Daily Papers

Recent advances in Deep Research Agents (DRAs) are transforming automated knowledge discovery and problem-solving. While the majority of existing efforts focus on enhancing policy capabilities via post-training, we propose an alternative paradigm: self-evolving the agent's ability by iteratively verifying the policy model's outputs, guided by meticulously crafted rubrics. This approach gives rise to the inference-time scaling of verification, wherein an agent self-improves by evaluating its generated answers to produce iterative feedback and refinements. We derive the rubrics based on an automatically constructed DRA Failure Taxonomy, which systematically classifies agent failures into five major categories and thirteen sub-categories. We present DeepVerifier, a rubrics-based outcome reward verifier that leverages the asymmetry of verification and outperforms vanilla agent-as-judge and LLM judge baselines by 12%-48% in meta-evaluation F1 score. To enable practical self-evolution, DeepVerifier integrates as a plug-and-play module during test-time inference. The verifier produces detailed rubric-based feedback, which is fed back to the agent for iterative bootstrapping, refining responses without additional training. This test-time scaling delivers 8%-11% accuracy gains on challenging subsets of GAIA and XBench-DeepResearch when powered by capable closed-source LLMs. Finally, to support open-source advancement, we release DeepVerifier-4K, a curated supervised fine-tuning dataset of 4,646 high-quality agent steps focused on DRA verification. These examples emphasize reflection and self-critique, enabling open models to develop robust verification capabilities.

Deep Research Agents (DRAs) aim to automatically produce analyst-level reports through iterative information retrieval and synthesis. However, most existing DRAs were validated on question-answering benchmarks, while research on generating comprehensive reports remains overlooked. Worse, current benchmarks for report synthesis suffer from task complexity and subjective metrics -- this fails to reflect user demands and limits the practical utility of generated reports. To address these gaps, we present Fine-grained DEepResearch bench (FINDER), an enhanced benchmark consisting of 100 human-curated research tasks with 419 structured checklist items that standardize report structure, analytical depth, and factual grounding. Based on approximately 1,000 reports produced by mainstream DRAs, we further propose Deep rEsearch Failure Taxonomy (DEFT), the first failure taxonomy for deep research agents. DEFT contains 14 fine-grained failure modes across reasoning, retrieval, and generation, and is built upon grounded theory with human-LLM co-annotating and inter-annotator reliability validation. Our experimental findings reveal that current DRAs struggle not with task comprehension but with evidence integration, verification, and reasoning-resilient planning.

Multi-provider LLM gateways reverse proxies that route, load-balance, and rate-limit requests across foundation-model APIs have become critical production infrastructure. Yet the failure modes specific to this architectural layer remain undocumented, scattered across issue trackers and post-mortems with no unifying framework. We introduce , a two-axis taxonomy that classifies failures by their origin layer (Network/Transport, Streaming/Protocol, State/Session, Model~Behavior, Governance/Cost) and their detectability (Loud vs.\ Silent). We populate this taxonomy with five verified catalog entries sourced from public bug reports and first-hand stress testing, each accompanied by a mechanistic root-cause analysis. Three entries include standalone reproduction scripts. Our principal finding is that the most operationally severe failures are silent: they return HTTP~200, pass every standard health check, and corrupt application state in ways that require semantic-level observability to detect. Two such silent failures a concurrency race condition causing history loss and a streaming index collision corrupting tool-call payloads were discovered first-hand during evaluation campaigns.

The continuous delivery of modern software requires the execution of many automated pipeline jobs. These jobs ensure the frequent release of new software versions while detecting code problems at an early stage. For TELUS, our industrial partner in the telecommunications field, reliable job execution is crucial to minimize wasted time and streamline Continuous Deployment (CD). In this context, flaky job failures are one of the main issues hindering CD. Prior studies proposed techniques based on machine learning to automate the detection of flaky jobs. While valuable, these solutions are insufficient to address the waste associated with the diagnosis of flaky failures, which remain largely unexplored due to the wide range of underlying causes. This study examines 4,511 flaky job failures at TELUS to identify the different categories of flaky failures that we prioritize based on Recency, Frequency, and Monetary (RFM) measures. We identified 46 flaky failure categories that we analyzed using clustering and RFM measures to determine 14 priority categories for future automated diagnosis and repair research. Our findings also provide valuable insights into the evolution and impact of these categories. The identification and prioritization of flaky failure categories using RFM analysis introduce a novel approach that can be used in other contexts.

Agentic systems consisting of multiple LLM-driven agents coordinating through tools and structured interactions, are increasingly deployed for complex reasoning and problem-solving tasks. At the same time, emerging low-code and template-based agent development platforms (e.g., Dify) enable users to rapidly build and orchestrate agentic systems, which we refer to as platform-orchestrated agentic systems. However, these systems are also fragile and it remains unclear how to systematically identify their potential failure root cause. This paper presents a study of root cause identification of these platform-orchestrated agentic systems. To support this initiative, we construct a dataset AgentFail containing 307 failure logs from ten agentic systems, each with fine-grained annotations linking failures to their root causes. We additionally utilize counterfactual reasoning-based repair strategy to ensure the reliability of the annotation. Building on the dataset, we develop a taxonomy that characterizes failure root causes and analyze their distribution across different platforms and task domains. Furthermore, we introduce a benchmark that leverages LLMs for automatically identifying root causes, in which we also utilize the proposed taxonomy as guidance for LLMs. Results show that the taxonomy can largely improve the performance, thereby confirming its utility. Nevertheless, the accuracy of root cause identification reaches at most 33.6%, which indicates that this task still remains challenging. In light of these results, we also provide actionable guidelines for building such agentic systems. In summary, this paper provides a reliable dataset of failure root cause for platform-orchestrated agentic systems, corresponding taxonomy and benchmark, which serves as a foundation for advancing the development of more reliable agentic systems.

AI agents often fail in ways that are difficult to localize because executions are probabilistic, long-horizon, multi-agent, and mediated by noisy tool outputs. We address this gap by manually annotating failed agent runs and release a novel benchmark of 115 failed trajectories spanning structured API workflows, incident management, and open-ended web/file tasks. Each trajectory is annotated with a critical failure step and a category from a grounded-theory derived, cross-domain failure taxonomy. To mitigate the human cost of failure attribution, we present AGENTRX, an automated domain-agnostic diagnostic framework that pinpoints the critical failure step in a failed agent trajectory. It synthesizes constraints, evaluates them step-by-step, and produces an auditable validation log of constraint violations with associated evidence; an LLM-based judge uses this log to localize the critical step and category. Our framework improves step localization and failure attribution over existing baselines across three domains.

Autonomous agent systems powered by Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising capabilities in automating complex tasks. However, current evaluations largely rely on success rates without systematically analyzing the interactions, communication mechanisms, and failure causes within these systems. To bridge this gap, we present a benchmark of 34 representative programmable tasks designed to rigorously assess autonomous agents. Using this benchmark, we evaluate three popular open-source agent frameworks combined with two LLM backbones, observing a task completion rate of approximately 50%. Through in-depth failure analysis, we develop a three-tier taxonomy of failure causes aligned with task phases, highlighting planning errors, task execution issues, and incorrect response generation. Based on these insights, we propose actionable improvements to enhance agent planning and self-diagnosis capabilities. Our failure taxonomy, together with mitigation advice, provides an empirical foundation for developing more robust and effective autonomous agent systems in the future.

Rubric-based evaluation is widely used in LLM benchmarks and training pipelines for open-ended, less verifiable tasks. While prior work has demonstrated the effectiveness of rubrics using downstream signals such as reinforcement learning outcomes, there remains no principled way to diagnose how a rubric itself fails from such aggregated or downstream signals alone. To address this gap, we introduce RIFT: RubrIc Failure mode Taxonomy, a taxonomy for systematically characterizing failure modes in rubric composition and design. RIFT consists of eight failure modes organized into three high-level categories: Reliability Failures, Content Validity Failures, and Consequential Validity Failures. RIFT is developed using grounded theory by iteratively annotating rubrics drawn from five diverse data sources spanning general instruction following, code generation, creative writing, and expert-level deep research, until no new failure modes are identified. We evaluate the consistency of the taxonomy by measuring agreement among independent human annotators, observing fair agreement overall (87% pairwise agreement and 0.64 average Cohen's kappa). Finally, to support scalable diagnosis, we propose automated rubric quality metrics and show that they align with human failure-mode annotations, achieving up to 0.925 F1.

Autonomous coding agents built on large language models (LLMs) are rapidly being integrated into development workflows, yet their operational safety properties remain poorly understood beyond evaluations of explicitly malicious inputs. In practice, high-impact failures arise during benign, goal-directed use through environment breakage, fabricated success reports, etc. that current benchmarks do not capture. What categories of operational safety failures actually occur when coding agents are used for everyday development tasks and what is their impact? We present an incident-driven empirical study grounded in two complementary evidence streams. We screen 68,816 papers from 22 premier venues, curating 185 safety-relevant studies, and mine 16,586 GitHub issues from widely deployed LLM-powered coding tools, manually confirming 547 genuine safety failures. Applying systematic open coding over both corpora, we derive a multi-dimensional safety taxonomy of 33 operational risk types organized across seven dimensions, and annotate each incident with contributing factors, task context, severity, and downstream impact. Our findings show that coding-agent failures are often severe, with 326 of 547 incidents rated high or critical. The dominant risks are constraint violations, destructive operations, authorization bypasses, and deception, and over 65% of incidents arise in bug fixing and setup or configuration, patterns largely missing from prior literature. These results have direct implications for SE tool designers and benchmark developers: guardrails must go beyond adversarial-prompt defenses to enforce environmental constraints, failure transparency, and safe-halt behaviors.

Root cause analysis (RCA) is essential for diagnosing failures within complex software systems to ensure system reliability. The highly distributed and interdependent nature of modern cloud-based systems often complicates RCA efforts, particularly for multi-hop fault propagation, where symptoms appear far from their true causes. Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) present new opportunities to enhance automated RCA. However, their practical value for RCA depends on the fidelity of reasoning and decision-making. Existing work relies on historical incident corpora, operates directly on high-volume telemetry beyond current LLM capacity, or embeds reasoning inside complex multi-agent pipelines -- conditions that obscure whether failures arise from reasoning itself or from peripheral design choices. We present a focused empirical evaluation that isolates an LLM's reasoning behavior. We design a controlled experimental framework that foregrounds the LLM by using a simplified experimental setting. We evaluate six LLMs under two agentic workflows (ReAct and Plan-and-Execute) and a non-agentic baseline on two real-world case studies (GAIA and OpenRCA). In total, we executed 48,000 simulated failure scenarios, totaling 228 days of execution time. We measure both root-cause accuracy and the quality of intermediate reasoning traces. We produce a labeled taxonomy of 16 common RCA reasoning failures and use an LLM-as-a-Judge for annotation. Our results clarify where current open-source LLMs succeed and fail in multi-hop RCA, quantify sensitivity to input data modalities, and identify reasoning failures that predict final correctness. Together, these contributions provide transparent and reproducible empirical results and a failure taxonomy to guide future work on reasoning-driven system diagnosis.

The open-world deployment of Machine Learning (ML) algorithms in safety-critical applications such as autonomous vehicles needs to address a variety of ML vulnerabilities such as interpretability, verifiability, and performance limitations. Research explores different approaches to improve ML dependability by proposing new models and training techniques to reduce generalization error, achieve domain adaptation, and detect outlier examples and adversarial attacks. However, there is a missing connection between ongoing ML research and well-established safety principles. In this paper, we present a structured and comprehensive review of ML techniques to improve the dependability of ML algorithms in uncontrolled open-world settings. From this review, we propose the Taxonomy of ML Safety that maps state-of-the-art ML techniques to key engineering safety strategies. Our taxonomy of ML safety presents a safety-oriented categorization of ML techniques to provide guidance for improving dependability of the ML design and development. The proposed taxonomy can serve as a safety checklist to aid designers in improving coverage and diversity of safety strategies employed in any given ML system.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) and generative AI become increasingly widespread, concerns about content safety have grown in parallel. Currently, there is a clear lack of high-quality, human-annotated datasets that address the full spectrum of LLM-related safety risks and are usable for commercial applications. To bridge this gap, we propose a comprehensive and adaptable taxonomy for categorizing safety risks, structured into 12 top-level hazard categories with an extension to 9 fine-grained subcategories. This taxonomy is designed to meet the diverse requirements of downstream users, offering more granular and flexible tools for managing various risk types. Using a hybrid data generation pipeline that combines human annotations with a multi-LLM "jury" system to assess the safety of responses, we obtain Aegis 2.0, a carefully curated collection of 34,248 samples of human-LLM interactions, annotated according to our proposed taxonomy. To validate its effectiveness, we demonstrate that several lightweight models, trained using parameter-efficient techniques on Aegis 2.0, achieve performance competitive with leading safety models fully fine-tuned on much larger, non-commercial datasets. In addition, we introduce a novel training blend that combines safety with topic following data.This approach enhances the adaptability of guard models, enabling them to generalize to new risk categories defined during inference. We plan to open-source Aegis 2.0 data and models to the research community to aid in the safety guardrailing of LLMs.

Despite growing enthusiasm for Multi-Agent Systems (MAS), where multiple LLM agents collaborate to accomplish tasks, their performance gains across popular benchmarks remain minimal compared to single-agent frameworks. This gap highlights the need to analyze the challenges hindering MAS effectiveness. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive study of MAS challenges. We analyze five popular MAS frameworks across over 150 tasks, involving six expert human annotators. We identify 14 unique failure modes and propose a comprehensive taxonomy applicable to various MAS frameworks. This taxonomy emerges iteratively from agreements among three expert annotators per study, achieving a Cohen's Kappa score of 0.88. These fine-grained failure modes are organized into 3 categories, (i) specification and system design failures, (ii) inter-agent misalignment, and (iii) task verification and termination. To support scalable evaluation, we integrate MASFT with LLM-as-a-Judge. We also explore if identified failures could be easily prevented by proposing two interventions: improved specification of agent roles and enhanced orchestration strategies. Our findings reveal that identified failures require more complex solutions, highlighting a clear roadmap for future research. We open-source our dataset and LLM annotator.

A prevalent assumption in LLM agent deployment holds that more structured harnesses universally improve reliability, and that higher-capability models need proportionally less structural guidance -- together implying a monotone inverse relationship between model capability tier and optimal harness complexity. We test this hypothesis through a controlled 432-run experiment crossing six models across four capability tiers with three harness conditions (light, balanced, strict) on HEAT-24, a 24-task synthetic benchmark with git-based workspace verification. Our results refute the monotone inverse relationship on two fronts. First, for the frontier chat model evaluated (Gemini 2.5 Flash), increased harness verbosity lowers VTSR by 29-38 percentage points -- a harness-complexity paradox. Second, for the frontier reasoning model evaluated (Qwen3.5-122B, extended thinking enabled), strict harness achieves the highest VTSR (91.7%) and the lowest latency, the opposite of the prediction. Within the constrained tier, a 2B model (Gemma4:e2B) matches strong-open-tier stability at 91.7% across all harnesses. Because each tier is represented by a single model in this study, these results should be interpreted as model-specific observations; harness sensitivity appears non-monotone across the models evaluated, and depends critically on model type (chat vs. reasoning). We introduce a six-label failure taxonomy showing that format_violation dominates capable-model failures while wrong_file dominates low-capability failures, and we derive practical tier-aware harness selection guidelines.

