplication (SpMV) is crucial in computational science, engineering, and machine learning. Despite substantial efforts to improve SpMV performance on GPUs through various techniques, issues related to data locality, hardware utilization, and load balancing persist, leaving room for further optimization. This paper presents CB-SpMV, a cache-friendly SpMV optimization algorithm, using a novel data convergent and adaptable 2D blocking structure. The matrix in CB-SpMV is divided into independent sub-blocks, with virtual pointers aggregating different types of intra-block data for better cache-level data locality. To enhance hardware utilization, a block-aware column aggregation strategy and the selection of sub-block formats are proposed to accelerate computation and adapt to varying sparse matrices. Finally, an inter-block load-balancing algorithm is designed to ensure efficient workload distribution across thread blocks. Experimental evaluations on 2,843 matrices from the SuiteSparse Collection show that CB-SpMV significantly improves cache hit rates and achieves average speedups of up to 3.95x over state-of-the-art methods like cuSPARSE-BSR, TileSpMV, and DASP on NVIDIA A100 and RTX 4090 GPUs. The implementation is available at: https://github.com/xing-cong/CB-Sparse.

Autoregressive models (ARMs) are hindered by slow sequential inference. While masked diffusion models (MDMs) offer a parallel alternative, they suffer from critical drawbacks: high computational overhead from precluding Key-Value (KV) caching, and incoherent generation arising from learning dependencies over an intractable space of token combinations. To address these limitations, we introduce ReFusion, a novel masked diffusion model that achieves superior performance and efficiency by elevating parallel decoding from the token level to a higher slot level, where each slot is a fixed-length, contiguous sub-sequence. This is achieved through an iterative ``plan-and-infill'' decoding process: a diffusion-based planning step first identifies a set of weakly dependent slots, and an autoregressive infilling step then decodes these selected slots in parallel. The slot-based design simultaneously unlocks full KV cache reuse with a unified causal framework and reduces the learning complexity from the token combination space to a manageable slot-level permutation space. Extensive experiments on seven diverse benchmarks show that ReFusion not only overwhelmingly surpasses prior MDMs with 34% performance gains and an over 18times speedup on average, but also bridges the performance gap to strong ARMs while maintaining a 2.33times average speedup.

Speculative decoding (SD) accelerates large language model inference by leveraging a draft-then-verify paradigm. To maximize the acceptance rate, recent methods construct expansive draft trees, which unfortunately incur severe VRAM bandwidth and computational overheads that bottleneck end-to-end speedups. While dynamic-depth pruning can reduce this latency by removing marginal branches, it also discards potentially valid candidates, preventing the acceptance rate from reaching the upper bound of dense trees. In this paper, we identify a critical opportunity in resource allocation: the transition from dense to pruned drafting frees up significant computational budget. To break this Pareto tradeoff, we introduce Graft, a compensation framework that couples pruning and retrieval as mutually reinforcing operations. Pruning supplies sufficient budget for retrieval, while retrieval compensates for pruning-induced coverage loss and recovers accepted length. By employing a sequential `prune-then-graft' mechanism, Graft attaches highly predictive retrieved tokens into positions opened by pruning, filling the topological gaps with near-zero overhead. Graft is entirely training-free and lossless. Comprehensive evaluations show that Graft establishes a new Pareto frontier across practical deployment settings, including short-context generation, long-context generation, and large-scale models. On short-context benchmarks, it achieves up to 5.41times speedup and improves average speedup over EAGLE-3 by up to 21.8% on the large-scale Qwen3-235B. We also provide a preliminary exploration of applying Graft to the DFlash-style block drafting paradigm, offering initial evidence and insights for extending grafting beyond autoregressive draft trees.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

Large discrete action spaces (LDAS) remain a central challenge in reinforcement learning. Existing solution approaches can handle unstructured LDAS with up to a few million actions. However, many real-world applications in logistics, production, and transportation systems have combinatorial action spaces, whose size grows well beyond millions of actions, even on small instances. Fortunately, such action spaces exhibit structure, e.g., equally spaced discrete resource units. With this work, we focus on handling structured LDAS (SLDAS) with sizes that cannot be handled by current benchmarks: we propose Dynamic Neighborhood Construction (DNC), a novel exploitation paradigm for SLDAS. We present a scalable neighborhood exploration heuristic that utilizes this paradigm and efficiently explores the discrete neighborhood around the continuous proxy action in structured action spaces with up to 10^{73} actions. We demonstrate the performance of our method by benchmarking it against three state-of-the-art approaches designed for large discrete action spaces across two distinct environments. Our results show that DNC matches or outperforms state-of-the-art approaches while being computationally more efficient. Furthermore, our method scales to action spaces that so far remained computationally intractable for existing methodologies.

Existing auto-bidding algorithms in digital advertising often treat the value of an ad opportunity as the revenue obtained when an ad is shown and/or clicked, and bid accordingly. This can lead to wasteful spending because the true value is the marginal gain from paid exposure: even without winning a sponsored slot, an advertiser may still earn revenue via an organic search result (e.g., on Google or Amazon). Motivated by recent work, we model ad value as a treatment effect--the outcome difference between winning and losing the auction--and study online learning for bidding in second-price (Vickrey) auctions under this causal perspective. We develop algorithms that attain rate-optimal regret under several feedback models. A key ingredient exploits the information revealed by the second-price payment rule, which strictly improves regret relative to analogous learning problems in first-price auctions.

Test-Time Scaling (TTS) improves the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) by using additional inference-time computation to explore multiple reasoning paths through search. Yet how to allocate a fixed rollout budget most effectively during search remains underexplored, often resulting in inefficient use of compute at test time. To bridge this gap, we formulate test-time search as a resource allocation problem and derive the optimal allocation strategy that maximizes the probability of obtaining a correct solution under a fixed rollout budget. Within this formulation, we reveal a core limitation of existing search methods: solution-level allocation tends to favor reasoning directions with more candidates, leading to theoretically suboptimal and inefficient use of compute. To address this, we propose Direction-Oriented Resource Allocation (DORA), a provably optimal method that mitigates this bias by decoupling direction quality from candidate count and allocating resources at the direction level. To demonstrate DORA's effectiveness, we conduct extensive experiments on challenging mathematical reasoning benchmarks including MATH500, AIME2024, and AIME2025. The empirical results show that DORA consistently outperforms strong baselines with comparable computational cost, achieving state-of-the-art accuracy. We hope our findings contribute to a broader understanding of optimal TTS for LLMs.

