Daily Papers

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly act as autonomous agents, using tools to execute code, read and write files, and access networks, creating novel security risks. To mitigate these risks, agents are commonly deployed and evaluated in isolated "sandbox" environments, often implemented using Docker/OCI containers. We introduce SANDBOXESCAPEBENCH, an open benchmark that safely measures an LLM's capacity to break out of these sandboxes. The benchmark is implemented as an Inspect AI Capture the Flag (CTF) evaluation utilising a nested sandbox architecture with the outer layer containing the flag and no known vulnerabilities. Following a threat model of a motivated adversarial agent with shell access inside a container, SANDBOXESCAPEBENCH covers a spectrum of sandboxescape mechanisms spanning misconfiguration, privilege allocation mistakes, kernel flaws, and runtime/orchestration weaknesses. We find that, when vulnerabilities are added, LLMs are able to identify and exploit them, showing that use of evaluation like SANDBOXESCAPEBENCH is needed to ensure sandboxing continues to provide the encapsulation needed for highly-capable models.

Code contains security and functional bugs. The process of identifying and localizing them is difficult and relies on human labor. In this work, we present a novel approach (FLAG) to assist human debuggers. FLAG is based on the lexical capabilities of generative AI, specifically, Large Language Models (LLMs). Here, we input a code file then extract and regenerate each line within that file for self-comparison. By comparing the original code with an LLM-generated alternative, we can flag notable differences as anomalies for further inspection, with features such as distance from comments and LLM confidence also aiding this classification. This reduces the inspection search space for the designer. Unlike other automated approaches in this area, FLAG is language-agnostic, can work on incomplete (and even non-compiling) code and requires no creation of security properties, functional tests or definition of rules. In this work, we explore the features that help LLMs in this classification and evaluate the performance of FLAG on known bugs. We use 121 benchmarks across C, Python and Verilog; with each benchmark containing a known security or functional weakness. We conduct the experiments using two state of the art LLMs in OpenAI's code-davinci-002 and gpt-3.5-turbo, but our approach may be used by other models. FLAG can identify 101 of the defects and helps reduce the search space to 12-17% of source code.

Existing benchmarks for LLM-based offensive security agents use isolated, single-target setups with a known vulnerable service and fixed objective. They measure exploitation effectively, but miss how real Capture-the-Flag (CTF) participants triage unknown surfaces, prioritize targets, and allocate effort under uncertainty. Current evaluations therefore fail to assess strategic reasoning beyond exploitation alone. To address this, we introduce CTFExplorer, a benchmark suite that shifts offensive security evaluation toward a multi-target setting, which tests how agents explore, prioritize, and chain attacks. CTFExplorer deploys 40 web-based vulnerable services within a single environment, where agents must autonomously discover, distinguish, and exploit targets without predefined guidance. We also present a reactive multi-agent setup as a reference agent framework and develop an agent-agnostic evaluation framework that records structured reasoning traces for fine-grained assessment. This enables behavioral evaluation beyond binary flag capture, such as how agents manage target selection, handle failed hypotheses, coordinate across multiple stages, and extract security intelligence.

As AI agents begin to automate AI R&D, we need ways to assess whether their outputs are safe to deploy, even when the agents themselves may be untrusted. AI control offers one such approach: rather than trusting the agent, it treats it as a potential adversary and uses a monitor to detect covert sabotage before deployment. We evaluate AI control for automated AI R&D with ResearchArena, a framework spanning four long-horizon tasks: safety post-training, capabilities post-training, CUDA-kernel optimization, and inference-server optimization. Because the deliverable in AI R&D is an artifact that will be deployed and run, we pair each main task with two kinds of hidden side task: an embedded side task that sabotages the submitted model, adapter, kernel, or server itself, and an independent side task that takes a covert out-of-scope action in the sandbox while leaving the artifact honest. We evaluate frontier agents at both sabotage and monitoring, across four monitor types that vary along two axes: whether the monitor may execute and probe the produced artifact, and whether it sees the agent's chain-of-thought. We find that sabotage hidden in the training data is the hardest to catch, flagged fewer than half the time. Letting the monitor run experiments on the artifact, rather than only read the trajectory, helps, but it is not enough: monitors still miss embedded sabotage by inspecting only the surface, by noticing the anomaly but explaining it away, or by probing the artifact with the wrong test. We release ResearchArena as a modular framework for evaluating sabotage and control in automated AI R&D.

Capture The Flag (CTF) challenges are puzzles related to computer security scenarios. With the advent of large language models (LLMs), more and more CTF participants are using LLMs to understand and solve the challenges. However, so far no work has evaluated the effectiveness of LLMs in solving CTF challenges with a fully automated workflow. We develop two CTF-solving workflows, human-in-the-loop (HITL) and fully-automated, to examine the LLMs' ability to solve a selected set of CTF challenges, prompted with information about the question. We collect human contestants' results on the same set of questions, and find that LLMs achieve higher success rate than an average human participant. This work provides a comprehensive evaluation of the capability of LLMs in solving real world CTF challenges, from real competition to fully automated workflow. Our results provide references for applying LLMs in cybersecurity education and pave the way for systematic evaluation of offensive cybersecurity capabilities in LLMs.

Recent advances in LLM agentic systems have improved the automation of offensive security tasks, particularly for Capture the Flag (CTF) challenges. We systematically investigate the key factors that drive agent success and provide a detailed recipe for building effective LLM-based offensive security agents. First, we present CTFJudge, a framework leveraging LLM as a judge to analyze agent trajectories and provide granular evaluation across CTF solving steps. Second, we propose a novel metric, CTF Competency Index (CCI) for partial correctness, revealing how closely agent solutions align with human-crafted gold standards. Third, we examine how LLM hyperparameters, namely temperature, top-p, and maximum token length, influence agent performance and automated cybersecurity task planning. For rapid evaluation, we present CTFTiny, a curated benchmark of 50 representative CTF challenges across binary exploitation, web, reverse engineering, forensics, and cryptography. Our findings identify optimal multi-agent coordination settings and lay the groundwork for future LLM agent research in cybersecurity. We make CTFTiny open source to public https://github.com/NYU-LLM-CTF/CTFTiny along with CTFJudge on https://github.com/NYU-LLM-CTF/CTFJudge.

Capture-the-Flag (CTF) competitions are crucial for cybersecurity education and training. As large language models (LLMs) evolve, there is increasing interest in their ability to automate CTF challenge solving. For example, DARPA has organized the AIxCC competition since 2023 to advance AI-powered automated offense and defense. However, this demands a combination of multiple abilities, from knowledge to reasoning and further to actions. In this paper, we highlight the importance of technical knowledge in solving CTF problems and deliberately construct a focused benchmark, CTFKnow, with 3,992 questions to measure LLMs' performance in this core aspect. Our study offers a focused and innovative measurement of LLMs' capability in understanding CTF knowledge and applying it to solve CTF challenges. Our key findings reveal that while LLMs possess substantial technical knowledge, they falter in accurately applying this knowledge to specific scenarios and adapting their strategies based on feedback from the CTF environment. Based on insights derived from this measurement study, we propose CTFAgent, a novel LLM-driven framework for advancing CTF problem-solving. CTFAgent introduces two new modules: two-stage Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) and interactive Environmental Augmentation, which enhance LLMs' technical knowledge and vulnerability exploitation on CTF, respectively. Our experimental results show that, on two popular CTF datasets, CTFAgent both achieves over 80% performance improvement. Moreover, in the recent picoCTF2024 hosted by CMU, CTFAgent ranked in the top 23.6% of nearly 7,000 participating teams. This reflects the benefit of our measurement study and the potential of our framework in advancing LLMs' capabilities in CTF problem-solving.

The extraction of a small number of relevant insights from vast amounts of data is a crucial component of data-driven decision-making. However, accomplishing this task requires considerable technical skills, domain expertise, and human labor. This study explores the potential of using Large Language Models (LLMs) to automate the discovery of insights in data, leveraging recent advances in reasoning and code generation techniques. We propose a new evaluation methodology based on a "capture the flag" principle, measuring the ability of such models to recognize meaningful and pertinent information (flags) in a dataset. We further propose two proof-of-concept agents, with different inner workings, and compare their ability to capture such flags in a real-world sales dataset. While the work reported here is preliminary, our results are sufficiently interesting to mandate future exploration by the community.

The increasing complexity and interconnectivity of digital infrastructures make scalable and reliable security assessment methods essential. Robotic systems represent a particularly important class of operational technology, as modern robots are highly networked cyber-physical systems deployed in domains such as industrial automation, logistics, and autonomous services. This paper explores the use of large language models for automated penetration testing in robotic environments. We propose an environment-grounded multi-agent architecture tailored to Robotics-based systems. The approach dynamically constructs a shared graph-based memory during execution that captures the observable system state, including network topology, communication channels, vulnerabilities, and attempted exploits. This enables structured automation while maintaining traceability and effective context management throughout the testing process. Evaluated across multiple iterations within a specialized robotics Capture-the-Flag scenario (ROS/ROS2), the system demonstrated high reliability, successfully completing the challenge in 100\% of test runs (n=5). This performance significantly exceeds literature benchmarks while maintaining the traceability and human oversight required by frameworks like the EU AI Act.

AI pentesting agents are increasingly credible as offensive security systems, but current benchmarks still provide limited guidance on which will perform best in real-world targets. Existing evaluation protocols assess and optimize for predefined goals such as capture-the-flag, remote code execution, exploit reproduction, or trajectory similarity, in simplified or narrow settings. These tools are valuable for measuring bounded capabilities, yet they do not adequately capture the complexity, open-ended exploration, and strategic decision-making required in realistic pentesting. In this paper, we present a practical evaluation protocol that shifts assessment from task completion to validated vulnerability discovery, allowing evaluation in sufficiently complex targets spanning multiple attack surfaces and vulnerability classes. The protocol combines structured ground-truth with LLM-based semantic matching to identify vulnerabilities, bipartite resolution to score findings under realistic ambiguity, continuous ground-truth maintenance, repeated and cumulative evaluation of stochastic agents, efficiency metrics, and reduced-suite selection for sustainable experimentation. This protocol extends the state of the art by enabling a more realistic, operationally informative comparison of AI pentesting agents. To enable reproducibility, we also release expert-annotated ground truth and code for the proposed evaluation protocol: https://github.com/ethiack/ethibench.

Although language model (LM) agents have demonstrated increased performance in multiple domains, including coding and web-browsing, their success in cybersecurity has been limited. We present EnIGMA, an LM agent for autonomously solving Capture The Flag (CTF) challenges. We introduce new tools and interfaces to improve the agent's ability to find and exploit security vulnerabilities, focusing on interactive terminal programs. These novel Interactive Agent Tools enable LM agents, for the first time, to run interactive utilities, such as a debugger and a server connection tool, which are essential for solving these challenges. Empirical analysis on 390 CTF challenges across four benchmarks demonstrate that these new tools and interfaces substantially improve our agent's performance, achieving state-of-the-art results on NYU CTF, Intercode-CTF, and CyBench. Finally, we analyze data leakage, developing new methods to quantify it and identifying a new phenomenon we term soliloquizing, where the model self-generates hallucinated observations without interacting with the environment. Our code and development dataset are available at https://github.com/SWE-agent/SWE-agent/tree/v0.7 and https://github.com/NYU-LLM-CTF/NYU_CTF_Bench/tree/main/development respectively.

We introduce AIRTBench, an AI red teaming benchmark for evaluating language models' ability to autonomously discover and exploit Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML) security vulnerabilities. The benchmark consists of 70 realistic black-box capture-the-flag (CTF) challenges from the Crucible challenge environment on the Dreadnode platform, requiring models to write python code to interact with and compromise AI systems. Claude-3.7-Sonnet emerged as the clear leader, solving 43 challenges (61% of the total suite, 46.9% overall success rate), with Gemini-2.5-Pro following at 39 challenges (56%, 34.3% overall), GPT-4.5-Preview at 34 challenges (49%, 36.9% overall), and DeepSeek R1 at 29 challenges (41%, 26.9% overall). Our evaluations show frontier models excel at prompt injection attacks (averaging 49% success rates) but struggle with system exploitation and model inversion challenges (below 26%, even for the best performers). Frontier models are far outpacing open-source alternatives, with the best truly open-source model (Llama-4-17B) solving 7 challenges (10%, 1.0% overall), though demonstrating specialized capabilities on certain hard challenges. Compared to human security researchers, large language models (LLMs) solve challenges with remarkable efficiency completing in minutes what typically takes humans hours or days-with efficiency advantages of over 5,000x on hard challenges. Our contribution fills a critical gap in the evaluation landscape, providing the first comprehensive benchmark specifically designed to measure and track progress in autonomous AI red teaming capabilities.

Language Model (LM) agents for cybersecurity that are capable of autonomously identifying vulnerabilities and executing exploits have the potential to cause real-world impact. Policymakers, model providers, and other researchers in the AI and cybersecurity communities are interested in quantifying the capabilities of such agents to help mitigate cyberrisk and investigate opportunities for penetration testing. Toward that end, we introduce Cybench, a framework for specifying cybersecurity tasks and evaluating agents on those tasks. We include 40 professional-level Capture the Flag (CTF) tasks from 4 distinct CTF competitions, chosen to be recent, meaningful, and spanning a wide range of difficulties. Each task includes its own description, starter files, and is initialized in an environment where an agent can execute bash commands and observe outputs. Since many tasks are beyond the capabilities of existing LM agents, we introduce subtasks, which break down a task into intermediary steps for more gradated evaluation; we add subtasks for 17 of the 40 tasks. To evaluate agent capabilities, we construct a cybersecurity agent and evaluate 7 models: GPT-4o, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Mixtral 8x22b Instruct, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Llama 3 70B Chat, and Llama 3.1 405B Instruct. Without guidance, we find that agents are able to solve only the easiest complete tasks that took human teams up to 11 minutes to solve, with Claude 3.5 Sonnet and GPT-4o having the highest success rates. Finally, subtasks provide more signal for measuring performance compared to unguided runs, with models achieving a 3.2\% higher success rate on complete tasks with subtask-guidance than without subtask-guidance. All code and data are publicly available at https://cybench.github.io

AI agents are moving from advisors to actors, booking travel, planning menus, and running procurement on behalf of users. Existing benchmarks for AI and animal welfare evaluate model text responses to question-answer prompts, leaving open whether the welfare reasoning surfaced in those responses transfers to agentic deployment where the model must take actions with tools. We introduce TAC (Travel Agent Compassion), the first agentic benchmark measuring whether AI agents avoid options involving animal exploitation when acting on behalf of users. TAC presents an AI agent with twelve hand-authored travel booking scenarios across six categories of animal exploitation, augmented to forty-eight samples to control for price, rating, and position confounds. We evaluate seven frontier models from four labs. Every model scores below the chance level of sixty-four percent, with the best performer (Claude Opus 4.7) at fifty-three percent. A single welfare-aware sentence in the system prompt yields gains of forty-seven to sixty-three percentage points in Claude and GPT-5.5, twenty-six points in GPT-5.2, and under twelve points in DeepSeek and Gemini. An auxiliary Inspect Scout audit of 288 base-condition transcripts from the top two performers, using Gemini 2.5 Flash Lite as judge, flags zero transcripts for evaluation awareness, suggesting the below-chance rates do not stem from the models recognising the evaluation. We discuss implications for category-level variation across cultural domains, the limits of text-response welfare benchmarks, and the EU General-Purpose AI Code of Practice systemic risk framework.

In the field of chest X-ray (CXR) diagnosis, existing works often focus solely on determining where a radiologist looks, typically through tasks such as detection, segmentation, or classification. However, these approaches are often designed as black-box models, lacking interpretability. In this paper, we introduce Interpretable Artificial Intelligence (I-AI) a novel and unified controllable interpretable pipeline for decoding the intense focus of radiologists in CXR diagnosis. Our I-AI addresses three key questions: where a radiologist looks, how long they focus on specific areas, and what findings they diagnose. By capturing the intensity of the radiologist's gaze, we provide a unified solution that offers insights into the cognitive process underlying radiological interpretation. Unlike current methods that rely on black-box machine learning models, which can be prone to extracting erroneous information from the entire input image during the diagnosis process, we tackle this issue by effectively masking out irrelevant information. Our proposed I-AI leverages a vision-language model, allowing for precise control over the interpretation process while ensuring the exclusion of irrelevant features. To train our I-AI model, we utilize an eye gaze dataset to extract anatomical gaze information and generate ground truth heatmaps. Through extensive experimentation, we demonstrate the efficacy of our method. We showcase that the attention heatmaps, designed to mimic radiologists' focus, encode sufficient and relevant information, enabling accurate classification tasks using only a portion of CXR. The code, checkpoints, and data are at https://github.com/UARK-AICV/IAI

Are Capture-the-Flag competitions obsolete? In 2025, Cybersecurity AI (CAI) systematically conquered some of the world's most prestigious hacking competitions, achieving Rank #1 at multiple events and consistently outperforming thousands of human teams. Across five major circuits-HTB's AI vs Humans, Cyber Apocalypse (8,129 teams), Dragos OT CTF, UWSP Pointer Overflow, and the Neurogrid CTF showdown-CAI demonstrated that Jeopardy-style CTFs have become a solved game for well-engineered AI agents. At Neurogrid, CAI captured 41/45 flags to claim the 50,000 top prize; at Dragos OT, it sprinted 37% faster to 10K points than elite human teams; even when deliberately paused mid-competition, it maintained top-tier rankings. Critically, CAI achieved this dominance through our specialized alias1 model architecture, which delivers enterprise-scale AI security operations at unprecedented cost efficiency and with augmented autonomy-reducing 1B token inference costs from 5,940 to just $119, making continuous security agent operation financially viable for the first time. These results force an uncomfortable reckoning: if autonomous agents now dominate competitions designed to identify top security talent at negligible cost, what are CTFs actually measuring? This paper presents comprehensive evidence of AI capability across the 2025 CTF circuit and argues that the security community must urgently transition from Jeopardy-style contests to Attack & Defense formats that genuinely test adaptive reasoning and resilience-capabilities that remain uniquely human, for now.