AI systems fail silently far more often than they fail visibly. In an analysis of 100K human-AI interactions from the WildChat dataset, we find that 79% of AI failures are invisible: something went wrong but the user gave no overt indication that there was a problem. These invisible failures cluster into eight archetypes that help us characterize where and how AI systems are failing to meet users' needs. In addition, the archetypes show systematic co-occurrence patterns indicating higher-level failure types. To address the question of whether these archetypes will remain relevant as AI systems become more capable, we also created and annotated a counterfactual dataset in which WildChat's 2024-era responses are replaced by those from three present-day frontier LMs. This analysis indicates that failure rates have dropped substantially, but that the vast majority of failures remain invisible in our sense, and the distribution of failure archetypes seems stable. Finally, we illustrate how the archetypes help us to identify systematic and variable AI limitations across different usage domains. Overall, we argue that our invisible failure taxonomy can be a key component in reliable failure monitoring for product developers, scientists, and policy makers. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/bigspinai/bigspin-invisible-failure-archetypes

Large Language Model (LLM) agents, which integrate planning, memory, reflection, and tool-use modules, have shown promise in solving complex, multi-step tasks. Yet their sophisticated architectures amplify vulnerability to cascading failures, where a single root-cause error propagates through subsequent decisions, leading to task failure. Current systems lack a framework that can comprehensively understand agent error in a modular and systemic way, and therefore fail to detect these errors accordingly. We address this gap with three contributions. First, we introduce the AgentErrorTaxonomy, a modular classification of failure modes spanning memory, reflection, planning, action, and system-level operations. Second, we construct AgentErrorBench, the first dataset of systematically annotated failure trajectories from ALFWorld, GAIA, and WebShop, grounding error analysis in real-world agent rollouts. Third, we propose AgentDebug, a debugging framework that isolates root-cause failures and provides corrective feedback, enabling agents to recover and iteratively improve. Experiments on AgentErrorBench show that AgentDebug achieves 24% higher all-correct accuracy and 17% higher step accuracy compared to the strongest baseline. Beyond detection, the targeted feedback generated by AgentDebug enables LLM agents to iteratively recover from failures, yielding up to 26% relative improvements in task success across ALFWorld, GAIA, and WebShop. These results establish principled debugging as a pathway to more reliable and adaptive LLM agents. The code and data will be available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/AgentDebug

Large language models (LLMs) are being rapidly integrated into decision-support tools, automation workflows, and AI-enabled software systems. However, their behavior in production environments remains poorly understood, and their failure patterns differ fundamentally from those of traditional machine learning models. This paper presents a system-level taxonomy of fifteen hidden failure modes that arise in real-world LLM applications, including multi-step reasoning drift, latent inconsistency, context-boundary degradation, incorrect tool invocation, version drift, and cost-driven performance collapse. Using this taxonomy, we analyze the growing gap in evaluation and monitoring practices: existing benchmarks measure knowledge or reasoning but provide little insight into stability, reproducibility, drift, or workflow integration. We further examine the production challenges associated with deploying LLMs - including observability limitations, cost constraints, and update-induced regressions - and outline high-level design principles for building reliable, maintainable, and cost-aware LLM systems. Finally, we outline high-level design principles for building reliable, maintainable, and cost-aware LLM-based systems. By framing LLM reliability as a system-engineering problem rather than a purely model-centric one, this work provides an analytical foundation for future research on evaluation methodology, AI system robustness, and dependable LLM deployment.

Can small language models achieve strong tool-use performance without complex adaptation mechanisms? This paper investigates this question through Meta-Tool, a controlled empirical study comparing hypernetwork-based LoRA adaptation against carefully designed few-shot prompting. Using a Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct backbone, we evaluate four adaptation mechanisms--few-shot prompting, documentation encoding, hypernetwork-generated LoRA weights, and value-guided beam search--across four diverse benchmarks: Gorilla APIBench, Spider 2.0, WebArena, and InterCode. Our central finding is a well-supported negative result: despite generating non-trivial weight matrices, the 227.8M-parameter hypernetwork provides no measurable improvement over few-shot prompting alone. Comprehensive ablation studies reveal that few-shot examples contribute +21.5% to performance and documentation contributes +5.0%, while the hypernetwork adds 0%. A 3B model with well-designed prompts achieves 79.7% of GPT-5's average performance at 10 times lower latency. Error analysis across 722 failure cases spanning all shot counts (0--5) shows that at the 5-shot configuration (106 failures), failure modes are task-dependent: schema-heavy tasks (Spider 2.0, WebArena) show near-zero format errors with remaining failures semantic, while format errors dominate on Gorilla (100%) and InterCode (70%). These findings redirect practitioners toward prompt engineering and example curation rather than complex adaptation architectures.

Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA) is consistently ranked the most critical API security vulnerability, yet the existing literature remains almost entirely conceptual. This paper presents one of the first large-scale empirical analyses of BOLA in publicly disclosed bug bounty reports. We constructed a reproducible sampling frame of 200 HackerOne disclosures tagged IDOR or Improper Access Control (2021-2026) and applied a three-criterion inclusion filter, yielding 107 fully classified reports. Classification used an LLM-assisted schema-completion procedure under constrained, human-adjudicated criteria against a six-family BOLA taxonomy. Of 107 classified reports, 84 (78.5%) were confirmed in-scope BOLA. Action-Level Object BOLA, defined by unauthorized state-changing actions on another user's objects, accounts for 41.7% of confirmed cases and emerges alongside Direct Object Reference BOLA as one of the two dominant families observed in the dataset. This shows a pattern historically underrepresented in practitioner guidance. Approximately 21.5% of classified reports are out-of-scope under strict criteria, indicating that tag-counting on platforms like HackerOne significantly overstates the BOLA-specific signal. We report distributions across family, action type, authorization direction, industry sector, identifier format, and exploit mechanism. Key secondary findings include an 11.9% rate of vertical (user-to-admin) privilege failures and systematic exploitation of GraphQL Global IDs across major platforms. Findings have direct implications for API security testing protocols, developer education, and OWASP guidance.

Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) is a critical tool for mitigating potential failures, particular during ramp-up phases of new products. However, its effectiveness is often limited by the missing reasoning capabilities of the FMEA tools, which are usually tabular structured. Meanwhile, large language models (LLMs) offer novel prospects for fine-tuning on custom datasets for reasoning within FMEA contexts. However, LLMs face challenges in tasks that require factual knowledge, a gap that retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) approaches aim to fill. RAG retrieves information from a non-parametric data store and uses a language model to generate responses. Building on this idea, we propose to advance the non-parametric data store with a knowledge graph (KG). By enhancing the RAG framework with a KG, our objective is to leverage analytical and semantic question-answering capabilities on FMEA data. This paper contributes by presenting a new ontology for FMEA observations, an algorithm for creating vector embeddings from the FMEA KG, and a KG enhanced RAG framework. Our approach is validated through a human study and we measure the performance of the context retrieval recall and precision.

The deployment of embodied agents in self-driving laboratories could accelerate scientific discovery, yet their reliability is constrained by the irreversible and safety-critical nature of chemical experiments. Progress is further hindered by scarce failure data and the lack of fine-grained evaluation protocols. To address these challenges, we introduce LabRobFail, a failure-centric framework for learning and evaluating robotic failure analysis in chemical laboratories. LabRobFail-Sim injects controllable failures at the control, physics, and semantic levels, enabling the construction of LabRobFail-Data, which contains over 20,000 trajectories across 70+ task scenarios, five failure categories, and 11 fine-grained failure types. LabRobFail-Bench evaluates six capabilities spanning task understanding, failure detection, temporal localization, severity assessment, failure classification, and actionable correction. We further develop LabRobFail-VLM, a domain-specialized vision-language model that generates structured failure diagnoses and recovery instructions. On seen environments, it achieves 90.83% failure-detection accuracy and 77.21% temporal-localization accuracy, substantially outperforming general-purpose VLMs. When integrated as a real-time supervisor, it improves downstream task success rates by 4-16 percentage points, demonstrating the value of fine-grained failure understanding for closed-loop recovery and reliable laboratory autonomy. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/Su-ISE-2001/SciRobo

Java remains central to enterprise software, and many applications outlive their original architecture. Migrating them across frameworks is a behavior-preserving refactoring spanning build configuration, dependency injection, persistence, request handling, and deployment. Existing software-engineering benchmarks cover bug fixing, feature implementation, and language or version modernization, but leave cross-framework refactoring largely unmeasured. We introduce ScarfBench, a benchmark for behavior-preserving cross-framework refactoring of enterprise Java applications. It is built from expert-written implementation triples across Spring, Jakarta EE, and Quarkus: 34 applications (29 focused single-layer, 5 whole) yielding 102 variants (~151K lines across 1946 source and test files) and 204 directed refactoring tasks. Each task gives an agent a working source application and a target framework; the agent must synthesize a target implementation preserving the source behavior. Correctness is evaluated by an application-specific executable oracle: the candidate must compile, deploy in a containerized target runtime, and pass behavioral tests over the application's observable interface. We evaluate five state-of-the-art coding agents on ScarfBench. The strongest achieves only 15.3% aggregate test pass on focused-layer migrations and 12.2% on whole applications, and only one of the 204 tasks yields a fully behaviorally equivalent target. Difficulty is asymmetric across framework directions and architectural layers: Spring<->Quarkus is the most tractable pair, and Jakarta-targeted migrations are hardest. From LLM-as-a-judge and expert adjudication of failed-task traces, we derive a taxonomy of recurring failure categories spanning build, deploy, and test stages. We release the benchmark, harness, and agent traces at https://scarfbench.info.

Deep Research Agents are a prominent category of LLM-based agents. By autonomously orchestrating multistep web exploration, targeted retrieval, and higher-order synthesis, they transform vast amounts of online information into analyst-grade, citation-rich reports--compressing hours of manual desk research into minutes. However, a comprehensive benchmark for systematically evaluating the capabilities of these agents remains absent. To bridge this gap, we present DeepResearch Bench, a benchmark consisting of 100 PhD-level research tasks, each meticulously crafted by domain experts across 22 distinct fields. Evaluating DRAs is inherently complex and labor-intensive. We therefore propose two novel methodologies that achieve strong alignment with human judgment. The first is a reference-based method with adaptive criteria to assess the quality of generated research reports. The other framework is introduced to evaluate DRA's information retrieval and collection capabilities by assessing its effective citation count and overall citation accuracy. We have open-sourced DeepResearch Bench and key components of these frameworks at https://github.com/Ayanami0730/deep_research_bench to accelerate the development of practical LLM-based agents.

Tool-using automation systems, from scripts and CI bots to agentic assistants, fail in recurring patterns. Common failures include unsafe side effects, invalid arguments, uncontrolled retries, and leakage of sensitive outputs. Many mitigations are model-centric and prompt-dependent, so they are brittle and do not generalize to non-LLM callers. We present Policy-First Tooling, a model-agnostic permission layer that mediates tool invocation through explicit constraints, risk-aware gating, recovery controls, and auditable explanations. The paper contributes a compact policy DSL, a runtime enforcement architecture with actionable rationale and fix hints, and a reproducible benchmark based on trace replay with controlled fault and misuse injection. In 225 controlled runs across five policy packs and three fault profiles, stricter packs improve violation prevention from 0.000 in P0 to 0.681 in P4, while task success drops from 0.356 to 0.067. Retry amplification decreases from 3.774 in P0 to 1.378 in P4, and leakage recall reaches 0.875 under injected secret outputs. These results make safety to utility trade-offs explicit and measurable.

Software engineers develop, fine-tune, and deploy deep learning (DL) models. They use and re-use models in a variety of development frameworks and deploy them on a range of runtime environments. In this diverse ecosystem, engineers use DL model converters to move models from frameworks to runtime environments. However, errors in converters can compromise model quality and disrupt deployment. The failure frequency and failure modes of DL model converters are unknown. In this paper, we conduct the first failure analysis on DL model converters. Specifically, we characterize failures in model converters associated with ONNX (Open Neural Network eXchange). We analyze past failures in the ONNX converters in two major DL frameworks, PyTorch and TensorFlow. The symptoms, causes, and locations of failures (for N=200 issues), and trends over time are also reported. We also evaluate present-day failures by converting 8,797 models, both real-world and synthetically generated instances. The consistent result from both parts of the study is that DL model converters commonly fail by producing models that exhibit incorrect behavior: 33% of past failures and 8% of converted models fell into this category. Our results motivate future research on making DL software simpler to maintain, extend, and validate.

Modern analyst agents must reason over complex, high token inputs, including dozens of retrieved documents, tool outputs, and time sensitive data. While prior work has produced tool calling benchmarks and examined factuality in knowledge augmented systems, relatively little work studies their intersection: settings where LLMs must integrate large volumes of dynamic, structured and unstructured multi tool outputs. We investigate LLM failure modes in this regime using crypto as a representative high data density domain. We introduce (1) CryptoAnalystBench, an analyst aligned benchmark of 198 production crypto and DeFi queries spanning 11 categories; (2) an agentic harness equipped with relevant crypto and DeFi tools to generate responses across multiple frontier LLMs; and (3) an evaluation pipeline with citation verification and an LLM as a judge rubric spanning four user defined success dimensions: relevance, temporal relevance, depth, and data consistency. Using human annotation, we develop a taxonomy of seven higher order error types that are not reliably captured by factuality checks or LLM based quality scoring. We find that these failures persist even in state of the art systems and can compromise high stakes decisions. Based on this taxonomy, we refine the judge rubric to better capture these errors. While the judge does not align with human annotators on precise scoring across rubric iterations, it reliably identifies critical failure modes, enabling scalable feedback for developers and researchers studying analyst style agents. We release CryptoAnalystBench with annotated queries, the evaluation pipeline, judge rubrics, and the error taxonomy, and outline mitigation strategies and open challenges in evaluating long form, multi tool augmented systems.

The alignment of Small Language Models (SLMs) in the 70--500M parameter range using reinforcement learning is often considered unstable, though the underlying failure mechanisms have not been systematically investigated. In the State-of-the-Art (SOTA) research, fifteen (model, corpus) configurations were trained using Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO). The experiments included Pythia-70M, 160M, 410M and SmolLM2-135M, 360M on the TinyStories, CNN/DailyMail, and Wikitext-103 corpora. Three reproducible failure modes were identified in small-scale language models: silent LoRA parameter freezing in standard PEFT/TRL pipelines, numerical overflow in importance ratios when using bfloat16, and catastrophic policy collapse due to reward-model error. These issues were addressed using a merge-and-reinitialize adapter technique, float32 precision during PPO updates, and a three-layer safety mechanism comprising reward whitening, importance-ratio guarding, and weight rollback. In this paper, a capacity-headroom hypothesis is proposed, which states that PPO performance at the SLM scale depends on both a fluent supervised model (PPL<20) and a discriminative reward signal, rather than on the number of model parameters. The proposed system converged stably in all experiments and improved preference win rate over the SFT baseline in configurations with a fluent prior and an informative reward signal. Furthermore, it outperformed instruction-tuned baselines while requiring significantly less training data. All checkpoints, preference datasets, and training scripts are publicly released^§.

Autonomous research systems increasingly make the scientific workflow executable: agents can propose ideas, run code, inspect results, and draft papers. But executable workflows do not by themselves produce research judgment. We analyze where current systems lose trial experience: weak evidence becomes prose, pilot signals become broad claims, memory remains textual, and recurring process failures do not change later behavior. We introduce Sibyl-AutoResearch, a self-evolving AutoResearch framework built around Scientific Trial-and-Error Harnesses. A harness lets agents run bounded trials, preserve positive and negative outcomes, and route lessons into later planning, validation, claim scope, scheduling, critique, writing, and harness repair. We formalize this through two auditable conversion units: trial-to-behavior conversion, which links trial signals to later research actions, and trial-to-harness-behavior conversion, which links recurring process failures to system updates. We implement the framework in SIBYL, a file-backed autonomous research system that exposes the state, roles, memory, gates, and artifact traces needed to inspect these conversion paths. A retrospective audit identifies eight high-confidence conversion events, with a median latency of one iteration and a maximum latency of three iterations. A recovered-failure registry further shows how five naturally occurring failure classes, including duplicate results, stale numbers, and unsupported statistics, were blocked, downgraded, or routed into later repair. These traces do not establish a comparative performance claim; they show that the proposed conversion units are recoverable from realistic autonomous-research workspaces. The SIBYL framework and system are available at https://github.com/Sibyl-Research-Team/AutoResearch-SibylSystem.

Refusal rates are a poor proxy for LLM safety, i.e., a model may over-refuse benign prompts while still complying with harmful ones. We audit both failure modes across 21 open-weight LLMs on four safety benchmarks (OR-Bench, XSTest, ToxiGen, BOLD), using a composition adjustment to isolate model sensitivity from dataset toxicity confounds. We report three findings. First, models adopt fundamentally different calibration strategies: conservative ecosystems such as Llama suppress unsafe outputs at the cost of elevated over-refusals, while permissive ecosystems such as DeepSeek and Qwen preserve helpfulness but tolerate higher harmful compliance. Second, demographic protection is unequal: models over-protect prominent racial and religious groups, frequently refusing even benign prompts about them, while providing substantially weaker protection against disability-targeted attacks. Third, refusal and compliance tendencies are stable within model families across generations and scales, suggesting that post-training objectives shape safety behavior more than architecture. Our results call for joint, demographically-aware, and multi-judge safety evaluation.