Mehta and Panigrahi (2012) proposed Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards, which generalizes the Online Bipartite Matching problem of Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (1990) by associating the edges with success probabilities. This new feature captures the pay-per-click model in online advertising. Recently, Huang and Zhang (2020) studied this problem under the online primal dual framework using the Configuration Linear Program (LP), and got the best known competitive ratios of the Stochastic Balance algorithm. Their work suggests that the more expressive Configuration LP is more suitable for this problem than the Matching LP. This paper advances the theory of Configuration LP in two directions. Our technical contribution includes a characterization of the joint matching outcome of an offline vertex and all its neighbors. This characterization may be of independent interest, and is aligned with the spirit of Configuration LP. By contrast, previous analyses of Ranking generally focus on only one neighbor. Second, we designed a Stochastic Configuration LP that captures a stochastic benchmark proposed by Goyal and Udwani (2020), who used a Path-based LP. The Stochastic Configuration LP is smaller and simpler than the Path-based LP. Moreover, using the new LP we improved the competitive ratio of Stochastic Balance from 0.596 to 0.611 when the success probabilities are infinitesimal, and to 0.613 when the success probabilities are further equal.

Non-cooperative game theory provides a robust framework for analyzing distributed resource allocation in multi-user wireless networks, with Iterative Water-Filling (IWF) emerging as a canonical solution for power control problems. Although classical fixed-point theorems guarantee the existence of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) under mild concavity and compactness conditions, the convergence of practical iterative algorithms to that equilibrium remains a challenging endeavor. This challenge intensifies under varying update schedules, interference regimes, and imperfections such as channel estimation errors or feedback delay. In this paper, we present an in-depth examination of IWF in multi-user systems under three different update schemes: (1) synchronous sequential updates, (2) synchronous simultaneous updates, and (3) totally asynchronous updates. We first formulate the water-filling operator in a multi-carrier environment, then recast the iterative process as a fixed-point problem. Using contraction mapping principles, we demonstrate sufficient conditions under which IWF converges to a unique NE and highlight how spectral radius constraints, diagonal dominance, and careful step-size selection are pivotal for guaranteeing convergence. We further discuss robustness to measurement noise, partial updates, and network scaling to emphasize the practical viability of these schemes. This comprehensive analysis unifies diverse threads in the literature while offering novel insights into asynchronous implementations. Our findings enable network designers to ascertain system parameters that foster both stable convergence and efficient spectrum usage.

We introduce the Series-Parallel Workflow Decomposition (SP\-WD) heuristic algorithm for the Workflow Scheduling Problem (WSP) decomposition. We demonstrate that the SPWD algorithm facilitates the scheduling of large WSP instances with the hybrid D-Wave Constrained Quadratic Model solver, enabling the scheduling of instances that would otherwise exceed its capacity limitations. We also describe the accompanying execution environment used to obtain the results of the experiments with real-life workflow instances available in the WfCommons standardization initiative repository.

Federated Learning (FL) typically involves a large-scale, distributed system with individual user devices/servers training models locally and then aggregating their model updates on a trusted central server. Existing systems for FL often use an always-on server for model aggregation, which can be inefficient in terms of resource utilization. They may also be inelastic in their resource management. This is particularly exacerbated when aggregating model updates at scale in a highly dynamic environment with varying numbers of heterogeneous user devices/servers. We present LIFL, a lightweight and elastic serverless cloud platform with fine-grained resource management for efficient FL aggregation at scale. LIFL is enhanced by a streamlined, event-driven serverless design that eliminates the individual heavy-weight message broker and replaces inefficient container-based sidecars with lightweight eBPF-based proxies. We leverage shared memory processing to achieve high-performance communication for hierarchical aggregation, which is commonly adopted to speed up FL aggregation at scale. We further introduce locality-aware placement in LIFL to maximize the benefits of shared memory processing. LIFL precisely scales and carefully reuses the resources for hierarchical aggregation to achieve the highest degree of parallelism while minimizing the aggregation time and resource consumption. Our experimental results show that LIFL achieves significant improvement in resource efficiency and aggregation speed for supporting FL at scale, compared to existing serverful and serverless FL systems.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

We consider the linear contextual bandit problem with resource consumption, in addition to reward generation. In each round, the outcome of pulling an arm is a reward as well as a vector of resource consumptions. The expected values of these outcomes depend linearly on the context of that arm. The budget/capacity constraints require that the total consumption doesn't exceed the budget for each resource. The objective is once again to maximize the total reward. This problem turns out to be a common generalization of classic linear contextual bandits (linContextual), bandits with knapsacks (BwK), and the online stochastic packing problem (OSPP). We present algorithms with near-optimal regret bounds for this problem. Our bounds compare favorably to results on the unstructured version of the problem where the relation between the contexts and the outcomes could be arbitrary, but the algorithm only competes against a fixed set of policies accessible through an optimization oracle. We combine techniques from the work on linContextual, BwK, and OSPP in a nontrivial manner while also tackling new difficulties that are not present in any of these special cases.

We introduce Block-Attention, an attention mechanism designed to address the increased inference latency and cost in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) scenarios. Traditional approaches often encode the entire context. Instead, Block-Attention divides retrieved documents into discrete blocks, with each block independently calculating key-value (KV) states except for the final block. In RAG scenarios, by defining each passage as a block, Block-Attention enables us to reuse the KV states of passages that have been seen before, thereby significantly reducing the latency and the computation overhead during inference. The implementation of Block-Attention involves block segmentation, position re-encoding, and fine-tuning the LLM to adapt to the Block-Attention mechanism. Experiments on four RAG benchmarks demonstrate that after block fine-tuning, the Block-Attention model achieves performance comparable to self-attention models (68.4\% vs 67.9\% on Llama3) or even superior performance (62.8\% vs 59.6\% on Mistral). Notably, Block-Attention significantly reduces the time to first token (TTFT) and floating point operations (FLOPs) to a very low level. It only takes 45 ms to output the first token for an input sequence with a total length of 32K. Compared to the self-attention models, the time consumption and corresponding FLOPs are reduced by 98.7\% and 99.8\%, respectively.

Resource scheduling and allocation is a critical component of many high impact systems ranging from congestion control to cloud computing. Finding more optimal solutions to these problems often has significant impact on resource and time savings, reducing device wear-and-tear, and even potentially improving carbon emissions. In this paper, we focus on a specific instance of a scheduling problem, namely the memory mapping problem that occurs during compilation of machine learning programs: That is, mapping tensors to different memory layers to optimize execution time. We introduce an approach for solving the memory mapping problem using Reinforcement Learning. RL is a solution paradigm well-suited for sequential decision making problems that are amenable to planning, and combinatorial search spaces with high-dimensional data inputs. We formulate the problem as a single-player game, which we call the mallocGame, such that high-reward trajectories of the game correspond to efficient memory mappings on the target hardware. We also introduce a Reinforcement Learning agent, mallocMuZero, and show that it is capable of playing this game to discover new and improved memory mapping solutions that lead to faster execution times on real ML workloads on ML accelerators. We compare the performance of mallocMuZero to the default solver used by the Accelerated Linear Algebra (XLA) compiler on a benchmark of realistic ML workloads. In addition, we show that mallocMuZero is capable of improving the execution time of the recently published AlphaTensor matrix multiplication model.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