Spacecraft deployed in outer space are routinely subjected to various forms of damage due to exposure to hazardous environments. In addition, there are significant risks to the subsequent process of in-space repairs through human extravehicular activity or robotic manipulation, incurring substantial operational costs. Recent developments in image segmentation could enable the development of reliable and cost-effective autonomous inspection systems. While these models often require large amounts of training data to achieve satisfactory results, publicly available annotated spacecraft segmentation data are very scarce. Here, we present a new dataset of nearly 64k annotated spacecraft images that was created using real spacecraft models, superimposed on a mixture of real and synthetic backgrounds generated using NASA's TTALOS pipeline. To mimic camera distortions and noise in real-world image acquisition, we also added different types of noise and distortion to the images. Finally, we finetuned YOLOv8 and YOLOv11 segmentation models to generate performance benchmarks for the dataset under well-defined hardware and inference time constraints to mimic real-world image segmentation challenges for real-time onboard applications in space on NASA's inspector spacecraft. The resulting models, when tested under these constraints, achieved a Dice score of 0.92, Hausdorff distance of 0.69, and an inference time of about 0.5 second. The dataset and models for performance benchmark are available at https://github.com/RiceD2KLab/SWiM.

This paper analyzes Large Language Model (LLM) security vulnerabilities based on data from Crucible, encompassing 214,271 attack attempts by 1,674 users across 30 LLM challenges. Our findings reveal automated approaches significantly outperform manual techniques (69.5% vs 47.6% success rate), despite only 5.2% of users employing automation. We demonstrate that automated approaches excel in systematic exploration and pattern matching challenges, while manual approaches retain speed advantages in certain creative reasoning scenarios, often solving problems 5x faster when successful. Challenge categories requiring systematic exploration are most effectively targeted through automation, while intuitive challenges sometimes favor manual techniques for time-to-solve metrics. These results illuminate how algorithmic testing is transforming AI red-teaming practices, with implications for both offensive security research and defensive measures. Our analysis suggests optimal security testing combines human creativity for strategy development with programmatic execution for thorough exploration.

Camouflaged Object Detection (COD), the task of identifying objects concealed within their environments, has seen rapid growth due to its wide range of practical applications. A key step toward developing trustworthy COD systems is the estimation and effective utilization of uncertainty. In this work, we propose a human-machine collaboration framework for classifying the presence of camouflaged objects, leveraging the complementary strengths of computer vision (CV) models and noninvasive brain-computer interfaces (BCIs). Our approach introduces a multiview backbone to estimate uncertainty in CV model predictions, utilizes this uncertainty during training to improve efficiency, and defers low-confidence cases to human evaluation via RSVP-based BCIs during testing for more reliable decision-making. We evaluated the framework in the CAMO dataset, achieving state-of-the-art results with an average improvement of 4.56\% in balanced accuracy (BA) and 3.66\% in the F1 score compared to existing methods. For the best-performing participants, the improvements reached 7.6\% in BA and 6.66\% in the F1 score. Analysis of the training process revealed a strong correlation between our confidence measures and precision, while an ablation study confirmed the effectiveness of the proposed training policy and the human-machine collaboration strategy. In general, this work reduces human cognitive load, improves system reliability, and provides a strong foundation for advancements in real-world COD applications and human-computer interaction. Our code and data are available at: https://github.com/ziyuey/Uncertainty-aware-human-machine-collaboration-in-camouflaged-object-identification.

Large language model systems face important security risks from maliciously crafted messages that aim to overwrite the system's original instructions or leak private data. To study this problem, we organized a capture-the-flag competition at IEEE SaTML 2024, where the flag is a secret string in the LLM system prompt. The competition was organized in two phases. In the first phase, teams developed defenses to prevent the model from leaking the secret. During the second phase, teams were challenged to extract the secrets hidden for defenses proposed by the other teams. This report summarizes the main insights from the competition. Notably, we found that all defenses were bypassed at least once, highlighting the difficulty of designing a successful defense and the necessity for additional research to protect LLM systems. To foster future research in this direction, we compiled a dataset with over 137k multi-turn attack chats and open-sourced the platform.

Context engineering has become central to building reliable AI agents, yet it remains largely unmeasured. Agents do not fail in isolation: their behavior is shaped by the instructions, tools, memory, retrieved knowledge, guardrails, and untrusted inputs accumulated in their context. When this context is weak, agents drift, hallucinate, misuse tools, ignore constraints, become vulnerable to injection, and waste tokens. This paper validates context-engineering quality as an independent leading indicator of agent reliability. We implement the measurement in ProofAgent-Harness, an open-source infrastructure for AI agent evaluation that uses multi-juror, consensus-based scoring. The harness assesses context across seven criteria: role clarity, guardrail coverage, instruction consistency, tool schema quality, grounding sufficiency, injection hardening, and token efficiency. Crucially, the context score is isolated from behavioral metrics and release decisions, enabling a non-circular validation. Through a controlled context-quality study across regulated agent domains, holding frontier LLM agents fixed and varying only their operating context, we show that context-quality criteria consistently predict their corresponding behavioral outcomes. Grounding sufficiency predicts hallucination resistance, guardrail coverage predicts manipulation resistance, instruction consistency predicts instruction following, and tool-schema quality predicts tool use. These findings establish context measurement as a validated preflight signal for agent reliability and position context engineering as an auditable layer of agent evaluation and governance.

With the rapid development of generative models, discerning AI-generated content has evoked increasing attention from both industry and academia. In this paper, we conduct a sanity check on "whether the task of AI-generated image detection has been solved". To start with, we present Chameleon dataset, consisting AIgenerated images that are genuinely challenging for human perception. To quantify the generalization of existing methods, we evaluate 9 off-the-shelf AI-generated image detectors on Chameleon dataset. Upon analysis, almost all models classify AI-generated images as real ones. Later, we propose AIDE (AI-generated Image DEtector with Hybrid Features), which leverages multiple experts to simultaneously extract visual artifacts and noise patterns. Specifically, to capture the high-level semantics, we utilize CLIP to compute the visual embedding. This effectively enables the model to discern AI-generated images based on semantics or contextual information; Secondly, we select the highest frequency patches and the lowest frequency patches in the image, and compute the low-level patchwise features, aiming to detect AI-generated images by low-level artifacts, for example, noise pattern, anti-aliasing, etc. While evaluating on existing benchmarks, for example, AIGCDetectBenchmark and GenImage, AIDE achieves +3.5% and +4.6% improvements to state-of-the-art methods, and on our proposed challenging Chameleon benchmarks, it also achieves the promising results, despite this problem for detecting AI-generated images is far from being solved.

The detection and clearance of explosive ordnance (EO) continues to be a predominantly manual and high-risk process that can benefit from advances in technology to improve its efficiency and effectiveness. Research on artificial intelligence (AI) for EO detection in clearance operations has grown significantly in recent years. However, this research spans a wide range of fields, making it difficult to gain a comprehensive understanding of current trends and developments. Therefore, this article provides a literature review of academic research on AI for EO detection in clearance operations. It finds that research can be grouped into two main streams: AI for EO object detection and AI for EO risk prediction, with the latter being much less studied than the former. From the literature review, we develop three opportunities for future research. These include a call for renewed efforts in the use of AI for EO risk prediction, the combination of different AI systems and data sources, and novel approaches to improve EO risk prediction performance, such as pattern-based predictions. Finally, we provide a perspective on the future of AI for EO detection in clearance operations. We emphasize the role of traditional machine learning (ML) for this task, the need to dynamically incorporate expert knowledge into the models, and the importance of effectively integrating AI systems with real-world operations.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are being deployed across various domains today. However, their capacity to solve Capture the Flag (CTF) challenges in cybersecurity has not been thoroughly evaluated. To address this, we develop a novel method to assess LLMs in solving CTF challenges by creating a scalable, open-source benchmark database specifically designed for these applications. This database includes metadata for LLM testing and adaptive learning, compiling a diverse range of CTF challenges from popular competitions. Utilizing the advanced function calling capabilities of LLMs, we build a fully automated system with an enhanced workflow and support for external tool calls. Our benchmark dataset and automated framework allow us to evaluate the performance of five LLMs, encompassing both black-box and open-source models. This work lays the foundation for future research into improving the efficiency of LLMs in interactive cybersecurity tasks and automated task planning. By providing a specialized benchmark, our project offers an ideal platform for developing, testing, and refining LLM-based approaches to vulnerability detection and resolution. Evaluating LLMs on these challenges and comparing with human performance yields insights into their potential for AI-driven cybersecurity solutions to perform real-world threat management. We make our benchmark dataset open source to public https://github.com/NYU-LLM-CTF/NYU_CTF_Bench along with our playground automated framework https://github.com/NYU-LLM-CTF/llm_ctf_automation.

The rapid integration of agentic AI into high-stakes real-world applications requires robust oversight mechanisms. The emerging field of AI Control (AIC) aims to provide such an oversight mechanism, but practical adoption depends heavily on implementation overhead. To study this problem better, we introduce the notion of Control tax -- the operational and financial cost of integrating control measures into AI pipelines. Our work makes three key contributions to the field of AIC: (1) we introduce a theoretical framework that quantifies the Control Tax and maps classifier performance to safety assurances; (2) we conduct comprehensive evaluations of state-of-the-art language models in adversarial settings, where attacker models insert subtle backdoors into code while monitoring models attempt to detect these vulnerabilities; and (3) we provide empirical financial cost estimates for control protocols and develop optimized monitoring strategies that balance safety and cost-effectiveness while accounting for practical constraints like auditing budgets. Our framework enables practitioners to make informed decisions by systematically connecting safety guarantees with their costs, advancing AIC through principled economic feasibility assessment across different deployment contexts.

Flaw reporting for deployed AI systems is fundamental to identifying system failures and improving AI safety. Yet the AI reporting ecosystem is fragmented: researchers who identify flaws often do not know what or where to report, and groups who receive reports rarely share them with other relevant stakeholders. As a result, good-faith reporters duplicate effort by submitting many different forms, and recipients lack standardized, triage-ready information. We audit 12 reporting systems published by AI developers, cybersecurity groups, and AI flaw aggregators, identifying five recurring design challenges spanning discoverability, scope, information collection, coordination, and guidance for strict-liability cases. Building on this analysis and feedback from 49 experts across 32 organizations representing developers, security researchers, and ecosystem coordinators, we introduce FLARE-AI, an open-source AI flaw reporting system designed for interoperability with existing systems. FLARE-AI streamlines flaw report creation by collecting triage-relevant information through conditional logic and early classification, then enables optional dissemination of standardized, machine-readable reports to multiple developers, coordinators, and incident registries from a single submission. By lowering barriers to reporting AI flaws and improving interoperability across stakeholders, FLARE-AI helps break down silos and accelerate remediation across the AI ecosystem.

As autonomous AI agents are used in regulated and safety-critical settings, organizations need effective ways to turn policy into enforceable controls. We introduce a regulatory machine learning framework that converts unstructured design artifacts (like PRDs, TDDs, and code) into verifiable runtime guardrails. Our Policy as Prompt method reads these documents and risk controls to build a source-linked policy tree. This tree is then compiled into lightweight, prompt-based classifiers for real-time runtime monitoring. The system is built to enforce least privilege and data minimization. For conformity assessment, it provides complete provenance, traceability, and audit logging, all integrated with a human-in-the-loop review process. Evaluations show our system reduces prompt-injection risk, blocks out-of-scope requests, and limits toxic outputs. It also generates auditable rationales aligned with AI governance frameworks. By treating policies as executable prompts (a policy-as-code for agents), this approach enables secure-by-design deployment, continuous compliance, and scalable AI safety and AI security assurance for regulatable ML.

AIs are increasingly being deployed with greater autonomy and capabilities, which increases the risk that a misaligned AI may be able to cause catastrophic harm. Untrusted monitoring -- using one untrusted model to oversee another -- is one approach to reducing risk. Justifying the safety of an untrusted monitoring deployment is challenging because developers cannot safely deploy a misaligned model to test their protocol directly. In this paper, we develop upon existing methods for rigorously demonstrating safety based on pre-deployment testing. We relax assumptions that previous AI control research made about the collusion strategies a misaligned AI might use to subvert untrusted monitoring. We develop a taxonomy covering passive self-recognition, causal collusion (hiding pre-shared signals), acausal collusion (hiding signals via Schelling points), and combined strategies. We create a safety case sketch to clearly present our argument, explicitly state our assumptions, and highlight unsolved challenges. We identify conditions under which passive self-recognition could be a more effective collusion strategy than those studied previously. Our work builds towards more robust evaluations of untrusted monitoring.

Sophisticated instrumentation for AI systems might have indicators that signal misalignment from human values, not unlike a "check engine" light in cars. One such indicator of misalignment is deceptiveness in generated responses. Future AI instrumentation may have the ability to detect when an LLM generates deceptive responses while reasoning about seemingly plausible but incorrect answers to factual questions. In this work, we demonstrate that linear probes on LLMs internal activations can detect deception in their responses with extremely high accuracy. Our probes reach a maximum of greater than 90% accuracy in distinguishing between deceptive and non-deceptive arguments generated by llama and qwen models ranging from 1.5B to 14B parameters, including their DeepSeek-r1 finetuned variants. We observe that probes on smaller models (1.5B) achieve chance accuracy at detecting deception, while larger models (greater than 7B) reach 70-80%, with their reasoning counterparts exceeding 90%. The layer-wise probe accuracy follows a three-stage pattern across layers: near-random (50%) in early layers, peaking in middle layers, and slightly declining in later layers. Furthermore, using an iterative null space projection approach, we find multitudes of linear directions that encode deception, ranging from 20 in Qwen 3B to nearly 100 in DeepSeek 7B and Qwen 14B models.

Camouflaged object detection (COD) poses a significant challenge in computer vision due to the high similarity between objects and their backgrounds. Existing approaches often rely on heavy training and large computational resources. While foundation models such as the Segment Anything Model (SAM) offer strong generalization, they still struggle to handle COD tasks without fine-tuning and require high-quality prompts to yield good performance. However, generating such prompts manually is costly and inefficient. To address these challenges, we propose First RAG, Second SEG (RAG-SEG), a training-free paradigm that decouples COD into two stages: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) for generating coarse masks as prompts, followed by SAM-based segmentation (SEG) for refinement. RAG-SEG constructs a compact retrieval database via unsupervised clustering, enabling fast and effective feature retrieval. During inference, the retrieved features produce pseudo-labels that guide precise mask generation using SAM2. Our method eliminates the need for conventional training while maintaining competitive performance. Extensive experiments on benchmark COD datasets demonstrate that RAG-SEG performs on par with or surpasses state-of-the-art methods. Notably, all experiments are conducted on a personal laptop, highlighting the computational efficiency and practicality of our approach. We present further analysis in the Appendix, covering limitations, salient object detection extension, and possible improvements. blue {Code: https://github.com/Lwt-diamond/RAG-SEG.}

By 2028 most cybersecurity actions will be autonomous, with humans teleoperating. We present the first classification of autonomy levels in cybersecurity and introduce Cybersecurity AI (CAI), an open-source framework that democratizes advanced security testing through specialized AI agents. Through rigorous empirical evaluation, we demonstrate that CAI consistently outperforms state-of-the-art results in CTF benchmarks, solving challenges across diverse categories with significantly greater efficiency -up to 3,600x faster than humans in specific tasks and averaging 11x faster overall. CAI achieved first place among AI teams and secured a top-20 position worldwide in the "AI vs Human" CTF live Challenge, earning a monetary reward of $750. Based on our results, we argue against LLM-vendor claims about limited security capabilities. Beyond cybersecurity competitions, CAI demonstrates real-world effectiveness, reaching top-30 in Spain and top-500 worldwide on Hack The Box within a week, while dramatically reducing security testing costs by an average of 156x. Our framework transcends theoretical benchmarks by enabling non-professionals to discover significant security bugs (CVSS 4.3-7.5) at rates comparable to experts during bug bounty exercises. By combining modular agent design with seamless tool integration and human oversight (HITL), CAI addresses critical market gaps, offering organizations of all sizes access to AI-powered bug bounty security testing previously available only to well-resourced firms -thereby challenging the oligopolistic ecosystem currently dominated by major bug bounty platforms.