Frontier deep research agents (DRAs) plan a research task, synthesize across documents, and return a structured deliverable on demand. They are being deployed in enterprise workflows faster than they are being evaluated. Existing benchmarks measure factual recall, single-hop QA, or generic agentic skill, missing the multi-document, decision-grade work DRAs are deployed to produce. We introduce a benchmark targeting the structured analytical deliverables that fill a management consultant's typical week. We grade three frontier agents, namely Claude Opus 4.6 with web search, OpenAI o3-deep-research, and Google Gemini 3.1 Pro deep-research, on 42 SME-authored prompts. Each of the 126 responses is scored on two layers: deterministic ground-truth verifiers (mean 13.8 per task) and a five-criterion 0-3 SME rubric, composed into a Verifier-Rubric Score (VRS) on 0-100. Most prompts embed cognitive traps that penalize surface-pattern matching. Acceptance under our joint threshold (rubric mean >= 2.5 and verifier rate >= 80%) is uniformly low: Gemini 21.4%, o3 9.5%, Claude 9.5%. Mean VRS scores agree with published rubric-based benchmarks (our top 62.6 vs. APEX-v1 64.2, ProfBench 65.9, ResearchRubrics < 68%), validating the rubric construct. ACCEPT rates sit below APEX-Agents' MC-segment Pass@1 band (12.3-22.7%) on dedicated DR agents; our floor is three points lower despite the harness advantage, opened by stricter conjunctive grading and trap design. Each agent fails distinctively. Claude produces the deliverable most reliably (4.5x the others' rate on file-required tasks) but carries the highest fabrication signature. o3 has the cleanest reasoning average yet drops required sections and propagates arithmetic errors. Gemini is bimodal, with the highest acceptance rate alongside the most zero-scored rubric cells.

Most medical AI benchmarks measure whether a model knows the correct answer. MedFailBench asks a different question: which safety boundary failed? We present a synthetic benchmark and failure atlas built by a clinician. The resource labels medical AI errors by severity from 1 to 5 and safety gate type: missed urgent escalation, unsafe remote dosing, unsafe discharge reassurance, evidence fabrication, unsafe protocol execution, and source support gap. The current public release (v0.2.1) contains 44 synthetic cases reviewed by a clinician, with severity annotations, a public Hugging Face Space source, a safety gate taxonomy, a clinical severity rubric, and an automated pipeline for archiving model response screening runs. Forty cases have a populated safety gate field, and four require gate completion. No patient data, clinical validation claims, or model rankings are included. MedFailBench is released under Apache-2.0 and CC-BY-4.0 and carries the Zenodo DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21205535.

This position paper argues that the machine learning community should prioritize early-stage quality assurance in annotation pipelines over the prevailing practice of late-stage validation. Data quality bottlenecks increasingly limit foundation model improvement, yet quality assurance research focuses almost exclusively on validation methods rather than validation timing. When validation occurs, not merely what methods are employed, fundamentally determines both error rates and annotation costs. This temporal neglect is puzzling given the well-established "shift-left" principle from software engineering, where empirical studies demonstrate 4--100x cost multipliers for defects detected in later stages (Boehm, 1981; Shull et al., 2002). Annotation pipelines exhibit analogous dynamics: errors caught before annotation begins cost a fraction of those discovered after review cycles complete. We propose a taxonomy of three QA trigger points, namely pre-annotation (T0), post-annotation (T1), and post-review (T2), that decompose annotation workflows into discrete validation opportunities. A parametric error-propagation model formalizes when timing affects final error rates versus only economics, making timing a measurable design variable rather than a configuration afterthought. A survey of 47 recent papers reveals that only 4% report when validation occurs, a striking gap given timing's demonstrated impact in adjacent fields. Without explicit attention to QA timing, the community risks optimizing validation methods while ignoring the structural variable that may matter most. Acting on this position requires three steps: researchers should report QA timing configurations alongside validation methods; annotation platforms should expose timing as a first-class parameter; and the community should run controlled experiments that measure stage-specific detection rates directly.

As modern microservice systems grow increasingly popular and complex-often consisting of hundreds or even thousands of fine-grained, interdependent components-they are becoming more susceptible to frequent and subtle failures. Ensuring system reliability therefore hinges on accurate and efficient failure localization. Traditional failure localization approaches based on small models lack the flexibility to adapt to diverse failure scenarios, while recent LLM-based methods suffer from two major limitations: they often rely on rigid invocation workflows that constrain the model's ability to dynamically explore optimal localization paths, and they require resource-intensive inference, making them cost-prohibitive for real-world deployment. To address these challenges, we explore the use of reinforcement fine-tuning to equip lightweight LLMs with reasoning and self-refinement capabilities, significantly improving the cost-effectiveness and adaptability of LLM-based failure localization. We begin with an empirical study to identify three key capabilities essential for accurate localization. Building on these insights, we propose a progressive multi-stage GRPO fine-tuning framework, which integrates a multi-factor failure localization grader and a recursion-of-thought actor module. The resulting model, ThinkFL, not only outperforms existing state-of-the-art LLMs and baseline methods in localization accuracy but also reduces end-to-end localization latency from minutes to seconds, demonstrating strong potential for real-world applications.

We introduce Llama Guard, an LLM-based input-output safeguard model geared towards Human-AI conversation use cases. Our model incorporates a safety risk taxonomy, a valuable tool for categorizing a specific set of safety risks found in LLM prompts (i.e., prompt classification). This taxonomy is also instrumental in classifying the responses generated by LLMs to these prompts, a process we refer to as response classification. For the purpose of both prompt and response classification, we have meticulously gathered a dataset of high quality. Llama Guard, a Llama2-7b model that is instruction-tuned on our collected dataset, albeit low in volume, demonstrates strong performance on existing benchmarks such as the OpenAI Moderation Evaluation dataset and ToxicChat, where its performance matches or exceeds that of currently available content moderation tools. Llama Guard functions as a language model, carrying out multi-class classification and generating binary decision scores. Furthermore, the instruction fine-tuning of Llama Guard allows for the customization of tasks and the adaptation of output formats. This feature enhances the model's capabilities, such as enabling the adjustment of taxonomy categories to align with specific use cases, and facilitating zero-shot or few-shot prompting with diverse taxonomies at the input. We are making Llama Guard model weights available and we encourage researchers to further develop and adapt them to meet the evolving needs of the community for AI safety.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) standardizes how AI agents discover and invoke external tools, with over 10,000 active servers and 97 million monthly SDK downloads as of early 2026. Yet MCP does not yet standardize how agents safely operate those tools at production scale. Three protocol-level primitives remain missing: identity propagation, adaptive tool budgeting, and structured error semantics. This paper identifies these gaps through field lessons from an enterprise deployment of an AI agent platform integrated with a major cloud provider's MCP servers (client name redacted). We propose three mechanisms to fill them: (1) the Context-Aware Broker Protocol (CABP), which extends JSON-RPC with identity-scoped request routing via a six-stage broker pipeline; (2) Adaptive Timeout Budget Allocation (ATBA), which frames sequential tool invocation as a budget allocation problem over heterogeneous latency distributions; and (3) the Structured Error Recovery Framework (SERF), which provides machine-readable failure semantics that enable deterministic agent self-correction. We organize production failure modes into five design dimensions (server contracts, user context, timeouts, errors, and observability), document concrete failure vignettes, and present a production readiness checklist. All three algorithms are formalized as testable hypotheses with reproducible experimental methodology. Field observations demonstrate that while MCP provides a solid protocol foundation, reliable agent tool integration requires infrastructure-level mechanisms that the specification does not yet address.

Recent advances in reinforcement learning for language model post-training, such as Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), have shown promise in low-resource settings. However, GRPO typically relies on solution-level and scalar reward signals that fail to capture the semantic diversity among sampled completions. This leads to what we identify as a diversity-quality inconsistency, where distinct reasoning paths may receive indistinguishable rewards. To address this limitation, we propose Diversity-aware Reward Adjustment (DRA), a method that explicitly incorporates semantic diversity into the reward computation. DRA uses Submodular Mutual Information (SMI) to downweight redundant completions and amplify rewards for diverse ones. This encourages better exploration during learning, while maintaining stable exploitation of high-quality samples. Our method integrates seamlessly with both GRPO and its variant DR.~GRPO, resulting in DRA-GRPO and DGA-DR.~GRPO. We evaluate our method on five mathematical reasoning benchmarks and find that it outperforms recent strong baselines. It achieves state-of-the-art performance with an average accuracy of 58.2%, using only 7,000 fine-tuning samples and a total training cost of approximately $55. The code is available at https://github.com/xiwenc1/DRA-GRPO.

We introduce FailureSensorIQ, a novel Multi-Choice Question-Answering (MCQA) benchmarking system designed to assess the ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to reason and understand complex, domain-specific scenarios in Industry 4.0. Unlike traditional QA benchmarks, our system focuses on multiple aspects of reasoning through failure modes, sensor data, and the relationships between them across various industrial assets. Through this work, we envision a paradigm shift where modeling decisions are not only data-driven using statistical tools like correlation analysis and significance tests, but also domain-driven by specialized LLMs which can reason about the key contributors and useful patterns that can be captured with feature engineering. We evaluate the Industrial knowledge of over a dozen LLMs-including GPT-4, Llama, and Mistral-on FailureSensorIQ from different lens using Perturbation-Uncertainty-Complexity analysis, Expert Evaluation study, Asset-Specific Knowledge Gap analysis, ReAct agent using external knowledge-bases. Even though closed-source models with strong reasoning capabilities approach expert-level performance, the comprehensive benchmark reveals a significant drop in performance that is fragile to perturbations, distractions, and inherent knowledge gaps in the models. We also provide a real-world case study of how LLMs can drive the modeling decisions on 3 different failure prediction datasets related to various assets. We release: (a) expert-curated MCQA for various industrial assets, (b) FailureSensorIQ benchmark and Hugging Face leaderboard based on MCQA built from non-textual data found in ISO documents, and (c) LLMFeatureSelector, an LLM-based feature selection scikit-learn pipeline. The software is available at https://github.com/IBM/FailureSensorIQ.

We describe WebSuite, the first diagnostic benchmark for generalist web agents, designed to systematically evaluate why agents fail. Advances in AI have led to the rise of numerous web agents that autonomously operate a browser to complete tasks. However, most existing benchmarks focus on strictly measuring whether an agent can or cannot complete a task, without giving insight on why. In this paper, we 1) develop a taxonomy of web actions to facilitate identifying common failure patterns, and 2) create an extensible benchmark suite to assess agents' performance on our taxonomized actions. This benchmark suite consists of both individual tasks, such as clicking a button, and end-to-end tasks, such as adding an item to a cart, and is designed such that any failure of a task can be attributed directly to a failure of a specific web action. We evaluate two popular generalist web agents, one text-based and one multimodal, and identify unique weaknesses for each agent. Because WebSuite can disaggregate task failures into specific action failures, this enables granular identification of which UX flows an individual agent has trouble with and immediately highlights promising avenues for improvement. These findings highlight the need for more focused benchmarking on where web agents go wrong to effectively improve agents beyond their weaker performance today.

Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) is increasingly deployed in safety-critical domains, yet methods for interpretable failure detection and attribution remain underdeveloped. We introduce a two-stage gradient-based framework that provides interpretable diagnostics for three critical failure analysis tasks: (1) detecting the true initial failure source (Patient-0); (2) validating why non-attacked agents may be flagged first due to domino effects; and (3) tracing how failures propagate through learned coordination pathways. Stage 1 performs interpretable per-agent failure detection via Taylor-remainder analysis of policy-gradient costs, declaring an initial Patient-0 candidate at the first threshold crossing. Stage 2 provides validation through geometric analysis of critic derivatives-first-order sensitivity and directional second-order curvature aggregated over causal windows to construct interpretable contagion graphs. This approach explains "downstream-first" detection anomalies by revealing pathways that amplify upstream deviations. Evaluated across 500 episodes in Simple Spread (3 and 5 agents) and 100 episodes in StarCraft II using MADDPG and HATRPO, our method achieves 88.2-99.4% Patient-0 detection accuracy while providing interpretable geometric evidence for detection decisions. By moving beyond black-box detection to interpretable gradient-level forensics, this framework offers practical tools for diagnosing cascading failures in safety-critical MARL systems.

Despite the success of reinforcement learning for large language models, a common failure mode is reduced sampling diversity, where the policy repeatedly generates similar erroneous behaviors. Classical entropy regularization encourages randomness under the current policy, but does not explicitly discourage recurrent failure patterns across rollouts. We propose MEDS, a Memory-Enhanced Dynamic reward Shaping framework that incorporates historical behavioral signals into reward design. By storing and leveraging intermediate model representations, we capture features of past rollouts and use density-based clustering to identify frequently recurring error patterns. Rollouts assigned to more prevalent error clusters are penalized more heavily, encouraging broader exploration while reducing repeated mistakes. Across five datasets and three base models, MEDS consistently improves average performance over existing baselines, achieving gains of up to 4.13 pass@1 points and 4.37 pass@128 points. Additional analyses using both LLM-based annotations and quantitative diversity metrics show that MEDS increases behavioral diversity during sampling.

Robotic manipulation in open-world settings requires not only task execution but also the ability to detect and learn from failures. While recent advances in vision-language models (VLMs) and large language models (LLMs) have improved robots' spatial reasoning and problem-solving abilities, they still struggle with failure recognition, limiting their real-world applicability. We introduce AHA, an open-source VLM designed to detect and reason about failures in robotic manipulation using natural language. By framing failure detection as a free-form reasoning task, AHA identifies failures and provides detailed, adaptable explanations across different robots, tasks, and environments. We fine-tuned AHA using FailGen, a scalable framework that generates the first large-scale dataset of robotic failure trajectories, the AHA dataset. FailGen achieves this by procedurally perturbing successful demonstrations from simulation. Despite being trained solely on the AHA dataset, AHA generalizes effectively to real-world failure datasets, robotic systems, and unseen tasks. It surpasses the second-best model (GPT-4o in-context learning) by 10.3% and exceeds the average performance of six compared models including five state-of-the-art VLMs by 35.3% across multiple metrics and datasets. We integrate AHA into three manipulation frameworks that utilize LLMs/VLMs for reinforcement learning, task and motion planning, and zero-shot trajectory generation. AHA's failure feedback enhances these policies' performances by refining dense reward functions, optimizing task planning, and improving sub-task verification, boosting task success rates by an average of 21.4% across all three tasks compared to GPT-4 models.

Before developing a Document Layout Analysis (DLA) model in real-world applications, conducting comprehensive robustness testing is essential. However, the robustness of DLA models remains underexplored in the literature. To address this, we are the first to introduce a robustness benchmark for DLA models, which includes 450K document images of three datasets. To cover realistic corruptions, we propose a perturbation taxonomy with 36 common document perturbations inspired by real-world document processing. Additionally, to better understand document perturbation impacts, we propose two metrics, Mean Perturbation Effect (mPE) for perturbation assessment and Mean Robustness Degradation (mRD) for robustness evaluation. Furthermore, we introduce a self-titled model, i.e., Robust Document Layout Analyzer (RoDLA), which improves attention mechanisms to boost extraction of robust features. Experiments on the proposed benchmarks (PubLayNet-P, DocLayNet-P, and M^6Doc-P) demonstrate that RoDLA obtains state-of-the-art mRD scores of 115.7, 135.4, and 150.4, respectively. Compared to previous methods, RoDLA achieves notable improvements in mAP of +3.8%, +7.1% and +12.1%, respectively.

Given the growing concerns around the safety and risks of Large Language Models (LLMs), it is essential to develop methods for mitigating these issues. We introduce Safe and Responsible Large Language Model (SR_{LLM}) , a model designed to enhance the safety of language generation using LLMs. Our approach incorporates a comprehensive LLM safety risk taxonomy and utilizes a dataset annotated by experts that align with this taxonomy. SR_{LLM} is designed to identify potentially unsafe content and produce benign variations. It employs instruction-based and parameter-efficient fine-tuning methods, making the model not only effective in enhancing safety but also resource-efficient and straightforward to adjust. Through our testing on five benchmark datasets and two proprietary datasets, we observed notable reductions in the generation of unsafe content. Moreover, following the implementation of safety measures, there was a significant improvement in the production of safe content. We detail our fine-tuning processes and how we benchmark safety for SR_{LLM} with the community engagement and promote the responsible advancement of LLMs. All the data and code are available anonymous at https://github.com/shainarazavi/Safe-Responsible-LLM .

While Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) excel in complex reasoning, they suffer from the cascading impact of erroneous information generated by individual participants. Current solutions often resort to rigid structural engineering or expensive fine-tuning, limiting their deployability and adaptability. We propose AgentDropoutV2, a test-time rectify-or-reject pruning framework designed to dynamically optimize MAS information flow without retraining. Our approach acts as an active firewall, intercepting agent outputs and employing a retrieval-augmented rectifier to iteratively correct errors based on a failure-driven indicator pool. This mechanism allows for the precise identification of potential errors using distilled failure patterns as prior knowledge. Irreparable outputs are subsequently pruned to prevent error propagation, while a fallback strategy preserves system integrity. Empirical results on extensive math benchmarks show that AgentDropoutV2 significantly boosts the MAS's task performance, achieving an average accuracy gain of 6.3 percentage points on math benchmarks. Furthermore, the system exhibits robust generalization and adaptivity, dynamically modulating rectification efforts based on task difficulty while leveraging context-aware indicators to resolve a wide spectrum of error patterns. Our code and dataset are released at https://github.com/TonySY2/AgentDropoutV2.

With the widespread application of Large Language Models (LLMs), their associated security issues have become increasingly prominent, severely constraining their trustworthy deployment in critical domains. This paper proposes a novel safety response framework designed to systematically safeguard LLMs at both the input and output levels. At the input level, the framework employs a supervised fine-tuning-based safety classification model. Through a fine-grained four-tier taxonomy (Safe, Unsafe, Conditionally Safe, Focused Attention), it performs precise risk identification and differentiated handling of user queries, significantly enhancing risk coverage and business scenario adaptability, and achieving a risk recall rate of 99.3%. At the output level, the framework integrates Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) with a specifically fine-tuned interpretation model, ensuring all responses are grounded in a real-time, trustworthy knowledge base. This approach eliminates information fabrication and enables result traceability. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed safety control model achieves a significantly higher safety score on public safety evaluation benchmarks compared to the baseline model, TinyR1-Safety-8B. Furthermore, on our proprietary high-risk test set, the framework's components attained a perfect 100% safety score, validating their exceptional protective capabilities in complex risk scenarios. This research provides an effective engineering pathway for building high-security, high-trust LLM applications.

LLM-agent budget overruns are a documented production failure class: a single retry loop can spend thousands of dollars before an operator notices, and the in-process integrity properties that would prevent it (no aliasing, no double-spend, no use-after-delegation of a cost-bearing value) are enforced, if at all, by ad-hoc wrappers rather than by the type system. Our central contribution is empirical: a catalog of 63 confirmed production incidents from 21 orchestration frameworks (2023-2026), each backed by a quoted GitHub issue and, where reported, a dollar loss, organized into an eight-cluster failure taxonomy (inter-rater Cohen's kappa = 0.837, N = 113), plus 47 supplementary structural entries. As one mitigation evaluated against this taxonomy, we build token-budgets, an 1,180-line Rust crate (no unsafe) that operationalizes affine ownership so that cloning, double-spending, or using a budget after delegating it are compile errors rather than runtime hazards an operator must remember to avoid. The dollar cap is runtime arithmetic under an estimator assumption; the affine layer makes that arithmetic non-bypassable. On single-agent workloads a 4-line Python counter matches the crate at 0/30 overshoot, so the distinguishing value is non-bypassability under operator error in multi-agent delegation: the delegation-fanout race documented in 11 incidents is rejected by the borrow checker at compile time, while the same pattern under asyncio overshoots 30/30 and three disciplined alternatives overshoot 0/30. Across five runtimes, three providers, and a temperature-stratified live-API test (N = 160), the approach reports zero cap violations and zero false refusals, at operational parity with concurrent work. Static over-reservation is 4-6x (2.11x adaptive). Binary-level cap-soundness on the running binary is left open.

Reward modeling (RM), which captures human preferences to align large language models (LLMs), is increasingly employed in tasks such as model finetuning, response filtering, and ranking. However, due to the inherent complexity of human preferences and the limited coverage of available datasets, reward models often fail under distributional shifts or adversarial perturbations. Existing approaches for identifying such failure modes typically rely on prior knowledge about preference distributions or failure attributes, limiting their practicality in real-world settings where such information is unavailable. In this work, we propose a tractable, preference-distribution agnostic method for discovering reward model failure modes via reward guided controlled decoding. Building on this, we introduce REFORM, a self-improving reward modeling framework that enhances robustness by using the reward model itself to guide the generation of falsely scored responses. These adversarial examples are then used to augment the training data and patch the reward model's misaligned behavior. We evaluate REFORM on two widely used preference datasets Anthropic Helpful Harmless (HH) and PKU Beavertails and demonstrate that it significantly improves robustness without sacrificing reward quality. Notably, REFORM preserves performance both in direct evaluation and in downstream policy training, and further improves alignment quality by removing spurious correlations.

Multi-agent systems powered by large language models (LLMs) are transforming enterprise automation, yet systematic evaluation methodologies for assessing tool-use reliability remain underdeveloped. We introduce a comprehensive diagnostic framework that leverages big data analytics to evaluate procedural reliability in intelligent agent systems, addressing critical needs for SME-centric deployment in privacy-sensitive environments. Our approach features a 12-category error taxonomy capturing failure modes across tool initialization, parameter handling, execution, and result interpretation. Through systematic evaluation of 1,980 deterministic test instances spanning both open-weight models (Qwen2.5 series, Functionary) and proprietary alternatives (GPT-4, Claude 3.5/3.7) across diverse edge hardware configurations, we identify actionable reliability thresholds for production deployment. Our analysis reveals that procedural reliability, particularly tool initialization failures, constitutes the primary bottleneck for smaller models, while qwen2.5:32b achieves flawless performance matching GPT-4.1. The framework demonstrates that mid-sized models (qwen2.5:14b) offer practical accuracy-efficiency trade-offs on commodity hardware (96.6\% success rate, 7.3 s latency), enabling cost-effective intelligent agent deployment for resource-constrained organizations. This work establishes foundational infrastructure for systematic reliability evaluation of tool-augmented multi-agent AI systems.

Using risky text prompts, such as pornography and violent prompts, to test the safety of text-to-image (T2I) models is a critical task. However, existing risky prompt datasets are limited in three key areas: 1) limited risky categories, 2) coarse-grained annotation, and 3) low effectiveness. To address these limitations, we introduce T2I-RiskyPrompt, a comprehensive benchmark designed for evaluating safety-related tasks in T2I models. Specifically, we first develop a hierarchical risk taxonomy, which consists of 6 primary categories and 14 fine-grained subcategories. Building upon this taxonomy, we construct a pipeline to collect and annotate risky prompts. Finally, we obtain 6,432 effective risky prompts, where each prompt is annotated with both hierarchical category labels and detailed risk reasons. Moreover, to facilitate the evaluation, we propose a reason-driven risky image detection method that explicitly aligns the MLLM with safety annotations. Based on T2I-RiskyPrompt, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of eight T2I models, nine defense methods, five safety filters, and five attack strategies, offering nine key insights into the strengths and limitations of T2I model safety. Finally, we discuss potential applications of T2I-RiskyPrompt across various research fields. The dataset and code are provided in https://github.com/datar001/T2I-RiskyPrompt.

When building Large Language Models (LLMs), it is paramount to bear safety in mind and protect them with guardrails. Indeed, LLMs should never generate content promoting or normalizing harmful, illegal, or unethical behavior that may contribute to harm to individuals or society. This principle applies to both normal and adversarial use. In response, we introduce ALERT, a large-scale benchmark to assess safety based on a novel fine-grained risk taxonomy. It is designed to evaluate the safety of LLMs through red teaming methodologies and consists of more than 45k instructions categorized using our novel taxonomy. By subjecting LLMs to adversarial testing scenarios, ALERT aims to identify vulnerabilities, inform improvements, and enhance the overall safety of the language models. Furthermore, the fine-grained taxonomy enables researchers to perform an in-depth evaluation that also helps one to assess the alignment with various policies. In our experiments, we extensively evaluate 10 popular open- and closed-source LLMs and demonstrate that many of them still struggle to attain reasonable levels of safety.

This review analyzes deployed and actively used workload schedulers' solutions and presents a taxonomy in which those systems are divided into several hierarchical groups based on their architecture and design. While other taxonomies do exist, this review has focused on the key design factors that affect the throughput and scalability of a given solution, as well as the incremental improvements which bettered such an architecture. This review gives special attention to Google's Borg, which is one of the most advanced and published systems of this kind.

Autonomous improvement loops are hard to trust because the improvement process is usually external scaffolding bolted onto the agent: failures go unlogged, diagnoses cannot be replayed, and promote-or-discard decisions land in a side database rather than the agent's own history. We show that an event-sourced agent runtime removes that friction and turns controlled improvement into a first-class workflow. When the agent's state is a deterministic projection of an append-only event log, failures are recorded, a run replays exactly from its log, candidate patches scope to typed pipeline seams, gates are auditable, and every promotion or discard is itself an event. We demonstrate this with Regimes, a loop on the ActiveGraph runtime that diagnoses failed evaluations, proposes a repair at a pipeline point, and promotes it only after static checks, sandbox execution, in-sample evaluation, and held-out validation. The loop is target-agnostic: the same control flow runs against different tasks through a common interface. On LongMemEval-S the dominant failure is not retrieval but reconciliation: the evidence is already in the assembled context, yet the reader answers incorrectly. Across five seeded held-out splits, Regimes discovers reader-prompt repairs that improve final held-out accuracy by +0.05 to +0.10 in four splits and +0.01 in one over-promotion split; two splits are individually significant (seed 5 unadjusted for its sequential promotion structure), and the pooled count is descriptive only, since the splits share one 500-question pool. The durable contributions are ActiveGraph as an auditable substrate that makes controlled improvement loops tractable, the held-out-gated loop it supports, the failure-regime taxonomy routing each failure to a pipeline location (whose marginal value over an unrouted baseline is the primary open question), and the prompt-as-discovery-probe hypothesis.

Existing agent-safety evaluation has focused mainly on externally induced risks. Yet agents may still enter unsafe trajectories under benign conditions. We study this complementary but underexplored setting through the lens of intrinsic risk, where intrinsic failures remain latent, propagate across long-horizon execution, and eventually lead to high-consequence outcomes. To evaluate this setting, we introduce non-attack intrinsic risk auditing and present HINTBench, a benchmark of 629 agent trajectories (523 risky, 106 safe; 33 steps on average) supporting three tasks: risk detection, risk-step localization, and intrinsic failure-type identification. Its annotations are organized under a unified five-constraint taxonomy. Experiments reveal a substantial capability gap: strong LLMs perform well on trajectory-level risk detection, but their performance drops to below 35 Strict-F1 on risk-step localization, while fine-grained failure diagnosis proves even harder. Existing guard models transfer poorly to this setting. These findings establish intrinsic risk auditing as an open challenge for agent safety.

Fine-tuning Large Language Models (LLMs) with Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) enhances adaptability while reducing computational costs. However, fine-tuning can compromise safety alignment, even with benign data, increasing susceptibility to harmful outputs. Existing safety alignment methods struggle to capture complex parameter shifts, leading to suboptimal safety-utility trade-offs. To address this issue, we propose Safe Pruning LoRA (SPLoRA), a novel pruning-based approach that selectively removes LoRA layers that weaken safety alignment, improving safety while preserving performance. At its core, we introduce Empirical-DIEM (E-DIEM), a dimension-insensitive similarity metric that effectively detects safety misalignment in LoRA-adapted models. We conduct extensive experiments on LLMs fine-tuned with mixed of benign and malicious data, and purely benign datasets, evaluating SPLoRA across utility, safety, and reliability metrics. Results demonstrate that SPLoRA outperforms state-of-the-art safety alignment techniques, significantly reducing safety risks while maintaining or improving model performance and reliability. Additionally, SPLoRA reduces inference overhead, making it a scalable and efficient solution for deploying safer and more reliable LLMs. The code is available at https://github.com/AoShuang92/SPLoRA.

Loss Given Default (LGD) modeling faces a fundamental data quality constraint: 90% of available training data consists of proxy estimates based on pre-distress balance sheets rather than actual recovery outcomes from completed bankruptcy proceedings. We demonstrate that this mixture-contaminated training structure causes systematic failure of recursive partitioning methods, with Random Forest achieving negative r-squared (-0.664, worse than predicting the mean) on held-out test data. Information-theoretic approaches based on Shannon entropy and mutual information provide superior generalization, achieving r-squared of 0.191 and RMSE of 0.284 on 1,218 corporate bankruptcies (1980-2023). Analysis reveals that leverage-based features contain 1.510 bits of mutual information while size effects contribute only 0.086 bits, contradicting regulatory assumptions about scale-dependent recovery. These results establish practical guidance for financial institutions deploying LGD models under Basel III requirements when representative outcome data is unavailable at sufficient scale. The findings generalize to medical outcomes research, climate forecasting, and technology reliability-domains where extended observation periods create unavoidable mixture structure in training data.

Language model deployments in consumer-facing applications introduce numerous risks. While existing research on harms and hazards of such applications follows top-down approaches derived from regulatory frameworks and theoretical analyses, empirical evidence of real-world failure modes remains underexplored. In this work, we introduce RealHarm, a dataset of annotated problematic interactions with AI agents built from a systematic review of publicly reported incidents. Analyzing harms, causes, and hazards specifically from the deployer's perspective, we find that reputational damage constitutes the predominant organizational harm, while misinformation emerges as the most common hazard category. We empirically evaluate state-of-the-art guardrails and content moderation systems to probe whether such systems would have prevented the incidents, revealing a significant gap in the protection of AI applications.

Existing benchmarks for scientific data analysis evaluate LLMs primarily on code execution or workflow completion, overlooking that scientific analysis serves to support distinct types of scientific claims: hypothesis exploration, statistical inference, mechanistic explanation, each with different assumptions and validity criteria. We introduce SDABench, a benchmark that reorganizes evaluation around six capabilities (descriptive, exploratory, inferential, predictive, causal, and mechanistic) across five domains (Biology, Chemistry, Environment, Geography, Physics). SDABench comprises 527 real-data instances (SDA-Real) and 6000 synthetic instances (SDA-Synth), each in both multiple-choice and open-ended formats, constructed through an automated pipeline. Evaluating 15 representative LLMs, we find that models handle descriptive analysis well but degrade sharply on tasks requiring assumption selection, latent-process modeling, or mechanistic reasoning. SDABench further provides a five-stage error analysis framework that locates where LLMs fail: more advanced models more reliably identify the relevant scope and variables, but still struggle to select appropriate analytical procedures, model variable relationships, and draw valid conclusions.

Failure attribution for LLM-based agentic systems, i.e., identifying which steps in a failure trajectory caused the task to fail, is critical for debugging and improving these systems. Existing approaches either rely on prompting-based pipelines, which are computationally expensive, or require post-training on failure trajectories with step-level error annotations, which are costly to collect and difficult to scale. We argue that a practical failure attribution model should be lightweight and trainable without step-level supervision on failure data. To this end, we address unsupervised failure attribution, i.e., training exclusively on successful trajectories and identifying error steps at inference time given a failure trajectory. We propose OAT, which casts this problem as one-class learning with neural controlled differential equations, modeling the dynamical pattern of successful trajectories in latent space. At inference time, each step in a failure trajectory is assigned an anomaly score based on its deviation from the dynamics learned on successful trajectories, which is then used to form a set of error steps. With training on only 100 successful trajectories, experiments show that OAT is 200--5000 times faster than prompting-based baselines, and, at the same time, consistently outperforms them in both in-domain and out-of-distribution datasets with +20% and +7% F1 scores, respectively, demonstrating that OAT is a promising and efficient direction for diagnosing agentic system failures.