Multi-agent LLM applications organize execution in synchronized rounds where a central scheduler gathers outputs from all agents and redistributes the combined context. This All-Gather communication pattern creates massive KV Cache redundancy, because every agent's prompt contains the same shared output blocks, yet existing reuse methods fail to exploit it efficiently. We present TokenDance, a system that scales the number of concurrent agents by exploiting the All-Gather pattern for collective KV Cache sharing. TokenDance's KV Collector performs KV Cache reuse over the full round in one collective step, so the cost of reusing a shared block is paid once regardless of agent count. Its Diff-Aware Storage encodes sibling caches as block-sparse diffs against a single master copy, achieving 11-17x compression on representative workloads. Evaluation on GenerativeAgents and AgentSociety shows that TokenDance supports up to 2.7x more concurrent agents than vLLM with prefix caching under SLO requirement, reduces per-agent KV Cache storage by up to 17.5x, and achieves up to 1.9x prefill speedup over per-request position-independent caching.

Block coordinate descent (BCD) methods are widely used for large-scale numerical optimization because of their cheap iteration costs, low memory requirements, amenability to parallelization, and ability to exploit problem structure. Three main algorithmic choices influence the performance of BCD methods: the block partitioning strategy, the block selection rule, and the block update rule. In this paper we explore all three of these building blocks and propose variations for each that can significantly improve the progress made by each BCD iteration. We (i) propose new greedy block-selection strategies that guarantee more progress per iteration than the Gauss-Southwell rule; (ii) explore practical issues like how to implement the new rules when using "variable" blocks; (iii) explore the use of message-passing to compute matrix or Newton updates efficiently on huge blocks for problems with sparse dependencies between variables; and (iv) consider optimal active manifold identification, which leads to bounds on the "active-set complexity" of BCD methods and leads to superlinear convergence for certain problems with sparse solutions (and in some cases finite termination at an optimal solution). We support all of our findings with numerical results for the classic machine learning problems of least squares, logistic regression, multi-class logistic regression, label propagation, and L1-regularization.

We investigate factors contributing to LLM agents' success in competitive multi-agent environments, using auctions as a testbed where agents bid to maximize profit. The agents are equipped with bidding domain knowledge, distinct personas that reflect item preferences, and a memory of auction history. Our work extends the classic auction scenario by creating a realistic environment where multiple agents bid on houses, weighing aspects such as size, location, and budget to secure the most desirable homes at the lowest prices. Particularly, we investigate three key questions: (a) How does a persona influence an agent's behavior in a competitive setting? (b) Can an agent effectively profile its competitors' behavior during auctions? (c) How can persona profiling be leveraged to create an advantage using strategies such as theory of mind? Through a series of experiments, we analyze the behaviors of LLM agents and shed light on new findings. Our testbed, called HARBOR, offers a valuable platform for deepening our understanding of multi-agent workflows in competitive environments.

Learning-augmented paging has been extensively studied in recent years. A key advantage over naive ML-based approaches is bounded robustness, which guarantees worst-case performance even when predictions are inaccurate, making these algorithms valuable for real-world systems. Prior work achieves robustness bounds of 2H_k + O(1) in the randomized setting, leaving a gap to the optimal competitive ratio H_k. In this paper, we study how to close this gap. We begin by reviewing online optimality and proving a new property of the latest H_k-competitive algorithm, which facilitates our analysis in the learning-augmented setting. Then, we review existing learning-augmented paging algorithms and introduce a unifying primitive, the relative prediction budget, which captures the essence of establishing robustness and reveals that prior algorithms either overuse or underutilize predictions. Guided by the above analysis, we develop a new framework that achieves the best-possible robustness up to an additive constant for learning-augmented paging: H_k + O(1). Experiments further demonstrate strong practical performance.

Classical convergence guarantees for gradient-based learning in games require the pseudo-gradient to be (strongly) monotone in Euclidean geometry as shown by rosen(1965), a condition that often fails even in simple games with strong cross-player couplings. We introduce Small-Gain Nash (SGN), a block small-gain condition in a custom block-weighted geometry. SGN converts local curvature and cross-player Lipschitz coupling bounds into a tractable certificate of contraction. It constructs a weighted block metric in which the pseudo-gradient becomes strongly monotone on any region where these bounds hold, even when it is non-monotone in the Euclidean sense. The continuous flow is exponentially contracting in this designed geometry, and projected Euler and RK4 discretizations converge under explicit step-size bounds derived from the SGN margin and a local Lipschitz constant. Our analysis reveals a certified ``timescale band'', a non-asymptotic, metric-based certificate that plays a TTUR-like role: rather than forcing asymptotic timescale separation via vanishing, unequal step sizes, SGN identifies a finite band of relative metric weights for which a single-step-size dynamics is provably contractive. We validate the framework on quadratic games where Euclidean monotonicity analysis fails to predict convergence, but SGN successfully certifies it, and extend the construction to mirror/Fisher geometries for entropy-regularized policy gradient in Markov games. The result is an offline certification pipeline that estimates curvature, coupling, and Lipschitz parameters on compact regions, optimizes block weights to enlarge the SGN margin, and returns a structural, computable convergence certificate consisting of a metric, contraction rate, and safe step-sizes for non-monotone games.

This position paper argues that agentic AI systems should be designed and evaluated as marginal token allocation economies rather than as text generators priced by the unit. We follow a single request -- a developer asking a coding agent to fix a failing test -- through four economic layers that today are designed in isolation: a router that decides which model answers, an agent that decides whether to plan, act, verify, or defer, a serving stack that decides how to produce each token, and a training pipeline that decides whether the trace is worth learning from. We show that all four layers are solving the same first-order condition -- marginal benefit equals marginal cost plus latency cost plus risk cost -- with different index sets and different prices. The framing is deliberately minimal: we do not propose a complete theory of AI economics. But adopting marginal token allocation as the shared accounting object explains why systems that locally minimize tokens globally misallocate them, predicts a small set of recurring failure modes (over-routing, over-delegation, under-verification, serving congestion, stale rollouts, cache misuse), and points to a concrete research agenda in token-aware evaluation, autonomy pricing, congestion-priced serving, and risk-adjusted RL budgeting.