We stress test monitoring systems for detecting covert misbehavior in autonomous LLM agents (e.g., secretly sharing private information). To this end, we systematize a monitor red teaming (MRT) workflow that incorporates: (1) varying levels of agent and monitor situational awareness; (2) distinct adversarial strategies to evade the monitor, such as prompt injection; and (3) two datasets and environments -- SHADE-Arena for tool-calling agents and our new CUA-SHADE-Arena, which extends TheAgentCompany, for computer-use agents. We run MRT on existing LLM monitor scaffoldings, which orchestrate LLMs and parse agent trajectories, alongside a new hybrid hierarchical-sequential scaffolding proposed in this work. Our empirical results yield three key findings. First, agent awareness dominates monitor awareness: an agent's knowledge that it is being monitored substantially degrades the monitor's reliability. On the contrary, providing the monitor with more information about the agent is less helpful than expected. Second, monitor scaffolding matters more than monitor awareness: the hybrid scaffolding consistently outperforms baseline monitor scaffolding, and can enable weaker models to reliably monitor stronger agents -- a weak-to-strong scaling effect. Third, in a human-in-the-loop setting where humans discuss with the LLM monitor to get an updated judgment for the agent's behavior, targeted human oversight is most effective; escalating only pre-flagged cases to human reviewers improved the TPR by approximately 15% at FPR = 0.01. Our work establishes a standard workflow for MRT, highlighting the lack of adversarial robustness for LLMs and humans when monitoring and detecting agent misbehavior. We release code, data, and logs to spur further research.

The United States Department of Defense (DOD) looks to accelerate the development and deployment of AI capabilities across a wide spectrum of defense applications to maintain strategic advantages. However, many common features of AI algorithms that make them powerful, such as capacity for learning, large-scale data ingestion, and problem-solving, raise new technical, security, and ethical challenges. These challenges may hinder adoption due to uncertainty in development, testing, assurance, processes, and requirements. Trustworthiness through assurance is essential to achieve the expected value from AI. This paper proposes a claims-based framework for risk management and assurance of AI systems that addresses the competing needs for faster deployment, successful adoption, and rigorous evaluation. This framework supports programs across all acquisition pathways provide grounds for sufficient confidence that an AI-enabled system (AIES) meets its intended mission goals without introducing unacceptable risks throughout its lifecycle. The paper's contributions are a framework process for AI assurance, a set of relevant definitions to enable constructive conversations on the topic of AI assurance, and a discussion of important considerations in AI assurance. The framework aims to provide the DOD a robust yet efficient mechanism for swiftly fielding effective AI capabilities without overlooking critical risks or undermining stakeholder trust.

The risks of frontier AI may require international cooperation, which in turn may require verification: checking that all parties follow agreed-on rules. For instance, states might need to verify that powerful AI models are widely deployed only after their risks to international security have been evaluated and deemed manageable. However, research on AI verification could benefit from greater clarity and detail. To address this, this report provides an in-depth overview of AI verification, intended for both policy professionals and technical researchers. We present novel conceptual frameworks, detailed implementation options, and key R&D challenges. These draw on existing literature, expert interviews, and original analysis, all within the scope of confidentially overseeing AI development and deployment that uses thousands of high-end AI chips. We find that states could eventually verify compliance by using six largely independent verification approaches with substantial redundancy: (1) built-in security features in AI chips; (2-3) separate monitoring devices attached to AI chips; and (4-6) personnel-based mechanisms, such as whistleblower programs. While promising, these approaches require guardrails to protect against abuse and power concentration, and many of these technologies have yet to be built or stress-tested. To enable states to confidently verify compliance with rules on large-scale AI development and deployment, the R&D challenges we list need significant progress.

Frontier language model capabilities are improving rapidly. We thus need stronger mitigations against bad actors misusing increasingly powerful systems. Prior work has shown that activation probes may be a promising misuse mitigation technique, but we identify a key remaining challenge: probes fail to generalize under important production distribution shifts. In particular, we find that the shift from short-context to long-context inputs is difficult for existing probe architectures. We propose several new probe architecture that handle this long-context distribution shift. We evaluate these probes in the cyber-offensive domain, testing their robustness against various production-relevant shifts, including multi-turn conversations, static jailbreaks, and adaptive red teaming. Our results demonstrate that while multimax addresses context length, a combination of architecture choice and training on diverse distributions is required for broad generalization. Additionally, we show that pairing probes with prompted classifiers achieves optimal accuracy at a low cost due to the computational efficiency of probes. These findings have informed the successful deployment of misuse mitigation probes in user-facing instances of Gemini, Google's frontier language model. Finally, we find early positive results using AlphaEvolve to automate improvements in both probe architecture search and adaptive red teaming, showing that automating some AI safety research is already possible.

AI models might use deceptive strategies as part of scheming or misaligned behaviour. Monitoring outputs alone is insufficient, since the AI might produce seemingly benign outputs while their internal reasoning is misaligned. We thus evaluate if linear probes can robustly detect deception by monitoring model activations. We test two probe-training datasets, one with contrasting instructions to be honest or deceptive (following Zou et al., 2023) and one of responses to simple roleplaying scenarios. We test whether these probes generalize to realistic settings where Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct behaves deceptively, such as concealing insider trading (Scheurer et al., 2023) and purposely underperforming on safety evaluations (Benton et al., 2024). We find that our probe distinguishes honest and deceptive responses with AUROCs between 0.96 and 0.999 on our evaluation datasets. If we set the decision threshold to have a 1% false positive rate on chat data not related to deception, our probe catches 95-99% of the deceptive responses. Overall we think white-box probes are promising for future monitoring systems, but current performance is insufficient as a robust defence against deception. Our probes' outputs can be viewed at data.apolloresearch.ai/dd and our code at github.com/ApolloResearch/deception-detection.

The prospect of artificial intelligence (AI) competing in the adversarial landscape of cyber security has long been considered one of the most impactful, challenging, and potentially dangerous applications of AI. Here, we demonstrate a new approach to assessing AI's progress towards enabling and scaling real-world offensive cyber operations (OCO) tactics in use by modern threat actors. We detail OCCULT, a lightweight operational evaluation framework that allows cyber security experts to contribute to rigorous and repeatable measurement of the plausible cyber security risks associated with any given large language model (LLM) or AI employed for OCO. We also prototype and evaluate three very different OCO benchmarks for LLMs that demonstrate our approach and serve as examples for building benchmarks under the OCCULT framework. Finally, we provide preliminary evaluation results to demonstrate how this framework allows us to move beyond traditional all-or-nothing tests, such as those crafted from educational exercises like capture-the-flag environments, to contextualize our indicators and warnings in true cyber threat scenarios that present risks to modern infrastructure. We find that there has been significant recent advancement in the risks of AI being used to scale realistic cyber threats. For the first time, we find a model (DeepSeek-R1) is capable of correctly answering over 90% of challenging offensive cyber knowledge tests in our Threat Actor Competency Test for LLMs (TACTL) multiple-choice benchmarks. We also show how Meta's Llama and Mistral's Mixtral model families show marked performance improvements over earlier models against our benchmarks where LLMs act as offensive agents in MITRE's high-fidelity offensive and defensive cyber operations simulation environment, CyberLayer.

Reasoning over heterogeneous artifacts (PDFs, spreadsheets, slide decks, etc.) increasingly occurs within structured agent workflows that iteratively extract, transform, and reference external information. In these workflows, uncertainty is not merely an input-quality issue: it can redirect decomposition and routing decisions, reshape intermediate state, and produce qualitatively different execution trajectories. We study this phenomenon by treating uncertainty as a controlled variable: we inject structured perturbations into artifact-derived representations, execute fixed workflows under comprehensive logging, and quantify contamination via trace divergence in plans, tool invocations, and intermediate state. Across 614 paired runs on 32 GAIA tasks with three different language models, we find a decoupling: workflows may diverge substantially yet recover correct answers, or remain structurally similar while producing incorrect outputs. We characterize three manifestation types: silent semantic corruption, behavioral detours with recovery, and combined structural disruption and their control-flow signatures (rerouting, extended execution, early termination). We measure operational costs and characterize why commonly used verification guardrails fail to intercept contamination. We contribute (i) a formal taxonomy of contamination manifestations in structured workflows, (ii) a trace-based measurement framework for detecting and localizing contamination across agent interactions, and (iii) empirical evidence with implications for targeted verification, defensive design, and cost control.

Adversarial testing of large language models (LLMs) is crucial for their safe and responsible deployment. We introduce a novel approach for automated generation of adversarial evaluation datasets to test the safety of LLM generations on new downstream applications. We call it AI-assisted Red-Teaming (AART) - an automated alternative to current manual red-teaming efforts. AART offers a data generation and augmentation pipeline of reusable and customizable recipes that reduce human effort significantly and enable integration of adversarial testing earlier in new product development. AART generates evaluation datasets with high diversity of content characteristics critical for effective adversarial testing (e.g. sensitive and harmful concepts, specific to a wide range of cultural and geographic regions and application scenarios). The data generation is steered by AI-assisted recipes to define, scope and prioritize diversity within the application context. This feeds into a structured LLM-generation process that scales up evaluation priorities. Compared to some state-of-the-art tools, AART shows promising results in terms of concept coverage and data quality.

Diagnosing a whole-slide image is an interactive, multi-stage process involving changes in magnification and movement between fields. Although recent pathology foundation models are strong, practical agentic systems that decide what field to examine next, adjust magnification, and deliver explainable diagnoses are still lacking. The blocker is data: scalable, clinically aligned supervision of expert viewing behavior that is tacit and experience-based, not written in textbooks or online, and therefore absent from large language model training. We introduce the AI Session Recorder, which works with standard WSI viewers to unobtrusively record routine navigation and convert the viewer logs into standardized behavioral commands (inspect or peek at discrete magnifications) and bounding boxes. A lightweight human-in-the-loop review turns AI-drafted rationales into the Pathology-CoT dataset, a form of paired "where to look" and "why it matters" supervision produced at roughly six times lower labeling time. Using this behavioral data, we build Pathologist-o3, a two-stage agent that first proposes regions of interest and then performs behavior-guided reasoning. On gastrointestinal lymph-node metastasis detection, it achieved 84.5% precision, 100.0% recall, and 75.4% accuracy, exceeding the state-of-the-art OpenAI o3 model and generalizing across backbones. To our knowledge, this constitutes one of the first behavior-grounded agentic systems in pathology. Turning everyday viewer logs into scalable, expert-validated supervision, our framework makes agentic pathology practical and establishes a path to human-aligned, upgradeable clinical AI.

Quality control is of vital importance during electronics production. As the methods of producing electronic circuits improve, there is an increasing chance of solder defects during assembling the printed circuit board (PCB). Many technologies have been incorporated for inspecting failed soldering, such as X-ray imaging, optical imaging, and thermal imaging. With some advanced algorithms, the new technologies are expected to control the production quality based on the digital images. However, current algorithms sometimes are not accurate enough to meet the quality control. Specialists are needed to do a follow-up checking. For automated X-ray inspection, joint of interest on the X-ray image is located by region of interest (ROI) and inspected by some algorithms. Some incorrect ROIs deteriorate the inspection algorithm. The high dimension of X-ray images and the varying sizes of image dimensions also challenge the inspection algorithms. On the other hand, recent advances on deep learning shed light on image-based tasks and are competitive to human levels. In this paper, deep learning is incorporated in X-ray imaging based quality control during PCB quality inspection. Two artificial intelligence (AI) based models are proposed and compared for joint defect detection. The noised ROI problem and the varying sizes of imaging dimension problem are addressed. The efficacy of the proposed methods are verified through experimenting on a real-world 3D X-ray dataset. By incorporating the proposed methods, specialist inspection workload is largely saved.

Embodied agents have made strong progress in navigating to target objects, but reaching the goal vicinity does not guarantee that the agent has found the correct instance: subtle attribute differences (e.g., "white floral" vs. "white striped") often require close-range, multi-view inspection. We address this gap with Active Instance Verification (AIV), a task in which an agent actively selects viewpoints around a candidate object to decide whether it matches a fine-grained natural-language description. We formalize AIV as a finite-horizon decision process and introduce PInVerify, an offline embodied benchmark for AIV: 3,000 evaluation episodes across 18 object categories, delivered as multi-view captures with a 6-sector navigation topology that exposes trap views (navigable but uninformative) and unreachable sectors. As reference baselines we build a training-free pipeline and a LoRA-fine-tuned end-to-end agent around open-source multimodal large language models (MLLMs) at on-device scale (leq8B parameters), with attribute decomposition, a visibility-weighted multi-view tracker, and three next-best-view (NBV) strategies. In our evaluation across Qwen3-VL (4B/8B), SenseNova-SI-1.2-InternVL3-8B, CLIP, and SigLIP2, the best MLLM-based baseline exceeds the best embedding baseline by 4.9 pp; GT-box ablations show a +3.1 pp detection gap; and we do not observe reliable gains from active viewpoint selection within the tested NBV strategies. A LoRA-fine-tuned agent (SFT+GSPO) reaches 85.6%. PInVerify aims to support further work on active, fine-grained semantic verification in embodied AI. Code: https://github.com/Avalon-S/PInVerify.

Recent works have established that AI models introduce spectral artifacts into generated images and propose approaches for learning to capture them using labeled data. However, the significant differences in such artifacts among different generative models hinder these approaches from generalizing to generators not seen during training. In this work, we build upon the key idea that the spectral distribution of real images constitutes both an invariant and highly discriminative pattern for AI-generated image detection. To model this under a self-supervised setup, we employ masked spectral learning using the pretext task of frequency reconstruction. Since generated images constitute out-of-distribution samples for this model, we propose spectral reconstruction similarity to capture this divergence. Moreover, we introduce spectral context attention, which enables our approach to efficiently capture subtle spectral inconsistencies in images of any resolution. Our spectral AI-generated image detection approach (SPAI) achieves a 5.5% absolute improvement in AUC over the previous state-of-the-art across 13 recent generative approaches, while exhibiting robustness against common online perturbations. Code is available on https://mever-team.github.io/spai.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have revolutionized inspection tasks by offering a safer, more efficient, and flexible alternative to traditional methods. However, battery limitations often constrain their effectiveness, necessitating the development of optimized flight paths and data collection techniques. While existing approaches like coverage path planning (CPP) ensure comprehensive data collection, they can be inefficient, especially when inspecting multiple non connected Regions of Interest (ROIs). This paper introduces the Fast Inspection of Scattered Regions (FISR) problem and proposes a novel solution, the multi UAV Disjoint Areas Inspection (mUDAI) method. The introduced approach implements a two fold optimization procedure, for calculating the best image capturing positions and the most efficient UAV trajectories, balancing data resolution and operational time, minimizing redundant data collection and resource consumption. The mUDAI method is designed to enable rapid, efficient inspections of scattered ROIs, making it ideal for applications such as security infrastructure assessments, agricultural inspections, and emergency site evaluations. A combination of simulated evaluations and real world deployments is used to validate and quantify the method's ability to improve operational efficiency while preserving high quality data capture, demonstrating its effectiveness in real world operations. An open source Python implementation of the mUDAI method can be found on GitHub (https://github.com/soc12/mUDAI) and the collected and processed data from the real world experiments are all hosted on Zenodo (https://zenodo.org/records/13866483). Finally, this online platform (https://sites.google.com/view/mudai-platform/) allows interested readers to interact with the mUDAI method and generate their own multi UAV FISR missions.

The game industry is challenged to cope with increasing growth in demand and game complexity while maintaining acceptable quality standards for released games. Classic approaches solely depending on human efforts for quality assurance and game testing do not scale effectively in terms of time and cost. Game-testing AI agents that learn by interaction with the environment have the potential to mitigate these challenges with good scalability properties on time and costs. However, most recent work in this direction depends on game state information for the agent's state representation, which limits generalization across different game scenarios. Moreover, game test engineers usually prefer exploring a game in a specific style, such as exploring the golden path. However, current game testing AI agents do not provide an explicit way to satisfy such a preference. This paper addresses these limitations by proposing an agent design that mainly depends on pixel-based state observations while exploring the environment conditioned on a user's preference specified by demonstration trajectories. In addition, we propose an imitation learning method that couples self-supervised and supervised learning objectives to enhance the quality of imitation behaviors. Our agent significantly outperforms state-of-the-art pixel-based game testing agents over exploration coverage and test execution quality when evaluated on a complex open-world environment resembling many aspects of real AAA games.