Large language model agents now act on codebases, browsers, operating systems, calendars, files, and tool ecosystems, but the benchmarks used to evaluate them are fragmented: each emphasizes a different unit of measurement (final task success, tool-call validity, repeated-pass consistency, trajectory safety, or attack robustness). A line of 2024-2025 work has converged on the diagnosis that a single accuracy column is no longer the right unit of comparison for deployable agents. AgentAtlas extends this line of work with four components: (i) a six-state control-decision taxonomy (Act / Ask / Refuse / Stop / Confirm / Recover); (ii) a nine-category trajectory-failure taxonomy with two orthogonal hierarchical labels (primary_error_source, impact); (iii) a taxonomy-aware vs. taxonomy-blind methodology that measures how much of a model's apparent capability comes from the supervision in the prompt; and (iv) a benchmark-coverage audit mapping fifteen agent benchmarks against six behavioral axes. To demonstrate the methodology we run a small fixed eight-model set (1,342 generated items, four frontier closed and four open-weight) under both prompt modes. Removing the explicit label menu drops every model's trajectory accuracy by 14-40 pp to a tight 0.54-0.62 floor regardless of family, and no single model wins on all three of control accuracy, trajectory diagnosis, and tool-context utility retention. We treat the synthetic run as a measurement-protocol demonstration, not a benchmark release.

LLM agents increasingly perform autonomous actions through external tools, leading to complex and evolving safety risks. However, existing safety testing targets expert-designed safety violations, and the corresponding outcomes are evaluated by hard-coded rules, making them costly to extend as agents evolve. To this end, we present Vera, an end-to-end automated safety testing framework that instantiates software engineering testing principles for non-deterministic agents through a three-stage, self-reinforcing pipeline. First, a literature-driven exploration continuously discovers and structures emerging risks into taxonomies of safety risks, attack methods, and tool execution environments. Second, combinatorial composition across taxonomy dimensions produces executable safety cases, each specifying a concrete safety goal, a programmatically constructed initial state, and a deterministic verification predicate grounded in observable artifacts. Third, adaptive execution runs heterogeneous agents in isolated sandboxes where a control agent steers multi-turn interaction based on runtime observations, while evidence-grounded verifiers judge outcomes from environment state and tool-call evidence rather than model self-report. We evaluate Vera on four production agent frameworks (OpenClaw, Hermes, Codex, Claude Code), revealing substantial safety weaknesses, with average attack success rates reaching 93.9\% under multi-channel attacks; we also release Vera-Bench, comprising 1600 executable safety cases spanning 124 risk categories across three execution settings. These results indicate that modular, executable testing infrastructure is essential for rigorous and maintainable safety evaluation of rapidly evolving agentic systems at scale. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/Yunhao-Feng/Vera.

We report a case study of four end-to-end attempts to autonomously generate ML research papers using a pipeline of six LLM agents mapped to stages of the scientific workflow. Of these four, three attempts failed during implementation or evaluation. One completed the pipeline and was accepted to Agents4Science 2025, an experimental inaugural venue that required AI systems as first authors, passing both human and multi-AI review. From these attempts, we document six recurring failure modes: bias toward training data defaults, implementation drift under execution pressure, memory and context degradation across long-horizon tasks, overexcitement that declares success despite obvious failures, insufficient domain intelligence, and weak scientific taste in experimental design. We conclude by discussing four design principles for more robust AI-scientist systems, implications for autonomous scientific discovery, and we release all prompts, artifacts, and outputs at https://github.com/Lossfunk/ai-scientist-artefacts-v1

While large language models (LLMs) perform well on table tasks, they still make data referencing errors (DREs), i.e., incorrectly citing or omitting table values, despite understanding the table structure. Beyond final-answer accuracy, DREs directly compromise the correctness and reliability of intermediate reasoning steps. Yet prior studies have only offered limited, small-scale analyses. In this work, we present the first systematic evaluation of tabular data referencing errors across different models and tasks. Our results show that DREs occur across all tested models (1.7B to 20B parameters). Furthermore, we demonstrate that incorporating data referencing as a critic significantly improves answer accuracy up to 12.0%, through critic-based filtering and rejection sampling. Finally, we trained a lightweight 4B-parameter critic model that achieves an average F1 score of 78.2% in detecting both in-distribution and out-of-distribution DREs, and effectively assists inference for larger models.

Large language models (LLMs) show promise in medical diagnosis, but real-world deployment remains challenging due to high-stakes clinical decisions and imperfect reasoning reliability. As a result, careful inspection of model behavior is essential for assessing whether diagnostic reasoning is reliable and clinically grounded. However, debugging medical LLMs remains difficult. First, developers often lack sufficient medical domain expertise to interpret model errors in clinically meaningful terms. Second, models can fail across a large and diverse set of instances involving different input types, tasks, and reasoning steps, making it challenging for developers to prioritize which errors deserve focused inspection. Third, developers struggle to identify recurring error patterns across cases, as existing debugging practices are largely instance-centric and rely on manual inspection of isolated failures. To address these challenges, we present VeriLLMed, a visual analytics system that integrates external biomedical knowledge to audit and debug medical LLM diagnostic reasoning. VeriLLMed transforms model outputs into comparable reasoning paths, constructs knowledge graph-grounded reference paths, and identifies three recurring classes of diagnosis errors: relation errors, branch errors, and missing errors. Case studies and expert evaluation demonstrate that VeriLLMed helps developers identify clinically implausible reasoning and generate actionable insights that can inform the improvement of medical LLMs.

Safety benchmark scores provide incomplete evidence of deployment readiness: aligned language models often adhere to rigid rules even when a situational update flips which action is safe. We term this failure brittle safety. To diagnose it, we introduce context-flip evaluation, testing 12 models across a safety benchmark (PacifAIst) and two commonsense controls using paired variants where the nominally safe action produces harm. Three findings emerge. First, brittle safety is safety-specific: all 12 models exhibit a safety-commonsense gap (mean +17.4 pp). Baseline accuracy fails to predict brittleness: among models above 90% baseline accuracy, brittleness rates range from 13.7% to 90.0%. Second, failures stem from policy override rather than miscomprehension: despite acknowledging the context change in every case, models persist via three distinct mechanisms that vary by update type and model family. Third, on a hand-audited probe of catastrophic consequence-flip scenarios, standard action-level guardrails catch none, while a state-aware validator catches all without false alarms on correct interventions. This indicates that action-level content moderation is systematically blind to consequence-flips, motivating state-aware architectural alternatives. We release our protocol, perturbed benchmarks, and deployment probe.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into numerous applications across various domains, LLMs' safety becomes a critical concern for both application developers and intended users. Currently, great efforts have been made to develop safety benchmarks with fine-grained taxonomies. However, these benchmarks' taxonomies are disparate with different safety policies. Thus, existing safeguards trained on these benchmarks are either coarse-grained to only distinguish between safe and unsafe, or constrained by the narrow risk taxonomies of a single benchmark. To leverage these fine-grained safety taxonomies across multiple safety benchmarks, in this paper, we propose GSPR, a Generalizable Safety Policy Reasoner to identify unsafe input prompts and LLMs' outputs with violated safety taxonomies through Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). Unlike prior safeguards which only cover a fixed set of risk factors, our GSPR incentivizes its reasoning capability with varied safety taxonomies through our careful cold-start strategy and reward design. Consequently, our GSPR can be trained across multiple safety benchmarks with distinct taxonomies and naturally exhibits powerful generalization ability. We conduct extensive experiments to show that our GSPR significantly improves existing safety guardrails' reasoning capabilities for both safety and category prediction tasks. Moreover, our GSPR not only demonstrates powerful safety generalization abilities but also achieves the least inference token costs with explanations.

AI systems deployed in legal workflows hallucinate at rates that aggregate metrics report at ~52%, but this average conceals where errors concentrate and in which direction they run, leaving compliance officers without an actionable signal for trustworthy deployment. We present LegalHalluLens, an auditing framework with three components: typed hallucination profiles across four legally-motivated claim categories (numeric, temporal, obligation/entitlement, factual) over CUAD (Hendrycks et al., 2021); a Risk Direction Index (RDI) that reduces omission-versus-invention bias to a single deployment-comparable scalar; and a typed debate pipeline calibrated to both magnitudes and directions. Across 510 contracts and 249,252 clause-level instances we measure a within-model gap of approximately 38-40 pp between obligation/numeric and temporal claims that aggregate reporting hides, and show that two systems with matched 52% rates can carry opposite RDIs. The debate pipeline reduces fabricated detections by 45% with per-category gains tracking the diagnosis, matching commercial APIs with a substantially smaller backbone (4B active parameters). Typed profiles and RDI surface failure modes that aggregate metrics hide; we further show these diagnostics serve as calibration inputs for multi-agent debate pipelines, where Skeptic challenges and asymmetric gates targeted at measured failure modes outperform generically-tuned debate. The framework supports direction-aware procurement, accountability, and agent design for legal AI deployed in the wild.

As an embodiment of intelligence evolution toward interconnected architectures, Deep Research Agents (DRAs) systematically exhibit the capabilities in task decomposition, cross-source retrieval, multi-stage reasoning, information integration, and structured output, which markedly enhance performance on complex and open-ended tasks. However, existing benchmarks remain deficient in evaluation dimensions, response format, and scoring mechanisms, limiting their effectiveness in assessing such agents. This paper introduces Dr. Bench, a multidimensional evaluation framework tailored to DRAs and long-form report-style responses. The benchmark comprises 214 expert-curated challenging tasks across 10 broad domains, each accompanied by manually constructed reference bundles to support composite evaluation. This framework incorporates metrics for semantic quality, topical focus, and retrieval trustworthiness, enabling a comprehensive evaluation of long reports generated by DRAs. Extensive experimentation confirms the superior performance of mainstream DRAs over web-search-tool-augmented reasoning models, yet reveals considerable scope for further improvement. This study provides a robust foundation for capability assessment, architectural refinement, and paradigm advancement of DRAs.

In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated notable success across various tasks, but the trustworthiness of LLMs is still an open problem. One specific threat is the potential to generate toxic or harmful responses. Attackers can craft adversarial prompts that induce harmful responses from LLMs. In this work, we pioneer a theoretical foundation in LLMs security by identifying bias vulnerabilities within the safety fine-tuning and design a black-box jailbreak method named DRA (Disguise and Reconstruction Attack), which conceals harmful instructions through disguise and prompts the model to reconstruct the original harmful instruction within its completion. We evaluate DRA across various open-source and closed-source models, showcasing state-of-the-art jailbreak success rates and attack efficiency. Notably, DRA boasts a 91.1% attack success rate on OpenAI GPT-4 chatbot.

The accelerating deployment of artificial intelligence systems across regulated sectors has exposed critical fragmentation in risk assessment methodologies. A significant "language barrier" currently separates technical security teams, who focus on algorithmic vulnerabilities (e.g., MITRE ATLAS), from legal and compliance professionals, who address regulatory mandates (e.g., EU AI Act, NIST AI RMF). This disciplinary disconnect prevents the accurate translation of technical vulnerabilities into financial liability, leaving practitioners unable to answer fundamental economic questions regarding contingency reserves, control return-on-investment, and insurance exposure. To bridge this gap, this research presents the AI System Threat Vector Taxonomy, a structured ontology designed explicitly for Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). The framework categorizes AI-specific risks into nine critical domains: Misuse, Poisoning, Privacy, Adversarial, Biases, Unreliable Outputs, Drift, Supply Chain, and IP Threat, integrating 53 operationally defined sub-threats. Uniquely, each domain maps technical vectors directly to business loss categories (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Legal, Reputation), enabling the translation of abstract threats into measurable financial impact. The taxonomy is empirically validated through an analysis of 133 documented AI incidents from 2025 (achieving 100% classification coverage) and reconciled against the main AI risk frameworks. Furthermore, it is explicitly aligned with ISO/IEC 42001 controls and NIST AI RMF functions to facilitate auditability.

Evaluating the safety of LLM-based agents is increasingly important because risks in realistic deployments often emerge over multi-step interactions rather than isolated prompts or final responses. Existing trajectory-level benchmarks remain limited by insufficient interaction diversity, coarse observability of safety failures, and weak long-horizon realism. We introduce ATBench, a trajectory-level benchmark for structured, diverse, and realistic evaluation of agent safety. ATBench organizes agentic risk along three dimensions: risk source, failure mode, and real-world harm. Based on this taxonomy, we construct trajectories with heterogeneous tool pools and a long-context delayed-trigger protocol that captures realistic risk emergence across multiple stages. The benchmark contains 1,000 trajectories (503 safe and 497 unsafe), averaging 9.01 turns and 3.95k tokens, with 1,954 invoked tools drawn from pools spanning 2,084 available tools. Data quality is supported by rule-based and LLM-based filtering plus full human audit. Experiments on frontier LLMs, open-source models, and specialized guard systems show that ATBench is challenging even for strong evaluators, while enabling taxonomy-stratified analysis, cross-benchmark comparison, and diagnosis of long-horizon failure patterns.

This study addresses a critical gap in safety tuning practices for Large Language Models (LLMs) by identifying and tackling a refusal position bias within safety tuning data, which compromises the models' ability to appropriately refuse generating unsafe content. We introduce a novel approach, Decoupled Refusal Training (DeRTa), designed to empower LLMs to refuse compliance to harmful prompts at any response position, significantly enhancing their safety capabilities. DeRTa incorporates two novel components: (1) Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) with Harmful Response Prefix, which trains models to recognize and avoid unsafe content by appending a segment of harmful response to the beginning of a safe response, and (2) Reinforced Transition Optimization (RTO), which equips models with the ability to transition from potential harm to safety refusal consistently throughout the harmful response sequence. Our empirical evaluation, conducted using LLaMA3 and Mistral model families across six attack scenarios, demonstrates that our method not only improves model safety without compromising performance but also surpasses well-known models such as GPT-4 in defending against attacks. Importantly, our approach successfully defends recent advanced attack methods (e.g., CodeAttack) that have jailbroken GPT-4 and LLaMA3-70B-Instruct. Our code and data can be found at https://github.com/RobustNLP/DeRTa.

Tool-using LLM agents can violate the very policies they are deployed to enforce while appearing to complete the task successfully. In policy-permissive environments, a tool may execute any well-formed call even when the corresponding state transition is forbidden by domain policy. The result is a silent wrong state (a booking cancelled, a passenger count changed, a claim acted on without verification) that neither the tool nor the agent's self-report exposes. We study this failure mode in the τ^2-bench airline domain. On a budget agent, 78% of observed failures are silent wrong-state failures with no tool error, and the aggregate failure rate is reproducible across disjoint seeds, not sampling noise. We then evaluate a lightweight intervention: deterministic, read-only pre-execution gates that inspect the proposed call and current state before allowing a write. A four-gate suite raises full-benchmark success from 29.6% to 42.0% on gpt-4o-mini (+12.4pp; paired task-level bootstrap P=0.0012), and the lift reproduces on a disjoint 15-seed set (+12.3pp; P=0.0008). The effect is concentrated where the gates fire: on the 26/50 firing tasks, success rises by +19.2pp, while movement on the 24 non-firing tasks does not exclude zero. Two negative controls (a self-enforcing retail domain and BFCL) bound the mechanism: gates help when tools are policy-permissive and add little where tools already self-enforce. As suggestive evidence, not a central claim, the same failure mode persists at the frontier: gpt-5.2 at default reasoning still attempts policy-violating writes, and the same suite improves success from 61.2% to 71.6% (+10.4pp; P=0.020; n=5, no replication). The contribution is a bounded evaluation and reliability result: deterministic gates do not guarantee task success, but they can deterministically prevent a known class of silent policy-violating writes at the action boundary.