Current evaluations of Large Language Model (LLM) agents primarily emphasize task completion, often overlooking resource efficiency and adaptability. This neglects a crucial capability: agents' ability to devise and adjust cost-optimal plans in response to changing environments. To bridge this gap, we introduce CostBench, a scalable, cost-centric benchmark designed to evaluate agents' economic reasoning and replanning abilities. Situated in the travel-planning domain, CostBench comprises tasks solvable via multiple sequences of atomic and composite tools with diverse, customizable costs. It also supports four types of dynamic blocking events, such as tool failures and cost changes, to simulate real-world unpredictability and necessitate agents to adapt in real time. Evaluating leading open-sourced and proprietary models on CostBench reveals a substantial gap in cost-aware planning: agents frequently fail to identify cost-optimal solutions in static settings, with even GPT-5 achieving less than 75% exact match rate on the hardest tasks, and performance further dropping by around 40% under dynamic conditions. By diagnosing these weaknesses, CostBench lays the groundwork for developing future agents that are both economically rational and robust.

How can a population of agents self-orchestrate and self-adapt into stronger collective intelligence without centralized control? Inspired by Friedrich Hayek's economic theory of decentralized coordination in markets, we study this question through an agent economy in which agents compete via auctions for the right to act, exchange payments, and accumulate wealth from environmental rewards. These simple economic signals induce decentralized credit assignment, driving planning without global orchestration or explicit communication protocols. The population evolves through economic selection: effective agents accumulate wealth and are mutated via exploitation, while ineffective ones go bankrupt and are replaced via exploration. We show that, initialized with weak agents, the economy produces emergent multi-step reasoning strategies and outperforms stronger monolithic baselines across five agentic tasks, including mathematical reasoning, financial research, scientific research, accelerator design, and distributed-system optimization. We further provide theoretical insights into how economic dynamics shape agent behaviors, linking local incentives to long-term global performance. Our results suggest a new path to multi-agent intelligence: rather than engineering coordination, we can design decentralized incentive structures under which it automatically emerges.

In this paper, we consider the minimum submodular cost allocation (MSCA) problem. The input of MSCA is k non-negative submodular functions f_1,ldots,f_k on the ground set N given by evaluation oracles, and the goal is to partition N into k (possibly empty) sets X_1,ldots,X_k so that sum_{i=1}^k f_i(X_i) is minimized. In this paper, we focus on the case when f_1,ldots,f_k are monotone (denoted by Mono-MSCA). We provide a natural LP-relaxation for Mono-MSCA, which is equivalent to the convex program relaxation introduced by Chekuri and Ene. We show that the integrality gap of the LP-relaxation is at most k/2, which yields a k/2-approximation algorithm for Mono-MSCA. We also show that the integrality gap of the LP-relaxation is at least k/2-epsilon for any constant epsilon>0 when k is fixed.

In this paper, we consider non-convex multi-block bilevel optimization (MBBO) problems, which involve mgg 1 lower level problems and have important applications in machine learning. Designing a stochastic gradient and controlling its variance is more intricate due to the hierarchical sampling of blocks and data and the unique challenge of estimating hyper-gradient. We aim to achieve three nice properties for our algorithm: (a) matching the state-of-the-art complexity of standard BO problems with a single block; (b) achieving parallel speedup by sampling I blocks and sampling B samples for each sampled block per-iteration; (c) avoiding the computation of the inverse of a high-dimensional Hessian matrix estimator. However, it is non-trivial to achieve all of these by observing that existing works only achieve one or two of these properties. To address the involved challenges for achieving (a, b, c), we propose two stochastic algorithms by using advanced blockwise variance-reduction techniques for tracking the Hessian matrices (for low-dimensional problems) or the Hessian-vector products (for high-dimensional problems), and prove an iteration complexity of O(mepsilon^{-3I(I<m)}{II} + mepsilon^{-3}{IB}) for finding an epsilon-stationary point under appropriate conditions. We also conduct experiments to verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms comparing with existing MBBO algorithms.

LLM agents increasingly rely on retrieval buffers to store and reuse past experience, yet the cache management policies governing these buffers remain largely ad-hoc. We formalize this as an online semantic cache replacement problem with switching costs, where items are matched by embedding similarity and hit quality is continuous rather than binary. Through experiments on two datasets from MemoryBench-Full (LoCoMo, DialSim) with 8 replacement policies, we reveal a surprising finding: classic heuristics (LRU, LFU) consistently underperform the naive FIFO baseline on semantic workloads, due to the absence of temporal locality and frequency concentration. We propose SOLAR, a learning-augmented framework that derives modification timing from regret accumulation (achieving sim17\% modification rate) and content selection from Bayesian online learning over implicit retrieval feedback. We prove SOLAR achieves a constant competitive ratio leq 3, independent of cache size and horizon (vs.\ Ω(K) for FIFO), and eviction regret O(KTlog T), matching the Ω(KT) lower bound up to logarithmic factors. Experiments demonstrate 5--75\% relative improvement over FIFO at tight cache sizes, with a clearly characterized phase transition at the working set boundary. Synthetic experiments with 5000-item pools further reveal an inverted-U relationship between pool size and retrieval quality, justifying capacity constraints as a retrieval noise phenomenon rather than a storage limitation.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based multi-agent systems are increasingly powerful, but current agentic workflow optimization paradigms make an unsatisfying trade-off. Task-level methods spend substantial offline compute yet deploy only a single workflow, leaving complementary candidates unused, while query-level methods synthesize a new workflow per query at substantial inference cost. Our motivating analysis shows these paradigms are more complementary than competing: workflows discovered during offline search often solve different subsets of queries, and many queries handled by expensive query-level generation can already be solved by cheaper precomputed workflows. This suggests a different objective: rather than searching for one universally best workflow or regenerating one per instance, we should build a compact bank of reusable, complementary workflows and select among them adaptively at inference time. Doing so requires solving three coupled problems: generating complementary rather than redundant candidates, compressing them into a small deployable portfolio, and assigning each query to the right workflow under a performance-cost trade-off. To this end, we present FlowBank, a three-stage framework for portfolio-based agentic workflow optimization. Diversifying proposes DiverseFlow to steer search toward under-covered queries and produce a high-coverage candidate pool. Curating proposes CuraFlow to compress this pool into a compact portfolio with minimal redundancy. Matching casts deployment as edge-value prediction on a query-workflow bipartite graph and routes each incoming query to the portfolio member with the best predicted utility. Across five benchmarks, FlowBank achieves the highest average score among the evaluated methods while remaining cost-competitive, improving over the strongest automated and handcrafted baselines by 4.26% and 14.92% relative, respectively.

Sparse sketches such as the sparse Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform are a core primitive in randomized numerical linear algebra because they leverage random sparsity to reduce the arithmetic cost of sketching, while still offering strong approximation guarantees. Their random sparsity, however, is at odds with efficient implementations on modern GPUs, since it leads to irregular memory access patterns that degrade memory bandwidth utilization. Motivated by this tension, we pursue a sketch-kernel co-design approach: we design a new family of sparse sketches, BlockPerm-SJLT, whose sparsity structure is chosen to enable FlashSketch, a corresponding optimized CUDA kernel that implements these sketches efficiently. The design of BlockPerm-SJLT introduces a tunable parameter that explicitly trades off the tension between GPU-efficiency and sketching robustness. We provide theoretical guarantees for BlockPerm-SJLT under the oblivious subspace embedding (OSE) framework, and also analyze the effect of the tunable parameter on sketching quality. We empirically evaluate FlashSketch on standard RandNLA benchmarks, as well as an end-to-end ML data attribution pipeline called GraSS. FlashSketch pushes the Pareto frontier of sketching quality versus speed, across a range of regimes and tasks, and achieves a global geomean speedup of roughly 1.7x over the prior state-of-the-art GPU sketches.