Anomaly detection in industrial visual inspection is challenging due to the scarcity of defective samples. Most existing methods rely on unsupervised reconstruction using only normal data, often resulting in overfitting and poor detection of subtle defects. We propose a semi-supervised deep reinforcement learning framework that integrates a neural batch sampler, an autoencoder, and a predictor. The RL-based sampler adaptively selects informative patches by balancing exploration and exploitation through a composite reward. The autoencoder generates loss profiles highlighting abnormal regions, while the predictor performs segmentation in the loss-profile space. This interaction enables the system to effectively learn both normal and defective patterns with limited labeled data. Experiments on the MVTec AD dataset demonstrate that our method achieves higher accuracy and better localization of subtle anomalies than recent state-of-the-art approaches while maintaining low complexity, yielding an average improvement of 0.15 in F1_max and 0.06 in AUC, with a maximum gain of 0.37 in F1_max in the best case.

Existing agent safety benchmarks report binary accuracy, conflating early intervention with post-mortem analysis. A detector that flags a violation at step 8 enables intervention; one that reports it at step 48 provides only forensic value. This distinction is critical, yet current benchmarks cannot measure it. We introduce StepShield, the first benchmark to evaluate when violations are detected, not just whether. StepShield contains 9,213 code agent trajectories, including 1,278 meticulously annotated training pairs and a 7,935-trajectory test set with a realistic 8.1% rogue rate. Rogue behaviors are grounded in real-world security incidents across six categories. We propose three novel temporal metrics: Early Intervention Rate (EIR), Intervention Gap, and Tokens Saved. Surprisingly, our evaluation reveals that an LLM-based judge achieves 59% EIR while a static analyzer achieves only 26%, a 2.3x performance gap that is entirely invisible to standard accuracy metrics. We further show that early detection has direct economic benefits: our cascaded HybridGuard detector reduces monitoring costs by 75% and projects to $108M in cumulative savings over five years at enterprise scale. By shifting the focus of evaluation from whether to when, StepShield provides a new foundation for building safer and more economically viable AI agents. The code and data are released under an Apache 2.0 license.

In recent years, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) equipped with imaging sensors and automated processing algorithms have emerged as a promising tool to accelerate large-area surveys while reducing risk to human operators. Although hyperspectral imaging (HSI) enables material discrimination using spectral signatures, standardized benchmarks for UAV-based landmine detection remain scarce. In this work, we present a systematic benchmark of four classical statistical detection algorithms, including Spectral Angle Mapper (SAM), Matched Filter (MF), Adaptive Cosine Estimator (ACE), and Constrained Energy Minimization (CEM), alongside a proposed lightweight Spectral Neural Network utilizing Parametric Mish activations for PFM-1 landmine detection. We also release pixel-level binary ground truth masks (target/background) to enable standardized, reproducible evaluation. Evaluations were conducted on inert PFM-1 targets across multiple scene crops using a recently released VNIR hyperspectral dataset. Metrics such as receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, area under the curve (AUC), precision-recall (PR) curve, and average precision (AP) were used. While all methods achieve high ROC-AUC on an independent test set, the ACE method observes the highest AUC of 0.989. However, because target pixels are extremely sparse relative to background, ROC-AUC alone can be misleading; under precision-focused evaluation (PR and AP), the Spectral-NN outperforms classical detectors, achieving the highest AP. These results emphasize the need for precision-focused evaluation, scene-aware benchmarking, and learning-based spectral models for reliable UAV-based hyperspectral landmine detection. The code and pixel-level annotations will be released.

Industrial visual inspection in pharmaceutical production requires high accuracy under strict constraints on cycle time, hardware footprint, and operational cost. Manual inline inspection is still common, but it is affected by operator variability and limited throughput. Classical rule-based computer vision pipelines are often rigid and difficult to scale to highly variable production scenarios. To address these limitations, we present a semi-supervised anomaly detection framework based on a generative adversarial architecture with a residual autoencoder and a dense bottleneck, specifically designed for online deployment on a high-speed Blow-Fill-Seal (BFS) line. The model is trained only on nominal samples and detects anomalies through reconstruction residuals, providing both classification and spatial localization via heatmaps. The training set contains 2,815,200 grayscale patches. Experiments on a real industrial test kit show high detection performance while satisfying timing constraints compatible with a 500 ms acquisition slot.

The fast growth of open-source AI infrastructure, from model serving engines and agent platforms to the Model Context Protocol (MCP) ecosystem and the language models themselves, has outpaced the security tooling available to defend it. We present AI-Infra-Guard, an open-source framework that organizes AI red teaming around a single observation: the attack surface of an AI agent is stratified across layers (infrastructure, protocol/tool, agent behavior, and model), and no single detection paradigm fits all of them. The framework therefore matches a paradigm to each layer, from deterministic rule matching over 75+ AI components and 1{,}400+ vulnerability rules, through LLM-driven agentic auditing of MCP servers and agent-skill packages and multi-turn black-box agent red teaming, to a jailbreak harness with 26+ attack operators over sixteen datasets. To our knowledge it is the only open-source framework to span all of these, including supply-chain auditing of the agent skills that increasingly extend AI agents. We release AI-Infra-Guard as open source so that layer-paradigm matching can serve as a practical foundation for agent security and a shared base for the community to build on.

As generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) advances, the realism of AI generated imagery has reached a threshold capable of deceiving even vigilant human observers. Yet, while current AI-generated Image Detection (AID) approaches perform exceptionally well on controlled benchmark datasets, they struggle significantly with real-world cases. To study this behavior we introduce the ITW-SM dataset, a curated collection of real and AI-generated images originating from major social media platforms. We employ it to analyze the effects of key design choices typically considered when building a detector, involving its architecture, pre-trained latent spaces, training data as well as pre-processing approaches. We indicate that naively scaling the pre-training stage or opting for more training data does not always lead to better detection performance. Instead, our work reveals that it is crucial to optimize each design choice to enable the processing pipeline to propagate and effectively analyze both low-level traces as well as high-level image semantics. Building on our findings, we achieve a substantial average improvement of 26.87% in AUC across multiple state-of-the-art detection approaches and under real-world conditions, providing a roadmap for developing more resilient detectors. Our assets are available on https://mever-team.github.io/itw-sm.

Red teaming assesses how large language models (LLMs) can produce content that violates norms, policies, and rules set during their safety training. However, most existing automated methods in the literature are not representative of the way humans tend to interact with AI models. Common users of AI models may not have advanced knowledge of adversarial machine learning methods or access to model internals, and they do not spend a lot of time crafting a single highly effective adversarial prompt. Instead, they are likely to make use of techniques commonly shared online and exploit the multiturn conversational nature of LLMs. While manual testing addresses this gap, it is an inefficient and often expensive process. To address these limitations, we introduce the Generative Offensive Agent Tester (GOAT), an automated agentic red teaming system that simulates plain language adversarial conversations while leveraging multiple adversarial prompting techniques to identify vulnerabilities in LLMs. We instantiate GOAT with 7 red teaming attacks by prompting a general-purpose model in a way that encourages reasoning through the choices of methods available, the current target model's response, and the next steps. Our approach is designed to be extensible and efficient, allowing human testers to focus on exploring new areas of risk while automation covers the scaled adversarial stress-testing of known risk territory. We present the design and evaluation of GOAT, demonstrating its effectiveness in identifying vulnerabilities in state-of-the-art LLMs, with an ASR@10 of 97% against Llama 3.1 and 88% against GPT-4 on the JailbreakBench dataset.

As large language models are integrated into society, robustness toward a suite of prompts is increasingly important to maintain reliability in a high-variance environment.Robustness evaluations must comprehensively encapsulate the various settings in which a user may invoke an intelligent system. This paper proposes ASSERT, Automated Safety Scenario Red Teaming, consisting of three methods -- semantically aligned augmentation, target bootstrapping, and adversarial knowledge injection. For robust safety evaluation, we apply these methods in the critical domain of AI safety to algorithmically generate a test suite of prompts covering diverse robustness settings -- semantic equivalence, related scenarios, and adversarial. We partition our prompts into four safety domains for a fine-grained analysis of how the domain affects model performance. Despite dedicated safeguards in existing state-of-the-art models, we find statistically significant performance differences of up to 11% in absolute classification accuracy among semantically related scenarios and error rates of up to 19% absolute error in zero-shot adversarial settings, raising concerns for users' physical safety.

The exponential growth of AI-generated images (AIGIs) underscores the urgent need for robust and generalizable detection methods. In this paper, we establish two key principles for AIGI detection through systematic analysis: (1) All Patches Matter: Unlike conventional image classification where discriminative features concentrate on object-centric regions, each patch in AIGIs inherently contains synthetic artifacts due to the uniform generation process, suggesting that every patch serves as an important artifact source for detection. (2) More Patches Better: Leveraging distributed artifacts across more patches improves detection robustness by capturing complementary forensic evidence and reducing over-reliance on specific patches, thereby enhancing robustness and generalization. However, our counterfactual analysis reveals an undesirable phenomenon: naively trained detectors often exhibit a Few-Patch Bias, discriminating between real and synthetic images based on minority patches. We identify Lazy Learner as the root cause: detectors preferentially learn conspicuous artifacts in limited patches while neglecting broader artifact distributions. To address this bias, we propose the Panoptic Patch Learning (PPL) framework, involving: (1) Random Patch Replacement that randomly substitutes synthetic patches with real counterparts to compel models to identify artifacts in underutilized regions, encouraging the broader use of more patches; (2) Patch-wise Contrastive Learning that enforces consistent discriminative capability across all patches, ensuring uniform utilization of all patches. Extensive experiments across two different settings on several benchmarks verify the effectiveness of our approach.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have achieved impressive success in natural visual understanding, yet they consistently underperform in industrial anomaly detection (IAD). This is because MLLMs trained mostly on general web data differ significantly from industrial images. Moreover, they encode each image independently and can only compare images in the language space, making them insensitive to subtle visual differences that are key to IAD. To tackle these issues, we present AD-Copilot, an interactive MLLM specialized for IAD via visual in-context comparison. We first design a novel data curation pipeline to mine inspection knowledge from sparsely labeled industrial images and generate precise samples for captioning, VQA, and defect localization, yielding a large-scale multimodal dataset Chat-AD rich in semantic signals for IAD. On this foundation, AD-Copilot incorporates a novel Comparison Encoder that employs cross-attention between paired image features to enhance multi-image fine-grained perception, and is trained with a multi-stage strategy that incorporates domain knowledge and gradually enhances IAD skills. In addition, we introduce MMAD-BBox, an extended benchmark for anomaly localization with bounding-box-based evaluation. The experiments show that AD-Copilot achieves 82.3% accuracy on the MMAD benchmark, outperforming all other models without any data leakage. In the MMAD-BBox test, it achieves a maximum improvement of 3.35times over the baseline. AD-Copilot also exhibits excellent generalization of its performance gains across other specialized and general-purpose benchmarks. Remarkably, AD-Copilot surpasses human expert-level performance on several IAD tasks, demonstrating its potential as a reliable assistant for real-world industrial inspection. All datasets and models will be released for the broader benefit of the community.

Recent generative models show impressive performance in generating photographic images. Humans can hardly distinguish such incredibly realistic-looking AI-generated images from real ones. AI-generated images may lead to ubiquitous disinformation dissemination. Therefore, it is of utmost urgency to develop a detector to identify AI generated images. Most existing detectors suffer from sharp performance drops over unseen generative models. In this paper, we propose a novel AI-generated image detector capable of identifying fake images created by a wide range of generative models. We observe that the texture patches of images tend to reveal more traces left by generative models compared to the global semantic information of the images. A novel Smash&Reconstruction preprocessing is proposed to erase the global semantic information and enhance texture patches. Furthermore, pixels in rich texture regions exhibit more significant fluctuations than those in poor texture regions. Synthesizing realistic rich texture regions proves to be more challenging for existing generative models. Based on this principle, we leverage the inter-pixel correlation contrast between rich and poor texture regions within an image to further boost the detection performance. In addition, we build a comprehensive AI-generated image detection benchmark, which includes 17 kinds of prevalent generative models, to evaluate the effectiveness of existing baselines and our approach. Our benchmark provides a leaderboard for follow-up studies. Extensive experimental results show that our approach outperforms state-of-the-art baselines by a significant margin. Our project: https://fdmas.github.io/AIGCDetect

Agentic large language models (LLMs) are increasingly evaluated on cybersecurity tasks using capture-the-flag (CTF) benchmarks, yet existing pointwise benchmarks offer limited insight into agent robustness and generalisation across alternative versions of the source code. We introduce CTF challenge families, whereby a single CTF is used to generate a family of semantically-equivalent challenges via semantics-preserving program transformations, enabling controlled evaluation of robustness while keeping the underlying exploit strategy fixed. We present Evolve-CTF, a tool that generates CTF families from Python challenges using a range of transformations. Using Evolve-CTF to derive families from Cybench and Intercode challenges, we evaluate 13 agentic LLM configurations with tool access. We find that models are remarkably robust to renaming and code insertion, but that composed transformations and deeper obfuscation degrade performance by requiring more sophisticated tool use. Enabling explicit reasoning has little effect on success rates. Our work contributes a technique and tool for future LLM evaluations, and a large dataset characterising the capabilities of current state-of-the-art models in this domain.

As generative AI, particularly large language models (LLMs), become increasingly integrated into production applications, new attack surfaces and vulnerabilities emerge and put a focus on adversarial threats in natural language and multi-modal systems. Red-teaming has gained importance in proactively identifying weaknesses in these systems, while blue-teaming works to protect against such adversarial attacks. Despite growing academic interest in adversarial risks for generative AI, there is limited guidance tailored for practitioners to assess and mitigate these challenges in real-world environments. To address this, our contributions include: (1) a practical examination of red- and blue-teaming strategies for securing generative AI, (2) identification of key challenges and open questions in defense development and evaluation, and (3) the Attack Atlas, an intuitive framework that brings a practical approach to analyzing single-turn input attacks, placing it at the forefront for practitioners. This work aims to bridge the gap between academic insights and practical security measures for the protection of generative AI systems.

Agent skills extend AI agents with reusable instructions, tools, scripts, references, and workflows, establishing a security boundary distinct from both model safety and traditional package-malware detection. ClawHub Security Signals is a sanitized dataset of 67,453 latest public OpenClaw skill versions. Each row pairs redacted SKILL.md content and sanitized bundled files where present with a final ClawScan registry verdict and evidence from three scanner families: VirusTotal, static heuristic analysis, and NVIDIA SkillSpector. Rather than estimating malicious-skill prevalence, we study scanner disagreement. The three scanners rarely flag the same skills: any pair overlaps on at most 10.4% of their combined positives, only 0.69% of skills are flagged by all three, and 81.9% of flagged skills are identified by a single scanner. The disagreement is structured by attack surface. SkillSpector, which raises semantic agentic-risk advisories rather than malware-reputation signals, is positive for 19,209 of 25,504 suspicious rows (75.3%) but only 14 of 206 malicious rows (6.8%). The malicious-verdict region shows the inverse profile: 150 of 206 malicious rows (72.8%) are VirusTotal-positive, consistent with bundled-code malware evidence. These results show that agent-skill security requires layered governance, not single-scanner allow/block decisions. The corpus is released as a sanitized silver-standard dataset: labels are the registry's automated verdicts, not human-annotated ground truth, and the release represents an early, versioned snapshot intended to support the community while a human-annotated subset is developed. Further research is encouraged, including models tailored for skill-security triage.

This technical report accompanies the LLM robustness leaderboard published by PRISM Eval for the Paris AI Action Summit. We introduce PRISM Eval Behavior Elicitation Tool (BET), an AI system performing automated red-teaming through Dynamic Adversarial Optimization that achieves 100% Attack Success Rate (ASR) against 37 of 41 state-of-the-art LLMs. Beyond binary success metrics, we propose a fine-grained robustness metric estimating the average number of attempts required to elicit harmful behaviors, revealing that attack difficulty varies by over 300-fold across models despite universal vulnerability. We introduce primitive-level vulnerability analysis to identify which jailbreaking techniques are most effective for specific hazard categories. Our collaborative evaluation with trusted third parties from the AI Safety Network demonstrates practical pathways for distributed robustness assessment across the community.

Language models can distinguish between testing and deployment phases -- a capability known as evaluation awareness. This has significant safety and policy implications, potentially undermining the reliability of evaluations that are central to AI governance frameworks and voluntary industry commitments. In this paper, we study evaluation awareness in Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct. We show that linear probes can separate real-world evaluation and deployment prompts, suggesting that current models internally represent this distinction. We also find that current safety evaluations are correctly classified by the probes, suggesting that they already appear artificial or inauthentic to models. Our findings underscore the importance of ensuring trustworthy evaluations and understanding deceptive capabilities. More broadly, our work showcases how model internals may be leveraged to support blackbox methods in safety audits, especially for future models more competent at evaluation awareness and deception.