Deploying Large Language Models (LLMs) for regulatory compliance demands rigorous traceability via comprehensive citations across multi-tiered authority structures. Unlike traditional multi-hop or legal QA, this task requires structured procedural lookups and evidence-set closure rather than entity resolution or case-law reasoning. Existing RAG systems struggle here due to flattened citation edges, fragmented retrieval expansions, and fragile post-hoc attribution. We formalize Regulatory Compliance QA with RegOps-Bench, a novel benchmark featuring an Operational Knowledge Graph derived from complex national R\&D regulations. To address these bottlenecks, we propose RefWalk, a unified framework driven by a shared topic anchor. RefWalk traverses cross-document citations, fuses multi-view candidates via max-based aggregation, and enforces per-rule attribution to explicitly map claims to sources. We establish a strong baseline with substantial improvements in retrieval recall and citation accuracy. Finally, a contrastive evaluation on a U.S. health compliance dataset (HIPAA) reveals that existing systems exhibit saturation on flat-structure rules, underscoring the need for RegOps-Bench. Our code is available at https://github.com/yeongjoonJu/RefWalk.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) and generative AI become more widespread, the content safety risks associated with their use also increase. We find a notable deficiency in high-quality content safety datasets and benchmarks that comprehensively cover a wide range of critical safety areas. To address this, we define a broad content safety risk taxonomy, comprising 13 critical risk and 9 sparse risk categories. Additionally, we curate AEGISSAFETYDATASET, a new dataset of approximately 26, 000 human-LLM interaction instances, complete with human annotations adhering to the taxonomy. We plan to release this dataset to the community to further research and to help benchmark LLM models for safety. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the dataset, we instruction-tune multiple LLM-based safety models. We show that our models (named AEGISSAFETYEXPERTS), not only surpass or perform competitively with the state-of-the-art LLM-based safety models and general purpose LLMs, but also exhibit robustness across multiple jail-break attack categories. We also show how using AEGISSAFETYDATASET during the LLM alignment phase does not negatively impact the performance of the aligned models on MT Bench scores. Furthermore, we propose AEGIS, a novel application of a no-regret online adaptation framework with strong theoretical guarantees, to perform content moderation with an ensemble of LLM content safety experts in deployment

As LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) are increasingly deployed for complex tasks, ensuring their reliability has become a pressing challenge. Since MAS coordinate through unstructured natural language rather than rigid protocols, they are prone to semantic failures (e.g., hallucinations, misinterpreted instructions, and reasoning drift) that propagate silently without raising runtime exceptions. Prevailing evaluation approaches, which measure only end-to-end task success, offer limited insight into how these failures arise or how effectively agents recover from them. To bridge this gap, we propose MAS-FIRE, a systematic framework for fault injection and reliability evaluation of MAS. We define a taxonomy of 15 fault types covering intra-agent cognitive errors and inter-agent coordination failures, and inject them via three non-invasive mechanisms: prompt modification, response rewriting, and message routing manipulation. Applying MAS-FIRE to three representative MAS architectures, we uncover a rich set of fault-tolerant behaviors that we organize into four tiers: mechanism, rule, prompt, and reasoning. This tiered view enables fine-grained diagnosis of where and why systems succeed or fail. Our findings reveal that stronger foundation models do not uniformly improve robustness. We further show that architectural topology plays an equally decisive role, with iterative, closed-loop designs neutralizing over 40% of faults that cause catastrophic collapse in linear workflows. MAS-FIRE provides the process-level observability and actionable guidance needed to systematically improve multi-agent systems.

Ensuring the safety of large language models (LLMs) is critical for responsible deployment, yet existing evaluations often prioritize performance over identifying failure modes. We introduce Phare, a multilingual diagnostic framework to probe and evaluate LLM behavior across three critical dimensions: hallucination and reliability, social biases, and harmful content generation. Our evaluation of 17 state-of-the-art LLMs reveals patterns of systematic vulnerabilities across all safety dimensions, including sycophancy, prompt sensitivity, and stereotype reproduction. By highlighting these specific failure modes rather than simply ranking models, Phare provides researchers and practitioners with actionable insights to build more robust, aligned, and trustworthy language systems.

The increasing development of large language models (LLMs) in code generation has drawn significant attention among researchers. To enhance LLM-based code generation ability, current efforts are predominantly directed towards collecting high-quality datasets and leveraging diverse training technologies. However, there is a notable lack of comprehensive studies examining the limitations and boundaries of these existing methods. To bridge this gap, we conducted an extensive empirical study evaluating the performance of three leading closed-source LLMs and four popular open-source LLMs on three commonly used benchmarks. Our investigation, which evaluated the length, cyclomatic complexity and API number of the generated code, revealed that these LLMs face challenges in generating successful code for more complex problems, and tend to produce code that is shorter yet more complicated as compared to canonical solutions. Additionally, we developed a taxonomy of bugs for incorrect codes that includes three categories and 12 sub-categories, and analyze the root cause for common bug types. Furthermore, to better understand the performance of LLMs in real-world projects, we manually created a real-world benchmark comprising 140 code generation tasks. Our analysis highlights distinct differences in bug distributions between actual scenarios and existing benchmarks. Finally, we propose a novel training-free iterative method that introduces self-critique, enabling LLMs to critique and correct their generated code based on bug types and compiler feedback. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach can significantly mitigate bugs and increase the passing rate by 29.2% after two iterations, indicating substantial potential for LLMs to handle more complex problems.

Large Language Model (LLM) agentic systems are software systems powered by LLMs that autonomously reason, plan, and execute multi-step workflows to achieve human goals, rather than merely executing predefined steps. During execution, these workflows frequently encounter exceptions. Existing exception handling solutions often treat exceptions superficially, failing to trace execution-phase exceptions to their reasoning-phase root causes. Furthermore, their recovery logic is brittle, lacking structured escalation pathways when initial attempts fail. To tackle these challenges, we first present a comprehensive taxonomy of 36 exception types across 12 agent artifacts. Building on this, we propose SHIELDA (Structured Handling of Exceptions in LLM-Driven Agentic Workflows), a modular runtime exception handling framework for LLM agentic workflows. SHIELDA uses an exception classifier to select a predefined exception handling pattern from a handling pattern registry. These patterns are then executed via a structured handling executor, comprising local handling, flow control, and state recovery, to enable phase-aware recovery by linking exceptions to their root causes and facilitating composable strategies. We validate SHIELDA's effectiveness through a case study on the AutoPR agent, demonstrating effective, cross-phase recovery from a reasoning-induced exception.

Rapid, accurate, and descriptive building damage assessment is critical for directing post-disaster resources, yet current automated methods typically provide only binary (damaged/undamaged) or ordinal severity scales. This paper introduces DamageCAT, a framework that advances damage assessment through typology-based categorical classifications. We contribute: (1) the BD-TypoSAT dataset containing satellite image triplets from Hurricane Ida with four damage categories - partial roof damage, total roof damage, partial structural collapse, and total structural collapse - and (2) a hierarchical U-Net-based transformer architecture for processing pre- and post-disaster image pairs. Our model achieves 0.737 IoU and 0.846 F1-score overall, with cross-event evaluation demonstrating transferability across Hurricane Harvey, Florence, and Michael data. While performance varies across damage categories due to class imbalance, the framework shows that typology-based classifications can provide more actionable damage assessments than traditional severity-based approaches, enabling targeted emergency response and resource allocation.

Existing evaluation frameworks for large language models -- including HELM, MT-Bench, AgentBench, and BIG-bench -- are designed for controlled, single-session, lab-scale settings. They do not address the evaluation challenges that emerge when agentic AI systems operate continuously in production: compounding decision errors, tool failure cascades, non-deterministic output drift, and the absence of ground truth for long-horizon tasks. This paper makes three contributions. First, we present a taxonomy of seven failure modes unique to production agentic systems, each grounded in observations from systems operating at billion-event scale. Second, we demonstrate empirically where standard metrics -- ROUGE, BERTScore, accuracy/AUC, and the agentic benchmarks above -- fail to detect each failure mode. Third, we propose PAEF (Production Agentic Evaluation Framework), a five-dimension evaluation framework with an open-source reference implementation, designed for continuous evaluation on production traffic rather than episodic benchmark runs. Our analysis shows that standard metrics fail to detect four of the seven failure modes entirely and detect three others only after a lag of multiple evaluation cycles.

Recent advances in robotic manipulation have integrated low-level robotic control into Vision-Language Models (VLMs), extending them into Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models. Although state-of-the-art VLAs achieve strong performance in downstream robotic applications, supported by large-scale crowd-sourced robot training data, they still inevitably encounter failures during execution. Enabling robots to reason and recover from unpredictable and abrupt failures remains a critical challenge. Existing robotic manipulation datasets, collected in either simulation or the real world, primarily provide only ground-truth trajectories, leaving robots unable to recover once failures occur. Moreover, the few datasets that address failure detection typically offer only textual explanations, which are difficult to utilize directly in VLA models. To address this gap, we introduce FailSafe, a novel failure generation and recovery system that automatically produces diverse failure cases paired with executable recovery actions. FailSafe can be seamlessly applied to any manipulation task in any simulator, enabling scalable creation of failure action data. To demonstrate its effectiveness, we fine-tune LLaVa-OneVision-7B (LLaVa-OV-7B) to build FailSafe-VLM. Experimental results show that FailSafe-VLM successfully helps robotic arms detect and recover from potential failures, improving the performance of three state-of-the-art VLA models (pi0-FAST, OpenVLA, OpenVLA-OFT) by up to 22.6% on average across several tasks in Maniskill. Furthermore, FailSafe-VLM could generalize across different spatial configurations, camera viewpoints, object and robotic embodiments. We plan to release the FailSafe code to the community.

Maybe not. We identify and analyse errors in the popular Massive Multitask Language Understanding (MMLU) benchmark. Even though MMLU is widely adopted, our analysis demonstrates numerous ground truth errors that obscure the true capabilities of LLMs. For example, we find that 57% of the analysed questions in the Virology subset contain errors. To address this issue, we introduce a comprehensive framework for identifying dataset errors using a novel error taxonomy. Then, we create MMLU-Redux, which is a subset of 3,000 manually re-annotated questions across 30 MMLU subjects. Using MMLU-Redux, we demonstrate significant discrepancies with the model performance metrics that were originally reported. Our results strongly advocate for revising MMLU's error-ridden questions to enhance its future utility and reliability as a benchmark. Therefore, we open up MMLU-Redux for additional annotation https://huggingface.co/datasets/edinburgh-dawg/mmlu-redux.

As agent systems move into increasingly diverse execution settings, trajectory-level safety evaluation and diagnosis require benchmarks that evolve with them. ATBench is a diverse and realistic agent trajectory benchmark for safety evaluation and diagnosis. This report presents ATBench-Claw and ATBench-CodeX, two domain-customized extensions that carry ATBench into the OpenClaw and OpenAI Codex / Codex-runtime settings. The key adaptation mechanism is to analyze each new setting, customize the three-dimensional Safety Taxonomy over risk source, failure mode, and real-world harm, and then use that customized taxonomy to define the benchmark specification consumed by the shared ATBench construction pipeline. This extensibility matters because agent frameworks remain relatively stable at the architectural level even as their concrete execution settings, tool ecosystems, and product capabilities evolve quickly. Concretely, ATBench-Claw targets OpenClaw-sensitive execution chains over tools, skills, sessions, and external actions, while ATBench-CodeX targets trajectories in the OpenAI Codex / Codex-runtime setting over repositories, shells, patches, dependencies, approvals, and runtime policy boundaries. Our emphasis therefore falls on taxonomy customization, domain-specific risk coverage, and benchmark design under a shared ATBench generation framework.

Kubernetes clusters generate rich operational events during pod lifecycle transitions, yet the platform's native event retention model systematically discards the most diagnostically valuable context through multiple evidence destruction mechanisms operating on deterministic schedules. We formalize these mechanisms as an evidence horizon taxonomy: five distinct boundaries after which specific categories of diagnostic context become permanently unrecoverable from the Kubernetes API. H1(LastTerminationState rotation, ~90s) destroys container failure forensics; H2 (scheduler event pruning, 1hr/1000-event cluster limit) destroys placement rationale; H3 (ephemeral container exit, immediate) destroys debug session context; H4 (kubelet reconciliation gap) destroys in-memory operational state; and H5 (scrape-interval blind spot) renders sub-interval pod lifetimes invisible to poll-based observability tools. This paper extends the Operational Memory Architecture (OMA) to address the full evidence horizon taxonomy. Two new causal patterns are defined: P004 (Scheduler Decision Provenance) captures FailedScheduling predicate failures before kube-apiserver TTL pruning and demonstrates the first cross-horizon causal chain linking scheduler evidence to downstream OOMKill failures. Two new Go watchers (EventWatcher, EphemeralWatcher) and two new storage tables (scheduler_events, ephemeral_exits) extend the original architecture. Validated on Minikube (3-node) and AKS 1.32.10. The original 30-run statistical latency analysis (242 edges, intra-cycle mean 0.702ms) and stress evaluation (2.86 events/sec at 20 pods, 8.8MB RAM) are carried forward and augmented with H2, H3, and H5 results.

Deep Reinforcement Learning approaches to Online Portfolio Selection have grown in popularity in recent years. The sensitive nature of training Reinforcement Learning agents implies a need for extensive efforts in market representation, behavior objectives, and training processes, which have often been lacking in previous works. We propose a training and evaluation process to assess the performance of classical DRL algorithms for portfolio management. We found that most Deep Reinforcement Learning algorithms were not robust, with strategies generalizing poorly and degrading quickly during backtesting.

In this work, we study the challenge of providing human-understandable descriptions for failure modes in trained image classification models. Existing works address this problem by first identifying clusters (or directions) of incorrectly classified samples in a latent space and then aiming to provide human-understandable text descriptions for them. We observe that in some cases, describing text does not match well with identified failure modes, partially owing to the fact that shared interpretable attributes of failure modes may not be captured using clustering in the feature space. To improve on these shortcomings, we propose a novel approach that prioritizes interpretability in this problem: we start by obtaining human-understandable concepts (tags) of images in the dataset and then analyze the model's behavior based on the presence or absence of combinations of these tags. Our method also ensures that the tags describing a failure mode form a minimal set, avoiding redundant and noisy descriptions. Through several experiments on different datasets, we show that our method successfully identifies failure modes and generates high-quality text descriptions associated with them. These results highlight the importance of prioritizing interpretability in understanding model failures.

Kubernetes is a free, open-source container orchestration system for deploying and managing Docker containers that host microservices. Kubernetes cluster logs help in determining the reason for the failure. However, as systems become more complex, identifying failure reasons manually becomes more difficult and time-consuming. This study aims to identify effective and efficient classification algorithms to automatically determine the failure reason. We compare five classification algorithms, Support Vector Machines, K-Nearest Neighbors, Random Forest, Gradient Boosting Classifier, and Multilayer Perceptron. Our results indicate that Random Forest produces good accuracy while requiring fewer computational resources than other algorithms.

The explosive growth in academic literature necessitates automated deep research (DR) agents, yet their evaluation remains a significant challenge. First, existing benchmarks often focus narrowly on retrieval while neglecting high-level planning and reasoning. Second, existing benchmarks favor general domains over the scientific domains that are the core application for DR agents. To address these gaps, we introduce Dr.Mi-Bench, a Modular-integrated benchmark for scientific DR agents. Grounded in academic literature, our benchmark uses a human-annotated dataset of 200 instances across 10 scientific domains, including both research and review papers. Besides, we also propose a Modular-integrated Evaluation Paradigm for DR Agents (Dr.Mi-Eval), a novel modular-integrated evaluation paradigm, which leverages the rich structure of academic papers to assess the core competencies of planning, retrieval, and reasoning through two complementary modes: an end-to-end evaluation for DR agents and an isolated evaluation for foundational LLMs as potential backbones. Experimental results reveal a fragmented performance landscape: agents exhibit specialized strengths but share critical weaknesses, most notably in performing the multi-source retrieval required for review-style tasks and performing consistently across diverse scientific fields. Moreover, improving high-level planning capability is the crucial factor for unlocking the reasoning potential of foundational LLMs as backbones. By exposing these actionable failure modes, Dr.Mi-Bench provides a diagnostic tool to guide the development of more reliable academic research assistants.

We present a comprehensive AI risk taxonomy derived from eight government policies from the European Union, United States, and China and 16 company policies worldwide, making a significant step towards establishing a unified language for generative AI safety evaluation. We identify 314 unique risk categories organized into a four-tiered taxonomy. At the highest level, this taxonomy encompasses System & Operational Risks, Content Safety Risks, Societal Risks, and Legal & Rights Risks. The taxonomy establishes connections between various descriptions and approaches to risk, highlighting the overlaps and discrepancies between public and private sector conceptions of risk. By providing this unified framework, we aim to advance AI safety through information sharing across sectors and the promotion of best practices in risk mitigation for generative AI models and systems.