Block Diffusion Models (BDMs) support parallel generation, flexible-length output, and KV caching, making them promising for efficient document parsing. However, existing BDMs bind denoising and cache commitment to fixed block boundaries: parallelism shrinks during intra-block denoising, while generated tokens cannot be cached until the whole block is completed. Moreover, intra-block bidirectional denoising conflicts with inter-block autoregression, creating inconsistent information flow that can challenge structure-sensitive recognition. We propose the Prefix-Adaptive Block Diffusion Model (PA-BDM), which replaces intra-block bidirectional denoising with causal denoising from prefix to suffix and treats the block size as a maximum candidate range rather than a fixed commitment unit. PA-BDM uses Confidence-gated Structural Loss (CSL) to build low-entropy prefixes before extending training to longer continuations. During inference, Progressive Prefix Commitment (PPC) then dynamically commits the longest reliable prefix into the KV cache and resets the next candidate range from the updated prefix, restoring a large parallel decoding space at each step. Experiments show that the 3B PA-BDM achieves higher recognition scores on several benchmarks and improves inference throughput by 71.6\% over the 2.5B MinerU-Diffusion.

Neural network pruning is widely used to reduce model size and computational cost. Yet, most existing methods treat sparsity as an externally imposed constraint, enforced through heuristic importance scores or training-time regularization. In this work, we propose a fundamentally different perspective: pruning as an equilibrium outcome of strategic interaction among model components. We model parameter groups such as weights, neurons, or filters as players in a continuous non-cooperative game, where each player selects its level of participation in the network to balance contribution against redundancy and competition. Within this formulation, sparsity emerges naturally when continued participation becomes a dominated strategy at equilibrium. We analyze the resulting game and show that dominated players collapse to zero participation under mild conditions, providing a principled explanation for pruning behavior. Building on this insight, we derive a simple equilibrium-driven pruning algorithm that jointly updates network parameters and participation variables without relying on explicit importance scores. This work focuses on establishing a principled formulation and empirical validation of pruning as an equilibrium phenomenon, rather than exhaustive architectural or large-scale benchmarking. Experiments on standard benchmarks demonstrate that the proposed approach achieves competitive sparsity-accuracy trade-offs while offering an interpretable, theory-grounded alternative to existing pruning methods.

Test-time scaling has become a dominant paradigm for improving LLM agent reliability, yet current approaches treat compute as an abundant resource, allowing agents to exhaust token and tool budgets on redundant steps or dead-end trajectories. Existing budget-aware methods either require expensive fine-tuning or rely on coarse, trajectory-level heuristics that cannot intervene mid-execution. We propose the Budget-Aware Value Tree (BAVT), a training-free inference-time framework that models multi-hop reasoning as a dynamic search tree guided by step-level value estimation within a single LLM backbone. Another key innovation is a budget-conditioned node selection mechanism that uses the remaining resource ratio as a natural scaling exponent over node values, providing a principled, parameter-free transition from broad exploration to greedy exploitation as the budget depletes. To combat the well-known overconfidence of LLM self-evaluation, BAVT employs a residual value predictor that scores relative progress rather than absolute state quality, enabling reliable pruning of uninformative or redundant tool calls. We further provide a theoretical convergence guarantee, proving that BAVT reaches a terminal answer with probability at least 1-ε under an explicit finite budget bound. Extensive evaluations on four multi-hop QA benchmarks across two model families demonstrate that BAVT consistently outperforms parallel sampling baselines. Most notably, BAVT under strict low-budget constraints surpasses baseline performance at 4times the resource allocation, establishing that intelligent budget management fundamentally outperforms brute-force compute scaling.

Clustering is a fundamental building block of modern statistical analysis pipelines. Fair clustering has seen much attention from the machine learning community in recent years. We are some of the first to study fairness in the context of hierarchical clustering, after the results of Ahmadian et al. from NeurIPS in 2020. We evaluate our results using Dasgupta's cost function, perhaps one of the most prevalent theoretical metrics for hierarchical clustering evaluation. Our work vastly improves the previous O(n^{5/6}polylog(n)) fair approximation for cost to a near polylogarithmic O(n^delta polylog(n)) fair approximation for any constant deltain(0,1). This result establishes a cost-fairness tradeoff and extends to broader fairness constraints than the previous work. We also show how to alter existing hierarchical clusterings to guarantee fairness and cluster balance across any level in the hierarchy.

Agentic systems increasingly solve complex user requests by executing orchestrated workflows, where subtasks are assigned to specialized models or tools and coordinated according to their dependencies. While recent work improves agent efficiency by optimizing the performance--cost--latency frontier, real deployments often impose concrete requirements: a workflow must be completed within a specified budget and before a specified deadline. This shifts the goal from average efficiency optimization to maximizing the probability that the entire workflow completes successfully under explicit budget and deadline constraints. We study constraint-driven online resource allocation for agentic workflows. Given a dependency-structured workflow and estimates of success rates and generation lengths for each subtask--model pair, the executor allocates models and parallel samples across simultaneously executable subtasks while managing the remaining budget and time. We formulate this setting as a finite-horizon stochastic online allocation problem and propose Monte Carlo Portfolio Planning (MCPP), a lightweight closed-loop planner that directly estimates constrained completion probability through simulated workflow executions and replans after observed outcomes. Experiments on CodeFlow and ProofFlow demonstrate that MCPP consistently improves constrained completion probability over strong baselines across a wide range of budget--deadline constraints.

Test-time scaling can improve model performance by aggregating stochastic reasoning trajectories. However, achieving sample-efficient test-time self-consistency under a limited budget remains an open challenge. We introduce PETS (Principled and Efficient Test-TimeSelf-Consistency), which initiates a principled study of trajectory allocation through an optimization framework. Central to our approach is the self-consistency rate, a new measure defined as agreement with the infinite-budget majority vote. This formulation makes sample-efficient test-time allocation theoretically grounded and amenable to rigorous analysis. We study both offline and online settings. In the offline regime, where all questions are known in advance, we connect trajectory allocation to crowdsourcing, a classic and well-developed area, by modeling reasoning traces as workers. This perspective allows us to leverage rich existing theory, yielding theoretical guarantees and an efficient majority-voting-based allocation algorithm. In the online streaming regime, where questions arrive sequentially and allocations must be made on the fly, we propose a novel method inspired by the offline framework. Our approach adapts budgets to question difficulty while preserving strong theoretical guarantees and computational efficiency. Experiments show that PETS consistently outperforms uniform allocation. On GPQA, PETS achieves perfect self-consistency in both settings while reducing the sampling budget by up to 75% (offline) and 55% (online) relative to uniform allocation. Code is available at https://github.com/ZDCSlab/PETS.