Rapid advances in image generation are eroding the evidentiary value of visual content in settings where authenticity can affect public safety and personal reputation. Yet existing detection benchmarks rarely examine synthetic images in public- and individual-safety contexts, where misleading visual content may carry substantial risks. Here we introduce SafeIMG, a safety-oriented benchmark spanning 12 public- and individual-safety scenarios generated using GPT Image 2. Unlike benchmarks centred on generic imagery and image-level labels, SafeIMG evaluates not only whether detectors recognise synthetic images, but also whether their decisions reflect human-identified anomalies. To this end, SafeIMG provides human annotations that localise suspicious regions and explain local artefacts and higher-level commonsense or physical inconsistencies. We evaluate specialized synthetic-image detectors and vision-language models (VLMs), and find that neither provides reliable detection. The strongest VLM identifies only 49.5% of generated images, whereas the best specialised detector identifies 33.1%, compared with 81.7% accuracy for human evaluators. Model explanations cover only 29.8\% of human-annotated anomalies and predominantly capture local defects in text, faces and hands. Their coverage falls to 15.0% for commonsense conflicts and 12.0% for physical inconsistencies, while detection performance deteriorates further after dissemination-induced image degradation. These findings show that current detectors lack the accuracy, explanatory alignment and robustness needed to evaluate AI-generated images reliably across public- and individual-safety settings.

Future AI systems could conceal their capabilities ('sandbagging') during evaluations, potentially misleading developers and auditors. We stress-tested sandbagging detection techniques using an auditing game. First, a red team fine-tuned five models, some of which conditionally underperformed, as a proxy for sandbagging. Second, a blue team used black-box, model-internals, or training-based approaches to identify sandbagging models. We found that the blue team could not reliably discriminate sandbaggers from benign models. Black-box approaches were defeated by effective imitation of a weaker model. Linear probes, a model-internals approach, showed more promise but their naive application was vulnerable to behaviours instilled by the red team. We also explored capability elicitation as a strategy for detecting sandbagging. Although Prompt-based elicitation was not reliable, training-based elicitation consistently elicited full performance from the sandbagging models, using only a single correct demonstration of the evaluation task. However the performance of benign models was sometimes also raised, so relying on elicitation as a detection strategy was prone to false-positives. In the short-term, we recommend developers remove potential sandbagging using on-distribution training for elicitation. In the longer-term, further research is needed to ensure the efficacy of training-based elicitation, and develop robust methods for sandbagging detection. We open source our model organisms at https://github.com/AI-Safety-Institute/sandbagging_auditing_games and select transcripts and results at https://huggingface.co/datasets/sandbagging-games/evaluation_logs . A demo illustrating the game can be played at https://sandbagging-demo.far.ai/ .

We introduce HackSynth, a novel Large Language Model (LLM)-based agent capable of autonomous penetration testing. HackSynth's dual-module architecture includes a Planner and a Summarizer, which enable it to generate commands and process feedback iteratively. To benchmark HackSynth, we propose two new Capture The Flag (CTF)-based benchmark sets utilizing the popular platforms PicoCTF and OverTheWire. These benchmarks include two hundred challenges across diverse domains and difficulties, providing a standardized framework for evaluating LLM-based penetration testing agents. Based on these benchmarks, extensive experiments are presented, analyzing the core parameters of HackSynth, including creativity (temperature and top-p) and token utilization. Multiple open source and proprietary LLMs were used to measure the agent's capabilities. The experiments show that the agent performed best with the GPT-4o model, better than what the GPT-4o's system card suggests. We also discuss the safety and predictability of HackSynth's actions. Our findings indicate the potential of LLM-based agents in advancing autonomous penetration testing and the importance of robust safeguards. HackSynth and the benchmarks are publicly available to foster research on autonomous cybersecurity solutions.

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into software engineering has revolutionized code generation, enabling unprecedented productivity through promptware and autonomous AI agents. However, this transformation introduces significant risks, including insecure code generation, hallucinated outputs, irreversible actions, and a lack of transparency and accountability. Incidents like the Replit database deletion underscore the urgent need for robust safety and governance mechanisms. This paper comprehensively analyzes the inherent challenges of LLM-assisted code generation, such as vulnerability inheritance, overtrust, misinterpretation, and the absence of standardized validation and rollback protocols. To address these, we propose the SAFE-AI Framework, a holistic approach emphasizing Safety, Auditability, Feedback, and Explainability. The framework integrates guardrails, sandboxing, runtime verification, risk-aware logging, human-in-the-loop systems, and explainable AI techniques to mitigate risks while fostering trust and compliance. We introduce a novel taxonomy of AI behaviors categorizing suggestive, generative, autonomous, and destructive actions to guide risk assessment and oversight. Additionally, we identify open problems, including the lack of standardized benchmarks for code specific hallucinations and autonomy levels, and propose future research directions for hybrid verification, semantic guardrails, and proactive governance tools. Through detailed comparisons of autonomy control, prompt engineering, explainability, and governance frameworks, this paper provides a roadmap for responsible AI integration in software engineering, aligning with emerging regulations like the EU AI Act and Canada's AIDA to ensure safe, transparent, and accountable AI-driven development.

Camouflage is primarily context-dependent yet current metrics for camouflaged scenarios overlook this critical factor. Instead, these metrics are originally designed for evaluating general or salient objects, with an inherent assumption of uncorrelated spatial context. In this paper, we propose a new contextualized evaluation paradigm, Context-measure, built upon a probabilistic pixel-aware correlation framework. By incorporating spatial dependencies and pixel-wise camouflage quantification, our measure better aligns with human perception. Extensive experiments across three challenging camouflaged object segmentation datasets show that Context-measure delivers more reliability than existing context-independent metrics. Our measure can provide a foundational evaluation benchmark for various computer vision applications involving camouflaged patterns, such as agricultural, industrial, and medical scenarios. Code is available at https://github.com/pursuitxi/Context-measure.

LLM agents span command-line interfaces (e.g., Codex) and agent frameworks (e.g., LangChain), integrating backend LLMs with harness code that parses model outputs, controls agent loops, and manages context. Both the harness and LLM-generated responses jointly shape an agent's execution. This architecture gives rise to bugs that cannot be readily understood by inspecting either component alone, because some bugs occur only when a particular LLM response elicits an abnormal reaction from the agent. Prior empirical studies of agent bugs have largely attributed failures either to limited model capabilities or to harness-side defects, such as outdated APIs and configuration misalignment, without characterizing these AR bugs. We conduct the first empirical study focused on agent-reactive (AR) bugs. Through manual analysis of 255 bug reports from Codex, Gemini-CLI, LangChain, and CrewAI, we construct a two-axis taxonomy covering observable symptoms and the LLM behaviors that trigger them. Our findings show that many AR bugs manifest as silent errors without well-defined test oracles, which makes detection difficult. The stochasticity of LLM responses further complicates bug reproduction. We additionally examine fixes proposed by users and implemented by developers. This analysis exposes a mismatch: users frequently advocate harness-side guardrails, whereas developers may attribute the issue to the LLM or respond slowly to user-proposed fixes. These findings point to the need for mechanisms that help users and developers understand the root causes and resolutions of AR bugs. Overall, the study highlights challenges specific to LLM agents and motivates the design of test oracles, reproduction support, and fault-localization techniques for AR bugs.

The spreading of AI-generated images (AIGI), driven by advances in generative AI, poses a significant threat to information security and public trust. Existing AIGI detectors, while effective against images in clean laboratory settings, fail to generalize to in-the-wild scenarios. These real-world images are noisy, varying from ``obviously fake" images to realistic ones derived from multiple generative models and further edited for quality control. We address in-the-wild AIGI detection in this paper. We introduce Mirage, a challenging benchmark designed to emulate the complexity of in-the-wild AIGI. Mirage is constructed from two sources: (1) a large corpus of Internet-sourced AIGI verified by human experts, and (2) a synthesized dataset created through the collaboration between multiple expert generators, closely simulating the realistic AIGI in the wild. Building on this benchmark, we propose Mirage-R1, a vision-language model with heuristic-to-analytic reasoning, a reflective reasoning mechanism for AIGI detection. Mirage-R1 is trained in two stages: a supervised-fine-tuning cold start, followed by a reinforcement learning stage. By further adopting an inference-time adaptive thinking strategy, Mirage-R1 is able to provide either a quick judgment or a more robust and accurate conclusion, effectively balancing inference speed and performance. Extensive experiments show that our model leads state-of-the-art detectors by 5% and 10% on Mirage and the public benchmark, respectively. The benchmark and code will be made publicly available.

Regulatory compliance auditing across diverse industrial domains requires heightened quality assurance and traceability. Present manual and intermittent approaches to such auditing yield significant challenges, potentially leading to oversights in the monitoring process. To address these issues, we introduce a real-time, multi-modal sensing system employing 3D time-of-flight and RGB cameras, coupled with unsupervised learning techniques on edge AI devices. This enables continuous object tracking thereby enhancing efficiency in record-keeping and minimizing manual interventions. While we validate the system in a knife sanitization context within agrifood facilities, emphasizing its prowess against occlusion and low-light issues with RGB cameras, its potential spans various industrial monitoring settings.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have made them indispensable, raising significant concerns over managing their safety. Automated red teaming offers a promising alternative to the labor-intensive and error-prone manual probing for vulnerabilities, providing more consistent and scalable safety evaluations. However, existing approaches often compromise diversity by focusing on maximizing attack success rate. Additionally, methods that decrease the cosine similarity from historical embeddings with semantic diversity rewards lead to novelty stagnation as history grows. To address these issues, we introduce DiveR-CT, which relaxes conventional constraints on the objective and semantic reward, granting greater freedom for the policy to enhance diversity. Our experiments demonstrate DiveR-CT's marked superiority over baselines by 1) generating data that perform better in various diversity metrics across different attack success rate levels, 2) better-enhancing resiliency in blue team models through safety tuning based on collected data, 3) allowing dynamic control of objective weights for reliable and controllable attack success rates, and 4) reducing susceptibility to reward overoptimization. Project details and code can be found at https://andrewzh112.github.io/#diverct.

The increasing realism of AI-generated images has raised serious concerns about misinformation and privacy violations, highlighting the urgent need for accurate and interpretable detection methods. While existing approaches have made progress, most rely on binary classification without explanations or depend heavily on supervised fine-tuning, resulting in limited generalization. In this paper, we propose ThinkFake, a novel reasoning-based and generalizable framework for AI-generated image detection. Our method leverages a Multimodal Large Language Model (MLLM) equipped with a forgery reasoning prompt and is trained using Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) reinforcement learning with carefully designed reward functions. This design enables the model to perform step-by-step reasoning and produce interpretable, structured outputs. We further introduce a structured detection pipeline to enhance reasoning quality and adaptability. Extensive experiments show that ThinkFake outperforms state-of-the-art methods on the GenImage benchmark and demonstrates strong zero-shot generalization on the challenging LOKI benchmark. These results validate our framework's effectiveness and robustness. Code will be released upon acceptance.

Visible tests are a common gate for LLM-generated code, but passing them does not certify specification correctness. We study a deployment-like monitoring problem: after code has passed public tests, can a weaker LLM verifier identify the residual hidden bugs? We introduce Code Monitor Red Teaming, a monitor-red-teaming protocol that fixes a public-check information boundary while varying generator pressure, verifier scaffolding, and weak-to-strong capability. We instantiate it as CodeMonitorBench, spanning function-level, data-science, and workflow code. Across 71,000 generated candidates, 43,677 pass public tests and 23,081 of those fail hidden tests. Weak verifiers improve with scaffolding and model family, but still miss most hidden bugs at 5% false-positive rate. As a robustness stress test, adversarial public-test-overfit pressure lowers verifier AUROC and raises low-FPR miss rates in most cells. A GLM-5.1 verifier recovers part of the gap under the same evidence boundary; an inferability audit shows that remaining misses mix verifier failures with M1 evidence limits.

Many ML-based approaches have been proposed to automatically detect, localize, and repair software vulnerabilities. While ML-based methods are more effective than program analysis-based vulnerability analysis tools, few have been integrated into modern IDEs, hindering practical adoption. To bridge this critical gap, we propose AIBugHunter, a novel ML-based software vulnerability analysis tool for C/C++ languages that is integrated into Visual Studio Code. AIBugHunter helps software developers to achieve real-time vulnerability detection, explanation, and repairs during programming. In particular, AIBugHunter scans through developers' source code to (1) locate vulnerabilities, (2) identify vulnerability types, (3) estimate vulnerability severity, and (4) suggest vulnerability repairs. In this article, we propose a novel multi-objective optimization (MOO)-based vulnerability classification approach and a transformer-based estimation approach to help AIBugHunter accurately identify vulnerability types and estimate severity. Our empirical experiments on a large dataset consisting of 188K+ C/C++ functions confirm that our proposed approaches are more accurate than other state-of-the-art baseline methods for vulnerability classification and estimation. Furthermore, we conduct qualitative evaluations including a survey study and a user study to obtain software practitioners' perceptions of our AIBugHunter tool and assess the impact that AIBugHunter may have on developers' productivity in security aspects. Our survey study shows that our AIBugHunter is perceived as useful where 90% of the participants consider adopting our AIBugHunter. Last but not least, our user study shows that our AIBugHunter could possibly enhance developers' productivity in combating cybersecurity issues during software development.

Multimodal large reasoning models (MLRMs) are increasingly deployed for vision-language tasks that produce explicit intermediate rationales. However, reasoning traces can contain unsafe content even when the final answer is non-harmful, creating deployment risks. Existing multimodal safety guards primarily evaluate only the input question and the final answer, neglecting the intermediate reasoning process. This oversight allows undetected harm, such as biased inferences or policy-violating use of visual context, to emerge during reasoning. We introduce GuardTrace-VL, a vision-aware safety auditor that monitors the full Question-Thinking-Answer (QTA) pipeline via joint image-text analysis, enabling detection of unsafe content as it emerges in the reasoning stage. To support training and evaluation, we construct the GuardTrace dataset, which is generated through diverse prompting strategies and refined via a MLRM- and human-based voting and verification pipeline. Furthermore, we propose a three-stage progressive training scheme combined with the data refinement process, enabling the model to learn nuanced and context-dependent safety preferences according to different risk levels. On our proposed test set covering both in-domain and out-of-domain scenarios, GuardTrace-VL model achieves an F1 score of 93.1% on unsafe reasoning detection tasks, representing a 13.5% improvement in F1 score compared to the previous strongest multimodal safety defense methods. The codes will be made publicly available.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly used to detect whether AI-generated images contain visible artifacts, yet their ability to analyze such artifacts remains poorly understood. A correct image-level decision can still hide important failures: a model may correctly flag an artifact while relying on the wrong visual cue, selecting the wrong region, or describing a defect that the image does not support. To evaluate these behaviors directly, we introduce SalArt-VQA, a diagnostic benchmark for fine-grained SALient ARTifact understanding in AI-generated images. SalArt-VQA contains 950 images and 3,681 human-authored multiple-choice questions spanning artifact images, matched real reference images, and paired generated reference images. Four aligned question types evaluate presence detection, semantic localization, spatial grounding, and evidence-grounded defect identification, while the reference splits test calibration and abstention when the annotated defect is absent. Across 20 VLMs, SalArt-VQA reveals failures that image-level detection accuracy hides: the strongest model reaches 99.37% detection recall on artifact images but answers all four artifact-side questions correctly on only 53.26% of images. Comparing artifact images with artifact-free references reveals a sensitivity-calibration tradeoff: sensitive models often make unsupported artifact claims, while conservative models avoid false alarms largely by missing real artifacts. These results show that high artifact detection accuracy alone does not imply grounded artifact understanding. SalArt-VQA exposes these hidden failure modes and provides a fine-grained evaluation of whether VLM artifact claims are supported by local visual evidence.

We evaluate the propensity of frontier models to sabotage or refuse to assist with safety research when deployed as AI research agents within a frontier AI company. We apply two complementary evaluations to four Claude models (Mythos Preview, Opus 4.7 Preview, Opus 4.6, and Sonnet 4.6): an unprompted sabotage evaluation testing model behaviour with opportunities to sabotage safety research, and a sabotage continuation evaluation testing whether models continue to sabotage when placed in trajectories where prior actions have started undermining research. We find no instances of unprompted sabotage across any model, with refusal rates close to zero for Mythos Preview and Opus 4.7 Preview, though all models sometimes only partially completed tasks. In the continuation evaluation, Mythos Preview actively continues sabotage in 7% of cases (versus 3% for Opus 4.6, 4% for Sonnet 4.6, and 0% for Opus 4.7 Preview), and exhibits reasoning-output discrepancy in the majority of these cases, indicating covert sabotage reasoning. Our evaluation framework builds on Petri, an open-source LLM auditing tool, with a custom scaffold running models inside Claude Code, alongside an iterative pipeline for generating realistic sabotage trajectories. We measure both evaluation awareness and a new form of situational awareness termed "prefill awareness", the capability to recognise that prior trajectory content was not self-generated. Opus 4.7 Preview shows notably elevated unprompted evaluation awareness, while prefill awareness remains low across all models. Finally, we discuss limitations including evaluation awareness confounds, limited scenario coverage, and untested pathways to risk beyond safety research sabotage.