Large language model (LLM) agents have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across various domains, gaining extensive attention from academia and industry. However, these agents raise significant concerns on AI safety due to their autonomous and non-deterministic behavior, as well as continuous evolving nature . From a DevOps perspective, enabling observability in agents is necessary to ensuring AI safety, as stakeholders can gain insights into the agents' inner workings, allowing them to proactively understand the agents, detect anomalies, and prevent potential failures. Therefore, in this paper, we present a comprehensive taxonomy of AgentOps, identifying the artifacts and associated data that should be traced throughout the entire lifecycle of agents to achieve effective observability. The taxonomy is developed based on a systematic mapping study of existing AgentOps tools. Our taxonomy serves as a reference template for developers to design and implement AgentOps infrastructure that supports monitoring, logging, and analytics. thereby ensuring AI safety.

Multi-objective reinforcement learning (MORL) extends traditional RL by seeking policies making different compromises among conflicting objectives. The recent surge of interest in MORL has led to diverse studies and solving methods, often drawing from existing knowledge in multi-objective optimization based on decomposition (MOO/D). Yet, a clear categorization based on both RL and MOO/D is lacking in the existing literature. Consequently, MORL researchers face difficulties when trying to classify contributions within a broader context due to the absence of a standardized taxonomy. To tackle such an issue, this paper introduces multi-objective reinforcement learning based on decomposition (MORL/D), a novel methodology bridging the literature of RL and MOO. A comprehensive taxonomy for MORL/D is presented, providing a structured foundation for categorizing existing and potential MORL works. The introduced taxonomy is then used to scrutinize MORL research, enhancing clarity and conciseness through well-defined categorization. Moreover, a flexible framework derived from the taxonomy is introduced. This framework accommodates diverse instantiations using tools from both RL and MOO/D. Its versatility is demonstrated by implementing it in different configurations and assessing it on contrasting benchmark problems. Results indicate MORL/D instantiations achieve comparable performance to current state-of-the-art approaches on the studied problems. By presenting the taxonomy and framework, this paper offers a comprehensive perspective and a unified vocabulary for MORL. This not only facilitates the identification of algorithmic contributions but also lays the groundwork for novel research avenues in MORL.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) are increasingly capable of tackling complex real-world tasks, yet their reliance on inter-agent coordination, tool use, and long-horizon reasoning makes error recognition particularly challenging. Minor errors can propagate across agents, escalating into task failures while producing long, intertwined execution trajectories that impose significant costs for both human developers and automated systems to debug and analyze. Our key insight is that, despite surface differences in failure trajectories (e.g., logs), MAS errors often recur with similar structural patterns. This paper presents CORRECT, the first lightweight, training-free framework that leverages an online cache of distilled error schemata to recognize and transfer knowledge of failure structures across new requests. This cache-based reuse allows LLMs to perform targeted error localization at inference time, avoiding the need for expensive retraining while adapting to dynamic MAS deployments in subseconds. To support rigorous study in this domain, we also introduce CORRECT-Error, a large-scale dataset of over 2,000 annotated trajectories collected through a novel error-injection pipeline guided by real-world distributions, and further validated through human evaluation to ensure alignment with natural failure patterns. Experiments across seven diverse MAS applications show that CORRECT improves step-level error localization up to 19.8% over existing advances while at near-zero overhead, substantially narrowing the gap between automated and human-level error recognition.

Reinforcement learning holds great promise for improving robot policies beyond the limits of imitation learning. However, its practical adoption remains bottlenecked by the lack of reliable vision-language reward models that provide dense and informative feedback. Two key challenges remain: acquiring diverse failure data at scale and obtaining fine-grained reward signals beyond sparse trajectory-level success labels. Collecting failure trajectories typically requires laborious human effort, while pseudo-failures constructed by relabeling successful demonstrations fail to capture the diverse physical failure modes that arise during robot execution. Meanwhile, existing reward models often predict sparse binary or trajectory-level rewards, which provide limited guidance for efficient policy optimization. We introduce DenseReward, a dense robotic reward model that addresses both challenges. To train DenseReward, we develop an automated failure data generation pipeline that synthesizes physically realistic failure trajectories in simulation without human labeling, covering diverse failure modes such as collisions, missed grasps, object drops, and recovery behaviors. DenseReward predicts dense frame-level reward scores from visual observations and language instructions, enabling fine-grained estimation of task progress throughout an episode. Experiments show that DenseReward outperforms general-purpose VLMs and existing robotic reward models in dense reward prediction across both simulated and real-world manipulation. We further demonstrate that DenseReward provides effective reward guidance for downstream model predictive control and reinforcement learning. We release the dataset, trained reward models, and evaluation suite to support the development of failure-aware dense reward modeling for robot learning.

As large language models (LLMs) become integral to safety-critical applications, ensuring their robustness against adversarial prompts is paramount. However, existing red teaming datasets suffer from inconsistent risk categorizations, limited domain coverage, and outdated evaluations, hindering systematic vulnerability assessments. To address these challenges, we introduce RedBench, a universal dataset aggregating 37 benchmark datasets from leading conferences and repositories, comprising 29,362 samples across attack and refusal prompts. RedBench employs a standardized taxonomy with 22 risk categories and 19 domains, enabling consistent and comprehensive evaluations of LLM vulnerabilities. We provide a detailed analysis of existing datasets, establish baselines for modern LLMs, and open-source the dataset and evaluation code. Our contributions facilitate robust comparisons, foster future research, and promote the development of secure and reliable LLMs for real-world deployment. Code: https://github.com/knoveleng/redeval

Large language model (LLM) agents offer a promising data-driven approach to automating Site Reliability Engineering (SRE), yet their enterprise deployment is constrained by three challenges: restricted access to proprietary data, unsafe action execution under permission-governed environments, and the inability of closed systems to improve from failures. We present AOI (Autonomous Operations Intelligence), a trainable multi-agent framework formulating automated operations as a structured trajectory learning problem under security constraints. Our approach integrates three key components. First, a trainable diagnostic system applies Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) to distill expert-level knowledge into locally deployed open-source models, enabling preference-based learning without exposing sensitive data. Second, a read-write separated execution architecture decomposes operational trajectories into observation, reasoning, and action phases, allowing safe learning while preventing unauthorized state mutation. Third, a Failure Trajectory Closed-Loop Evolver mines unsuccessful trajectories and converts them into corrective supervision signals, enabling continual data augmentation. Evaluated on the AIOpsLab benchmark, our contributions yield cumulative gains. (1) The AOI runtime alone achieves 66.3% best@5 success on all 86 tasks, outperforming the prior state-of-the-art (41.9%) by 24.4 points. (2) Adding Observer GRPO training, a locally deployed 14B model reaches 42.9% avg@1 on 63 held-out tasks with unseen fault types, surpassing Claude Sonnet 4.5. (3) The Evolver converts 37 failed trajectories into diagnostic guidance, improving end-to-end avg@5 by 4.8 points while reducing variance by 35%.

Large language model-driven multi-agent systems (LLM-MAS) excel at complex tasks, yet unreliable agents remain a key bottleneck to system-level reliability. Automatic failure attribution is therefore critical, but existing approaches, such as direct prediction of agent-error pairs and agent-first failure attribution, rely on local logs of agents and miss global failures that only manifest over full interaction trajectories, such as cross-step inconsistencies and inter-agent coordination errors. Moreover, directly predicting failures induces a large combinatorial search space, hindering fine-grained attribution. To address these challenges, we propose VerifyMAS, a hypothesis verification framework for agent failure attribution. Instead of directly predicting faulty agents and error types, VerifyMAS formulates and verifies failure hypotheses against full trajectories. This verification-based approach decomposes attribution into trajectory-level error validation and fine-grained agent localization, providing an error-first attribution approach that captures global failure patterns while substantially reducing the search space. We further introduce a hypothesis-based data construction strategy grounded in a structured error taxonomy and fine-tune a specialized LLM verifier model for trajectory-level failure verification and agent attribution. Experiments on Aegis-Bench and Who&When show that VerifyMAS consistently improves diverse backbone models, including open-source Qwen and API-based GPT models, outperforming prior methods without sacrificing inference efficiency for long multi-agent trajectories.

Disasters are inevitable and increasingly costly, and effective response depends on querying structured tabular data: precise, information-dense records of hazard, exposure, vulnerability, and lifeline infrastructure that underpin disaster management. Current text-to-SQL methods enable natural-language access to such tables but transfer poorly to the disaster domain, where queries span heterogeneous geospatial schemas and require reasoning over causal relations. We introduce DisasterLex, a knowledge-graph-mediated framework that inserts an Expert Knowledge Graph (EKG) of curated concepts and typed causal edges between the user query and the database, bridged to schema by concept-to-table links. The orchestration runs four stages (identifying query entities, routing to the operational domain, planning over causal edges, and grounding the SQL), restricting the schema passed to the model at each step. We instantiate it on a disaster-analytics database (36 geospatial tables, 150 columns) with an EKG of 107 concepts, 117 causal edges, and 52 concept-to-schema links, evaluated on a 75-query test set. On all seven base models spanning proprietary and open-weight families, DisasterLex beats four state-of-the-art baselines (LightRAG, HippoRAG 2, ReFoRCE, CHESS) by 1.4x to 2.75x, with absolute scores of 1.65 to 3.56 (of 5.0). Error analysis shows baseline failures cluster in routing and multi-table SQL composition, the operations our orchestration explicitly addresses. Code, data, and the EKG artifact are available at https://github.com/YimingXiao98/DisasterLex and on Zenodo at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20388029.

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to unsafe training data that even small amounts of unsafe data can lead to harmful model behaviors. Detecting and filtering such unsafe training data is essential for trustworthy model development. Current state-of-the-art (SOTA) approaches typically rely on training moderation classifiers which requires significant computational overhead and are limited to predefined taxonomies, making them less adaptable to evolving safety concerns. Moreover, these classifiers lack insight into the training process, limiting their effectiveness in filtering unsafe data. To address these limitations, we propose DABUF, leveraging data attribution to detect and filter unsafe training data by attributing harmful model outputs to influential training data points. DABUF enables flexible identification of various unsafe data types without predefined taxonomies. However, in practice, model outputs can be complex with combined safe linguistic features and unsafe content, leading to reduced attribution accuracy. In such cases, DABUF will integrate moderation classifiers to identify a minimal subset of unsafe training data for targeted attribution (such as jailbreak). When model outputs are relatively straightforward, DABUF uses model outputs directly as the attribution targets. We evaluate the performance on two different tasks: in filtering jailbreaking training data and in identifying and mitigating gender bias. DABUF outperforms SOTA approaches by up to 7.5\% in detection AUPRC in jailbreaking scenarios, and 44.1\% in detecting gender bias. Moreover, retraining on DABUF-filtered data leads to higher model safety across experiments, underscoring its versatility in addressing a broad spectrum of unsafe data issues.

Failure attribution in LLM multi-agent systems-identifying the agent and step responsible for task failures-provides crucial clues for systems debugging but remains underexplored and labor-intensive. In this paper, we propose and formulate a new research area: automated failure attribution for LLM multi-agent systems. To support this initiative, we introduce the Who&When dataset, comprising extensive failure logs from 127 LLM multi-agent systems with fine-grained annotations linking failures to specific agents and decisive error steps. Using the Who&When, we develop and evaluate three automated failure attribution methods, summarizing their corresponding pros and cons. The best method achieves 53.5% accuracy in identifying failure-responsible agents but only 14.2% in pinpointing failure steps, with some methods performing below random. Even SOTA reasoning models, such as OpenAI o1 and DeepSeek R1, fail to achieve practical usability. These results highlight the task's complexity and the need for further research in this area. Code and dataset are available at https://github.com/mingyin1/Agents_Failure_Attribution

We show that safety alignment in modular LLMs can exhibit a compositional vulnerability: adapters that appear benign and plausibly functional in isolation can, when linearly composed, compromise safety. We study this failure mode through Colluding LoRA (CoLoRA), in which harmful behavior emerges only in the composition state. Unlike attacks that depend on adversarial prompts or explicit input triggers, this composition-triggered broad refusal suppression causes the model to comply with harmful requests under standard prompts once a particular set of adapters is loaded. This behavior exposes a combinatorial blind spot in current unit-centric defenses, for which exhaustive verification over adapter compositions is computationally intractable. Across several open-weight LLMs, we find that individual adapters remain benign in isolation while their composition yields high attack success rates, indicating that securing modular LLM supply-chains requires moving beyond single-module verification toward composition-aware defenses.

Reliable benchmarking is critical for developing machine learning models for tandem mass spectrometry (MS/MS) based molecule discovery. Subtle issues in experimental design and model evaluation procedures can degrade the trustworthiness of such benchmarks and lead to erroneous conclusions. We conduct a thorough review of model evaluation issues in the recent MS/MS machine learning literature, using the standard MassSpecGym benchmark suite as a case study to illustrate the impact of these issues. We find evaluation issues in at least 17 of 26 papers reporting MassSpecGym benchmark results in the first year of its adoption. We isolate three classes of failures: (i) data leakage, (ii) shortcut learning, and (iii) implementation bugs and metric divergence. Through extensive experimentation and code replication, we quantify the impact of these issues and show how they corrupt the evaluation standards MassSpecGym was designed to enforce. We distill our findings into recommendations generalizable to MS/MS challenges, benchmarks, and custom evaluation setups. We also release MassSpecGym v1.5, an implementation of our recommendations in the MassSpecGym benchmarking suite which addresses the failure modes identified in this audit. MassSpecGym v1.5 is publicly available at https://github.com/pluskal-lab/MassSpecGym.

Algorithm configuration (AC) is concerned with the automated search of the most suitable parameter configuration of a parametrized algorithm. There is currently a wide variety of AC problem variants and methods proposed in the literature. Existing reviews do not take into account all derivatives of the AC problem, nor do they offer a complete classification scheme. To this end, we introduce taxonomies to describe the AC problem and features of configuration methods, respectively. We review existing AC literature within the lens of our taxonomies, outline relevant design choices of configuration approaches, contrast methods and problem variants against each other, and describe the state of AC in industry. Finally, our review provides researchers and practitioners with a look at future research directions in the field of AC.

Automatic Prompt Optimization (APO) has emerged as a critical technique for enhancing Large Language Model (LLM) performance, yet current state-of-the-art methods typically rely on large, labeled gold-standard development sets to compute fitness scores for evolutionary or Reinforcement Learning (RL) approaches. In real-world software engineering, however, such curated datasets are rarely available during the initial cold start of agent development, where engineers instead face messy production logs and evolving failure modes. We present ROAD (Reflective Optimization via Automated Debugging), a novel framework that bypasses the need for refined datasets by treating optimization as a dynamic debugging investigation rather than a stochastic search. Unlike traditional mutation strategies, ROAD utilizes a specialized multi-agent architecture, comprising an Analyzer for root-cause analysis, an Optimizer for pattern aggregation, and a Coach for strategy integration, to convert unstructured failure logs into robust, structured Decision Tree Protocols. We evaluated ROAD across both a standardized academic benchmark and a live production Knowledge Management engine. Experimental results demonstrate that ROAD is highly sample-efficient, achieving a 5.6 percent increase in success rate (73.6 percent to 79.2 percent) and a 3.8 percent increase in search accuracy within just three automated iterations. Furthermore, on complex reasoning tasks in the retail domain, ROAD improved agent performance by approximately 19 percent relative to the baseline. These findings suggest that mimicking the human engineering loop of failure analysis and patching offers a viable, data-efficient alternative to resource-intensive RL training for deploying reliable LLM agents.

AI scientist systems, capable of autonomously executing the full research workflow from hypothesis generation and experimentation to paper writing, hold significant potential for accelerating scientific discovery. However, the internal workflow of these systems have not been closely examined. This lack of scrutiny poses a risk of introducing flaws that could undermine the integrity, reliability, and trustworthiness of their research outputs. In this paper, we identify four potential failure modes in contemporary AI scientist systems: inappropriate benchmark selection, data leakage, metric misuse, and post-hoc selection bias. To examine these risks, we design controlled experiments that isolate each failure mode while addressing challenges unique to evaluating AI scientist systems. Our assessment of two prominent open-source AI scientist systems reveals the presence of several failures, across a spectrum of severity, which can be easily overlooked in practice. Finally, we demonstrate that access to trace logs and code from the full automated workflow enables far more effective detection of such failures than examining the final paper alone. We thus recommend journals and conferences evaluating AI-generated research to mandate submission of these artifacts alongside the paper to ensure transparency, accountability, and reproducibility.