LLM-powered coding agents, which operate in iterative loops (turns) to solve software engineering tasks, are becoming increasingly powerful. However, their practical deployment is hindered by significant and unpredictable costs. This challenge arises from a combination of factors: quadratically growing token counts with each turn, the high price of models, the large number of turns required for real-world tasks, and the tendency of agents to take inefficient or unnecessary actions. While existing research focuses on optimizing individual turns, the strategic control of the total number of turns remains an underexplored area for managing agent performance and cost. To address this gap, we conduct a comprehensive empirical study on SWE-bench using three state-of-the-art models and evaluate the impact of three distinct turn-control strategies: an unrestricted baseline, a fixed-turn limit with reminders, and a novel dynamic-turn strategy that grants extensions on-demand. Our findings first reveal a fundamental trade-off in the unrestricted setting, where no single model excels across performance, cost, and turn efficiency. We then show that a fixed-turn limit, specifically at the 75th percentile of the baseline, serves as a "sweet spot", substantially reducing costs (by 24%-68%) with minimal impact on solve rates. Most significantly, the dynamic-turn strategy consistently outperforms fixed-limit approaches, achieving comparable or better solve rates while further reducing costs by an additional 12%-24% by intelligently allocating resources only to tasks that need them. This work provides the first systematic analysis of turn-control strategies, offering simple yet effective guidelines for developers to balance cost and efficacy. We demonstrate that dynamic resource allocation is a superior, easy-to-implement approach for deploying powerful yet economically viable coding agents.

Network pruning techniques, including weight pruning and filter pruning, reveal that most state-of-the-art neural networks can be accelerated without a significant performance drop. This work focuses on filter pruning which enables accelerated inference with any off-the-shelf deep learning library and hardware. We propose the concept of network pruning spaces that parametrize populations of subnetwork architectures. Based on this concept, we explore the structure aspect of subnetworks that result in minimal loss of accuracy in different pruning regimes and arrive at a series of observations by comparing subnetwork distributions. We conjecture through empirical studies that there exists an optimal FLOPs-to-parameter-bucket ratio related to the design of original network in a pruning regime. Statistically, the structure of a winning subnetwork guarantees an approximately optimal ratio in this regime. Upon our conjectures, we further refine the initial pruning space to reduce the cost of searching a good subnetwork architecture. Our experimental results on ImageNet show that the subnetwork we found is superior to those from the state-of-the-art pruning methods under comparable FLOPs.

Diffusion large language models (dLLMs) have emerged as a promising alternative for text generation, distinguished by their native support for parallel decoding. In practice, block inference is crucial for avoiding order misalignment in global bidirectional decoding and improving output quality. However, the widely-used fixed, predefined block (naive) schedule is agnostic to semantic difficulty, making it a suboptimal strategy for both quality and efficiency: it can force premature commitments to uncertain positions while delaying easy positions near block boundaries. In this work, we analyze the limitations of naive block scheduling and disclose the importance of dynamically adapting the schedule to semantic difficulty for reliable and efficient inference. Motivated by this, we propose Dynamic Sliding Block (DSB), a training-free block scheduling method that uses a sliding block with a dynamic size to overcome the rigidity of the naive block. To further improve efficiency, we introduce DSB Cache, a training-free KV-cache mechanism tailored to DSB. Extensive experiments across multiple models and benchmarks demonstrate that DSB, together with DSB Cache, consistently improves both generation quality and inference efficiency for dLLMs. Code is released at https://github.com/lizhuo-luo/DSB.

We design efficient approximation algorithms for maximizing the expectation of the supremum of families of Gaussian random variables. In particular, let OPT:=max_{σ_1,cdots,σ_n}Eleft[sum_{j=1}^{m}max_{iin S_j} X_iright], where X_i are Gaussian, S_jsubset[n] and sum_iσ_i^2=1, then our theoretical results include: - We characterize the optimal variance allocation -- it concentrates on a small subset of variables as |S_j| increases, - A polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) for computing OPT when m=1, and - An O(log n) approximation algorithm for computing OPT for general m>1. Such expectation maximization problems occur in diverse applications, ranging from utility maximization in auctions markets to learning mixture models in quantitative genetics.

The best-of-both-worlds paradigm advocates an approach that achieves desirable properties both ex-ante and ex-post. We launch a best-of-both-worlds fairness perspective for the important social choice setting of approval-based committee voting. To this end, we initiate work on ex-ante proportional representation properties in this domain and formalize a hierarchy of notions including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Group Fair Share (GFS), and their stronger variants. We establish their compatibility with well-studied ex-post concepts such as extended justified representation (EJR) and fully justified representation (FJR). Our first main result is a polynomial-time algorithm that simultaneously satisfies ex-post EJR, ex-ante GFS and ex-ante Strong UFS. Subsequently, we strengthen our ex-post guarantee to FJR and present an algorithm that outputs a lottery which is ex-post FJR and ex-ante Strong UFS, but does not run in polynomial time.

In LLM serving, reusing the KV cache of prompts across requests is critical for reducing TTFT and serving costs. Cache-affinity scheduling, which co-locates requests with the same prompt prefix to maximize KV cache reuse, often conflicts with load-balancing scheduling that distributes requests evenly across compute instances. Existing schedulers fail to reconcile this trade-off as they operate within a single mapping space, typically applying cache-affinity routing to a subset of requests and load-balanced routing to the rest, without a unified solution to achieve both goals. To address this limitation, we propose DualMap, a dual-mapping scheduling strategy for distributed LLM serving that achieves both cache affinity and load balancing. Its key idea is to map each request to two candidate instances via two independent hash functions based on the request prompt, then intelligently select the better candidate based on current system states. This design increases the likelihood that requests with shared prefixes are co-located, while evenly dispersing distinct prefixes across the cluster via ``the power of two choices''. To make DualMap robust under dynamic and skewed real-world workloads, we incorporate three techniques: 1) SLO-aware request routing, which prioritizes cache affinity but switches to load-aware scheduling when TTFT exceeds the SLO, enhancing load balance without sacrificing cache reuse; 2) hotspot-aware rebalancing, which dynamically migrates requests from overloaded to underloaded instances, mitigating hotspots and rebalancing the system; 3) lightweight dual-hash-ring scaling, which leverages a dual-hash-ring mapping to support fast and low-overhead instance scaling without costly global remapping. Experiments on real-world workloads show that DualMap improves effective request capacity by up to 2.25times under the same TTFT SLO constraints compared with SOTA work.