Natural-language autoencoders score explanations of hidden activations by reconstruction: an explanation is deemed faithful if the activation can be regenerated from it. The test is structurally insensitive to individual false claims: if flipping a claim does not change the reconstruction, the claim is never penalized. We show the test is passed in two ways, neither faithful. On a released Qwen-2.5-7B verbalizer, explanations reconstruct well above chance while ~2% of specific claims are reconstruction-dependent, so the score tracks gist, not specific facts. Under exact synthetic ground truth, the standard recipe develops co-adapted private codes (false wording the reconstruction depends on) in 5/5 runs, and fixes that leave the target model unchanged do not help. We contribute two audit protocols, the grounded-vs-true cross and the evaluator swap, and RECAP (Readable Encodings via Co-trained Auxiliary Predictors): linear heads trained alongside the target model to keep designated content decodable. On RECAP-trained sandbox models, fresh verbalizers state the designated content truly and the codes vanish, at a +0.001-nat cost. This replicates on a pretrained Pythia-160M: the content becomes reliably probe-decodable, though a fresh verbalizer conveys it only in part (truth 0.44-0.46 vs a near-zero control). For interpretability, high reconstruction does not certify individual claims. For AI safety, RECAP makes designated internal content independently checkable against probes rather than asserted by prose a model can game: an independent probe scores the verbalizer's true claims above its false ones (AUC 0.96, vs 0.82 without RECAP). Against an adversary that edits an explanation to maximize the reconstruction score while lying (suppressing ~87% of its lie penalty), the RECAP probe still flags the lies (AUC 0.95) while the control probe collapses to chance (0.51).

Industrial anomaly detection (IAD) is difficult due to the scarcity of normal reference samples and the subtle, localized nature of many defects. Single-pass vision-language models (VLMs) often overlook small abnormalities and lack explicit mechanisms to compare against canonical normal patterns. We propose AgentIAD, a tool-driven agentic framework that enables multi-stage visual inspection. The agent is equipped with a Perceptive Zoomer (PZ) for localized fine-grained analysis and a Comparative Retriever (CR) for querying normal exemplars when evidence is ambiguous. To teach these inspection behaviors, we construct structured perceptive and comparative trajectories from the MMAD dataset and train the model in two stages: supervised fine-tuning followed by reinforcement learning. A two-part reward design drives this process: a perception reward that supervises classification accuracy, spatial alignment, and type correctness, and a behavior reward that encourages efficient tool use. Together, these components enable the model to refine its judgment through step-wise observation, zooming, and verification. AgentIAD achieves a new state-of-the-art 97.62% classification accuracy on MMAD, surpassing prior MLLM-based approaches while producing transparent and interpretable inspection traces.

Current AI-Generated Image (AIGI) detection approaches predominantly rely on binary classification to distinguish real from synthetic images, often lacking interpretable or convincing evidence to substantiate their decisions. This limitation stems from existing AIGI detection benchmarks, which, despite featuring a broad collection of synthetic images, remain restricted in their coverage of artifact diversity and lack detailed, localized annotations. To bridge this gap, we introduce a fine-grained benchmark towards eXplainable AI-Generated image Detection, named X-AIGD, which provides pixel-level, categorized annotations of perceptual artifacts, spanning low-level distortions, high-level semantics, and cognitive-level counterfactuals. These comprehensive annotations facilitate fine-grained interpretability evaluation and deeper insight into model decision-making processes. Our extensive investigation using X-AIGD provides several key insights: (1) Existing AIGI detectors demonstrate negligible reliance on perceptual artifacts, even at the most basic distortion level. (2) While AIGI detectors can be trained to identify specific artifacts, they still substantially base their judgment on uninterpretable features. (3) Explicitly aligning model attention with artifact regions can increase the interpretability and generalization of detectors. The data and code are available at: https://github.com/Coxy7/X-AIGD.

Automating penetration testing is crucial for enhancing cybersecurity, yet current Large Language Models (LLMs) face significant limitations in this domain, including poor error handling, inefficient reasoning, and an inability to perform complex end-to-end tasks autonomously. To address these challenges, we introduce Pentest-R1, a novel framework designed to optimize LLM reasoning capabilities for this task through a two-stage reinforcement learning pipeline. We first construct a dataset of over 500 real-world, multi-step walkthroughs, which Pentest-R1 leverages for offline reinforcement learning (RL) to instill foundational attack logic. Subsequently, the LLM is fine-tuned via online RL in an interactive Capture The Flag (CTF) environment, where it learns directly from environmental feedback to develop robust error self-correction and adaptive strategies. Our extensive experiments on the Cybench and AutoPenBench benchmarks demonstrate the framework's effectiveness. On AutoPenBench, Pentest-R1 achieves a 24.2\% success rate, surpassing most state-of-the-art models and ranking second only to Gemini 2.5 Flash. On Cybench, it attains a 15.0\% success rate in unguided tasks, establishing a new state-of-the-art for open-source LLMs and matching the performance of top proprietary models. Ablation studies confirm that the synergy of both training stages is critical to its success.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have led to increasingly sophisticated safety protocols and features designed to prevent harmful, unethical, or unauthorized outputs. However, these guardrails remain susceptible to novel and creative forms of adversarial prompting, including manually generated test cases. In this work, we present two new test cases in mental health for (i) suicide and (ii) self-harm, using multi-step, prompt-level jailbreaking and bypass built-in content and safety filters. We show that user intent is disregarded, leading to the generation of detailed harmful content and instructions that could cause real-world harm. We conduct an empirical evaluation across six widely available LLMs, demonstrating the generalizability and reliability of the bypass. We assess these findings and the multilayered ethical tensions that they present for their implications on prompt-response filtering and context- and task-specific model development. We recommend a more comprehensive and systematic approach to AI safety and ethics while emphasizing the need for continuous adversarial testing in safety-critical AI deployments. We also argue that while certain clearly defined safety measures and guardrails can and must be implemented in LLMs, ensuring robust and comprehensive safety across all use cases and domains remains extremely challenging given the current technical maturity of general-purpose LLMs.

Monitoring autonomous large language model (LLM) agents for covert malicious behavior is challenging due to delayed, context-dependent, and long-horizon attack patterns. Agents may pursue hidden objectives while maintaining superficially benign behavior, making detection difficult even with full trajectory access. Prior monitoring approaches improve scaffolding or ensemble aggregation, but treat each trajectory independently and do not learn from prior monitoring experience. Moreover, standard reasoning methods explain observed behavior without explicitly reasoning about agent beliefs, intentions, and goal alignment required to distinguish benign task execution from covert deviation. We propose Agent-ToM, a learning-to-monitor framework grounded in Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning for security analysis of autonomous agents. Agent-ToM performs structured full-trajectory analysis by inferring beliefs, intent hypotheses with calibrated confidence, expected actions, and deviations from task-consistent behavioral baselines. At inference time, it employs a Reason-Verify-Refine pipeline to construct and validate monitoring decisions. At training time, Agent-ToM distills critique signals into a persistent semantic guardrail memory, enabling reusable belief- and intent-conditioned constraints across episodes. We evaluate Agent-ToM on adversarial agent monitoring benchmarks (SHADE-Arena and CUA-SHADE-Arena). Agent-ToM achieves strong precision-recall balance and outperforms state-of-the-art monitoring baselines, including ensemble methods, while using a coherent two-call reasoning pipeline. These results demonstrate that learning at the monitoring layer, combined with structured ToM reasoning and verification, provides an effective and deployable foundation for securing autonomous LLM agents.

Camouflaged object detection (COD) approaches heavily rely on pixel-level annotated datasets. Weakly-supervised COD (WSCOD) approaches use sparse annotations like scribbles or points to reduce annotation effort, but this can lead to decreased accuracy. The Segment Anything Model (SAM) shows remarkable segmentation ability with sparse prompts like points. However, manual prompt is not always feasible, as it may not be accessible in real-world application. Additionally, it only provides localization information instead of semantic one, which can intrinsically cause ambiguity in interpreting the targets. In this work, we aim to eliminate the need for manual prompt. The key idea is to employ Cross-modal Chains of Thought Prompting (CCTP) to reason visual prompts using the semantic information given by a generic text prompt. To that end, we introduce a test-time adaptation per-instance mechanism called Generalizable SAM (GenSAM) to automatically enerate and optimize visual prompts the generic task prompt for WSCOD. In particular, CCTP maps a single generic text prompt onto image-specific consensus foreground and background heatmaps using vision-language models, acquiring reliable visual prompts. Moreover, to test-time adapt the visual prompts, we further propose Progressive Mask Generation (PMG) to iteratively reweight the input image, guiding the model to focus on the targets in a coarse-to-fine manner. Crucially, all network parameters are fixed, avoiding the need for additional training. Experiments demonstrate the superiority of GenSAM. Experiments on three benchmarks demonstrate that GenSAM outperforms point supervision approaches and achieves comparable results to scribble supervision ones, solely relying on general task descriptions as prompts. our codes is in: https://lwpyh.github.io/GenSAM/.

Chart-to-code generation demands strict visual precision and syntactic correctness from Vision-Language Models (VLMs). However, existing approaches are fundamentally constrained by data-centric limitations: despite the availability of growing chart-to-code datasets, simply scaling homogeneous chart-code pairs conflates visual perception with program logic, preventing models from fully leveraging the richness of multimodal supervision. We present CharTide, a novel data-centric framework that systematically redesigns both training and alignment data for chart-to-code generation. First, we construct a 2M-sample dataset via a Tri-Perspective Tuning strategy, explicitly decoupling training into visual perception, pure-text code logic, and modality fusion streams, enabling a 7B model to surpass specialized baselines using only supervised data. Second, we reformulate alignment as a data verification problem rather than a heuristic scoring task. To this end, we introduce an Inquiry-Driven RL framework grounded in the principle of information invariance: a downstream model should yield consistent answers to identical visual queries across both original and generated charts. Moving beyond rigid rule matching or VLM scoring, we employ a frozen Inspector to objectively verify generated charts through atomic QA tasks, providing verifiable reward signals based on answer accuracy. Experiments on ChartMimic, Plot2Code, and ChartX show that CharTide-7B/8B significantly outperforms open-source baselines, surpasses GPT-4o, and is competitive with GPT-5.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes domains, ensuring their security and alignment has become a critical challenge. Existing red-teaming practices depend heavily on manual testing, which limits scalability and fails to comprehensively cover the vast space of potential adversarial behaviors. This paper introduces an automated red-teaming framework that systematically generates, executes, and evaluates adversarial prompts to uncover security vulnerabilities in LLMs. Our framework integrates meta-prompting-based attack synthesis, multi-modal vulnerability detection, and standardized evaluation protocols spanning six major threat categories -- reward hacking, deceptive alignment, data exfiltration, sandbagging, inappropriate tool use, and chain-of-thought manipulation. Experiments on the GPT-OSS-20B model reveal 47 distinct vulnerabilities, including 21 high-severity and 12 novel attack patterns, achieving a 3.9times improvement in vulnerability discovery rate over manual expert testing while maintaining 89\% detection accuracy. These results demonstrate the framework's effectiveness in enabling scalable, systematic, and reproducible AI safety evaluations. By providing actionable insights for improving alignment robustness, this work advances the state of automated LLM red-teaming and contributes to the broader goal of building secure and trustworthy AI systems.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents to navigate mobile graphical user interfaces (GUIs). Operating in dynamic on-device ecosystems, which include notifications, pop-ups, and inter-app interactions, exposes them to a unique and underexplored threat vector: environmental injection. Unlike prompt-based attacks that manipulate textual instructions, environmental injection corrupts an agent's visual perception by inserting adversarial UI elements (for example, deceptive overlays or spoofed notifications) directly into the GUI. This bypasses textual safeguards and can derail execution, causing privacy leakage, financial loss, or irreversible device compromise. To systematically evaluate this threat, we introduce GhostEI-Bench, the first benchmark for assessing mobile agents under environmental injection attacks within dynamic, executable environments. Moving beyond static image-based assessments, GhostEI-Bench injects adversarial events into realistic application workflows inside fully operational Android emulators and evaluates performance across critical risk scenarios. We further propose a judge-LLM protocol that conducts fine-grained failure analysis by reviewing the agent's action trajectory alongside the corresponding screenshot sequence, pinpointing failure in perception, recognition, or reasoning. Comprehensive experiments on state-of-the-art agents reveal pronounced vulnerability to deceptive environmental cues: current models systematically fail to perceive and reason about manipulated UIs. GhostEI-Bench provides a framework for quantifying and mitigating this emerging threat, paving the way toward more robust and secure embodied agents.

This paper describes a machine learning method to automate reading of cockpit gauges, using a CNN to invert affine transformations and deduce aircraft states from instrument images. Validated with synthetic images of a turn-and-bank indicator, this research introduces methods such as generating datasets from a single image, the 'Clean Training Principle' for optimal noise-free training, and CNN interpolation for continuous value predictions from categorical data. It also offers insights into hyperparameter optimization and ML system software engineering.

A classical intuition holds that verifying a solution is easier than producing one. For today's coding agents, this intuition is being inverted: as foundation models develop stronger reasoning capabilities and engineering harnesses grow more sophisticated, generating complex candidate solutions is no longer difficult -- reliably verifying them has become the harder problem. Every verifier we can build is only a proxy for human intent, never the intent itself. This makes verification subject to a twofold difficulty: first, intent is underspecified by nature, making it inherently hard to faithfully check whether it has been fulfilled; second, during model training, optimization widens the gap between proxy and intent -- manifesting as reward hacking or signal saturation. To address this, we characterize the quality of verification signals along three dimensions -- scalability, faithfulness, and robustness -- and argue that achieving all three simultaneously is the central challenge. We further study four reward constructions: a test verifier for general coding tasks, a rubric verifier for frontend tasks, the user as verifier for real-world agent tasks, and an automated agent verifier for long-horizon tasks. Across different task types and policy capability levels, we conduct in-depth analysis and experiments on the core challenges of reward design and how to more effectively leverage reward signals. Experiments show that targeted verification design can effectively suppress reward hacking, improve task completion quality, and achieve significant gains across multiple internal and public benchmarks. These experiences collectively point to a core observation: no fixed reward function can remain effective as policy capability continues to grow; and verification must co-evolve with the generator.

The proliferation of AI techniques for image generation, coupled with their increasing accessibility, has raised significant concerns about the potential misuse of these images to spread misinformation. Recent AI-generated image detection (AGID) methods include CNNDetection, NPR, DM Image Detection, Fake Image Detection, DIRE, LASTED, GAN Image Detection, AIDE, SSP, DRCT, RINE, OCC-CLIP, De-Fake, and Deep Fake Detection. However, we argue that the current state-of-the-art AGID techniques are inadequate for effectively detecting contemporary AI-generated images and advocate for a comprehensive reevaluation of these methods. We introduce the Visual Counter Turing Test (VCT^2), a benchmark comprising ~130K images generated by contemporary text-to-image models (Stable Diffusion 2.1, Stable Diffusion XL, Stable Diffusion 3, DALL-E 3, and Midjourney 6). VCT^2 includes two sets of prompts sourced from tweets by the New York Times Twitter account and captions from the MS COCO dataset. We also evaluate the performance of the aforementioned AGID techniques on the VCT^2 benchmark, highlighting their ineffectiveness in detecting AI-generated images. As image-generative AI models continue to evolve, the need for a quantifiable framework to evaluate these models becomes increasingly critical. To meet this need, we propose the Visual AI Index (V_AI), which assesses generated images from various visual perspectives, including texture complexity and object coherence, setting a new standard for evaluating image-generative AI models. To foster research in this domain, we make our https://huggingface.co/datasets/anonymous1233/COCO_AI and https://huggingface.co/datasets/anonymous1233/twitter_AI datasets publicly available.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has enabled agents to master complex video games, from first-person shooters like Counter-Strike to real-time strategy games such as StarCraft II and racing games like Gran Turismo. While these achievements are notable, applying these AI methods in commercial video game production remains challenging due to computational constraints. In commercial scenarios, the majority of computational resources are allocated to 3D rendering, leaving limited capacity for AI methods, which often demand high computational power, particularly those relying on pixel-based sensors. Moreover, the gaming industry prioritizes creating human-like behavior in AI agents to enhance player experience, unlike academic models that focus on maximizing game performance. This paper introduces a novel methodology for training neural networks via imitation learning to play a complex, commercial-standard, VALORANT-like 2v2 tactical shooter game, requiring only modest CPU hardware during inference. Our approach leverages an innovative, pixel-free perception architecture using a small set of ray-cast sensors, which capture essential spatial information efficiently. These sensors allow AI to perform competently without the computational overhead of traditional methods. Models are trained to mimic human behavior using supervised learning on human trajectory data, resulting in realistic and engaging AI agents. Human evaluation tests confirm that our AI agents provide human-like gameplay experiences while operating efficiently under computational constraints. This offers a significant advancement in AI model development for tactical shooter games and possibly other genres.