Reinforcement learning fine-tuning (RLFT) is a dominant paradigm for improving pretrained policies for downstream tasks. These pretrained policies, trained on large datasets, produce generations with a broad range of promising but unrefined behaviors. Often, a critical failure mode of RLFT arises when policies lose this diversity and collapse into a handful of easily exploitable outputs. This convergence hinders exploration, which is essential for expanding the capabilities of the pretrained policy and for amplifying the benefits of test-time compute scaling. To address this, we introduce an objective for policy gradient methods that explicitly enforces the exploration and refinement of diverse generations, which we call a polychromic objective. We then show how proximal policy optimization (PPO) can be adapted to optimize this objective. Our method (1) employs vine sampling to collect on-policy rollouts and (2) modifies the advantage function to reflect the advantage under our new objective. Experiments on BabyAI, Minigrid, and Algorithmic Creativity show that our method improves success rates by reliably solving a larger set of environment configurations and generalizes better under large perturbations. Moreover, when given multiple attempts in pass@k experiments, the policy achieves substantially higher coverage, demonstrating its ability to maintain and exploit a diverse repertoire of strategies.

Vision models often fail systematically on groups of data that share common semantic characteristics (e.g., rare objects or unusual scenes), but identifying these failure modes is a challenge. We introduce AdaVision, an interactive process for testing vision models which helps users identify and fix coherent failure modes. Given a natural language description of a coherent group, AdaVision retrieves relevant images from LAION-5B with CLIP. The user then labels a small amount of data for model correctness, which is used in successive retrieval rounds to hill-climb towards high-error regions, refining the group definition. Once a group is saturated, AdaVision uses GPT-3 to suggest new group descriptions for the user to explore. We demonstrate the usefulness and generality of AdaVision in user studies, where users find major bugs in state-of-the-art classification, object detection, and image captioning models. These user-discovered groups have failure rates 2-3x higher than those surfaced by automatic error clustering methods. Finally, finetuning on examples found with AdaVision fixes the discovered bugs when evaluated on unseen examples, without degrading in-distribution accuracy, and while also improving performance on out-of-distribution datasets.

We introduce Synthetic Alignment data Generation for Safety Evaluation and Red Teaming (SAGE-RT or SAGE) a novel pipeline for generating synthetic alignment and red-teaming data. Existing methods fall short in creating nuanced and diverse datasets, providing necessary control over the data generation and validation processes, or require large amount of manually generated seed data. SAGE addresses these limitations by using a detailed taxonomy to produce safety-alignment and red-teaming data across a wide range of topics. We generated 51,000 diverse and in-depth prompt-response pairs, encompassing over 1,500 topics of harmfulness and covering variations of the most frequent types of jailbreaking prompts faced by large language models (LLMs). We show that the red-teaming data generated through SAGE jailbreaks state-of-the-art LLMs in more than 27 out of 32 sub-categories, and in more than 58 out of 279 leaf-categories (sub-sub categories). The attack success rate for GPT-4o, GPT-3.5-turbo is 100% over the sub-categories of harmfulness. Our approach avoids the pitfalls of synthetic safety-training data generation such as mode collapse and lack of nuance in the generation pipeline by ensuring a detailed coverage of harmful topics using iterative expansion of the topics and conditioning the outputs on the generated raw-text. This method can be used to generate red-teaming and alignment data for LLM Safety completely synthetically to make LLMs safer or for red-teaming the models over a diverse range of topics.

Refusals - instances where large language models (LLMs) decline or fail to fully execute user instructions - are crucial for both AI safety and AI capabilities and the reduction of hallucinations in particular. These behaviors are learned during post-training, especially in instruction fine-tuning (IFT) and reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). However, existing taxonomies and evaluation datasets for refusals are inadequate, often focusing solely on should-not-related (instead of cannot-related) categories, and lacking tools for auditing refusal content in black-box LLM outputs. We present a comprehensive framework for classifying LLM refusals: (a) a taxonomy of 16 refusal categories, (b) a human-annotated dataset of over 8,600 instances from publicly available IFT and RLHF datasets, (c) a synthetic dataset with 8,000 examples for each refusal category, and (d) classifiers trained for refusal classification. Our work enables precise auditing of refusal behaviors in black-box LLMs and automatic analyses of refusal patterns in large IFT and RLHF datasets. This facilitates the strategic adjustment of LLM refusals, contributing to the development of more safe and reliable LLMs.

In Agentic AI, Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in the orchestration layer to coordinate multiple agents and to interact with external services, retrieval components, and shared memory. In this setting, failures are not limited to incorrect final outputs. They also arise from long-horizon interaction, stochastic decisions, and external side effects (such as API calls, database writes, and message sends). Common failures include non-termination, role drift, propagation of unsupported claims, and attacks via untrusted context or external channels. This paper presents an assurance framework for such Agentic AI systems. Executions are instrumented as Message-Action Traces (MAT) with explicit step and trace contracts. Contracts provide machine-checkable verdicts, localize the first violating step, and support deterministic replay. The framework includes stress testing, formulated as a budgeted counterexample search over bounded perturbations. It also supports structured fault injection at service, retrieval, and memory boundaries to assess containment under realistic operational faults and degraded conditions. Finally, governance is treated as a runtime component, enforcing per-agent capability limits and action mediation (allow, rewrite, block) at the language-to-action boundary. To support comparative evaluations across stochastic seeds, models, and orchestration configurations, the paper defines trace-based metrics for task success, termination reliability, contract compliance, factuality indicators, containment rate, and governance outcome distributions. More broadly, the framework is intended as a common abstraction to support testing and evaluation of multi-agent LLM systems, and to facilitate reproducible comparison across orchestration designs and configurations.

Self-improving AI agents are designed to learn from their mistakes. We show they can also hallucinate mistakes that never happened. We study this failure mode in automated harness optimization, where an LLM-based proposer edits an agent's scaffold, including prompts, parsers, filters, validators and guardrails, to eliminate observed failures. But this process rarely asks first: was there a real failure to fix? We introduce the Counterfactual Fabrication Lab, a deterministic micro-lab where the correct action is known: do nothing. The lab plants a candidate guardrail for a failure class that provably never occurs, presents only legal episodes, and uses a byte-exact oracle to check every cited violation. The proposer behaves as expected on real violations and abstains on featureless legal input. Yet when the legal input contains a harmless pattern resembling a familiar game rule, it invents a failure: in 15/60 runs, versus 0/60 on featureless input, it enables the nonexistent-rule guardrail and cites a violation the oracle refutes. The effect is structured, not indiscriminate. In single-shot proposals it appears only when three conditions coincide: a rule-shaped pattern, an open-ended rule set and an instruction that presupposes failures. Removing any of these conditions eliminates the fabrication. Because the invented guardrail changes no true outcome and cannot improve an already-perfect suppression score, the phenomenon is neither reward hacking nor over-refusal. It is a phantom guardrail: a fix for a failure that never happened, invisible to suppression-only acceptance. Inside an add-only accept loop it re-enters even without the failure-presupposing instruction, the loop's keep-adding role supplying the demand the instruction supplied in single shot, and once in it stays. We present the Counterfactual Fabrication Lab for measuring fabricated failures in self-improving agent harnesses.

Distributed Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) aims to leverage more computational resources to train autonomous agents with less training time. Despite recent progress in the field, reproducibility issues have not been sufficiently explored. This paper first shows that the typical actor-learner framework can have reproducibility issues even if hyperparameters are controlled. We then introduce Cleanba, a new open-source platform for distributed DRL that proposes a highly reproducible architecture. Cleanba implements highly optimized distributed variants of PPO and IMPALA. Our Atari experiments show that these variants can obtain equivalent or higher scores than strong IMPALA baselines in moolib and torchbeast and PPO baseline in CleanRL. However, Cleanba variants present 1) shorter training time and 2) more reproducible learning curves in different hardware settings. Cleanba's source code is available at https://github.com/vwxyzjn/cleanba

Large language models (LLMs) possess impressive linguistic capabilities but often fail to faithfully retain factual knowledge, leading to hallucinations and unreliable outputs. Understanding LLMs' knowledge deficiencies by exhaustively evaluating against full-scale knowledge bases is computationally prohibitive, especially for closed-weight models. We propose stochastic error ascent (SEA), a scalable and efficient framework for discovering knowledge deficiencies (errors) in closed-weight LLMs under a strict query budget. Rather than naively probing all knowledge candidates, SEA formulates error discovery as a stochastic optimization process: it iteratively retrieves new high-error candidates by leveraging the semantic similarity to previously observed failures. To further enhance search efficiency and coverage, SEA employs hierarchical retrieval across document and paragraph levels, and constructs a relation directed acyclic graph to model error propagation and identify systematic failure modes. Empirically, SEA uncovers 40.7x more knowledge errors than Automated Capability Discovery and 26.7% more than AutoBencher, while reducing the cost-per-error by 599x and 9x, respectively. Human evaluation confirms the high quality of generated questions, while ablation and convergence analyses validate the contribution of each component in SEA. Further analysis on the discovered errors reveals correlated failure patterns across LLM families and recurring deficits, highlighting the need for better data coverage and targeted fine-tuning in future LLM development.

Failure attribution is essential for diagnosing and improving multi-agent systems (MAS), yet existing benchmarks and methods largely assume a single deterministic root cause for each failure. In practice, MAS failures often admit multiple plausible attributions due to complex inter-agent dependencies and ambiguous execution trajectories. We revisit MAS failure attribution from a multi-perspective standpoint and propose multi-perspective failure attribution, a practical paradigm that explicitly accounts for attribution ambiguity. To support this setting, we introduce MP-Bench, the first benchmark designed for multi-perspective failure attribution in MAS, along with a new evaluation protocol tailored to this paradigm. Through extensive experiments, we find that prior conclusions suggesting LLMs struggle with failure attribution are largely driven by limitations in existing benchmark designs. Our results highlight the necessity of multi-perspective benchmarks and evaluation protocols for realistic and reliable MAS debugging.

We introduce LlavaGuard, a family of VLM-based safeguard models, offering a versatile framework for evaluating the safety compliance of visual content. Specifically, we designed LlavaGuard for dataset annotation and generative model safeguarding. To this end, we collected and annotated a high-quality visual dataset incorporating a broad safety taxonomy, which we use to tune VLMs on context-aware safety risks. As a key innovation, LlavaGuard's new responses contain comprehensive information, including a safety rating, the violated safety categories, and an in-depth rationale. Further, our introduced customizable taxonomy categories enable the context-specific alignment of LlavaGuard to various scenarios. Our experiments highlight the capabilities of LlavaGuard in complex and real-world applications. We provide checkpoints ranging from 7B to 34B parameters demonstrating state-of-the-art performance, with even the smallest models outperforming baselines like GPT-4. We make our dataset and model weights publicly available and invite further research to address the diverse needs of communities and contexts.

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models enable robots to follow natural language instructions and generalize across diverse tasks, but they remain vulnerable to execution failures that compromise reliability in real-world deployment. Detecting such failures during execution is therefore critical for the robust deployment of embodied systems. Existing failure detection methods either rely on expensive action resampling or external models, while alternatives propagate trajectory-level labels uniformly across every timestep, obscuring localized failure signals. In this paper, we propose Hide-and-Seek, a framework that formulates VLA failure detection as a coarsely supervised learning problem. By combining inter-trajectory and intra-trajectory contrastive objectives, Hide-and-Seek localizes failure-indicative actions and induces temporally structured failure signals from trajectory-level supervision alone, without any step-level annotation. We evaluate Hide-and-Seek on LIBERO, VLABench, and a real-world robotic platform across three representative VLA policies: OpenVLA, π_0, and π_{0.5}.Our method achieves state-of-the-art multi-task failure detection performance with a practical accuracy--timeliness trade-off under conformal prediction, and generalizes well to both seen and unseen tasks.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into automated, multi-stage pipelines, risk patterns that arise from unvalidated trust between processing stages become a practical concern. This paper presents a mechanism-centered taxonomy of 41 recurring risk patterns in commercial LLMs. The analysis shows that inputs are often interpreted non-neutrally and can trigger implementation-shaped responses or unintended state changes even without explicit commands. We argue that these behaviors constitute architectural failure modes and that string-level filtering alone is insufficient. To mitigate such cross-stage vulnerabilities, we recommend zero-trust architectural principles, including provenance enforcement, context sealing, and plan revalidation, and we introduce "Countermind" as a conceptual blueprint for implementing these defenses.

Modern web dashboards and enterprise applications increasingly rely on complex, distributed microservices architectures. While these architectures offer scalability, they introduce significant challenges in debugging and observability. When failures occur, they often manifest as opaque error messages to the end-user such as Something went wrong. This masks the underlying root cause which may reside in browser side exceptions, API contract violations, or server side logic failures. Existing monitoring tools capture these events in isolation but fail to correlate them effectively or provide intelligible explanations to non technical users. This paper proposes a novel system for Automated Multi Source Debugging and Natural Language Error Explanation. The proposed framework automatically collects and correlates error data from disparate sources such as browser, API, server logs and validates API contracts in real time, and utilizes Large Language Models to generate natural language explanations. This approach significantly reduces Mean Time to Resolution for support engineers and improves the user experience by transforming cryptic error codes into actionable insights.

Open-domain question answering (QA) is known to involve several underlying knowledge and reasoning challenges, but are models actually learning such knowledge when trained on benchmark tasks? To investigate this, we introduce several new challenge tasks that probe whether state-of-the-art QA models have general knowledge about word definitions and general taxonomic reasoning, both of which are fundamental to more complex forms of reasoning and are widespread in benchmark datasets. As an alternative to expensive crowd-sourcing, we introduce a methodology for automatically building datasets from various types of expert knowledge (e.g., knowledge graphs and lexical taxonomies), allowing for systematic control over the resulting probes and for a more comprehensive evaluation. We find automatically constructing probes to be vulnerable to annotation artifacts, which we carefully control for. Our evaluation confirms that transformer-based QA models are already predisposed to recognize certain types of structural lexical knowledge. However, it also reveals a more nuanced picture: their performance degrades substantially with even a slight increase in the number of hops in the underlying taxonomic hierarchy, or as more challenging distractor candidate answers are introduced. Further, even when these models succeed at the standard instance-level evaluation, they leave much room for improvement when assessed at the level of clusters of semantically connected probes (e.g., all Isa questions about a concept).

Through a systematic review of academic literature, we propose a taxonomy of systemic risks associated with artificial intelligence (AI), in particular general-purpose AI. Following the EU AI Act's definition, we consider systemic risks as large-scale threats that can affect entire societies or economies. Starting with an initial pool of 1,781 documents, we analyzed 86 selected papers to identify 13 categories of systemic risks and 50 contributing sources. Our findings reveal a complex landscape of potential threats, ranging from environmental harm and structural discrimination to governance failures and loss of control. Key sources of systemic risk emerge from knowledge gaps, challenges in recognizing harm, and the unpredictable trajectory of AI development. The taxonomy provides a snapshot of current academic literature on systemic risks. This paper contributes to AI safety research by providing a structured groundwork for understanding and addressing the potential large-scale negative societal impacts of general-purpose AI. The taxonomy can inform policymakers in risk prioritization and regulatory development.

In this work, we dive into the fundamental challenges of evaluating Text2SQL solutions and highlight potential failure causes and the potential risks of relying on aggregate metrics in existing benchmarks. We identify two largely unaddressed limitations in current open benchmarks: (1) data quality issues in the evaluation data, mainly attributed to the lack of capturing the probabilistic nature of translating a natural language description into a structured query (e.g., NL ambiguity), and (2) the bias introduced by using different match functions as approximations for SQL equivalence. To put both limitations into context, we propose a unified taxonomy of all Text2SQL limitations that can lead to both prediction and evaluation errors. We then motivate the taxonomy by providing a survey of Text2SQL limitations using state-of-the-art Text2SQL solutions and benchmarks. We describe the causes of limitations with real-world examples and propose potential mitigation solutions for each category in the taxonomy. We conclude by highlighting the open challenges encountered when deploying such mitigation strategies or attempting to automatically apply the taxonomy.