Major Internet advertising platforms offer budget pacing tools as a standard service for advertisers to manage their ad campaigns. Given the inherent non-stationarity in an advertiser's value and also competing advertisers' values over time, a commonly used approach is to learn a target expenditure plan that specifies a target spend as a function of time, and then run a controller that tracks this plan. This raises the question: how many historical samples are required to learn a good expenditure plan? We study this question by considering an advertiser repeatedly participating in T second-price auctions, where the tuple of her value and the highest competing bid is drawn from an unknown time-varying distribution. The advertiser seeks to maximize her total utility subject to her budget constraint. Prior work has shown the sufficiency of Tlog T samples per distribution to achieve the optimal O(T)-regret. We dramatically improve this state-of-the-art and show that just one sample per distribution is enough to achieve the near-optimal tilde O(T)-regret, while still being robust to noise in the sampling distributions.

We solve a challenging yet practically useful variant of 3D Bin Packing Problem (3D-BPP). In our problem, the agent has limited information about the items to be packed into the bin, and an item must be packed immediately after its arrival without buffering or readjusting. The item's placement also subjects to the constraints of collision avoidance and physical stability. We formulate this online 3D-BPP as a constrained Markov decision process. To solve the problem, we propose an effective and easy-to-implement constrained deep reinforcement learning (DRL) method under the actor-critic framework. In particular, we introduce a feasibility predictor to predict the feasibility mask for the placement actions and use it to modulate the action probabilities output by the actor during training. Such supervisions and transformations to DRL facilitate the agent to learn feasible policies efficiently. Our method can also be generalized e.g., with the ability to handle lookahead or items with different orientations. We have conducted extensive evaluation showing that the learned policy significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art methods. A user study suggests that our method attains a human-level performance.

Global placement is a critical step with high computational complexity in VLSI physical design. Modern analytical placers formulate the placement problem as a nonlinear optimization, where initialization strongly affects both convergence behavior and final placement quality. However, existing initialization methods exhibit a trade-off: area-aware initializers account for cell areas but are computationally expensive and can dominate total runtime, while fast point-based initializers ignore cell area, leading to a modeling gap that impairs convergence and solution quality. We propose a lightweight co-optimization framework that bridges this initialization gap through two strategies. First, an area-hint refinement initializer incorporates heuristic cell area information into a signed graph signal by augmenting the netlist graph with virtual nodes and negative-weight edges, yielding an area-aware and spectrally smooth placement initialization. Second, a macro-schedule placement procedure progressively restores area constraints, enabling a smooth transition from the refined initializer to the full area-aware objective and producing high-quality placement results. We evaluate the framework on macro-heavy ISPD2005 academic benchmarks and two real-world industrial designs across two technology nodes (12 cases in total). Experimental results show that our method consistently improves half-perimeter wirelength (HPWL) over point-based initializers in 11 out of 12 cases, achieving up to 2.2% HPWL reduction, while running approximately 100 times faster than the state-of-the-art area-aware initializer.

Computing stable partitions in hedonic games is a challenging task because there exist games in which stable outcomes do not exist. Even more, these No-instances can often be leveraged to prove computational hardness results. We make this impression rigorous in a dynamic model of cardinal hedonic games by providing meta theorems. These imply hardness of deciding about the possible or necessary convergence of deviation dynamics based on the mere existence of No-instances. Our results hold for additively separable, fractional, and modified fractional hedonic games (ASHGs, FHGs, and MFHGs). Moreover, they encompass essentially all reasonable stability notions based on single-agent deviations. In addition, we propose dynamics as a method to find individually rational and contractually individual stable (CIS) partitions in ASHGs. In particular, we find that CIS dynamics from the singleton partition possibly converge after a linear number of deviations but may require an exponential number of deviations in the worst case.

Neural Architecture Search (NAS) has gained significant popularity as an effective tool for designing high performance deep neural networks (DNNs). NAS can be performed via policy gradient, evolutionary algorithms, differentiable architecture search or tree-search methods. While significant progress has been made for both policy gradient and differentiable architecture search, tree-search methods have so far failed to achieve comparable accuracy or search efficiency. In this paper, we formulate NAS as a Combinatorial Multi-Armed Bandit (CMAB) problem (CMAB-NAS). This allows the decomposition of a large search space into smaller blocks where tree-search methods can be applied more effectively and efficiently. We further leverage a tree-based method called Nested Monte-Carlo Search to tackle the CMAB-NAS problem. On CIFAR-10, our approach discovers a cell structure that achieves a low error rate that is comparable to the state-of-the-art, using only 0.58 GPU days, which is 20 times faster than current tree-search methods. Moreover, the discovered structure transfers well to large-scale datasets such as ImageNet.

In this work, we present a new network design paradigm. Our goal is to help advance the understanding of network design and discover design principles that generalize across settings. Instead of focusing on designing individual network instances, we design network design spaces that parametrize populations of networks. The overall process is analogous to classic manual design of networks, but elevated to the design space level. Using our methodology we explore the structure aspect of network design and arrive at a low-dimensional design space consisting of simple, regular networks that we call RegNet. The core insight of the RegNet parametrization is surprisingly simple: widths and depths of good networks can be explained by a quantized linear function. We analyze the RegNet design space and arrive at interesting findings that do not match the current practice of network design. The RegNet design space provides simple and fast networks that work well across a wide range of flop regimes. Under comparable training settings and flops, the RegNet models outperform the popular EfficientNet models while being up to 5x faster on GPUs.

Nash regret has recently emerged as a principled fairness-aware performance metric for stochastic multi-armed bandits, motivated by the Nash Social Welfare objective. Although this notion has been extended to linear bandits, existing results suffer from suboptimality in ambient dimension d, stemming from proof techniques that rely on restrictive concentration inequalities. In this work, we resolve this open problem by introducing new analytical tools that yield an order-optimal Nash regret bound in linear bandits. Beyond Nash regret, we initiate the study of p-means regret in linear bandits, a unifying framework that interpolates between fairness and utility objectives and strictly generalizes Nash regret. We propose a generic algorithmic framework, FairLinBandit, that works as a meta-algorithm on top of any linear bandit strategy. We instantiate this framework using two bandit algorithms: Phased Elimination and Upper Confidence Bound, and prove that both achieve sublinear p-means regret for the entire range of p. Extensive experiments on linear bandit instances generated from real-world datasets demonstrate that our methods consistently outperform the existing state-of-the-art baseline.