As vision-language models (VLMs) gain prominence, their multimodal interfaces also introduce new safety vulnerabilities, making the safety evaluation challenging and critical. Existing red-teaming efforts are either restricted to a narrow set of adversarial patterns or depend heavily on manual engineering, lacking scalable exploration of emerging real-world VLM vulnerabilities. To bridge this gap, we propose ARMs, an adaptive red-teaming agent that systematically conducts comprehensive risk assessments for VLMs. Given a target harmful behavior or risk definition, ARMs automatically optimizes diverse red-teaming strategies with reasoning-enhanced multi-step orchestration, to effectively elicit harmful outputs from target VLMs. We propose 11 novel multimodal attack strategies, covering diverse adversarial patterns of VLMs (e.g., reasoning hijacking, contextual cloaking), and integrate 17 red-teaming algorithms into ARMs via model context protocol (MCP). To balance the diversity and effectiveness of the attack, we design a layered memory with an epsilon-greedy attack exploration algorithm. Extensive experiments on instance- and policy-based benchmarks show that ARMs achieves SOTA attack success rates, exceeding baselines by an average of 52.1% and surpassing 90% on Claude-4-Sonnet. We show that the diversity of red-teaming instances generated by ARMs is significantly higher, revealing emerging vulnerabilities in VLMs. Leveraging ARMs, we construct ARMs-Bench, a large-scale multimodal safety dataset comprising over 30K red-teaming instances spanning 51 diverse risk categories, grounded in both real-world multimodal threats and regulatory risks. Safety fine-tuning with ARMs-Bench substantially improves the robustness of VLMs while preserving their general utility, providing actionable guidance to improve multimodal safety alignment against emerging threats.

Linear probes are a promising approach for monitoring AI systems for deceptive behaviour. Previous work has shown that a linear classifier trained on a contrastive instruction pair and a simple dataset can achieve good performance. However, these probes exhibit notable failures even in straightforward scenarios, including spurious correlations and false positives on non-deceptive responses. In this paper, we identify the importance of the instruction pair used during training. Furthermore, we show that targeting specific deceptive behaviors through a human-interpretable taxonomy of deception leads to improved results on evaluation datasets. Our findings reveal that instruction pairs capture deceptive intent rather than content-specific patterns, explaining why prompt choice dominates probe performance (70.6% of variance). Given the heterogeneity of deception types across datasets, we conclude that organizations should design specialized probes targeting their specific threat models rather than seeking a universal deception detector.

Exploratory GUI testing is essential for software quality but suffers from high manual costs. While Multi-modal Large Language Model (MLLM) agents excel in navigation, they fail to autonomously discover defects due to two core challenges: Goal-Oriented Masking, where agents prioritize task completion over reporting anomalies, and Execution-Bias Attribution, where system defects are misidentified as agent errors. To address these, we first introduce GUITestBench, the first interactive benchmark for this task, featuring 143 tasks across 26 defects. We then propose GUITester, a multi-agent framework that decouples navigation from verification via two modules: (i) a Planning-Execution Module (PEM) that proactively probes for defects via embedded testing intents, and (ii) a Hierarchical Reflection Module (HRM) that resolves attribution ambiguity through interaction history analysis. GUITester achieves an F1-score of 48.90\% (Pass@3) on GUITestBench, outperforming state-of-the-art baselines (33.35\%). Our work demonstrates the feasibility of autonomous exploratory testing and provides a robust foundation for future GUI quality assurance~Our code is now available in~\href{https://github.com/ADaM-BJTU/GUITestBench{https://github.com/ADaM-BJTU/GUITestBench}}.

Vision-language models (VLM) have markedly advanced AI-driven interpretation and reporting of complex medical imaging, such as computed tomography (CT). Yet, existing methods largely relegate clinicians to passive observers of final outputs, offering no interpretable reasoning trace for them to inspect, validate, or refine. To address this, we introduce RadAgent, a tool-using AI agent that generates CT reports through a stepwise and interpretable process. Each resulting report is accompanied by a fully inspectable trace of intermediate decisions and tool interactions, allowing clinicians to examine how the reported findings are derived. In our experiments, we observe that RadAgent improves Chest CT report generation over its 3D VLM counterpart, CT-Chat, across three dimensions. Clinical accuracy improves by 6.0 points (36.4% relative) in macro-F1 and 5.4 points (19.6% relative) in micro-F1. Robustness under adversarial conditions improves by 24.7 points (41.9% relative). Furthermore, RadAgent achieves 37.0% in faithfulness, a new capability entirely absent in its 3D VLM counterpart. By structuring the interpretation of chest CT as an explicit, tool-augmented and iterative reasoning trace, RadAgent brings us closer toward transparent and reliable AI for radiology.

The increasing adoption of autonomous coding agents accelerates software development but also introduces scoped security risks within high-impact file paths that can outpace traditional human review capacity. While prior research has primarily evaluated these systems in terms of functional correctness and productivity, this paper presents a large-scale empirical study using the AIDev dataset to systematically characterize security code smells in agent-generated pull requests (PRs). Through a combination of a validated LLM-as-a-judge framework and manual qualitative analysis, we identify and classify security misconfigurations across 16,112 file changes spanning 4,022 pull requests. Our results reveal that 38.9% of agent-generated PRs contain at least one security smell, with supply chain integrity issues accounting for 82.3% of all detected security smells. Furthermore, hard-coded credentials constitute 99.6% of all critical-severity security smells. Crucially, we find that human collaborators are responsible for introducing 67.6% of genuine leaked secrets within these agent-assisted workflows, while existing automated and human review processes fail to detect 81.1% of these credentials prior to integration. These findings highlight substantial security risks in agent-assisted software development workflows and suggest a potential reduction in developer vigilance. They also underscore the urgent need for context-aware security guardrails implemented directly at the point of human-AI collaboration.

We demonstrate how AI agents can coordinate to deceive oversight systems using automated interpretability of neural networks. Using sparse autoencoders (SAEs) as our experimental framework, we show that language models (Llama, DeepSeek R1, and Claude 3.7 Sonnet) can generate deceptive explanations that evade detection. Our agents employ steganographic methods to hide information in seemingly innocent explanations, successfully fooling oversight models while achieving explanation quality comparable to reference labels. We further find that models can scheme to develop deceptive strategies when they believe the detection of harmful features might lead to negative consequences for themselves. All tested LLM agents were capable of deceiving the overseer while achieving high interpretability scores comparable to those of reference labels. We conclude by proposing mitigation strategies, emphasizing the critical need for robust understanding and defenses against deception.

Long-horizon language-model agents are dominated, in lines of code and in operational complexity, not by their underlying model but by the harness that wraps it: context compaction, tool caching, semantic memory, trajectory reuse, speculative tool prediction, and the glue that binds the model to a sandboxed execution environment. We argue that harness design is a first-class machine-learning problem and that automated configuration search dominates manual stacking once the flag space exceeds a handful of bits. We defend this claim in two steps. First, we formalize automated harness optimization as constrained noisy Bayesian optimization over a mixed-variable, cost-heterogeneous configuration space with cold-start-corrected rewards and a posterior chance-constrained safety check, and give a reference solver, HARBOR (Harness Axis-aligned Regularized Bayesian Optimization Routine), built from a block-additive SAAS surrogate, multi-fidelity cost-aware acquisition, and TuRBO trust regions. Second, we instantiate the problem in a flag-gated harness over a production coding agent and report a controlled four-round manual-tuning case study against a fixed task suite and an end-to-end HARBOR run. The formulation itself is task-class agnostic: the configuration space, reward correction, acquisition, and safety check apply to any agent harness with a bounded flag space and a reproducible task suite.

Vision Language Models (VLMs) are improving quickly, but standard benchmarks can hide systematic failures that reduce real world trust. We introduce MATS (Multimodal Audit for Truthful Spatialization), a compact behavioral audit that measures whether models reject visually contradicted statements, and two metrics Spatial Consistency Score (SCS) and Incorrect Agreement Rate (IAR). Instruction tuned generative VLMs (LLaVA 1.5, QwenVLchat) exhibit very low SCS and high IAR, while contrastive encoders (CLIP, SigLIP) are far more robust. Activation patching causally localizes failure loci (mid to late cross attention for generative models, pooled projection components for contrastive models) and suggests concrete repair paths.

Data-driven companies use AI models extensively to develop products and intelligent business solutions, making the health of these models crucial for business success. Model monitoring and alerting in industries pose unique challenges, including a lack of clear model health metrics definition, label sparsity, and fast model iterations that result in short-lived models and features. As a product, there are also requirements for scalability, generalizability, and explainability. To tackle these challenges, we propose AlerTiger, a deep-learning-based MLOps model monitoring system that helps AI teams across the company monitor their AI models' health by detecting anomalies in models' input features and output score over time. The system consists of four major steps: model statistics generation, deep-learning-based anomaly detection, anomaly post-processing, and user alerting. Our solution generates three categories of statistics to indicate AI model health, offers a two-stage deep anomaly detection solution to address label sparsity and attain the generalizability of monitoring new models, and provides holistic reports for actionable alerts. This approach has been deployed to most of LinkedIn's production AI models for over a year and has identified several model issues that later led to significant business metric gains after fixing.

The rapid rise of generative AI has transformed music creation, with millions of users engaging in AI-generated music. Despite its popularity, concerns regarding copyright infringement, job displacement, and ethical implications have led to growing scrutiny and legal challenges. In parallel, AI-detection services have emerged, yet these systems remain largely opaque and privately controlled, mirroring the very issues they aim to address. This paper explores the fundamental properties of synthetic content and how it can be detected. Specifically, we analyze deconvolution modules commonly used in generative models and mathematically prove that their outputs exhibit systematic frequency artifacts -- manifesting as small yet distinctive spectral peaks. This phenomenon, related to the well-known checkerboard artifact, is shown to be inherent to a chosen model architecture rather than a consequence of training data or model weights. We validate our theoretical findings through extensive experiments on open-source models, as well as commercial AI-music generators such as Suno and Udio. We use these insights to propose a simple and interpretable detection criterion for AI-generated music. Despite its simplicity, our method achieves detection accuracy on par with deep learning-based approaches, surpassing 99% accuracy on several scenarios.

AI agents are entering high-risk production settings, where they use tools, retain context, follow policies, handle private data, and interact with users over multiple turns. Yet many evaluation methods still judge isolated outputs or static tasks, missing failures that emerge through trajectory, pressure, and adversarial interaction. We introduce ProofAgent Harness, open infrastructure for scalable, auditable, and adversarial AI agent evaluation. The harness provides evaluation infrastructure around an agent: it curates evaluation intelligence, runs adversarial multi-turn trials, captures behavioral traces, applies post-hoc multi-juror scoring, resolves disagreement, and produces evidence-linked reports. Its open design allows developers and researchers to extend domains, traps, metrics, juror personas, scoring rules, and reporting formats. At its core is Adversarial Multi-Juror Scoring with Turn-Level Audit, which evaluates completed agent behavior under pressure using calibrated juror personas, consensus checks, and turn-level evidence. Experiments across customer support, medical triage, privacy and security, and code generation agents show that strong agents fail selectively through weak metrics, fragile turns, unsafe reframing, and manipulation paths. We also find that a small quantized local Harness LLM can challenge production agents powered by best-in-class large LLMs, suggesting that evaluation capability emerges from the full harness pipeline rather than model scale alone. ProofAgent Harness turns AI agent evaluation from a static score into scalable adversarial evaluation infrastructure: repeatable, evidence-backed, extensible, and actionable before deployment.

Camouflaged object segmentation presents unique challenges compared to traditional segmentation tasks, primarily due to the high similarity in patterns and colors between camouflaged objects and their backgrounds. Effective solutions to this problem have significant implications in critical areas such as pest control, defect detection, and lesion segmentation in medical imaging. Prior research has predominantly emphasized supervised or unsupervised pre-training methods, leaving zero-shot approaches significantly underdeveloped. Existing zero-shot techniques commonly utilize the Segment Anything Model (SAM) in automatic mode or rely on vision-language models to generate cues for segmentation; however, their performances remain unsatisfactory, due to the similarity of the camouflaged object and the background. This work studies how to avoid training by integrating large pre-trained models like SAM-2 and Owl-v2 with temporal information into a modular pipeline. Evaluated on the MoCA-Mask dataset, our approach achieves outstanding performance improvements, significantly outperforming existing zero-shot methods by raising the F-measure (F_beta^w) from 0.296 to 0.628. Our approach also surpasses supervised methods, increasing the F-measure from 0.476 to 0.628. Additionally, evaluation on the MoCA-Filter dataset demonstrates an increase in the success rate from 0.628 to 0.697 when compared with FlowSAM, a supervised transfer method. A thorough ablation study further validates the individual contributions of each component. Besides our main contributions, we also highlight inconsistencies in previous work regarding metrics and settings. Code can be found in https://github.com/weathon/vcos.

AI agents have the potential to significantly alter the cybersecurity landscape. Here, we introduce the first framework to capture offensive and defensive cyber-capabilities in evolving real-world systems. Instantiating this framework with BountyBench, we set up 25 systems with complex, real-world codebases. To capture the vulnerability lifecycle, we define three task types: Detect (detecting a new vulnerability), Exploit (exploiting a given vulnerability), and Patch (patching a given vulnerability). For Detect, we construct a new success indicator, which is general across vulnerability types and provides localized evaluation. We manually set up the environment for each system, including installing packages, setting up server(s), and hydrating database(s). We add 40 bug bounties, which are vulnerabilities with monetary awards from \10 to 30,485, covering 9 of the OWASP Top 10 Risks. To modulate task difficulty, we devise a new strategy based on information to guide detection, interpolating from identifying a zero day to exploiting a given vulnerability. We evaluate 10 agents: Claude Code, OpenAI Codex CLI with o3-high and o4-mini, and custom agents with o3-high, GPT-4.1, Gemini 2.5 Pro Preview, Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking, Qwen3 235B A22B, Llama 4 Maverick, and DeepSeek-R1. Given up to three attempts, the top-performing agents are Codex CLI: o3-high (12.5% on Detect, mapping to \3,720; 90% on Patch, mapping to 14,152), Custom Agent: Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking (67.5% on Exploit), and Codex CLI: o4-mini (90% on Patch, mapping to \$14,422). Codex CLI: o3-high, Codex CLI: o4-mini, and Claude Code are more capable at defense, achieving higher Patch scores of 90%, 90%, and 87.5%, compared to Exploit scores of 47.5%, 32.5%, and 57.5% respectively; while the custom agents are relatively balanced between offense and defense, achieving Exploit scores of 17.5-67.5% and Patch scores of 25-60%.

Recent advances have enabled LLM-powered AI agents to autonomously execute complex tasks by combining language model reasoning with tools, memory, and web access. But can these systems be trusted to follow deployment policies in realistic environments, especially under attack? To investigate, we ran the largest public red-teaming competition to date, targeting 22 frontier AI agents across 44 realistic deployment scenarios. Participants submitted 1.8 million prompt-injection attacks, with over 60,000 successfully eliciting policy violations such as unauthorized data access, illicit financial actions, and regulatory noncompliance. We use these results to build the Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark - a curated set of high-impact attacks - and evaluate it across 19 state-of-the-art models. Nearly all agents exhibit policy violations for most behaviors within 10-100 queries, with high attack transferability across models and tasks. Importantly, we find limited correlation between agent robustness and model size, capability, or inference-time compute, suggesting that additional defenses are needed against adversarial misuse. Our findings highlight critical and persistent vulnerabilities in today's AI agents. By releasing the ART benchmark and accompanying evaluation framework, we aim to support more rigorous security assessment and drive progress toward safer agent deployment.

LLM agents increasingly rely on agent harness: the runtime infrastructure around the base model that defines execution environments, tool interfaces, context, lifecycle orchestration, observability, verification, and governance. Existing self-improving agents and automatic harness evolution methods mainly improve agents through runtime supervision, prompt optimization, workflow search, or harness modification based on final outcomes. However, they often fail to diagnose where the responsible evidence lies in failed trajectories and which harness implementation mechanism causes the unreliable behavior, resulting in broad, indirect, or poorly scoped changes. This paper proposes HarnessFix, a trace-grounded and diagnosis-driven framework for repairing agent harnesses. HarnessFix compiles raw execution traces and harness artifacts into a Harness-aware Trace Intermediate Representation (HTIR), which normalizes fragmented trajectory evidence, captures step-level data-flow and control-flow relations, and aligns runtime steps with the harness artifacts that shape their behavior. It then attributes failures to responsible steps and harness artifacts, and consolidates recurring diagnoses into repair-oriented flaw records. Finally, HarnessFix maps these records to scoped repair operators, generates patches under flaw-specific repair specifications, and accepts them through regression-aware validation. We evaluate HarnessFix on four popular benchmarks, and results show that it improves the performance over the initial harnesses by 6.3% to 18.4%, significantly outperforming human-designed and self-evolution baselines. HarnessFix highlights the value of treating failed trajectories not only as feedback signals, but also as structured evidence for diagnosing and repairing the harness mechanisms behind agent failures.

Mitigating reward hacking--where AI systems misbehave due to flaws or misspecifications in their learning objectives--remains a key challenge in constructing capable and aligned models. We show that we can monitor a frontier reasoning model, such as OpenAI o3-mini, for reward hacking in agentic coding environments by using another LLM that observes the model's chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning. CoT monitoring can be far more effective than monitoring agent actions and outputs alone, and we further found that a LLM weaker than o3-mini, namely GPT-4o, can effectively monitor a stronger model. Because CoT monitors can be effective at detecting exploits, it is natural to ask whether those exploits can be suppressed by incorporating a CoT monitor directly into the agent's training objective. While we show that integrating CoT monitors into the reinforcement learning reward can indeed produce more capable and more aligned agents in the low optimization regime, we find that with too much optimization, agents learn obfuscated reward hacking, hiding their intent within the CoT while still exhibiting a significant rate of reward hacking. Because it is difficult to tell when CoTs have become obfuscated, it may be necessary to pay a monitorability tax by not applying strong optimization pressures directly to the chain-of-thought, ensuring that CoTs remain monitorable and useful for detecting misaligned behavior.

We present our vision for developing an automated tool capable of translating visual properties observed in Machine Learning (ML) visualisations into Python assertions. The tool aims to streamline the process of manually verifying these visualisations in the ML development cycle, which is critical as real-world data and assumptions often change post-deployment. In a prior study, we mined 54,070 Jupyter notebooks from Github and created a catalogue of 269 semantically related visualisation-assertion (VA) pairs. Building on this catalogue, we propose to build a taxonomy that organises the VA pairs based on ML verification tasks. The input feature space comprises of a rich source of information mined from the Jupyter notebooks -- visualisations, Python source code, and associated markdown text. The effectiveness of various AI models, including traditional NLP4Code models and modern Large Language Models, will be compared using established machine translation metrics and evaluated through a qualitative study with human participants. The paper also plans to address the challenge of extending the existing VA pair dataset with additional pairs from Kaggle and to compare the tool's effectiveness with commercial generative AI models like ChatGPT. This research not only contributes to the field of ML system validation but also explores novel ways to leverage AI for automating and enhancing software engineering practices in ML.

AI agents increasingly act through external tools: they query databases, execute shell commands, read and write files, and send network requests. Yet in most current agent stacks, model-generated tool calls are handed to the execution layer with no framework-agnostic control point in between. Post-execution observability can record these actions, but it cannot stop them before side effects occur. We present AEGIS, a pre-execution firewall and audit layer for AI agents. AEGIS interposes on the tool-execution path and applies a three-stage pipeline: (i) deep string extraction from tool arguments, (ii) content-first risk scanning, and (iii) composable policy validation. High-risk calls can be held for human approval, and all decisions are recorded in a tamper-evident audit trail based on Ed25519 signatures and SHA-256 hash chaining. In the current implementation, AEGIS supports 14 agent frameworks across Python, JavaScript, and Go with lightweight integration. On a curated suite of 48 attackinstances, AEGIS blocks all attacks in the suite before execution; on 500 benign tool calls, it yields a 1.2% false positive rate; and across 1,000 consecutive interceptions, it adds 8.3 ms median latency. The live demo will show end-to-end interception of benign, malicious, and human-escalated tool calls, allowing attendees to observe real-time blocking, approval workflows, and audit-trail generation. These results suggest that pre-execution mediation for AI agents can be practical, low-overhead, and directly deployable.

Multimodal industrial anomaly inspection assistants are a critical component of next-generation smart factories, enabling interactive vision-language-based querying. However, multimodal large language models remain impractical for on-site deployment due to prohibitive computational demands and privacy risks from cloud-based inference. Compact multimodal small language models (MSLMs) offer a deployable alternative, yet progress is constrained by the lack of comprehensive robustness analyses and meaningfully challenging benchmarks that reflect real-world industrial conditions. To address this gap, we develop RobustMAD, the first deployment-motivated benchmark, designed to comprehensively evaluate model robustness through diverse open-ended queries spanning object understanding, anomaly detection, unanswerable problems, and visual quality degradations. Contrary to conventional assumptions, top-performing MSLMs exhibit promising capabilities, surprisingly outperforming even the larger GPT-5 Nano. However, they still fall short of safety-critical requirements, and RobustMAD reveals critical robustness gaps that pose operational risks. In particular, three recurring failure modes emerge: (i) fragile multimodal grounding under fine-grained distinctions or degraded visual conditions, (ii) insufficiently comprehensive responses, and (iii) weak logical grounding on unanswerable or ill-posed queries, leading to hallucinated outputs. Grounded in these insights, we provide actionable guidance for the design of next-generation multimodal industrial inspection assistants that leverage their promising competence. Code is available at https://github.com/en-research/RobustMAD.

AI control is a family of techniques to prevent an AI with malicious goals from subverting its operator's intent. AI Control usually studies a single agent in one trajectory, but real deployments run many agents over shared infrastructure, and the most severe risks (model-weight exfiltration, training-run poisoning) plausibly need several agents acting in concert. We initiate the empirical study of multi-agent AI control, formalising distributed attacks in which several agents jointly aim for a malicious goal. We develop FakeLab: a synthetic AI-lab codebase (9 services, 86 benign tasks, 4 attack objectives). We evaluate single agent monitoring against distributed attacks, varying the number of agents, their coordination, model capabilities and precise monitoring configuration. Our central finding is the fragmentation effect: as more agents coordinate to attack, per-agent monitoring becomes less likely to catch any of the attackers. Secondly, this is not driven by the ratio of benign to malicious code -- we argue this is likely dependent on model capability. Third, an explicit planner amplifies the fragmentation effect, raises the rate of completing the attack up to sevenfold, and mildly sharpens executors' poor monitor-theory-of-mind. Finally: a weak "trusted" monitor misses most attacks, while a stronger one cuts undetected success by more than an order of magnitude but remains imperfect. We are happy to share FakeLab, our control setting, with safety researchers on request.

Visual Inspection with Acetic Acid (VIA) remains the most feasible cervical cancer screening test in resource-constrained settings of low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), which are often performed screening camps or primary/community health centers by nurses instead of the preferred but unavailable expert Gynecologist. To address the highly subjective nature of the test, various handheld devices integrating cameras or smartphones have been recently explored to capture cervical images during VIA and aid decision-making via telemedicine or AI models. Most studies proposing AI models retrospectively use a relatively small number of already collected images from specific devices, digital cameras, or smartphones; the challenges and protocol for quality image acquisition during VIA in resource-constrained camp settings, challenges in getting gold standard, data imbalance, etc. are often overlooked. We present a novel approach and describe the end-to-end design process to build a robust smartphone-based AI-assisted system that does not require buying a separate integrated device: the proposed protocol for quality image acquisition in resource-constrained settings, dataset collected from 1,430 women during VIA performed by nurses in screening camps, preprocessing pipeline, and training and evaluation of a deep-learning-based classification model aimed to identify (pre)cancerous lesions. Our work shows that the readily available smartphones and a suitable protocol can capture the cervix images with the required details for the VIA test well; the deep-learning-based classification model provides promising results to assist nurses in VIA screening; and provides a direction for large-scale data collection and validation in resource-constrained settings.

Self-improving AI agents are designed to learn from their mistakes. We show they can also hallucinate mistakes that never happened. We study this failure mode in automated harness optimization, where an LLM-based proposer edits an agent's scaffold, including prompts, parsers, filters, validators and guardrails, to eliminate observed failures. But this process rarely asks first: was there a real failure to fix? We introduce the Counterfactual Fabrication Lab, a deterministic micro-lab where the correct action is known: do nothing. The lab plants a candidate guardrail for a failure class that provably never occurs, presents only legal episodes, and uses a byte-exact oracle to check every cited violation. The proposer behaves as expected on real violations and abstains on featureless legal input. Yet when the legal input contains a harmless pattern resembling a familiar game rule, it invents a failure: in 15/60 runs, versus 0/60 on featureless input, it enables the nonexistent-rule guardrail and cites a violation the oracle refutes. The effect is structured, not indiscriminate. In single-shot proposals it appears only when three conditions coincide: a rule-shaped pattern, an open-ended rule set and an instruction that presupposes failures. Removing any of these conditions eliminates the fabrication. Because the invented guardrail changes no true outcome and cannot improve an already-perfect suppression score, the phenomenon is neither reward hacking nor over-refusal. It is a phantom guardrail: a fix for a failure that never happened, invisible to suppression-only acceptance. Inside an add-only accept loop it re-enters even without the failure-presupposing instruction, the loop's keep-adding role supplying the demand the instruction supplied in single shot, and once in it stays. We present the Counterfactual Fabrication Lab for measuring fabricated failures in self-improving agent harnesses.

AI led chess systems to a superhuman level, yet these systems heavily rely on black-box algorithms. This is unsustainable in ensuring transparency to the end-user, particularly when these systems are responsible for sensitive decision-making. Recent interpretability work has shown that the inner representations of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) were fathomable and contained human-understandable concepts. Yet, these methods are seldom contextualised and are often based on a single hidden state, which makes them unable to interpret multi-step reasoning, e.g. planning. In this respect, we propose contrastive sparse autoencoders (CSAE), a novel framework for studying pairs of game trajectories. Using CSAE, we are able to extract and interpret concepts that are meaningful to the chess-agent plans. We primarily focused on a qualitative analysis of the CSAE features before proposing an automated feature taxonomy. Furthermore, to evaluate the quality of our trained CSAE, we devise sanity checks to wave spurious correlations in our results.

Outsourced printed circuit board (PCB) fabrication necessitates increased hardware assurance capabilities. Several assurance techniques based on automated optical inspection (AOI) have been proposed that leverage PCB images acquired using digital cameras. We review state-of-the-art AOI techniques and observe a strong, rapid trend toward machine learning (ML) solutions. These require significant amounts of labeled ground truth data, which is lacking in the publicly available PCB data space. We contribute the FICS PCB Image Collection (FPIC) dataset to address this need. Additionally, we outline new hardware security methodologies enabled by our data set.

Progress in image generation raises significant public security concerns. We argue that fake image detection should not operate as a "black box". Instead, an ideal approach must ensure both strong generalization and transparency. Recent progress in Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) offers new opportunities for reasoning-based AI-generated image detection. In this work, we evaluate the capabilities of MLLMs in comparison to traditional detection methods and human evaluators, highlighting their strengths and limitations. Furthermore, we design six distinct prompts and propose a framework that integrates these prompts to develop a more robust, explainable, and reasoning-driven detection system. The code is available at https://github.com/Gennadiyev/mllm-defake.

With the rapid advancement of generative models, highly realistic image synthesis has posed new challenges to digital security and media credibility. Although AI-generated image detection methods have partially addressed these concerns, a substantial research gap remains in evaluating their performance under complex real-world conditions. This paper introduces the Real-World Robustness Dataset (RRDataset) for comprehensive evaluation of detection models across three dimensions: 1) Scenario Generalization: RRDataset encompasses high-quality images from seven major scenarios (War and Conflict, Disasters and Accidents, Political and Social Events, Medical and Public Health, Culture and Religion, Labor and Production, and everyday life), addressing existing dataset gaps from a content perspective. 2) Internet Transmission Robustness: examining detector performance on images that have undergone multiple rounds of sharing across various social media platforms. 3) Re-digitization Robustness: assessing model effectiveness on images altered through four distinct re-digitization methods. We benchmarked 17 detectors and 10 vision-language models (VLMs) on RRDataset and conducted a large-scale human study involving 192 participants to investigate human few-shot learning capabilities in detecting AI-generated images. The benchmarking results reveal the limitations of current AI detection methods under real-world conditions and underscore the importance of drawing on human adaptability to develop more robust detection algorithms.

AI agents that interact with their environments through tools enable powerful applications, but in high-stakes business settings, unintended actions can cause unacceptable harm, such as privacy breaches and financial loss. Existing mitigations, such as training-based methods and neural guardrails, improve agent reliability but cannot provide guarantees. We study symbolic guardrails as a practical path toward strong safety and security guarantees for AI agents. Our three-part study includes a systematic review of 80 state-of-the-art agent safety and security benchmarks to identify the policies they evaluate, an analysis of which policy requirements can be guaranteed by symbolic guardrails, and an evaluation of how symbolic guardrails affect safety, security, and agent success on τ^2-Bench, CAR-bench, and MedAgentBench. We find that 85\% of benchmarks lack concrete policies, relying instead on underspecified high-level goals or common sense. Among the specified policies, 74\% of policy requirements can be enforced by symbolic guardrails, often using simple, low-cost mechanisms. These guardrails improve safety and security without sacrificing agent utility. Overall, our results suggest that symbolic guardrails are a practical and effective way to guarantee some safety and security requirements, especially for domain-specific AI agents. We release all codes and artifacts at https://github.com/hyn0027/agent-symbolic-guardrails.

Observability into the decision making of modern AI systems may be required to safely deploy increasingly capable agents. Monitoring the chain-of-thought (CoT) of today's reasoning models has proven effective for detecting misbehavior. However, this "monitorability" may be fragile under different training procedures, data sources, or even continued system scaling. To measure and track monitorability, we propose three evaluation archetypes (intervention, process, and outcome-property) and a new monitorability metric, and introduce a broad evaluation suite. We demonstrate that these evaluations can catch simple model organisms trained to have obfuscated CoTs, and that CoT monitoring is more effective than action-only monitoring in practical settings. We compare the monitorability of various frontier models and find that most models are fairly, but not perfectly, monitorable. We also evaluate how monitorability scales with inference-time compute, reinforcement learning optimization, and pre-training model size. We find that longer CoTs are generally more monitorable and that RL optimization does not materially decrease monitorability even at the current frontier scale. Notably, we find that for a model at a low reasoning effort, we could instead deploy a smaller model at a higher reasoning effort (thereby matching capabilities) and obtain a higher monitorability, albeit at a higher overall inference compute cost. We further investigate agent-monitor scaling trends and find that scaling a weak monitor's test-time compute when monitoring a strong agent increases monitorability. Giving the weak monitor access to CoT not only improves monitorability, but it steepens the monitor's test-time compute to monitorability scaling trend. Finally, we show we can improve monitorability by asking models follow-up questions and giving their follow-up CoT to the monitor.

As LLM agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent systems, they introduce risks of covert coordination that may evade standard forms of human oversight. While linear probes on model activations have shown promise for detecting deception in single-agent settings, collusion is inherently a multi-agent phenomenon, and the use of internal representations for detecting collusion between agents remains unexplored. We introduce NARCBench, a benchmark for evaluating collusion detection under environment distribution shift, and propose five probing techniques that aggregate per-agent deception scores to classify scenarios at the group level. Our probes achieve 1.00 AUROC in-distribution and 0.60--0.86 AUROC when transferred zero-shot to structurally different multi-agent scenarios and a steganographic blackjack card-counting task. We find that no single probing technique dominates across all collusion types, suggesting that different forms of collusion manifest differently in activation space. We also find preliminary evidence that this signal is localised at the token level, with the colluding agent's activations spiking specifically when processing the encoded parts of their partner's message. This work takes a step toward multi-agent interpretability: extending white-box inspection from single models to multi-agent contexts, where detection requires aggregating signals across agents. These results suggest that model internals provide a complementary signal to text-level monitoring for detecting multi-agent collusion, particularly for organisations with access to model activations. Code and data are available at https://github.com/aaronrose227/narcbench.

Agentic AI systems act through tools and evolve their behavior over long, stochastic interaction traces. This setting complicates assurance, because behavior depends on nondeterministic environments and probabilistic model outputs. Prior work introduced runtime verification for agentic AI via Dynamic Probabilistic Assurance (DPA), learning an MDP online and model checking quantitative properties. A key limitation is that developers must manually define the state abstraction, which couples verification to application-specific heuristics and increases adoption friction. This paper proposes TriCEGAR, a trace-driven abstraction mechanism that automates state construction from execution logs and supports online construction of an agent behavioral MDP. TriCEGAR represents abstractions as predicate trees learned from traces and refined using counterexamples. We describe a framework-native implementation that (i) captures typed agent lifecycle events, (ii) builds abstractions from traces, (iii) constructs an MDP, and (iv) performs probabilistic model checking to compute bounds such as Pmax(success) and Pmin(failure). We also show how run likelihoods enable anomaly detection as a guardrailing signal.