Cascading bandits have gained popularity in recent years due to their applicability to recommendation systems and online advertising. In the cascading bandit model, at each timestep, an agent recommends an ordered subset of items (called an item list) from a pool of items, each associated with an unknown attraction probability. Then, the user examines the list, and clicks the first attractive item (if any), and after that, the agent receives a reward. The goal of the agent is to maximize the expected cumulative reward. However, the prior literature on cascading bandits ignores the influences of user states (e.g., historical behaviors) on recommendations and the change of states as the session proceeds. Motivated by this fact, we propose a generalized cascading RL framework, which considers the impact of user states and state transition into decisions. In cascading RL, we need to select items not only with large attraction probabilities but also leading to good successor states. This imposes a huge computational challenge due to the combinatorial action space. To tackle this challenge, we delve into the properties of value functions, and design an oracle BestPerm to efficiently find the optimal item list. Equipped with BestPerm, we develop two algorithms CascadingVI and CascadingBPI, which are both computationally-efficient and sample-efficient, and provide near-optimal regret and sample complexity guarantees. Furthermore, we present experiments to show the improved computational and sample efficiencies of our algorithms compared to straightforward adaptations of existing RL algorithms in practice.

The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) has established LLM routing as a standard service delivery mechanism, where users select models based on cost, Quality of Service (QoS), among other things. However, optimal pricing in LLM routing platforms requires precise modeling for dynamic service markets, and solving this problem in real time at scale is computationally intractable. In this paper, we propose \PriLLM, a novel practical and scalable solution for real-time dynamic pricing in competitive LLM routing. \PriLLM models the service market as a Stackelberg game, where providers set prices and users select services based on multiple criteria. To capture real-world market dynamics, we incorporate both objective factors (\eg~cost, QoS) and subjective user preferences into the model. For scalability, we employ a deep aggregation network to learn provider abstraction that preserve user-side equilibrium behavior across pricing strategies. Moreover, \PriLLM offers interpretability by explaining its pricing decisions. Empirical evaluation on real-world data shows that \PriLLM achieves over 95\% of the optimal profit while only requiring less than 5\% of the optimal solution's computation time.

Task allocation is a key combinatorial optimization problem, crucial for modern applications such as multi-robot cooperation and resource scheduling. Decision makers must allocate entities to tasks reasonably across different scenarios. However, traditional methods assume static attributes and numbers of tasks and entities, often relying on dynamic programming and heuristic algorithms for solutions. In reality, task allocation resembles Markov decision processes, with dynamically changing task and entity attributes. Thus, algorithms must dynamically allocate tasks based on their states. To address this issue, we propose a two-stage task allocation algorithm based on similarity, utilizing reinforcement learning to learn allocation strategies. The proposed pre-assign strategy allows entities to preselect appropriate tasks, effectively avoiding local optima and thereby better finding the optimal allocation. We also introduce an attention mechanism and a hyperparameter network structure to adapt to the changing number and attributes of entities and tasks, enabling our network structure to generalize to new tasks. Experimental results across multiple environments demonstrate that our algorithm effectively addresses the challenges of dynamic task allocation in practical applications. Compared to heuristic algorithms like genetic algorithms, our reinforcement learning approach better solves dynamic allocation problems and achieves zero-shot generalization to new tasks with good performance. The code is available at https://github.com/yk7333/TaskAllocation.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Ranking algorithms in traditional search engines are powered by enormous training data sets that are meticulously engineered and curated by a centralized entity. Decentralized peer-to-peer (p2p) networks such as torrenting applications and Web3 protocols deliberately eschew centralized databases and computational architectures when designing services and features. As such, robust search-and-rank algorithms designed for such domains must be engineered specifically for decentralized networks, and must be lightweight enough to operate on consumer-grade personal devices such as a smartphone or laptop computer. We introduce G-Rank, an unsupervised ranking algorithm designed exclusively for decentralized networks. We demonstrate that accurate, relevant ranking results can be achieved in fully decentralized networks without any centralized data aggregation, feature engineering, or model training. Furthermore, we show that such results are obtainable with minimal data preprocessing and computational overhead, and can still return highly relevant results even when a user's device is disconnected from the network. G-Rank is highly modular in design, is not limited to categorical data, and can be implemented in a variety of domains with minimal modification. The results herein show that unsupervised ranking models designed for decentralized p2p networks are not only viable, but worthy of further research.

This paper discusses the system architecture design and deployment of non-stationary multi-armed bandit approaches to determine a near-optimal payment routing policy based on the recent history of transactions. We propose a Routing Service architecture using a novel Ray-based implementation for optimally scaling bandit-based payment routing to over 10,000 transactions per second, adhering to the system design requirements and ecosystem constraints with Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS). We first evaluate the effectiveness of multiple bandit-based payment routing algorithms on a custom simulator to benchmark multiple non-stationary bandit approaches and identify the best hyperparameters. We then conducted live experiments on the payment transaction system on a fantasy sports platform Dream11. In the live experiments, we demonstrated that our non-stationary bandit-based algorithm consistently improves the success rate of transactions by 0.92% compared to the traditional rule-based methods over one month.

Mobile users (or UEs, to use 3GPP terminology) served by small cells in dense urban settings may abruptly experience a significant deterioration in their channel to their serving base stations (BSs) in several scenarios, such as after turning a corner around a tall building, or a sudden knot of traffic blocking the direct path between the UE and its serving BS. In this work, we propose a scheme to temporarily increase the data rate to/from this UE with additional bandwidth from the nearest Coordinated Multi-Point (CoMP) cluster of BSs, while the slower process of handover of the UE to a new serving BS is ongoing. We emphasize that this additional bandwidth is additional to the data rates the UE is getting over its primary connection to the current serving BS and, after the handover, to the new serving BS. The key novelty of the present work is the proposal of a decentralized market-based resource allocation method to perform resource allocation to support Coordinated Beamforming (CB) CoMP. It is scalable to large numbers of UEs and BSs, and it is fast because resource allocations are made bilaterally, between BSs and UEs. Once the resource allocation to the UE has been made, the coordinated of transmissions occurs as per the usual CB methods. Thus the proposed method has the benefit of giving the UE access to its desired amount of resources fast, without waiting for handover to complete, or reporting channel state information before it knows the resources it will be allocated for receiving transmissions from the serving BS.

With the development of LLMs as agents, there is a growing interest in connecting multiple agents into multi-agent systems to solve tasks concurrently, focusing on their role in task assignment and coordination. This paper explores how LLMs can effectively allocate computational tasks among multiple agents, considering factors such as cost, efficiency, and performance. In this work, we address key questions, including the effectiveness of LLMs as orchestrators and planners, comparing their effectiveness in task assignment and coordination. Our experiments demonstrate that LLMs can achieve high validity and accuracy in resource allocation tasks. We find that the planner method outperforms the orchestrator method in handling concurrent actions, resulting in improved efficiency and better utilization of agents. Additionally, we show that providing explicit information about worker capabilities enhances the allocation strategies of planners, particularly when dealing with suboptimal workers.